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GREEK PHILOSOPHY II

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

A COLLECTION OF TEXTS

WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

BY

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VOLUME II

ARISTOTLE, THE EARLY PERIPATETIC
SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1953

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PREFACE

To this volume I have few things to add. Those who take the trouble of reading it will easily understand the purpose of the book. I altered my first project so far as to think it better to divide Greek philosophy after Plato into two volumes, so that after this one there will be a third containing the Hellenistic systems and Neoplatonism with its preparation.

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor A. Mansion at Louvain, who kindly read the manuscript of the chapter dealing with Aristotle's philosophy of nature, and to Professor Fr. Wehrli of Zürich, who was so kind as to give me the opportunity of reading his manuscript on Lycon and the two Aristons before it was published, in September 1951, and of discussing certain points with him ¹.

I thank also Dr. W. Vollgraff and Dr. L. M. de Rijk, who read the proofs with me, and two English ladies, Mrs. Paap and Mrs. Breuning, who purified the barbarisms of my English text.

Perfection is a thing not easily attained in earthly life. A few misprints are rectified in the Errata. I hope that, for the rest, very few mistakes have crept in.

C. J. d. V.

¹ The references to Prof. Wehrli's edition of the fragments of Heraclides Ponticus in ch. XIX, 3, were added by himself to the proofs of this work.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As to the text of Aristotle, I did not follow exclusively one edition. Generally speaking, I used the editions of Sir David Ross of the *Physics*, *Metaphysics* and *Analytica*, that of Minio-Paluello of the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, Rackham's of the *Ethica Nicomachea*, Immisch for the *Politica*. For the *De anima* I used P. Siwek's edition, of the *Rhetoric* those of M. Dufour and J. H. Freese, of the *Poetics* those of Bywater and of Hardy. Of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* I used, as is indicated, the edition of Ross-Fobes; where newer editions are lacking, the fragments are taken from Wimmer. For the other Peripatetics I used Wehrli's *Schule des Aristoteles*; for the Academy the indicated sources and the existing collections of the fragments of Speusippus (Lang) and Xenocrates (Heinze).

BOOK III

ARISTOTLE

TENTH CHAPTER

LIFE AND WORKS

I—PROLEGOMENA: THE ARISTOTELIAN QUESTION

395—Concerning Plato we had to ask the radical question whether **the problem** we really know his doctrine; whether his own works do contain this doctrine, or whether we have to pay more attention to the indications of his disciples. This may be called the Platonic question. It dates from Trendelenburg's work on the ideal Numbers (1826). One might speak of an Aristotelian question too, in the sense of a radical problem of the tradition. Werner Jaeger was the first to raise this matter radically in his *Aristotle* of 1923. The problem is due to the following two points:
1. We have not the complete works of Aristotle at our disposal; 2. the writings which we possess contain older and younger parts, and it would not be difficult to make Aristotle contradict Aristotle.

Ad 1. Of Plato we possess the complete literary works meant for publication. On the other hand, his school-teaching is not directly known to us. With Aristotle, the situation is exactly the reverse: his literary works, which were much read in Antiquity, are lost, while his school-writings are preserved to us. A scholar like Jaeger ascribed to this situation the seeming opposition of character between Plato and Aristotle. This view, however, is only partly justified: it leaves out of account the fact that the lost works of Aristotle all belonged to the period of his youth. This being so, the study of their fragments can teach us something of the development of their author and of the genesis of his philosophy; but they are not to be put on one level with his riper works. The true Aristotle remains for us the author of the School-writings, more especially of the ripest parts of them, the utility of the older fragments being precisely this, that they give us a standard by which to distinguish the older from the younger parts of his works.

Ad 2. The school-writings of Aristotle, as they are preserved to us, cannot be divided into three chronological periods, as may be done with Plato's works. The mixture of earlier and later parts runs through the whole of them. Now this creates a rather complicated situation. Werner Jaeger was the first to realize this problem clearly and to propose a solution which, although it may be corrected and completed on several points, has given a new approach and new *elan* to the studies of Aristotle.

what has
been reached

396—Three points have been established:

1. The existence of a Platonic period in the thinking of Aristotle has been proved by Jaeger ¹.
2. The period between the Academy and the Lyceum, which seemed to be a vacuum as long as the school-writings were all supposed to be written during the latest period ², has now been filled up with a large part of them.
3. Our idea of the latest period of Aristotle's activity as a teacher has been considerably changed.

a restriction

397—From the fact that many points in the chronology of the works of Aristotle are not definitely cleared up, it must not be concluded that we cannot yet form for ourselves an idea of the philosophy of Aristotle nor get a true knowledge of it. It must be noted first that the description, given by W. D. Ross in his *Aristotle* of 1923, was made before its author knew the work of Jaeger, which appeared in the same year. This fact is an interesting illustration of the remark which has been made by A. Mansion in his *Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne*: that, if one wishes to speak of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, or even of any other part of his philosophy, ethics excepted, the situation is not so unfavourable and problems not so complicated as they might seem to be ³.—Why? Mansion said it very clearly in his Introduction cited above: the reason could be this, that in the development of Aristotle's thinking after all the continuity is more important than the difference; which might be seen in the fact that Aristotle himself did little to eliminate all the traces of his earlier opinions that may be seen in the final form of his works ⁴.

¹ J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis zu seinen übrigen Werken*, Berlin 1863, tries to confine the Platonic influence to the literary form of Aristotle's early writings. V. Rose, who collected all these platonizing passages from the Dialogues of Aristotle, went further and concluded that they were spurious (*Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, Lipsii 1863).

² In fact this was the opinion of Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* II 2, ³ p. 155), and also of Bernays.

³ Mansion, *o.c.*, ²1946, p. 7.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 33/34: "Mais ce qu'il faut noter surtout c'est que, de façon générale, Aristote n'a pas jugé nécessaire de remanier profondément ces rédactions reprises à quelque cours antérieur et ainsi l'adaptation de la doctrine à des vues devenues plus tard classiques chez lui, apparaît par moments comme bien imparfaite. C'est, sans doute, qu'il avait davantage conscience de l'unité et de la continuité de sa pensée, que des étapes diverses et mêmes parfois contradictoires entre elles qu'elle avait parcourues, pour aboutir à son développement ultime."

2—LIFE AND WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

398—Dionys. Halic., *Ep. I ad Ammaeum* 5, p. 727 R.:

life

Ἀριστοτέλης πατὴρ * μὲν ἦν Νικομάχου τὸ γένος καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἀναφέ-
ροντος εἰς Μαχάονα τὸν Ἀσκληπιοῦ ¹, μητὴρ δὲ Φαιστίδος, ἀπογόνου τινὸς
τῶν ἐκ Χαλκίδος τὴν ἀποικίαν ἀγαγόντων εἰς Στάγειρα· ἐγεννήθη δὲ κατὰ
τὴν ἐνενηκοστήν καὶ ἐνάτην ὀλυμπιάδα Διοτρεφοῦς Ἀθῆναισι ἄρχοντος
5 (ol. 99, 1; a. 384) ² ... ἐπὶ δὲ Πολυζήλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 103, 2; a. 366/7)
τελευτήσαντος τοῦ πατρὸς ὀκτωκαίδεκατον ἔτος ἔχων εἰς Ἀθήνας ἦλθεν, καὶ
συσταθεὶς Πλάτῳ χρόνον εἰκοσαετῇ διέτριψε σὺν αὐτῷ. ἀποθανόντος δὲ
Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Θεοφίλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 1; a. 348/7) ἀπῆρε πρὸς Ἑρμίαν
τὸν Ἀταρνέως τύραννον ³ καὶ τριετῇ χρόνον παρ' αὐτῷ διατρίψας ** ἐπ'
10 Εὐβούλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 4; a. 345/4) εἰς Μυτιλήνην ἐχωρίσθη ⁴. ἐκεῖθεν
δὲ πρὸς Φίλιππον ὤχετο *** κατὰ Πυθόδοτον ἄρχοντα (ol. 109, 2; a. 343/2),

¹ Aristotle's father was the court-physician of Amyntas II, king of Macedonia and father of Philippos.

² Diog. Laert. V 9 gives the same chronology and traces it back to the Chronicle of Apollodorus.

³ Hermias is known to us as one of the addressees of the Sixth Letter of Plato. The two others, Erastus and Coriscus, disciples of Plato and his Academy, doubtless tried to introduce in their native town Scepsis certain political reforms that had been suggested in the Academy. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 1948, p. 113, sums up the tendency of Plato's Letter in the following words: "Presumably Plato wished to institute a friendship between the two companions and their 'neighbour' Hermias, because, while he recognized their noble disposition, he was afraid they might be somewhat doctrinaire. The letter that we possess is the solemn record of this peculiar pact between *Realpolitik* and theoretical schemes of reform."

At the request of this Hermias, who possessed a formidable military power and was practically independent of the Persian Empire, Ar. and Xenocrates established themselves at Assos after the death of Plato, and stayed there for three years. For Aristotle these years were a period of intense work. An important part of his works on logic, physics and metaphysics was written here. Surely Erastus, Coriscus and Hermias attended his lectures. We find the name of Coriscus frequently cited in the *Organon* to illustrate an individual case as opposed to the καθόλου.

⁴) That Aristotle left Assos and settled at Mytilene was probably due to the influence of Theophrastus, who was a native of Lesbos and also an ancient disciple of Plato and the Academy. That, during the years of Assos and Mytilene, Aristotle was already occupied with biological research, may be inferred from the fact that in his biological works localities in Asia Minor and Lesbos are rather frequently mentioned. Consult: Thompson, Translation of the *Historia animalium*, p. VII, and the same, *Aristotle as a biologist*, p. 12.

* πατὴρ is a correction of Van Herwerden. The Mss have υἷδς.

** διατρίψας Wolf; Mss τριψας.

*** ὤχετο Usener; others read ἔχετο.

καὶ διέτριψε χρόνον ὀκταετῇ παρ' αὐτῷ καθηγούμενος Ἀλεξάνδρου¹. μετὰ δὲ τὴν Φιλίππου τελευτὴν ἐπ' Εὐαϊνέτου ἄρχοντος (ol. III, 2; a. 335/4) ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐσχόλαζεν ἐν Λυκείῳ χρόνον ἐτῶν δώδεκα. τῷ δὲ τρισκαίδεκάτῳ, μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώρου ἄρχοντος (ol. II4, 15 2; a. 322) ἀπάρας εἰς Χαλκίδα νόσω τελευτᾷ, τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἐξήκοντα βιώσας ἔτη.

three poems
of Aristotle

399—a. Olympiodorus in his Commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* has preserved for us the following poem of Aristotle in commemoration of Plato (Fr. 673 Rose):

on Plato

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐς κλεινὸν Κεκροπίης δάπεδον
εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς φιλίης ἰδρύσατο βωμὸν
ἄνδρὸς ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις·
ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἑναργῶς
οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
ὥς ἀγαθὸς τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνὴρ·
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτα ποτέ.

5

The poem has been interpreted by Wilamowitz in *Aristoteles und Athen* II, p. 412-416. He declares the construction βωμὸν φιλίας to be a metaphor that would be tolerable "für backfische, aber nicht für Hellenen", and is most inclined to explain φιλίας as a genitivus causae. "In any case Ar. means that the man about whom he speaks, i.e. Eudemus, founded an altar for Plato for the sake of his friendship" ("um seiner Freundschaft willen dem Platon einen Altar gestiftet hat"). Jaeger protests against the assumption that Plato was formally venerated as a god by his disciples, and I think he is right. Having stated that the dedicator of the altar is unknown to us, he remarks: "a Greek would surely have assumed without question that what was meant was that he set up an altar to most honourable Philia, in honour of the friendship of the man whom bad men may not even praise" (*Aristotle*, p. 108).

¹) Hermias had friendly relations with the Macedonian court (an anti-Persian coalition). It is probable that on his recommendation Philip invited Aristotle to be the praeceptor of the young Alexander.

Of his years at the Macedonian court are doubtless Aristotle's six books on philological problems in Homer (*Ἀπορήματα Ὀμηρικά*), brought to Alexandria by Demetrius of Phaleron. Here they became the foundation of philological studies of the Alexandrian scholars.

For Alexander Aristotle wrote a work *Περὶ μοναρχίας* and another about colonization.

According to a decree of the Delphians, found by Homolle in 1895, Aristotle and his nephew Callisthenes were praised and honoured for having made a list of the Pythionikai (Dittenberger, *Syll.*³, 275). This list, which was a valuable document for the history of Greek literature, must have been made by Ar. in the very last years of his stay at the Macedonian court or during the first year of his second stay at Athens, Callisthenes having gone to Asia in 334. Other similar lists of the victors of the great Dionysia and of those at Olympia are mentioned among the works of Ar.

As to the last four lines of this elegy, cp. the nrs. 275a, b and 374a of our first volume.

b. Fr. 674 Rose (Diog. Laert. V 6), an epigramma dedicated to Hermias of Atarneus, who had been treacherously arrested at a conference, and sent captive to the Great King. The latter, having vainly tried to coerce him into revealing Philip's plans, finally executed him by a *servile supplicium* (crucifixion).

τόνδε ποτ' οὐχ ὁσίως παραβάς μακάρων θέμιν ἀγνήν
ἔκτεινεν Περσῶν τοξοφόρων βασιλεύς,
οὐ φανερῶς λόγχῃ φονίους ἐν ἀγῶσι κρατήσας,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς πίστει χρησάμενος δολίου.

on Hermias

c. Fr. 675 Rose (Athenaeus XV, p. 696 A; also Diog. L. V 7). Hymn to Virtue, in honour of Hermias, who died as a martyr for the sake of philosophy.

Hymn to
Virtue

Ἀρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ,
θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῳ,
σᾶς πέρι, παρθένε, μορφᾶς
καὶ θανεῖν ζαλωτὸς ἐν Ἑλλάδι πότμος
καὶ πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροῦς ἀκάμαντας·
τοῖον ἐπὶ φρένα βάλλεις
καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω
καὶ γονέων μαλακαυγήτοιό θ' ὕπνου·
σεῦ δ' ἔνεχ' οἱ Διὸς Ἡρακλέης Λήδας τε κοῦροι
πολλ' ἀνέτλασαν ἔργοις
σὺν ἀγρεύοντες δύναμιν.
σοῖς δὲ πόθοις Ἀχιλεὺς Αἴας τ' Αἰδαο δόμους ἦλθον·
σᾶς δ' ἔνεκεν φιλίου μορφᾶς καὶ Ἀταρνέος ἔντροφος ἀελίου
χῆρωσεν αὐγᾶς·
τοιγὰρ αἰδιμὸς ἔργοις, ἀθάνατόν τέ μιν αὐξήσουσι Μοῦσαι
Μναμοσύνας θύγατρες, Διὸς ξενίου σέβας αὖξουσιν φιλίας
τε γέρας βεβαίου.

Wilamowitz explained this poem in *Ar. u. Athen* II, p. 405-412; Jaeger in *Aristotle*, p. 117 ff.

πόνους μαλεροῦς ἀκάμαντας - unceasing labours, wearing out.

καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον. I have adopted the correction of Wilamowitz: ἰσαθάνατον.

Athenaeus has τ' ἀθάνατον, Diog. L. εἰς ἀθάνατον.

The meaning is: ἔσον τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ.

χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω καὶ γονέων - better than gold and ancestors.

σοῖς δὲ πόθοις - not so much "through longing for thee" as "by enthusiasm for thee" (cp. Gorgias' *Epitaphios*, Diels VS² II 81 B 6, the end, where the orator

says that, "though they have died themselves, ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν"; which does not mean "the longing for them"—for this can hardly be called ἀθάνατος —, but "the enthusiasm for noble deeds" ¹).

Διὸς Ξενίου σέβας and γέρας φιλίας may be paraphrased as follows: *ὅτι καὶ Δίῳ Ξένιον ἐσέβετο καὶ φιλίαν βέβαιον ἐγέραιρεν*.

two kinds
of lectures

400—Ar. used to lecture during the morning hours for a selected group of more advanced disciples, while in the evening he lectured for a larger, non-selected circle of students.

Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XX 5, 1:

Commentationum suarum artiumque, quas discipulis tradebat, Aristoteles philosophus . . . duas species habuisse dicitur: alia erant quae nominabat ἐξωτερικά, alia quae appellabat ἀκροατικά. ἐξωτερικά dicebantur quae ad rhetoricas meditationes facultatemque argutiarum civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant, ἀκροατικά autem vocabantur ⁵ in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur quaeque ad naturae contemplationes disceptationesve dialecticas pertinebant. huic disciplinae, quam dixi, ἀκροατικῇ tempus exercendae dabat in Lycio matutinum nec ad eam quemquam temere admittebat, nisi quorum ante ingenium et eruditionis elementa atque in discendo studium la- ¹⁰ boremque explorasset. illas vero exotericas auditiones exercitiumque 'dicendi eodem in loco vesperi faciebat easque vulgo iuvenibus sine delectu praebebat; atque cum δειλινὸν περίπατον appellabat, illum alterum supra ἑωθινόν; utroque enim tempore ambulans disserebat. libros quoque suos, earum omnium rerum commentarios, seorsum divisit, ut alii ¹⁵ exotERICI dicerentur, partim acroatici.

Cp. Cic., *De fin.* V 12; *Ep. ad Att.* IV 16, 2; Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 609; Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14, 4, p. 1115.

the fate of
Ar.'s library

401—The library of Aristotle had a highly remarkable fate.

a. Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 608:

told by
Strabo

Ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (βιβλιοθήκην) Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ὅπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν. Θεόφραστος δὲ Νηλεῖ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' εἰς Σικῆψιν κομίσας τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν παρέδωκεν, ἰδιώταις ἀνθρώποις, οἱ κατάκλειστα εἶχον τὰ βιβλία οὐδ' ἐπιμελῶς κείμενα. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ῥηθόντο τὴν ⁵ σπουδὴν τῶν Ἀτταλικῶν βασιλέων, ὑφ' οἷς ἦν ἡ πόλις, ζητούντων βιβλία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκης, κατὰ γῆς ἔκρυψαν ἐν διώρυγῇ

¹ See the remarkable study of C. W. Vollgraaf on the *Epitaphios: L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias*, Leiden 1952, p. 85-87, and the following section (p. 87-169).

τινι ¹· ὑπὸ δὲ νοτίας καὶ σιγῶν ² κακωθέντα ὅψε ποτε ἀπέδοντο οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ
γένους Ἀπελλικῶντι τῷ Τητῷ πολλῶν ἀργυρίων τὰ τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὰ
10 τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλία· ἦν δὲ ὁ Ἀπελλικῶν φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος·
διὸ καὶ ζητῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν διαβρωμάτων ³ εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε
τὴν γραφὴν ἀναπληρῶν οὐκ εὖ καὶ ἐξέδωκεν ἀμαρτάδων πλήρη τὰ βιβλία.
συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων, τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον, οὐκ
ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ⁴, μηδὲν
15 ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν ⁵, τοῖς δ' ὕστερον,
ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προῆλθεν, ἄμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστο-
τελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
ἀμαρτιῶν. πολὺ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη προσελάβετο· εὐθὺς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν
Ἀπελλικῶντος τελευτὴν Σύλλας ἤρε τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος βιβλιοθήκην ὁ τὰς
20 Ἀθήνας ἐλὼν· δεῦρο δὲ (εἰς Ῥώμην) κομισθεῖσαν Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς
διεχειρίσατο φιλαριστοτέλης ὢν, θεραπεύσας τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης, καὶ
βιβλιοπῶλαί τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες, ὅπερ
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει τῶν εἰς πρᾶσιν γραφομένων βιβλίων καὶ ἐνθάδε
καὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ.

b. Plut. *Sulla* 26, 1-2 tells the same story:

and by
Plutarchus

Ἀναχθεῖς δὲ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἐφέσου, τριταῖος ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθωρ-
μίσθη· καὶ μυηθεὶς ἐξεῖλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶνος τοῦ Τητοῦ βιβλιοθήκην,
ἐν ἣ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου βιβλίων ἦν, οὕτω τότε
σαφῶς γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται δὲ κομισθείσης αὐτῆς εἰς Ῥώμην
Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλὰ, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν
Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀνα-
γράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας.

¹ "in a cave". Athenaeus I 3 a tells us that, before the arranging of the library at Pergamum, Nelus sold books of Aristotle to Ptolemaeus Philadelphus for the library at Alexandria.

² Moths or worms.

³ διαβρώματα — worm-eaten parchments.

⁴ If this account is true, we must note that the school-writings of Aristotle came very near to being lost for ever, and that the full knowledge of his philosophy barely escaped being confined to the first generation of the School. Up to Cicero Antiquity would have known Aristotle almost exclusively from his exoteric writings. We have some reason to doubt this. Zeller II 2, ³ 138-154. Interesting from this point of view is the list, given by Diog. Laert. V, 22-27, which is probably based on a list made by Hermippus c. 200 B.C. Many of the school-writings of Ar., or parts of them, are mentioned here under other titles.

⁵ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν — declaim commonplaces.

Works of Aristotle

402—Aristotle's literary work is divided by Ross into three main sections:

- (1) Works of a more or less popular order, which were published by himself;
- (2) Memoranda and collections of material, which may have been made by disciples;
- (3) scientific works, written by himself.

Nearly the whole existing Corpus Aristotelicum, so far as it is authentic, belongs to the third group.

First group The list of Diog. begins with 19 works which seem to have been all more or less popular and belonged to the Platonic period of Ar. The greater part were dialogues; some of them bore the same titles as certain dialogues of Plato: *Sophistes*, *Politicus*, *Menexenus*, *Symposion*. The dialogue *Eudemus* or *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, written shortly after 354, was modelled closely on the *Phaedo*. The *Protrepticus*, addressed to Themison, the prince of Cyprus, also belonged to the period of the Academy. The *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*, still written in the form of a dialogue, was a work of Platonic style but with marked differences in doctrine. It dates from the years of Assos.

Second group Of the second group a large number of titles is mentioned. Of the extant works of Aristotle only book K of the *Metaph.*, and probably the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* may be classed among this group.

Third group The so-called school-writings of Ar. Systematically classified the Corpus Aristotelicum contains the following works:

I. On logic, brought together in the *Organon*.

1. *Κατηγορίαι (Categoriae)*. Probably authentic ¹.
2. *Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (De interpretatione)*. There is no reason to doubt the authenticity.
- 3-4. *Ἀναλυτικὰ πρότερα* and *ὑστερα (Analytica priora and posteriora)*.
5. *Τοπικά (Topica)*.
6. *Περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων (De sophisticis elenchis)*.

II. Philosophy of nature.

1. *Φυσικά* or *Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις (Physica)*, 8 books.
2. *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ (De caelo)*, 4 books.
3. *Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, De generatione et corruptione*, 2 books.
4. *Μετεωρολογικά (Meteorologica)*, 4 books, of which the fourth is generally considered as not genuine ².

In the Corpus follows the short book *Περὶ κόσμου (De mundo)*. It is surely not a work of Aristotle. Probably it dates from the first century B.C. Its philosophy bears the traces of Posidonius.

¹ In modern times the authenticity has been doubted, because the idea of substance in this work differs from that of *Metaph.* ZH. Suzanne Mansion pleaded against the authenticity (*Proceedings of the tenth International Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 1097-1100), L. M. de Rijk defends it (in *Mnemosyne* 1951, pp. 129-159).

² A. Mansion, *Introd.* p. 16, judges the unauthenticity not sufficiently proved.

If we follow the order of the *Corpus Aristotelicum*, we have to mention first the psychological works, and then the biological.

III. Psychology.

1. Περὶ ψυχῆς (*De anima*), 3 books.
2. The so-called *Parva naturalia*, containing
 - (1) Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (*De sensu et sensibili*)
 - (2) Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως (*De memoria et reminiscencia*)
 - (3) Περὶ ὕπνου (*De somno*)
 - (4) Περὶ ἐνυπνίων (*De insomniis*)
 - (5) Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς (*De divinatione per somnum*)
 - (6) Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος (*De longitudine et brevitate vitae*)
 - (7) Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου (*De vita et morte*)¹
 - (8) Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς (*De respiratione*).

In the *Corpus* follows here the short treatise Περὶ πνεύματος (*de spiritu*), which may have been written ± 250. It contains a later doctrine than was known to Aristotle².

IV. Biological works.

1. Περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι (*Historia animalium*), 10 books, of which the tenth is not of Ar. Probably also b. VII, a part of VIII, and b. IX are spurious. A large collection of facts.

The following 4 works give the author's theories based on them.

2. Περὶ ζῶων μορίων (*De partibus animalium*), 4 books.
3. Περὶ ζῶων κινήσεως (*De motu animalium*).
4. Περὶ πορείας ζῶων (*De incessu animalium*).
5. Περὶ ζῶων γενέσεως (*De generatione animalium*), 5 books.

In the *Corpus* these authentic works of Aristotle are succeeded by a series of treatises which all originate from the Peripatetic School, but not from the Master himself. Among them are the *Problemata*, a large collection of all kinds of problems—mathematical, optical, musical, physiological, medical—; partly they reach back to Ar. himself.

V. Metaphysics.

Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, 14 books, first collected by Andronicus and placed by him after the *Physics*, whence they were called by this name. The science we call *metaphysics* is named by Ar. himself πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or also θεολογία.

VI. Ethics.

1. Next follow in the *Corpus* the 10 books of the Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (*Ethica Nicomachea*).

2. The 2 books of the Ἠθικὰ μεγάλα (*Magna moralia*).

3. Four books of the Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμεια (*Ethica Eudemia*), namely the books A, B, Γ, H. The books Δ Ε Ζ have been left out, because they are the same as Ε Ζ Η of

¹ The first two chapters of this treatise are headed by the editors Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως. Ar. mentions this subject at the beginning of the first chapter, but he does not deal with it here.

² The distinction of veins and arteries, which was unknown to Ar.

the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The last three chapters of the *Eudemian Ethics* (H 13-15) are also separated and headed as a book VIII (Θ), e.g. by W. Jaeger.

These three works, of which only the *Nic. Ethics* are without doubt authentic¹, are followed in the Corpus by a small treatise *Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν*, which dates probably from the first century B.C. or A.C.

VII. Politics and Economics.

1. Πολιτικά, 8 books.

2. Οἰκονομικά, 3 books, generally not accepted as authentic. The third exists only in a Latin translation.

Of the large collection of 158 politeiai, which was made in the School of Ar. and on his suggestion, only that of the Athenians has been preserved (found on a papyrus in 1890). This document being probably not written by Ar. himself but by a disciple, we had good reason to mention it as belonging to the second group.

VIII. Rhetoric and Poetics.

1. Τέχνη ῥητορική, 3 books, of which the third has been suspected, but is now generally believed to be authentic.

In the Corpus it is succeeded by the *Ῥητορική πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον*, an early Peripatetic work, but not of Ar. himself.

2. Περὶ ποιητικῆς, authentic but fragmentary.

3—DATE OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS ACCORDING TO W. JAEGER

Concerning the chronology of the works of Ar. W. Jaeger has come to the following results:

First period 403—To the first Athenian period (the Academy) belong the *Dialogues* of Ar. (except the *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*) with the *Protrepticus*.—Jaeger fixed no special date either to the *logical treatises* of Ar. or to his *Rhetoric*. But he says somewhere more or less incidentally that Ar.'s logic was formed at an early date, probably still in the Academy². We have good reasons to put the *Rhetoric* in a later period.

In treating the *Metaphysics*, of which the older part must have been written at Assos, Jaeger remarks that at that date the fundamental principles of the *Physics*

¹ The *Magna moralia* are now generally considered as a work of a generation after Aristotle, and are in fact proved to be so by various arguments, lastly by an analysis of the style (K. O. Brink, *Stil und Form der ps. Aristotelischen MM.* Thesis of Berlin 1933). As to the *Eudemian Ethics*, since Jaeger they are generally believed to be an early work of Aristotle, from his platonizing period. In a recent study (*Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Ar.*, Paderborn 1940) E. J. Schächer tries to prove that they are not a work of Ar., but of his able disciple Eudemos of Rhodos. The arguments he gives in order to prove this thesis, are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet, in my opinion he has shaken the theory of Jaeger as to the early date of the work in question and opened a new perspective.

² Certainly it is not necessary to deduce that the six works of the *Organum* were all written during the first period, and we can hardly admit that this was the opinion of Jaeger. But he has left the task of stating this point more precisely to others.

were already fixed: the idea of teleology, the principles of form and matter, potency and act. Consequently J. admits that the first books of the *Physics* (I and II) were conceived, and probably written, at Athens, under the eyes of Plato. He assumes this explicitly for *De caelo* I, where the hypothesis of aether has been proposed for the first time as a new solution opposed to Platonism.

At Athens was also written the oldest part of the *Politics*, the criticism of Plato's *Republic*: *Pol. II*, 2-3. Ar. wrote it before having read the *Nomoi*. He must have received this work at Assos and, having read it hastily, have added a short review of it to the ch. 3 of *Pol. II*. "Perfectly Platonic" is, according to J., book III of the *De anima*, which contains the doctrine of the *noûs*. The actual form of this book may be of a more recent date, the substance of the thought originates from the Academy.

404—The years of Assos, Lesbos and the Macedonian court. At Assos was written the *oldest part of the Metaphysics* ("Urmetaphysik"): the books A (historical survey, Δ (a kind of encyclopaedia of philosophical terms), K 1-8 (treating the same subject-matter as the books B Γ E, but in an earlier form); next the book Λ, the so-called *Theology*, a short survey of the whole metaphysical system, except ch. 8, which is a later addition; finally chapters 9-10 of the book M¹ and the whole book N, in which the theory of the Ideas is shortly criticized and Speusippus' theory of numbers amply².

the middle
period

The books B and Γ are also of an early date, but posterior to K 1-8.

From the same time as *Metaph. A* dates the *dialogue* Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, which contains almost the same criticism of the theory of the Ideas as the first-mentioned book.

From the period of Assos also date the *Eudemian Ethics*. Jaeger characterizes this work as "reformplatonisch". He means by this term, that the author, having given up the theory of Ideas, wishes to found a new, reformed Platonism. The main argument for the early date of this work is that the term φρόνησις is used here in the Platonic meaning of philosophical insight into a transcendent reality, whereas later, in the *Nic. Eth.*, Aristotle uses it to indicate a ἐξὺς πρακτική, even for animals (a kind of instinct for what is or is not harmful to them).

According to J. a part of the *Politica* too was written at Assos, namely the last books, H Θ, containing the ideal state (ἀρίστη πολιτεία), which is opposed to that of Plato. To this part of the work belong the books B³ and Γ⁴. On the other hand, the books Δ E Z are of a much later date: giving an empirical foundation to the best constitution, they belong to the third period of Ar.'s activity. Book A has then been put at the head of the whole, by way of introduction.

As to the *Physics*, we found that J. rather suggests that books I and II were written at Athens during the life of Plato. In this case book VII too, which

¹ These two chapters are an older introduction to the discussion of the theory of numbers.

² In the book N the name of Xenocrates is not mentioned. His theory is criticized by Ar. very sharply in the book M, which for this reason must have been written in a later period, namely in the Lyceum, when Xenocrates was the head of the Academy. During the years of Assos, while Speusippus directed the School of Plato at Athens, Xenocrates was in the company of Ar.

³ A survey of former theories of the state, partly written at Athens (the ch. 2-3) partly at Assos.

⁴ Book Γ treats the notion of πόλις and πολιτεία.

belongs to the oldest parts of Ar.'s works, must be dated in the first period. Book Θ¹ being a later addition (to be dated in the third period), we have the impression, though J. does not say so explicitly, that Books III-VI must be placed in the middle period, at Assos or later, but most probably at Assos, because in these years the author was occupied with what is called by J. *speculative physics*.

What he states explicitly is, that *the form in which we have the work De caelo* dates from these years (at least two years after the death of Plato, but not much later). The style is near to that of *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*; the theory of the movement of the celestial spheres in B 8 is later than that of the movement of the celestial bodies in Π. φιλ.

Also the *Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς*, being a work of "speculative physics", is to be dated in this period, probably still at Assos. J. sees these works of physics as being of the same order of ideas as the politics of the ideal state, the ethics based on theology (the *Eudemian Eth.*) and that part of the *Metaphysics* which exhibits the same character ("Urmetaphysik").

the third period

405—Ar.'s second stay at Athens: the years of the Lyceum. There is an important province in the works of Ar. which, according to J., originates without exception from the third period: the *research-work*, as well on the field of history as on that of nature. The only argument for this late dating which J. gives, is, that the expedition of Alexander furnished a great deal of material for zoology as well as for botany².—According to this theory all the biological works of Ar. belong to the last period of his activity.

The *Meteorology* too is dated by J. in the last period. He does so with reference to the work on the *rising of the Nile*, which ends with the triumphant words:

Οὐκέτι πρόβλημα ἔστιν· ὥφθη γὰρ φανερώς ὅτι ἐξ ὑετῶν αὖξει.

J. cites these words as characteristic of the experimental method of Ar., as opposed to that of Plato and the Academy, which was still closely followed by Ar. himself in his early, Platonizing works³.

To the third period J. also reckons the whole group of *anthropological-physiological treatises*: *De anima* I and II, the *Parva naturalia* without exception. (Not the doctrine of the *noûs* in *De anima* III, which harmonizes with the early ethics and metaphysics).

J. points especially to the method used in the treatise on *divination by dreams*, which being purely experimental differs *toto coelo* from the point of view in the middle period, in *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*⁴.

Finally J. cites the fifth chapter of the *De partibus animalium* I in order to illustrate the purely empirical character of Ar.'s idea of science during this last period⁵. We give the text of this famous chapter.

¹ This book contains a revision of the theory of the Prime Mover.

² In fact, J. opposes the method of research of Ar. and his successors to that of Plato and the Academy, Ar.'s purpose being to study the details, while Plato's was merely the division of notions.—The question is first whether this opposition is justified. We have to remark that, in order to make a division of notions, details must be studied. Secondly, we saw Ar. occupied in Mikrasia and on Lesbos with the collection of material for the *Historia Animalium*.

³ Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 331.

⁴ *Ib.*, p. 162 ff., 333 f. In the *De divinatione per somnum* Ar. no longer explains the prevision of the future in the dream state as proceeding from metaphysical regions, but he explains it in a purely natural way, by means of psycho-physiology.

⁵ *Ib.*, p. 337-340.

406—Aristotle, *De part. anim.* I 5, 644 b²²-645 a³⁸:

the beauty
of empirical
research,
expounded
by Ar.

Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὄσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι
τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τὰς δὲ μετέχειν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ
μὲν ἐκείνας τιμίας οὐσας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ
26 ἐξ ὧν ἂν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς
ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερά κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν), περὶ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ
ζώων εὐποροῦμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ τὸ σύντροφον· πολλὰ γὰρ περὶ
30 ἕκαστον γένος λάβοι τις ἂν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων βουλούμενος διαπνεεῖν ἱκανῶς.
Ἐχει δ' ἑκάτερα χάριν. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ εἰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμεθα, ὅμως διὰ
τὴν τιμιότητα τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἥδιον ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
35 ἐρωμένων τὸ τυχόν καὶ μικρὸν μόριον κατιδεῖν ἥδιόν ἐστιν ἢ πολλὰ ἕτερα καὶ
545 α μεγάλᾳ δὲ ἀκριβείᾳ ἰδεῖν· τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ πλείω γνωρίζειν αὐτῶν
λαμβάνει τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχὴν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ πλησιαίτερα ἡμῶν εἶναι
καὶ τῆς φύσεως οἰκειότερα ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι¹ πρὸς τὴν περὶ τὰ θεῖα
5 φιλοσοφίαν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων διήλθομεν λέγοντες τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν,
λοιπὸν περὶ τῆς ζωικῆς φύσεως εἰπεῖν, μὴδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μῆτε
ἀτιμότερον μῆτε τιμιώτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς
τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις² ἀμηχάνους
10 ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις.
Καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντας
χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν
ἢ τὴν πλαστικὴν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν
15 θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς
τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμότερων ζώων ἐπίσκεψιν. Ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί
τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς
βουλομένους ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς
20 τῷ ἵπνῳ ἔστησαν (ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ
ἐνταῦθα θεούς), οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ζώων προσιέναι
δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον³, ὥς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ
μὴ τυχόντως ἀλλ' ἕνεκά τινος ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα·
25 οὐ δ' ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἵληφεν. Εἰ δέ
τις τὴν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων θεωρίαν ἄτιμον εἶναι νενόμικε, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον
οἴεσθαι χρὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄνευ πολλῆς δυσχερείας ἰδεῖν ἐξ ὧν
συνέστηκε τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, οἷον αἷμα, σάρκες, ὅστ' α', φλέβες καὶ τὰ
30 τοιαῦτα μόρια. Ὁμοίως τε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν περὶ οὐτινοσοῦν τῶν μορίων ἢ

¹ ἀντικαταλλάττεται τι - balances somewhat.

² ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις - "Nature that created them as an intelligent artist.
See on the meaning of this version our Ch. XIII, § 3, nrs. 499-501.

³ προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον - "we must not recoil with childish aversion".

τῶν σκευῶν διαλεγόμενον μὴ περὶ τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μνήμην, μηδὲ ταύτης χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς, οἷον καὶ περὶ οἰκίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλίνθων καὶ πηλοῦ καὶ ξύλων· καὶ τὸν περὶ φύσεως περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ τῆς ὅλης 35 οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ τούτων ἀ μὴ συμβαίνει χωριζόμενά ποτε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν.

Jaeger, l.c., calls this "a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic School"¹, which explains to us the spirit that reigns in the works of Ar.'s followers. As to Ar. himself, J. describes the spirit of his later years as opposed to his former conception of metaphysics in the following words: "He no longer speaks of the world of appearances as more knowable to us but to be contrasted with the essence of reality, which is more knowable naturally². He justifies metaphysics now by means of the everlasting longing of the human heart to penetrate the mysteries of the imperishable and invisible world, and is ready to content himself with the merest corner of that hidden truth, while the precedence of real science (ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχή) is now clearly assigned to empirical research. This is the praise of devotion to the small, the confession of allegiance to the study that fulfills its highest achievements in the *History of Animals*, the collection of *Constitutions*, the history of the theatre, and the chronicle of the Pythian competitions."—"He (Ar.) organizes and overcomes the manifold (ἄπειρον) of appearances, which Plato simply passes over"³.

the organization of science

407—To the third period of Ar.'s activity belongs also the organization of the writing of a complete *history of the sciences*. *Theophrastus* was charged with the writing of a detailed *History of philosophy* (the Φυσικῶν δόξαι in 18 books), from Thales up to his time. This work has been the basis for all later doxography.

Eudemus of Rhodes had to write a *History of the mathematical sciences* (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), probably also of *theology*.

Meno wrote the *History of Medicine*, the ἱατρικά, known to us by a papyrus-fragment.

J. mentions here, too, the great illustrated work Ἀνατομαί, a collection which was regularly used in the medical lectures of the Lyceum. Ar. often refers to it in his treatises.

the revision of the theory of the First Mover

408—To this last period belongs, finally, the revision of the theory of the First Mover in *Metaph.* A 8. This revision is based on new astronomic theories: Eudoxus admitted 26 celestial spheres, his (indirect) disciple Callippus assumed 33; Ar. himself comes in *Metaph.* A 8 to 47 or 55, and accordingly postulates the existence of the same number of Unmoved Movers. J. thinks this to be an innovation after the original theory, which admitted of only one Unmoved Mover, who alone governs the kosmos which is one, and is called therefore θεός. Thus in

¹ "ein Forschungs- und Unterrichtsprogramm der peripatetischen Schule".

² We shall find this view of Ar. directly at the beginning of his *Physics* (I 1) and of his *Metaphysics* (A 2). See our nrs. 470 and 519 (982a²³⁻²⁵); also *Eth. Nic.* I, 1095b²⁻⁴ (our nr. 566).

³ "Ar. organisiert und überwindet das Apeiron der Erscheinungen, das Platon überfliegt", Jaeger says. The truth of this statement, however, seems to me doubtful, because Plato in the *Philebus* designed as the especial task of philosophy the determining of "the intermediate stages" between the One and the Apeiron.

chapters A 7 and 9-10, which form a close unity. The 8th chapter is clearly a later addition.

Phys. VIII also gives a revised treatment of the question of the First Mover, and must be of a later date ¹.

409—To complete the image we have to make to ourselves of Ar.'s third period according to Jaeger, we must state the following points.

1. First the empirical books (Δ E Z) of the *Politics* must be reckoned to this last period, as they are based on the material of the 158 constitutions; then also book A, which is an introduction to the whole.

2. J. does not say explicitly that the *Nic. Ethics* are to be placed in this period too. This seems, however, to be an almost inevitable conclusion. First by the character of the work. The empirical books of the *Politics* are characterized by J. as a *phaenomenology of real political life*. Now the *Nic. Ethics* give such a *phaenomenology of moral life*. And secondly, the relation to the *Eudemian Ethics*. We have seen that by J. this work was placed in the middle period. The *Nic. Ethics*, representing a later phasis of Ar.'s thought, then seem almost necessarily to have been written in the third period.

3. Finally the central books of the *Metaphysics*: Z H Θ , containing the doctrine of substance and that of potency and act, and with them the introductory book E. Are they to be placed in the third period?—Such seems to be the opinion of J., though he only says explicitly that book M, which criticizes Xenocrates, must have been written in the years of the Lyceum. The thesis of J., however, is not to say that Ar. *has abandoned metaphysics* during this period and has turned to merely empirical research, but rather that he *has changed his conception of metaphysics*, the object of this science having been first to him supra-sensible being, afterwards the $\delta\upsilon\ \eta\ \delta\upsilon$, which means: being in all its *nuances*, being in its multiplicity. Now this is in harmony with the spirit of empirical research. Thus it fits well to the third period.

**Parts of the
Politics, *Ethics*
and *Metaph.*
to be placed
in the third
period**

4—REACTIONS AND CORRECTIONS

410—The work of Jaeger has been generally acknowledged as a study of fundamental importance. Its chronology has been adopted by Ross ², E. Bréhier ³ and Überweg-Praechter ⁴.

**the results
of Jaeger
generally
accepted**

E. Hoffmann wrote in the *Philologische Wochenschrift* of 1924 that J. "had resuscitated the living Aristotle in the flesh". He understands Jaeger in this way that a separation should be made between a metaphysical and an empirical period in the development of Ar.

J. Bidez in *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité: à la recherche des épaves de l'Aristote perdu* (Brussels 1938) is occupied with the early works of Ar. in the footsteps of Jaeger.

¹ We treat this question in our Ch. XIII, § 5.

² W. D. Ross remarks in the Introduction to his *Aristotle-Selections* (New-York 1938, p. XIV: "The attempt to trace the development of Ar.'s thought through his works is still in its infancy." Yet the main conclusions of J. are well established in his opinion, and he adopts almost J.'s whole chronology.

³ *Histoire de la Philosophie* I, 1926.

⁴ *Geschichte der Phil.* I, ¹²1926.

E. Bignone uses the traces of the lost works of Ar. for the study of Epicurus.

Jaeger's theory of the revision of the doctrine of the First Mover has found an almost general agreement—up to the very last years ¹. So by *M. J. Lagrange* in his article *Comment s'est transformée la pensée religieuse d'Aristote d'après un livre récent* in *Revue Thomiste* 1926, p. 285 ff., and by *R. Mugnier*, *La théorie du premier Moteur et l'évolution de la pensée aristotélicienne*, Paris 1930.

With the same question deals *M. Bousset*, *Sur la théologie d'Aristote: monothéisme ou polythéisme?* in *Revue Thomiste* 1938, p. 798 ff.

serious
objections of
A. Mansion

411—a. *A. Mansion* of Louvain has been the first to criticize J.'s theories in a more radical way ².

He remarks first that *Metaph.* A must be of a much later date than J. thinks it is, so that the distance of time which lies between ch. 8 and the rest of this book can by no means be so great as J. assumes it to be. Secondly, Ar. has left his *Metaph.* unfinished. This fact implies that he worked at it till the end of his life. It is impossible to accept that the work we have was finished before 335 ³.

Mansion's final judgment on the work of J. is that, in general, his conclusions cannot be accepted as being definitive. "En somme son travail est en grande partie à refaire."

b. After Mansion *Von Ivanka* protested against the separation of a metaphysical and an empirical period, which would have succeeded one another in Ar.'s development ⁴.

Other
protests

412—The objections of Mansion and Von Ivanka were based on a purely historical method. Such is not the case of the protest of *M. de Corte* (in *La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Ar.*, Paris 1934) against the genetic method, applied by Jaeger to the study of Ar. De Corte starts from the Thomistic interpretation of Ar. as being the right one. Now the doctrine of Thomas on the *intellectus agens* as a part—or perhaps rather as a function—of the human soul may have been a real correction of Ar.'s doctrine of the *noûs*; it is, however, more a philosophical than a purely historical interpretation ⁵. But, if the method of W. Jaeger is to be criticized, it should be done on purely historical grounds, not on dogmatic assumptions.

The same remark applies to the work of *P. van Schilfjaar*, *De zielkunde van Aristoteles* (Leiden 1938): the author pleads for a philosophizing interpretation of Ar.,—which means with him, an interpretation in the style of Hegel ⁶.

¹ Since the interesting study of *Ph. Merlan* on Ar.'s Unmoved Movers in *Traditio* of 1946, others too find traces of a plurality of Unmoved Movers in Ar.'s early works. See our nr. 518.

² In the *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 1927, pp. 307 ff. and 423 ff.

³ In fact, I do not think this to have been the opinion of J. Vid. supra (nr. 409).

⁴ *Scholastik* VII, p. 27 ff.

⁵ *F. Nuyens* remarks rightly that the texts of Ar. point rather to the Averroistic interpretation of the *noûs* as a *substantia separata*.

⁶ Dr. Nuyens wrote a review of this work in *Studiën* 1939, p. 66 f.; I did the same for the *Museum* 1940, p. 149 ff.

413—F. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles* the work of Nuyens
(thesis of the University of Amsterdam, 1939), French translation at Louvain 1948 (*L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote*) has found in the development of the psychology of Ar. a criterion which enables him to a more exact determination of the chronology of Ar.'s works, and so to an important correction of the results of Jaeger.

Standard is: the conception of the soul as entelechy of a body in *De anima*. the leading principle
Soul and body are then essentially joined. The soul is not a substance, as it was with Plato and in the *Eudemus* of Ar. The question is: what are the intermediate stages between the *Eudemus* and the *De anima*? A special treatise on the soul, dating from the middle period, does not exist. But Ar. speaks repeatedly on the subject more or less incidentally, often in the *Ethics* and *Politics*, less frequently but still in a sufficient measure in the *Metaph.* and in his biological works. Three periods can be distinguished:

(I) The first is that of an *antagonistic dualism*, in which body and soul are opposed to each other as hostile powers (the *Eudemus*);

(II) A *natural collaboration* of soul and body. The soul does not directly lose its independence. It is a vital power which, being joined to a special organ, lives in the body. It dominates the body and uses it as its instrument (*vitalistic instrumentism*). This conception is characteristic of the middle period. Biological study has influenced the author: in the *Eudemus* psychology was restricted to man, in *De anima* it has become "general", i.e. extending to all living beings;

(III) In the third period the soul is the entelechy of the body. Soul and body are essentially joined; whence follows that the soul comes into being and perishes with the body. It is no longer deemed immortal, as it was in (I).

The problem of the *noûs* is necessarily linked up with that of the soul. In the the problem of the noûs
first period the *noûs* belongs to the soul and is immortal with it; in the second *noûs* and soul are separated, *noûs* is what is not bodily. In the third the *noûs* comes *θώραθεν*: it is immaterial and immortal. It does not belong to the soul.

This criterion leads its author to the following results:

Results

1. *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας* does not belong to the middle period (Assos), as it was dated by Jaeger, but to the first. It is of the same time as the *Protrepticus*¹. In this last work too the theory of Ideas is already criticized.

2. This statement has a further consequence: if *Π. φιλ.* was written in the Academy, then also *De caelo*, *Phys.* I-VII, and *De generatione et corruptione*.

3. The *Categories*, *Topica* and *Π. σοφ. ἐλ.* prove to belong to the first period; *De interpr.*, *Anal. pr.* and *post.* to the second.

4. To the middle period belongs, as it appears from the local references (to the region of Assos and Lesbos) the *Historia Animalium*. Ross had already remarked this. N. concludes: but with this fact the whole construction of Jaeger that the biological works of Ar. all belong to the third period and there mark a new phase in their author's development, collapses.

To the *Hist. anim.* succeeds the *De partibus anim.* In this work the dualism of body and soul is replaced by collaboration. The soul is localized in the heart.

The same view is represented by the *De motu anim.*, and some of the *Parva naturalia*, namely the *De iuv. et sen.*, *De vita et morte* and the *De resp.*

¹ We shall see in our next chapter that this conclusion of Dr. Nuyens cannot be right. This fact surely must exhort us to a certain prudence as to the application of his criterion.

The 6th treatise of the *Parva Nat.* however, the *De long. et brev. vitae*, is nearer to the *De anima*. It forms a transition to the third period. As to the rest of the biological works, only the *De gener. anim.* represents the same view as the *De anima*, and therefore belongs to the final period.

5. Concerning the *Metaph.* N. confirms the early date of the book A, B, K 1-8, M 9-10 and N; also that M 1-9 belongs to the final period. Book Γ has no texts relative to the soul, but E has. The view of the soul in this book is near to that of *De anima*. It must be dated shortly before this work.

N.'s criterion leads to an exact determination of the date of books Z H Θ. These books presuppose the definition of soul in *De anima*. Consequently they belong to the last years of Ar.'s activity. In book Θ, however, are also older traces. So this book, as we have it, is probably a later redaction of an earlier treatise.

Book I gives no indications as to its date.

Concerning A Nuyens confirms the objection of Mansion against Jaeger. Soul and body are considered in this book as form and matter of the living being. This must have been written *after De anima*, i.e. *very late*. Chapter 8 is a later addition, but as to time it is not far removed from the rest.

6. N. determines also the date of the *Nic. Ethics*. Whether this work belongs to the third period, to the beginning of it or to the end, is a question which was left open by Jaeger. Both Mansion and Ross date the work very late. N. comes to other conclusions: the psychology which is presupposed here, is not that of *De anima*; it is much nearer to Plato. For this reason the work must be dated surely ten years before the *De anima*: it may have been written towards the end of the middle period or at the beginning of the third.

7. Also regarding the *Politics* N. comes to an important conclusion. We saw that books IV-VI were reckoned by Jaeger to the third period, and that the first book was added, according to him, afterwards as an introduction to the whole. Now the relation of body and soul appears to be conceived in this book in a clearly mechanical way, and soul is divided into parts as was done by Plato but not in Ar.'s *De anima*. So this first book may have been written *early in the third period*, but by no means very late.

8. N. too cites the fifth chapter of the *De part. anim.* I and comments on it in a somewhat different way from Jaeger: we cannot cite this beautiful chapter as a document in illustration of a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. This author never cultivated science at the cost of speculative philosophy. Both go together, up to the end of his activity. The science which he defends here, is according to himself the prerogative of the *φύσει φιλόσοφοι*.

9. Finally the *De anima*. *The third book is not of an early date*, as it was in the opinion of Jaeger, and also of Ross. Its doctrine of the *noûs* is not Platonic; it is no remainder of a former period, but just the result of the psychology of the final period. The work shows a unity of composition; the problem of the *noûs* pervades the whole.

A part of the *Parvâ naturalia* is closely connected with the *De anima*: *De sensu et sensato*, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, *De somno et vigilia*, *De insomniis* and *De divinatione*. Together with the *De gener. anim.* they belong to the last years.

These then are the results of the work of Dr. Nuyens. The fact that they in their turn must be corrected on several points, does not take away the importance of the work.

borg 1943; that of certain treatises of the *Parva naturalia* by H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, *Aristotelis De insomniis et de divinatione per somnum*, Leiden 1947. Both authors know the book of Nuyens and make use of his results.

Some objections against the method of Nuyens have been made by **Objections** G. Verbeke, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 1948, pp. 335-351.

Verbeke remarks first that it is impossible to date whole works of Ar. on the ground of a few texts in which the relation soul-body is touched upon. In the same treatise may be earlier and later parts (as Döring proved that the first book of the *De partibus* is of a much earlier date than the following books of this treatise, and Drossaart Lulofs that both in the *De Somno* and in the *De insomniis* there are sections of an earlier and a more advanced date). Secondly he points out that the arguments adduced by N. for the early date of the *Topics* are not conclusive; thirdly that there are serious difficulties as to the chronology of the *Nic. Ethics*, the doctrine of the *noûs* in this last work being much nearer to Plato than is supposed by N.

I myself had to make an objection to N. regarding the early date he attributes to the *Περὶ φιλοσοφίας*. Now, because the chronology of the physical treatises is based by N. on that of this dialogue, this point too must be revised.

The main result of the work of N. remains that the biological works of Ar. are of a much earlier date than Jaeger had admitted; that the later books of the *Metaphysics* are of the author's latest years, and consequently that neither the "research"-work of Ar. is to be attributed as a whole to his latest period, nor the metaphysical speculation to a former phase of his development¹.

¹ I have to remark here again that in my opinion Jaeger's theory does not necessarily imply that the last books of the *Metaph.* were written before 335, and that, consequently, the results of Dr. Nuyens on this point are rather a precision than a contradiction of Jaeger's views.

I had the opportunity, after having written the above chapter, to ask Prof. Jaeger himself, when he visited our country in July 1950, whether my impression on this point was right. He confirmed to me that it has never been his intention to make a radical separation between a metaphysical and a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. He did not think it possible to date books Z H Θ of the *Metaph.* more precisely, but he did not intend to exclude the possibility that they might have been written very late.

ELEVENTH CHAPTER THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS

I—THE EUDEMUS OR ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ

the theme **415**—Ar. wrote this dialogue shortly after the death of Eudemus of Cyprus, a companion of his in the Academy of Plato, who died in Sicily under the standard of Dio (354). The story of his death is told by Cicero.

a. Cic., *De div.* I 25 (Fr. 37 R.):

Quid? singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium familiarem suum iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur. in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum fuisse ut omnes medici diffiderent. ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbreui convalesceret paucisque diebus interiturum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. atque ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta et convaluisse Eudemum et ab uxoris fratribus interfectum tyrannum. quinto autem anno exeunte cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprium illum ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse. ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum ut cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur.

15

b. Cp. Plut., *Life of Dio*, 22:

Συνέπραττον δὲ (τῷ Δίῳ) καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὃ τε Κύπριος Εὐδήμος, εἰς ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποθανέντα τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογον ἐποίησε, καὶ Τιμωνίδης ὁ Λευκάδιος.

the soul no harmony **416**—In this dialogue Ar. defends the immortality of the soul and attacks the doctrine that the soul is the harmony of the body. Philoponus, in his commentary of the *De anima*, mentions the following two arguments, used by Ar. in the *Eudemus*.

a. Fr. 45 R., p. 50:

Τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ, φησίν, ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ἡ ἀναρμοστία· τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρμονία ἐστίν.

**First
argument**

Jaeger, *Ar.* 41, points to the corresponding logical formula in the *Categ.* 3 b³⁴ ff.: 'Ἦτάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. "Substances never have contraries".—Soul, then, is a substance, as is said directly by Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 7, 8: τὸ μὲν (sc. πρότερον, ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐσία, ἡ δὲ ἀρμονία οὐκ οὐσία.

Jaeger, though he does not think the *Categ.* authentic¹, cites another parallel between a Platonic argument (*Phaedo* 93 b-d) why the soul is no harmony, and a formula in the *Categ.* Plato says: the soul is either good, moral and rational, or the opposite. Now these opposed constitutions are a sort of harmony and disharmony of the soul. But the attributes "good" etc. and their opposites admit of a μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. Consequently, if harmony = soul, the soul would admit of degrees,—which is impossible. Cp. *Categ.* 3 b³³-4 a⁹: Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον. E.q.s. "Substance does not admit of degrees".

b. Fr. 45 R., ib.:

Τῇ ἀρμονίᾳ, φησί, τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τοῦ σώματος, ἀναρμοστία δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἰσχος· ὦν τὸ μὲν ἀσυμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων ἡ νόσος, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἡ ἀσθένεια, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὸ αἰσχος. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀναρμοστία νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἰσχος, ἡ ἀρμονία ἄρα ὑγίεια καὶ ἰσχύς καὶ κάλλος· ψυχὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τούτων οὔτε ὑγίεια φημί οὔτε ἰσχύς οὔτε κάλλος· ψυχὴν γὰρ εἶχε καὶ ὁ Θερσίτης· αἰσχιστος ὦν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρμονία.

**Second
argument**

c. Simplicius in *Ar.*, *De anima* I 3, says that, according to *Ar.* in the *Eudemus*, the soul is an *eidos*.

**the soul
an *eidos***

Fr. 46 R.:

Καὶ ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῷ γεγραμμένῳ διαλόγῳ εἰδός τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

J., l.c., remarks that in this period the young *Ar.* was still dependent on Plato in metaphysics, but completely independent of him in the sphere of logic and methodology. "The fundamental attitude embodied in the doctrine of the categories, and the main portions of the doctrine itself, had been developed before *Ar.* dared to shake the metaphysical foundation of Plato's philosophy".

417—a. The story of Midas and Silenus, cited by Plutarch in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 27: Silenus, captured by Midas, answers to the question of the king what is the highest good to man (τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ

**the immor-
tality of
the soul**

¹ *Ar.* p. 46, with note 3. I think the arguments adduced by J. on this point not decisive. I am rather inclined to accept the authenticity of the *Categ.* and to explain the doctrine of the πρώτη οὐσία in this treatise as a strong reaction of the author against the theory of the Ideas, which may be placed at the beginning of the years of Assos.

βέλτιστον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τί τὸ πάντων αἰρετώτατον);—he answers after a long silence, μόλις and ἀνακαγχάζων (fr. 44 R., p. 49):

Δαίμονος ἐπιπόνου καὶ τύχης χαλεπῆς ἐφήμερον σπέρμα, τί με βιάζεσθε λέγειν ἃ ὑμῖν ἄρειον μὴ γινῶναι; μετ' ἀγνοίας γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων κακῶν ἀλυπότατος ὁ βίος. ἀνθρώποις δὲ πάνπαν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον οὐδὲ μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου φύσεως· ἄριστον γὰρ πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι, τὸ μέντοι μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀνυστῶν τὸ γενομένου ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὐσης κρείττονος τῆς ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι διαγωγῆς ἢ τῆς ἐν τῷ ζῆν, οὕτως ἀπεφάνητο.

J., *Ar.* p. 48, rightly pointed to the Platonic style and spirit of this answer: Τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι is not merely "not to be born"; it also means "not to enter into Becoming".

the doctrine
of the Ideas
accepted by
Ar.

b. Proclus in *Plat. Remp.*; *Ar.* fr. 41 R.:

Λέγει δὲ καὶ ὁ δαιμόνιος Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίαν δι' ἣν ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἰοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ δεῦρο ἐπιλανθάνεται τῶν ἐκεῖ θεαμάτων, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐξιῶσα μέμνηται ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνταῦθα παθημάτων.

The ἐκεῖ θεάματα are doubtless the Ideas.

c. The same fr.

the life of the
soul without
body normal

Ar. concludes from the above-cited fact that the life of the soul without body is normal and like a state of health, whereas the life in the body is to be considered as abnormal and a state of disease.

Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ μὲν ὑγείας εἰς νόσον ὁδεύοντας λήθην ἴσχειν τινὰς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἐμεμαθήκεισαν, ἐκ νόσου δὲ εἰς ὑγείαν ἰόντα μηδένα πώποτε τοῦτο πάσχειν· εἰκέναι δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄνευ σώματος ζῶντα ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ φύσιν οὔσαν <ὑγείᾳ, νόσῳ δὲ τὴν ἐν σώματι>.

the noûs
a part of
the soul

418—a. That the noûs was considered by *Ar.* during this period as a part of the soul (unlike the later doctrine of the *De anima*), appears from the passage of *Simpl.* cited supra (416c: the soul an *eidos*), Fr. 46 R., where he continues (after the words εἰδὸς τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι):

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπαινεῖ τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν δεκτικὴν λέγοντας τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐχ ὅλην ἀλλὰ τὴν νοητικὴν ὡς τῶν ἀληθῶν δευτέρως εἰδῶν γνωστικὴν· τῷ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονι νῷ τὰ ἀληθῆ εἶδη σύστοιχα.

The question might be asked here whether the words οὐχ ὅλην c.q.s. are still a report of *Ar.*'s view in the *Eudemus*, or whether they rather contain an explanation of *Simplicius*. In the first case—which seems to be the right one—this fragment would prove that the doctrine of the noûs as the highest part of the human soul, which therefore alone is divine and immortal, originates in the very first period

of Ar.'s thought¹. This doctrine differs from that of *De anima*, where the *noûs* no longer is regarded as a *part* of the soul, but as a "separated substance" which comes from the outside. We find it explicitly in the *Protr.* (fr. 61 R.), in *Metaph.* A 3 and in the *Nic. Ethics*.

b. Ar., fr. 61 R. (from Iamblichus, *Protr.* ch. 8, p. 48 ed. Pistelli): **noûs alon immortal**

Οὐδὲν οὖν θεῖον ἢ μακάριον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πλὴν ἐκεῖνό γε μόνον ἄξιον σπουδῆς ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως. τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀθάνατον καὶ μόνον θεῖον. καὶ παρὰ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως δύνασθαι κοινωνεῖν, καίπερ ὧν ὁ βίος ἄθλιος φύσει καὶ χαλεπός, ὅμως οὕτως ὠκονόμηται χαριέντως ὥστε δοκεῖν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον. ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός, εἴτε Ἑρμότιμος εἴτε Ἀναξαγόρας εἶπε τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι ὁ θνητὸς αἰὼν μέρος ἔχει θεοῦ τινός.

c. Ar., *Metaph.* A 3, 1070 a²⁴⁻²⁶.

Ar. is speaking here about pre-existing and non pre-existing causes. He says: Motive causes (τὰ μὲν κινοῦντα αἷτια) precede, formal causes (τὰ δὲ ὡς ὁ λόγος) are simultaneous with the thing they produce. It is a further question whether the form survives the thing. In certain cases this is certainly possible, e.g. the *noûs*.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὑστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως.

d. Cp. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 7, 1177 b²⁶⁻³¹.

In the preceding lines the author has spoken of the advantages of the *βίος θεωρητικός*, being that of the activity of the mind (ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια). He then continues:

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. Εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

Now this *noûs* is not only *in* man, but it is *a part* of him, and his chief and best part. So we could even say that man is his *noûs*. 1178 a²⁻⁴:

Δύζει δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου.

¹ I do not think it is already explicitly present in the *Eudemus*, but it is very near. Certainly Dr. Nuyens is not right in admitting that the limitation of immortality to the *noûs* is a characteristic of the last period of Ar.'s development. Ross and Mansion have rightly pointed out that this doctrine is of very early date.

2—THE PROTREPTICUS

the theme 419—The *Protrepticus* was an exhortation to the philosophic life, the βίος θεωρητικός, such as it was understood in the Academy. It was addressed to Themiso, the prince of Cyprus. Against the pragmatistic conception of knowledge in the school of Isocrates Ar. here fervently defends the beauty and the happiness of the purely contemplative life, which is exercised solely for its own sake. We have the answer from the school of Isocr. in the anonymous *Protrept. ad Demonicum*.

a. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 59. The pragmatists speak:

Δεῖ δὴ μὴ λεληθέναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ πράττειν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ γινώσκειν μόνον· οὔτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνομεν τῷ γνωρίζειν τὰ ποιητικά τῆς ὑγιείας ἀλλὰ τῷ προφέρεισθαι τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε πλουτοῦμεν τῷ γινώσκειν πλοῦτον ἀλλὰ τῷ κεκτηῖσθαι πολλὴν οὐσίαν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάντων μέ- 5 γιστον εὖ ζῶμεν τῷ γινώσκειν ἅττα τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ τῷ πράττειν εὖ· τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ' ἐστίν. ὥστε προσήκει καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἵπερ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος ἥτοι πρᾶξιν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις.

**Ar.'s defence
of the com-
templative
life**

b. Ar., fr. 58 R. (Iamblichus, *Protr.* c. 9). The answer of Ar.:

Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι καὶ δεῖν χρησίμην αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἀγνοοῦντός τινός ἐστιν ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· διαφέρει γὰρ πλεῖστον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἕτερον ἀγαπώ- 5 μενα τῶν πραγμάτων ὧν ἄνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ συναίτια λεκτέον, ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτά, κἂν ἀποβαίνειν μὴδὲν ἕτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τόδε 5 μὲν αἰρετόν διὰ τόδε, τόδε δὲ δι' ἄλλο, τοῦτό τε εἰς ἄπειρον οἴχεται προίον, ἀλλ' ἴσταται που. γελοῖον οὖν ἤδη παντελῶς τὸ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ παντός ὠφέλειαν ἐτέραν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τί οὖν ὑμῖν ὄφελος καὶ τί χρήσιμον ἐρωτᾶν. ὥς ἀληθῶς γὰρ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἶον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῇ διανοίᾳ κομίσσειεν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεῖα οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄφελος 10 ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύ- νοιτο δικαίως ὅστις ἡμῶν ἐξουσίας γενομένης ἐν μακάρων οἰκῆσαι νήσοις, ἀδύνατος εἶη δι' ἑαυτόν. οὐκοῦν οὐ μεμπτός ὁ μισθός ἐστι τῆς ἐπιστήμης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲ μικρόν τὸ γιννόμενον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς 15 δικαιοσύνης, ὥς φασιν οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν ἥδου κομιζόμεθα τὰς δωρεάς, οὕτω τῆς φρονήσεως ἐν μακάρων νήσοις, ὥς ἔοικεν. οὐδὲν οὖν δεινόν, ἂν μὴ φαίνεται χρησίμη οὕσα μὴδ' ὠφέλιμος· οὐ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλ' ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι φαμεν, οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτὴν αἰρεῖσθαι αὐτὴν προσήκει. ὥσπερ

20 γὰρ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς θεᾶς ἀποδημοῦμεν, καὶ εἰ μὴδὲν μέλλοι
 πελεῖον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔσσεσθαι, αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ θεωρία κρείττων πολλῶν ἐστὶ χρημάτων,
 καὶ τὰ Διονύσια δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐχ ὥς ληψόμενοι τι παρὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἀλλὰ
 καὶ προσθέντες, πολλὰς τε ἄλλας θεᾶς ἐλοίμεθα ἂν ἀντὶ πολλῶν χρημάτων,
 οὕτω καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τοῦ παντὸς προτιμητέον πάντων τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι
 25 χρησίμων. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐπὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τοὺς μὲν μιμουμένους γύναια καὶ
 δούλους τοὺς δὲ μαχομένους καὶ θέοντας δεῖ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς
 ἕνεκα τοῦ θεάσασθαι αὐτούς, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄντων φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ
 οἴεσθαι δεῖν θεωρεῖν ἀμισθί.

In *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a^{11,28} we shall again find the theme that philosophy alone is exercised for its own sake and not χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν (our nr. 519).

420—a. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 61 f. (Iambl., *Protr.* c. 6).

Phronēsis is the highest good; therefore philosophy is to be striven after.

Πάντες γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν ὅτι δεῖ μὲν τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν καὶ τὸν τὴν phronēsis
the highest
good
 φύσιν κράτιστον, τὸν δὲ νόμον ἄρχοντα καὶ κύριον εἶναι μόνον· οὗτος δὲ
 φρόνησις τις καὶ λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεώς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ τίς ἡμῖν κανὼν ἢ ὁρος
 ἀκριβέστερος τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ὁ φρόνιμος; ὅσα γὰρ ἂν οὗτος ἐλοιτο κατὰ
 5 τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἰρούμενος, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, καὶ κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις.
 ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες αἰροῦνται μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἕξεις, τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικαίως
 ζῆν ὁ δίκαιος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὁ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὸ
 σωφρονεῖν, ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὁ φρόνιμος αἰρήσεται πάντων
 μάλιστα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι κατὰ
 10 τὴν κυριωτάτην κρίσιν κράτιστόν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ φρόνησις.

Two remarks must be made here.

I. The sentence that the φρόνιμος is the highest standard of what is good, at once reminds us of the Aristotelian definition of virtue as it is given in the *Eth. Nic.* II 6, 15 (1106 b³⁸-1107 a³): "Virtue is a state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and as the φρόνιμος would determine it" (our nr. 571b).

Here again the φρόνιμος has the arbitrium of what is good.

II. W. Jaeger has pointed out that the meaning of the term φρόνησις as it is used here differs from that in the *Nic. Eth.*: in the *Protr.*, as in the *Eud. Eth.*, φρόνησις is used in the Platonic sense of the word, which means philosophical insight, based on the knowledge of a transcendent reality, whereas in the *Nic. Eth.* it means simply *practical wisdom*, which has nothing to do with a transcendent reality, and may be predicated even of animals (*Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 b³⁰). It is no longer directed towards the general, but towards the concrete. In *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, 1141 b³⁻⁵, it is therefore said explicitly that men like Anaxagoras and Thales were not φρόνιμοι, but σοφοί, because they were indifferent to their own advantage, but strove after knowledge of the eternal laws of the universe (our nrs. 590a and 591b).

In the following passage of the *Protr.* we shall see that φρόνιμος and σοφός are here almost identic.

Therefore
philosophy
to be striven
after

b. The same fr. continued.

Οὐ δὲ δεῖ φεύγειν φιλοσοφίαν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν φιλοσοφία καθάπερ οἰόμεθα κτῆσίς τε καὶ χρῆσις σοφίας, ἡ δὲ σοφία τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν, οὐ δὲ δεῖ χρημάτων μὲν ἕνεκα πλεῖν ἐφ' Ἡρακλέους στήλας καὶ πολλάκις κινδυνεύειν, διὰ δὲ φρόνησιν μηδὲν πονεῖν μηδὲ δαπανᾶν. ἢ μὴν ἀνδραποδῶδές γε τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὖ γλίχεσθαι, καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήματα ζητεῖν τῶν δὲ καλῶν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.

The formula εὖ ζῆν is used by Ar. in the *Nic. Eth.* I 4, 1095 a¹⁸, as a general and preliminary definition of happiness: both οἱ πολλοὶ and οἱ χαριέντες (more civilized persons) agree on this point, that they identify happiness (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) with τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν.

Again we find the term used thrice in the eleventh chapter of the *Magna Moralia* II.

the theory
of the Ideas
still accepted

421—That the author of the *Protr.* still accepts the metaphysical basis of the theory of the Ideas, appears from the following passage.

a. Ar., *Protr.* 13 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* p. 54 and 55 Pistelli):

Τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τά τε ὄργανα καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους οὐκ ἂν π' αὐτῶν τῶν πρώτων λαβόντες σχεδὸν ἴσασιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ πολλοστών, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξ ἐμπειρίας λαμβάνουσι· τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἂν π' αὐτῶν τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἡ μίμησις ἐστίν· αὐτῶν γάρ ἐστι θεατής, ἀλλ' οὐ μιμημάτων. — Μόνος γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων ζῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ καθάπερ ἂν εἰ κυβερνήτης τις ἀγαθὸς ἐξ αἰδίων καὶ μονίμων ἀναψάμενος τοῦ βίου τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁρμᾷ καὶ ζῇ καθ' ἑαυτόν.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 91, rightly remarks that in *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a²⁵ the author no longer speaks of αὐτὰ τὰ πρώτα, but simply of τὰ πρώτα:

Ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν.

The omission is not fortuitous: it is a consequence of the rejection of the Ideas, which makes the opposition to μιμήματα disappear.

terminology
compared
with
π. ιδεῶν

b. The expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ in the *Protr.* is explained by the following passage from the *Περὶ ἰδεῶν*.

Ar., fr. 187 R., p. 149 (Alex. Aphr. in Ar. *Metaph.* I, 9, 990 b¹⁰):

Ἄλλων δὲ τινων παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἑκαστά εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ταῦτα γὰρ ἄπειρά τε καὶ ἀόριστα, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι ὁρισμέναι· ἐστὶν ἄρα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἑκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ αἱ ιδέαι.

Concrete things are ἄπειρα and therefore not knowable; science has as its object "the determinate": τὰ ὁρισμένα. Cp. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 93. The same term is used in *Protr.* c. 6 (fr. 52 R., p. 60, l. 21 ff.).

422—In this Platonically-minded work Ar. speaks in a tone of great disdain about earthly things.

a. Ar., fr. 59 R. (Iambl., *Protr.* c. 8, p. 132 Kiessling):

**Disdain of
earthly
things**

Γνοίη δ' ἂν τις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων, εἰ θεωρήσειεν ὑπ' αὐγὰς ¹ τὸν ἀνθρώ-
πειον βίον. εὐρήσει γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι μεγάλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντα ὄντα
σκιαγραφίαν. ὅθεν καὶ λέγεται καλῶς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ
μηδὲν εἶναι βέβαιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἰσχύς τε γὰρ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος
5 γέλως ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια. κάλλος γε παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὄρᾶν ἀκριβὲς δοκεῖ
εἶναι τοιοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ τις ἐδύνατο βλέπειν καθάπερ τὸν Λυγκέα φασίν, ὃς διὰ
τῶν τοίχων ἐώρα καὶ τῶν δένδρων, πότ' ἂν ἔδοξεν εἶναι τινα τὴν ὄψιν ἀνεκτὸν
ὄρᾶν ἐξ οἴων συνέστηκε κακῶν; τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ δόξαι τὰ ζηλούμενα μᾶλλον τῶν
λοιπῶν ἀδιηγήτου γέμει φλυαρίας. τῷ γὰρ καθορῶντι τῶν ἀδίων τι ἡλίθιον
10 περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζειν. τί δ' ἐστὶ μακρὸν ἢ πολυχρόνιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων;
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν οἶμαι καὶ βίου βραχύτητα καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται
πολύ.

b. In this spiritual climate life in a body becomes the death of the soul, and death the escape into a higher life. As we saw in the *Eudemus* (fr. 41 R.), the life of the soul without body seemed normal to the author and life with a body abnormal and like a disease (our nr. 417a). Here the imprisonment of the soul in the body is painted in horrible colours as an unnatural state full of awful suffering.

Ar., fr. 60 R. (Iambl., *Protr.* 8, p. 134 K.):

**the im-
prisonment
of the soul
in a body**

Τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖον οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι τὸ φάναι διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν
καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἀμαρτημάτων. πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευξις
τοιοῦτω τινι ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ
φασὶ βασανίζειν πολλάκις τοὺς ἀλισκομένους πρὸςδεσμεύοντας πρὸς ἀντικρὺ
τοῖς ζῶσι νεκροὺς ἀντιπρὸςώπους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος προσαρμότ-
τοντας, οὕτως ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ διατετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολληθῆσαι πᾶσι τοῖς
αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν.

c. Next follows the fr. 61 R. on the divine character of the nous, which alone is immortal. Our nr. 418b.

**Nous alone
divine and
immortal**

423—Dr. Nuyens, Fr. ed. p. 93 ff., has pointed to what seems to him to be some later elements in the *Protr.* of Ar., namely firstly the idea of teleology in nature, and secondly what he calls the instrumental conception of the relation soul-body.

¹ After ὑπ' αὐγὰς a word has probably dropped out: τοῦ αἰῶνος is possible (after *Tim.* 37 d).

**The principle
of teleology**

a. Ar., *Protr.*, II Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* 9, p. 49 Pist.):

Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τύχης γινομένων οὐδὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστι τέλος αὐτοῖς· τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τέχνης γινομένοις ἕνεστι καὶ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα —, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατὰ γε φύσιν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, καὶ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν αἰὲ συνίσταται ἢ καθάπερ τὸ διὰ τέχνης· μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἢ φύσιν ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῷ βοηθεῖν καὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

b. Ar., *Protr.* 6 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* 7, p. 41 Pist.):

Ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ ψυχὴ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ δὲ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν χρῆται τὸ δ' ὑποκεῖται ὡς ὄργανον. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον συντάττεται ἢ τοῦ ἀρχομένου καὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου χρεῖα.

This is, according to Dr. N., a conception of the relation soul-body different from that of antagonism, as it was seen in the *Phaedo* and in the *Eudemus*: in principle it is just that instrumentism which is characteristic of the middle period of Ar.'s development, and therefore points to a later date of this work.

In fact, this argument of N. is not conclusive. We have to remark that Plato's psychology in the *Republic*, where the rational part of the soul is called the leading part or ἡγεμονικόν, implied this kind of instrumentism; so that the differences, arranged by N. in periods of Ar.'s development, were present at the same time in the thought of Plato. Why could they not be present at the same time in the thought of Aristotle too without there marking a different period?

In the next paragraph we shall find decisive reasons for upholding the early date of the *Protr.*

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

**the first
book**

424—In the first book of his Π. φιλ. Ar. seems to have treated of the history of philosophy, including the Orient.

a. In fr. 6 R. he mentions the magi and the dualism of Zarathustra (Diog. Laert. I 8).

**the magi and
Zarathustra
mentioned**

Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι (τοὺς μάγους) τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὄνομα εἶναι Ζεὺς καὶ Ὀρομάσδης, τῷ δὲ Ἄιδης καὶ Ἀρειμάνιος.

We know that, in Plato's later years, the Academy was keenly interested in oriental wisdom. The doctrine of Zarathustra was mentioned also in the *Alcib. Mai.*,

which is certainly not a work of Plato but a product of his school in its early years ¹.
See: J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient*, Brussels 1945. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 131 ff.

b. The fr. 7 R. mentions the Orphic poems. Ar. distinguishes their doctrine, which is old, from their literary form, which is of a much later date (Philoponus in Ar. *De anima* I 5).

the Orphic poems

— αὐτοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δὲ φησιν Ὀνομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι κατατεῖναι.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 129 f., explains this as an instance of the author's view that the same truths reappear in human history several times. Thus in *De caelo* I 3, 270 b¹⁹, where he says, speaking of the name of the "first body" (aether): "It seems too that the name of this first body has been passed down to the present time by the ancients, who thought of it in the same way as we do" ² οὐ γὰρ ἄπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις δεῖ νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνεῖσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς.

See also *Metaph.* Λ δ, at the end (1074 b¹⁰): κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὐρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας (sc. that the first principles are regarded as gods) ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν.

"While probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure" ³.

425—a. In the second book Plato's doctrine of the ideal Numbers was criticized. Fr. 9 R. (Syrianus in Ar. *Metaph.* 12, 9):

Second book

Ὁμολογεῖ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων (sc. the Platonics before Xenocrates) ὑποθέσεις μηδ' ὅλως παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς εἰδητικοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, εἴπερ ἕτεροι τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἶεν, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ β' τῶν περὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον „ὥστε εἰ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς αἰδεῖται, μὴ μαθηματικὸς δέ, οὐδεμίαν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνεσιν ἔχοιμεν ἄν. τίς γὰρ τῶν γε πλείστων ἡμῶν συνήσιν ἄλλον ἀριθμόν";

b. Probably this passage belonged to a general criticism of the doctrine of the Ideas. We know, both from Proclus and from Plutarchus, that Ar. criticized this doctrine sharply in his *Dialogues*.

the theory of Ideas criticized

Fr. 8 R. (Proclus ap. Ioann. gramm., *de mundi aetern.* II, 2):

Καὶ κινδυνεύει μηδὲν οὕτως ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος (ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης) ἀποποιήσασθαι τῶν Πλάτωνος ὡς τὴν τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑπόθεσιν, οὐ μόνον ἐν λογικοῖς . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἡθικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν τῇ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πολλῶ πλέον . . . καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγὼς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθεῖν καὶ τις αὐτὸν οἴηται διὰ φιλονεικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

¹ The arguments adduced by E. de Strycker in *Les Etudes Classiques* of 1942 are decisive.

² Transl. of W. K. C. Guthrie.

³ Transl. of W. D. Ross.

c. Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14 (same fr. R.).

Τάς γε μὴν ἰδέας περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτῳ πανταχοῦ κινῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν τοῖς <μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ἐν τοῖς> φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλόγων, φιλονεικότερον ἐνίοις ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἔχειν τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ, ὡς προθέμενος τὴν Πλάτωνος ὑπεριδεῖν φιλοσοφίαν· οὕτω μακρὰν ἦν τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν.

I think Jaeger is right in referring this criticism of Platonism exclusively to the II. φιλ. Dr. Nuyens defends the thesis that in the *Protr.* too Platonism was criticized. We shall see in one of our next numbers that this opinion of N. is erroneous.

426—This book contained further what is called by Jaeger Ar.'s philosophy of religion.

Two sources
of religious
belief

a. Ar., fr. 10 R. (Sextus, *Adv. dogm.* III, 20-22):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν ἐννοίαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγονέναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀπὸ τε τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινομένους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμούς καὶ τὰς μαντείας. ὅταν γάρ, φησὶν, ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ καθ' ἑαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχὴ, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεται τε καὶ 5 προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δέ ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων. ἀποδέχεται γοῦν καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν "Ομηρον ὡς τοῦτο παρατηρήσαντα· πεποιήκε γὰρ τὸν μὲν Πάτροκλον ἐν τῷ ἀναιρεῖσθαι προαγορεύοντα περὶ τῆς "Εκτορος ἀναιρέσεως, τὸν δ' "Εκτορα περὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως τελευτῆς. ἐκ τούτων οὖν, φησὶν, ὑπενόησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τι θεόν, τὸ οἱ 10 καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἰκόδες τῇ ψυχῇ πάντων ἐπιστημονικώτατον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων· θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὐτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναι τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον. τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης.

The thought is of Plato and the Academy. Cp. *Laws* XII 966 d: our nr. **394a**.

Cosmic order
a proof for
the existence
of God(s)

b. Fr. 11 R. Sextus (ib. 26-27) expresses this last view in rather picturesque colours. The passage may be taken quite well from Ar.'s Π. φιλ. II.

Ἐνιοὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπαράβατον καὶ εὐτακτον τῶν οὐρανίων κίνησιν παραγενόμενοι φασι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπινοαίαις ἀπὸ ταύτης γεγονέναι πρῶτον· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῆς Τρωικῆς καθεζόμενος Ἰδῆς ἑώρα τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατείαν μετὰ πολλοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιοῦσαν „ἱππῆας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχρεσφιν, πεζοὺς δ' ἐξόπιθεν", πάντως ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος 5 εἰς ἐννοίαν ἦλθε τοῦ ὅτι ἐστι τις ὁ διατάσσει τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν καὶ ἐγκελευόμενος τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸν κοσμουμένοις στρατιώταις, οἷον Νέστωρ ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν

ἡρώων ὃς ἤδει „κοσμηῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας”· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ
 ἔμπειρος νεὼς ἅμα τῷ θεάσασθαι πόρρωθεν ναῦν οὐρίῳ διωκομένην πνεύματι
 10 καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἰστίοις εὐτρεπιζομένην συνήσιν ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ κατευθύνων ταύτην
 καὶ εἰς τοὺς προκειμένους λιμένας καταντῶν, οὕτως οἱ πρῶτον εἰς οὐρανὸν
 ἀναβλέψαντες καὶ θεασάμενοι ἥλιον μὲν τοὺς ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι δύσεως
 δρόμους σταδιεύοντα, ἀστέρων δὲ εὐτάκτους τινὰς χορείας, ἐπεζήτουν τὸν
 δημιουργὸν τῆς περικαλλοῦς αὐτῆς διακοσμήσεως, οὐκ ἐκ ταῦτομάτου στοχα-
 15 ζόμενοι συμβαίνειν αὐτὴν ἀλλ’ ὑπὸ τινος κρείττονος καὶ ἀφθάρτου φύσεως,
 ἥ τις ἦν θεός.

427—The same view occurs in the following interesting passage, which shows us Ar.’s transposition of Plato’s allegory of the den.

Cicero, *De Nat. deorum* II 37, 95 (Ar., fr. 12 R.):

Praeclare ergo Aristoteles si essent, inquit, qui sub terra semper
 habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis quae essent ornata signis
 atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus quibus abundant ii qui
 beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram, accepissent
 5 autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde
 aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere
 in haec loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent, cum repente
 terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem vento-
 rumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magni-
 10 tudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent quod
 is diem efficeret tot caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset
 tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque
 luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis eorumque omnium
 ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus:
 15 quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum
 esse arbitrarentur. atque haec quidem ille.

Ar.’s trans-
 position of
 the allegory
 of the den

We have to state that the rupture with Platonism has become a fact here: the ideal World—a transcendent Reality which alone is truly real and of which sensible things are images—the ideal World of Plato has disappeared. There is just one reality: the sensible world in which we live. Its beauty and order point the philosopher to a divine Maker¹. Surely this is a Platonic thought. But in the later philosophy of Ar. it has disappeared completely: the Prime Mover of *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph.* A is not the Maker of the kosmos as it is said in π. φιλ. II.

the rupture
 with
 Platonism
 a fact

Two conclusions must be drawn from this fact:

1. As in this work of Ar. the theory of the Ideas has been abandoned, while

¹ Surely not in the biblical sense of a Creator, but in the sense all Greeks gave to the term: the “Builder of the Universe” who “made the kosmos”, i.e. who *arranged* formless matter into a kosmos.

it is still accepted in the *Protr.* (our nr. 421a), it is impossible that the dialogue π. φιλ. would be anterior to the *Protr.* Hence the chronology of Jaeger must be right on this point, and it must be stated that the criterion of Nuyens has failed here ¹.

2. As in this work, π. φιλ., Ar. admits of a Demiourgos, who "made the kosmos" in the Greek sense of the term, while in the so-called "theology" of *Metaph.* A no trace of this view can be found, it is impossible that this last book was written by its author at a rather early date, such as during the years of Assos or even before them. On the contrary, the chapters A 7, 9 and 10 represent a very different mind, and we must suppose that a considerable space of time elapsed between the half-Platonic view of Π. φιλ. and the full-grown Aristotelian view of *Metaph.* A. So on this point A. Mansion appears to be right when he dates this book of the *Metaph.* much later than Jaeger does.

On the other hand, on the well-known words of *De caelo* I 4, 271 a³³: „Ο δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν" a great light is poured by the present fr. from Π. φιλ. It has been supposed ² that these words are a mere literary form, an expression without any real meaning, because they do not fit in with Ar.'s view of the Prime Mover in *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph.* A. True,—but they do fit in excellently with the belief of the young Ar. in Π. φιλ., who, having rejected the theory of the Ideas, still keeps the religious principle of Plato that a divine Mind must be the cause of order in the visible world.

428—The spirit of the *Timaeus* still speaks in the following fragments of Π. φιλ.

the spirit of
the *Timaeus*

a. Fr. 14 R. (Seneca, *Quaest. nat.* VII 30, 1):

Egregie Aristoteles ait numquam nos verecundiores esse debere quam cum de dis agitur. si intramus templa compositi . . . quanto hoc magis facere debemus, cum de sideribus, de eorum natura, de stellis disputamus, ne quid temere, ne quid imprudenter aut ignorantes adfirmemus aut scientes mentiamur.

b. Fr. 18 R. (Ps. Philo, π. ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου, p. 222, 12, Bernays):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μήποτ' εὐσεβῶς καὶ ὁσίως ἐνιστάμενος ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον ἔφη τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, δεινὴν δὲ ἀθεότητα κατεγίνωσκε τῶν τὰ ἐναντία διεξιόντων, οἳ τῶν χειροκμήτων οὐδὲν ᾤήθησαν διαφέρειν τοσοῦτον ὁρατὸν θεὸν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν πλανήτων καὶ ἀπλανῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς περιέχοντα πάνθειον.

This fr. belonged to the third book π. φιλ.

A dialectical
proof of the
existence of
God

429—a. A formal proof of the existence of God seems to have been given by Ar. in the so-called *argumentum ex gradibus*.

¹ It is far from me to pretend that this criterion is altogether useless. No, but it should be applied with greater prudence and controlled from other points of view.

² By Mansion in his *Introd. à la Phys. Ar.*

Ar., fr. 16 R. (Simpl. in Ar., *De caelo* I 9):

Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἐστὶ τι βέλτιον, ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶ τι καὶ ἄριστον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἄλλο ἄλλου βέλτιον, ἔστιν ἄρα τι καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ εἴη ἂν τὸ θεῖον.

b. Another proof is given in the fr. 17 R.:

A second
proof

‘Ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ μία ἢ πολλαί. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία, ἔχομεν τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ πολλαί, ἢ τεταγμέναι ἢ ἄτακτοι. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἄτακτοι, ἀτακτότερα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ κόσμος ὁ κόσμος ἀλλ’ ἀκοσμία, καὶ ἔστι τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μὴ ὄντος. εἰ δὲ τεταγμέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐτάχθησαν ἢ ὑπὸ ἑξωθεν τινὸς αἰτίας. ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν ἐτάχθησαν, ἔχουσί τι κοινὸν τὸ συνάπτον αὐτάς κακεῖνο ἢ ἀρχή.

This text reminds us of the final passage of *Metaph.* Λ 8: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς· “οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη” etc.

430—The fragments 18-26 concern the eternity of the kosmos and the doctrine that the celestial bodies have souls. With the first thesis Ar. is against Plato’s doctrine in the *Tim.* (at least as he took it); with the latter he showed himself to be still closely connected with the doctrine of the Academy.

Third book

Cic., *De nat. deorum* I 13, 33 (Ar. fr. 26 R.). The Epicurean Velleius is speaking.

difficulties
in Ar.’s
doctrine
of God

Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone non dissentiens. modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam¹ mundi motum regat atque tueatur. tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse, non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designarit deum. quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta

¹ I do not think, after all, that by the words *replicatione quadam* Cic. means a *retrograde movement*, such as is meant by Plato in *Politicus* 270 d (τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνελίξει), and by Ar. in *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1074 a² (σφαίρας . . . ἀνελιττούσας). Since the chief aspect of Aristotle’s theory of the movement of the celestial bodies is that they move by a motion *returning on itself*, i.e. by a circular movement, I think that the plain and obvious sense of Cicero’s words is to state that, sometimes, Ar. admitted a God to whom he attributed the rôle of governing and maintaining the movement of the universe by a *motion returning on itself*.—Festugière, *Le Dieu cosmique* p. 245 f., adopts the interpretation of J. Moreau who suggests that by *replicatione quadam* Cicero meant the movement of the first heaven which turns round in the opposite sense to that of the planets. In fact, since the motion of the first heaven is considered by Ar. as the πρώτη φορά (*De caelo* II 12), one could hardly qualify this as “retrograde” or “reacting”, such as the movement of the planets presents itself to us when we compare it with the fixed stars.

conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. quo porro modo moveri carens corpore, aut 10 quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?

That Velleius found some difficulties in Ar.'s theories about the first principle or God, is comprehensible and not without reason. When he says that Ar. called now "Mind" God, now the Universe, or "Someone else" whom he put at the head of it, or even aether (caeli ardorem), we can understand what is behind it. In fact, Ar. admitted one ἀρχή (fr. 17). He called it God and seems to have conceived his idea of an Unmoved Mover at an early date: even if *Metaph.* A 6 and 7 are much later, we have a proof for the existence of a Prime Mover in *Phys.* VII 1, and we see Ar. occupied with the problem of motion in the *De caelo* and *De gen. et corr.* In *De Caelo* II 3 he calls "the heaven" a θεῖον σῶμα which as such must be in eternal movement, i.e. in circular movement. For θεοῦ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἀίδιος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τῷ θεῷ κίνησιν αἰδίου ὑπάρχειν. Now, this being so, it is contradictory to admit of a Prime Mover with the purpose of excluding a regressus ad infinitum, as is argued in *Phys.* I. This contradiction remains even when the celestial bodies are no longer regarded as animated beings having a θεῖον σῶμα which consists of aether, as was taught by Ar. in II. φιλ. III (see our next nr.).

In *Metaph.* A 8 we find Ar.'s final doctrine of the celestial spheres which have each an unmoved Mover, the "first heaven" being moved by the First Unmoved Mover, who is placed as the first principle above the others. In the same way we have to imagine that the star gods of II. φιλ. were considered by the author as inferior to the first principle. The inconsequence, also of the final doctrine, is that, the circular movement of heaven being considered as a necessary consequence of its divine character, the relation to a Prime Mover becomes problematic.

the divinity
of the celest-
ial bodies

431—a. Cic., *De nat. deorum* II 15, 42 (Ar., fr. 23 R.).

That the stars are animated beings, was proved by Ar. first by the following argument.

Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aere aliorum, absurdum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare. sidera autem aetherium locum obtinent. qui quoniam tenuissimus est et semper agitur et viget, necesse est quod animal in eo gignatur id et 5 sensu acerrimo et mobilitate celerrima esse. quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intelligentiam. ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda.

Plato, *Tim.* 39 e, spoke of the four elements as peopled by living beings. Cp. *Epin.* 984 d, where the fifth element (aether) is mentioned,—an argument for the later date of this dialogue.

We find the argument again in *Philo*, who interprets the inhabitants of the air as angels¹, and finally in *Apuleius*, in the *De deo Socratis* (on the daemonium) VIII 137. He too makes "daemons" out of the inhabitants of the air.

¹ *De gig.* 2, 7-8; *De plantat.* 3, 12; *De somn.* I 22, 135.

Consult: Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 144 ff.

b. Cic. *ib.* 16, 42-43. The stars must have a superior intellect, **they feed themselves on aether** because they feed themselves on aether, the finest and lightest of elements.

Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora eorum qui terras incolant eas in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis quam illorum qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto. quin etiam cibo quo utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. probabile est igitur
5 praestantem intellegendiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur.

The same doctrine occurs in Plato, *Laws* V 747 d, and in the *Epin.* 981 e.

c. Cic. *ib.* (16, 43-44). The divinity of the celestial bodies proved by their order and by their movement. **their order proves that they are animated beings**

Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegendiam maxime declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil fortuitum. ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque
5 naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica varietati constantiam respuit. sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur. Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus in eo quod omnia quae moventur aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem
10 natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate in sublime ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumque ferretur; nec vero dici potest vi quadam maiore fieri ut contra naturam astra moveantur (quae enim potest maior esse?); restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius.

15 Quae qui videat non indocte solum verum etiam impie faciat si deos esse neget.

Cp. Plato, *Laws* X, 888 c sqq. and the *Epin.* 982 a sqq., where is spoken of an ἀρίστη βούλευσις of the stars, by which they accomplish their circular movement. Later Ar. denies this point explicitly, e.g. in the *Nic. Eth.* Γ 5, 1112 a²¹: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδείς βουλευέται.

d. Also the doctrine that noûs is of the same substance as the heavenly bodies, viz. aether, appears to have been taught by Aristotle, probably in Π. φιλ. **Noûs of the same substance as the heavenly bodies**

Cic., *Acad. post.* I, 7, 26:

Quintum genus, eo quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque

quattuor (sc. elementorum) quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.

History of the doctrine This doctrine, which appears first with Alcmaeon of Croton (our nr. 46b; cp. also Socr. in Xen., *Mem.* I 4, our nr. 216, vol. I p. 145, n. 1, and Plato in *Tim.* 40 b-c, 42 b-d; our nrs. 352 and 354b) had a remarkable history. It revived in the Arabian doctrine of the *intelligences of the spheres*, the last of which is the "active intellect" of man (*intellectus agens separatus*). Hence the disputations of Western philosophers of the 13th century: *de unitate intellectus* (Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Thomas, and again Duns Scotus). In the 16th century we find the doctrine of the consubstantiality of mind with the stars in Jacob Boehme. By his influence it appears again in certain poems of the Dutch 17th century poet Jan Luyken ¹.

e. On the influence of Ar.'s II. φιλ. in later Antiquity, in particular the doctrine of the heavenly bodies, see the volume of A. J. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique (La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste II)*, Paris 1949, ch. VIII ff. Also E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, Firenze 1937; J. Moreau, *L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1939; A. J. Festugière, *Epicure et ses Dieux*, Paris 1946, ch. V.

¹ Vid. A. C. M. Meeuwesse, *Jan Luyken als dichter van de Duytse Lier*, diss. Utrecht 1952, p. 234/5 and 271 (the modern author did not understand the doctrine).

TWELFTH CHAPTER

LOGIC

1—THE SCHOOL-WRITINGS. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

432—Strictly speaking Ar.'s logic does not belong to the system of philosophy according to his own intention. Ar. made a systematical division of all human thinking. There is no place for logic in this scheme.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, 1025 b²⁵:

πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητικὴ.

Ar.'s division
of all human
thinking

The πράττειν is the province of ethics; it depends on free choice (προαί-σεσις). The ποιεῖν aims at the realization of a concrete ἔργον, technical or artistic. Theoretical thinking has "a kind of being" as its object (περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστίν). Now, as this genus may have three different species, theoretical thinking contains three main provinces: *physics*, which deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable; *mathematics*, which has to do with things which are immovable but do not exist separately, and the *first philosophy* (called *metaphysics* by a post-aristotelian term) which deals with things which are both immovable and exist separately.

Ar. expresses this view in the following passage.

b. Ar., *ib.*, 1026 a¹³⁻¹⁸, 18-19:

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἓν ἓν περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἀλλ' ὥς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. — "Ὡστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματικὴ, φυσικὴ, θεολογικὴ.

the three
provinces of
theoretical
thinking

As to the object of mathematics, Ar.'s formula betrays a certain hesitation: in fact, he is rather inclined to regard mathematical objects as an accident of physical things; and it is clear that, in this case, mathematics are rather near to physics. We have to treat this point in our ch. XIII, § 3.

c. Ar., *ib.*, 1026 a¹⁹⁻²³. Ar. continues after the lines cited sub b: a hierarchy of sciences

Οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἰρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν.

the object of
the first
philosophy

d. Ar., *ib.* 1026 a²⁷⁻³²:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη ¹· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὃν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ² ἢ ὄν.

We shall consider this conception of metaphysics more closely in our ch. XIV, § 1.

The place
of logic

433—According to Ar. logic has the character of a propaedeusis to all sciences. He calls it τὰ ἀναλυτικά (the term “logic” is of a later date; it is generally used by Stoic writers in the first century), and Ar. thinks it necessary to study this discipline before exercising any science at all.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b²⁻⁵:

“Ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν.

“As to the attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted”—

Ar. means that the inquiry into the conditions under which beliefs are to be accepted as true, should not be mixed up with questions about the nature of reality. It belongs to logic, which should be studied before one approaches the questions of being, which belong to metaphysics. Ross supposes that with the τινες τῶν λεγόντων Antisthenes and his school are referred to ³.

ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν - One should not inquire into the formal principles of knowledge which belong to logic while attending lectures on metaphysics.

b. The same principle is displayed in *Metaph.* α 3, 995 a¹²⁻¹⁴:

Διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης.

Later
division
of phil.

c. Directly after Ar. we find a different division of philosophy. The Stoics take logic as a part of it, dividing philosophy into these three parts: logic, physics (including metaphysics), ethics. See our vol. III.

Logic an
“instrument”

434—Because then logic had the character of an “instrument” for all philosophy and science, the Ancients gave to it the name of *organon*. We find this term used in the following instructive passage of Philoponus.

Philoponus in Ar. *Anal. pr.* 6, 19 Wallies:

Ζητητέον, πότερον μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ὄργανον ἢ λογικὴ τε καὶ διαλεκτικὴ πραγματεία τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐπεὶ περ ἐναντίως καὶ διαφόρως δοκεῖ τοῖς παλαιοῖς

¹ “And it must be universal in this way, because it is first”.

² “And the attributes which belong to it”.

³ See the commentary of Ross on this place, *Metaph.* I, p. 263.

περὶ αὐτῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ ἀντικρὺς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνονται, τοῖς ἄλλοις δὺο μέρεσι τῆς φιλοσοφίας αὐτὴν ἀντιδιαιοῦντες· οἱ δὲ Περιπατητικοὶ τουτέστιν οἱ ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ὄργανον· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ὧν ἔστι καὶ Πλάτων, καὶ μέρος καὶ ὄργανον φαίνονται λέγοντες.

We may see from this fragment, that the author does not consider logic as the *proprium* of Ar. and the Aristotelian spirit: Plato too was a logician, and Ar. built on the foundations which were laid by him.—This view is confirmed by modern scholars.

See: E. Kapp, *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*, New-York 1942.

Cp. also the interesting study of R. Schaerer, *La dialectique platonicienne dans ses rapports avec le syllogisme et la méthode cartésienne* in *Revue de Théol. et de Phil.* N.S. t. XXXVI, 1948, p. 24-40.

435—a. The centre of Ar.'s logic is his doctrine of the syllogism. **The Organon of Ar. the doctrine of the syllogism** This term occurs in Plato's *Theaet.* 186 d, our nr. **319b**, in the general sense of *thought* or *reflexion*. Ar. uses it technically in the sense of drawing a conclusion from two theses which have been admitted (premisses). He gives his definition in *An. pr.* I 1, 24 b¹⁸:

Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἔστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

Three of the six works of the *Organon* deal with the syllogism: the prior and posterior *Analytics*, the *Topics*, and as a fourth may be joined to them the Π. σοφ. ἐλ., which is closely connected with the *Topics*.

The interrelation of these works is as follows:

In the *pr. Anal.* the syllogism is defined and its various forms are treated. Abstraction is made of the truth of the premisses, so that the conclusion ought not to be true (This is what Ar. calls the *dialectical syllogism*).

The *post. Anal.* give the doctrine of demonstration: they deal with the apodeictic or scientific syllogism, of which the premisses are true.

The *Topics* are a large collection of arguments, not limited at all to the three main forms of the syllogism, but displaying a great multiplicity of forms. The Π. σοφ. ἐλ. is often considered as a part of the *Topics* and cited as the IXth book of them.

b. Brandis¹ already remarked that the *Topics* would have been written very differently, if their author had had in his mind a clear conception of the syllogism. The greater part of this work must be anterior to the doctrine of the *Analytics*. **the Topics anterior to the Anal.**

This remark has been confirmed by modern critics, such as Fr. Solmsen², P. Gohlke³ and E. Kapp⁴.

¹ *Über die Reihenfolge der Bücher des Aristotelischen Organons*. Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1833.

² *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik u. Rhetorik*, 1929.

³ *Die Entstehung der ar. Logik*, Berlin 1936.

⁴ *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*, New-York 1942.

The latter cites the opening phrase of the *Topics* in order to prove that here the doctrine of the syllogism is not presupposed.

Ar., *Top.* I 1, 100 a¹⁸⁻²¹:

‘Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν, ἀφ’ ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μὴθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον.

Next follows: Πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, c.q.s. Kapp thinks that this has been added later. It is more probable perhaps that this introductory chapter has been added later by the author and has been adapted by him to the character of the whole work.

the *Categ.* and
π. ‘Ερμ.

c. In the *Corpus* the *Analytics* are preceded by the *Categories* and the *De interpr.*

The *Categ.* begin with an explanation of the terms *homonymous*, *synonymous* and *paronymous*. Chapters 2 and 3 contain more grammatical than philosophical remarks. Ch. 4 gives the list of the ten categories, which are explained in the following chapters.

The *De interpr.* begins with a definition of nouns and verbs, gives remarks upon simple and compound nouns, on indefinites, on declension and conjugation; next on sentences or propositions (general, particular and indefinite; affirmative or negative, and the like).

Now in traditional logic the doctrine of the syllogism is preceded by a first chapter on terms and a second on propositions. Modern historians of philosophy, however, have pointed out that in Ar.’s *Analytics* the doctrine of the *Categories* and *De interpr.* is not presupposed¹. These works may have been added later.

2—THE CATEGORIES: TERMS

aequivocal

436—a. Ar., *Categ.* I a¹⁻³:

‘Ὀμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον.

univocal

b. Ib., I a⁶⁻⁸:

Συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινόν, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῶον ὃ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς.

derivatively
named

c. Ib., I a¹²⁻¹⁵:

Παρώνομα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπὸ τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοῦ-

¹ Thus E. Kapp in *Gr. Foundations* etc. It seems to me very doubtful whether this thesis is right. W. D. Ross says (*Ar.*, p. 21 f.): “The categories—some or all of them—appear in almost every one of Aristotle’s works, and the doctrine is everywhere treated as something already established”.

νομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικός καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

437—a. Ar., *Categ.* 2, 1 a¹⁶⁻¹⁹:

Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

uncombined
and
combined
words

b. Ib. 4, 1 b²⁵⁻² a⁴:

Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἥτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρὸς τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτέ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπων εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρὸς τι δὲ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἡμισυ, μεῖζον· ποῦ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ¹, ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτέ δὲ οἷον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δὲ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθεται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δὲ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δὲ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται.

the ten
categories

The same list occurs in *Top.* I 9, 103 b²⁰⁻²³.

In other places κεῖσθαι and ἔχειν are omitted; the other eight are cited as forming a complete list. So in *An. post.* I 22, 83 b¹⁵⁻¹⁸. Cp. *Phys.* V 1, 225b⁵⁻⁹; 2, 226a²³⁻²⁵.

Ross (*Ar.*, p. 22) remarks: "It seems as if he had later come to the conclusion that posture and possession are not ultimate, unanalysable notions".

In *Top.* I 9 instead of οὐσία the term τί ἐστι is used, both in the sense of *substance* and in that of *essence*. In other places Ar. uses in the latter sense the term τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, e.g. *Top.* 8, 103 b⁹⁻¹⁰, where he speaks about the "conversion" or interchange of terms:

Ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ περὶ τίνος κατηγορούμενον ἥτοι ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ πράγματος ἢ μὴ· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, ὁρος ἢ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη· εἰ μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὁ ρος, εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει, ἴδιον.

438—a. Ar., *Categ.* 5, 2 a¹¹⁻¹⁹:

Οὐσία δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρῶτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἡ μῆτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μῆτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ ἐστὶν, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τις ἵππος. δευτέραι δὲ οὐσαὶ λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἶδεν αἱ πρῶτως οὐσαὶ λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τι καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, οἷον ὁ τις ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἶδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἰδούς ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον· δευτέραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσαὶ, οἷον ὁ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῶον.

According to this passage οὐσία in its first and proper sense means: *the concrete, individual being*.

Now according to book Z of the *Metaph.* substance is not the individual, but the τί ἐστι, i.e. the *essence* or *quiddity*, which is neither purely individual—for it is the intelligible "form" of the concrete being—nor purely universal—for it is bound up with matter. See: A. M. de Vos, *La vraie substance d'après la Métaphysique*

Substance

¹ The fact that the Lykeion is mentioned, is used by Jaeger as an argument for the later date of the treatise (*Aristotle*, p 46 n. 3). But cp. Plato, *Euthyd.* 271 a.

d'Aristote (in *Proceedings of the tenth internat. Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, p. 1094 ff.). For this reason, S. Mansion (ib., p. 1097 ff.) stating that the doctrine of the *Categ.* is the farthest removed from Plato, infers that this treatise is not authentic, as there is no period in Ar.'s development in which we could place it.

L. M. de Rijk argues against this (in *Mnem.* 1951, p. 148 ff. and in *The Categories of being*, p. 51 f.).

Definitions of substance in *Metaph.* Δ

b. Both senses are mentioned in Ar.'s book of definitions: *Metaph.*

Δ 8, 1017 b¹⁰, 21.

Οὐσία λέγεται τά τε ἀπλᾶ σώματα . . . καὶ ὅλως σώματα . . . ὅτι οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἅλλα. . . ἔτι τὸ τί ᾗν εἶναι, οὗ ὁ λόγος ὁρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἐκάστου.

the first sense in two other places

c. The first sense is also found in *Metaph.* B 6, 1003 a⁷⁻⁹:

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, ἢ δ' οὐσία τόδε τι.

d. It seems to occur again in *Metaph.* Z 13, 1038 b³⁴-1039 a²:

Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων¹ οὐσία ἐστὶ, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων² τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.

Ar. is proving here that universals are no substances. Yet it would be too rash to conclude that substances are in his final opinion individual things, even when he gives us some reason to make this inference. He is not yet at his final conclusion.

We have to face the question again in dealing with the metaphysics.

Other characteristics of substance

439—Besides by the definitions, given under **438a**, the author characterizes substance by the following three points.

a. Substances never have contraries. *Categ.* 5, 3 b²⁴⁻²⁵:

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι.

b. No substance admits of degrees. *Ib.*, 3 b³³⁻³⁴:

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἥττον.

c. Opposite qualifications can be predicated of it. *Ib.*, 4 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:

Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ ὃν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν.

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ: PROPOSITIONS

440—Ar., *De interpr.* I, 16 a¹⁻⁸:

Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα τί ἐστὶν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ λόγος.

¹ οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων - no universal attribute.

² οὐδὲν τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων - no common predicate.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρῶτως, ταῦτα πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταῦτά.

Words are symbols of παθήματα

these are images of things

In this case a declaration or statement (ἀπόφανσις) does not consist of grasping combinations in reality, but of making combinations of "impressions" (παθήματα) of the soul. These then may be called "notions". But they are ὁμοιώματα of things. A statement will be true when it combines two notions which are an image of two combined elements in reality; it will be untrue in the opposite case. So this passage does not contradict the famous passage in *Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b³ (our nr. 557): Ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον ολόμενος διηρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἐψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα.

In the same way ἀληθής and ψευδής λόγος are defined by Plato, *Soph.* 263 b-d (our nr. 343). Ar. builds on the foundation which has been laid by Plato.

441—His definitions of *nomen* and *verbum* are new.

a. Ar., *De interpr.* 2, 16 a¹⁹⁻²¹:

definition of noun

Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἥς μὴδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ »Κάλλιππος« τὸ »ἵππος« οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ »καλὸς ἵππος«.

According to the definition of λόγος (see our next nr.) in ch. 4, this word does not only indicate a phrase or sentence; it can also indicate a part of it, an "expression" consisting of words which have a meaning separately. Consequently the τῷ before καλὸς ἵππος ought not to be dropped.

b. Ib. 3, 16 b⁶⁻⁸:

verb

Ῥῆμα δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρὶς, καὶ ἔστιν αἰεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημείον.

442—a. Definition of logos. Ib. 4, 16 b²⁶⁻³⁰; 17 a¹⁻⁷.

phrase or sentence

Λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἥς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικὸν ἐστὶ κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. λέγω δέ, οἷον »ἄνθρωπος« σημαίνει μὲν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἑάν τι προστεθῇ. —

Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, ... ἀποφαντικός δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν propositions ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεῦδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. οὐκ ἐν ἅπασιν δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μὲν, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκιοτέρα ἢ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικός τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.

b. Ib. 5, 17 a⁸⁻¹².

simple

Ἔστι δὲ εἰς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικός κατάφασις, εἴτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ' propositions

ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμων εἷς. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως ῥήματος· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἢ τοιοῦτον προστεθῇ, οὕτω λόγος ἀποφαντικός.

affirmation,
negation

c. Ib. 6, 17 a²⁵⁻²⁶:

Κατάφασις δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος κατὰ τινος, ἀπόφασις δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόφανσις τινος ἀπὸ τινος.

4—THE PRIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF THE SYLLOGISM

Division of
propositions:
universal,
particular

443—a. Ar., *An. pr.* I 1, 24 a¹⁶⁻²²:

Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἔστι λόγος καταφατικός ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατὰ τινος. οὗτος δὲ ἢ καθόλου ἢ ἐν μέρει ἢ ἀδιόριστος. λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν τὸ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ τινὶ ἢ μὴ τινὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἀδιόριστον δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ τὸ τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν.

I. „Πρότασις est propositio ad conclusionem inde efficiendam praemissa”.

II. The division of propositions into universal and particular is called a division according to quantity. Ar. makes it first in *De interpr.* 7, where he gives the following examples:

(a) Universal propositions:

Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. — Οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός.

(b) Particular propositions:

Τίς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. }
Ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός. } — Οὐκ ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός.

The division into affirmative and negative propositions, which has been made in *De interpr.* 6, is called in traditional logic a division according to quality.

Traditional scheme:

a. All x is y — Universal affirmative — S a P

e. No x is y — Universal negative — S e P

i. Some x is y — Particular affirmative — S i P

o. Some x is not y — Particular negative — S o P

modality

b. Ar. distinguishes also what is called in traditional logic the *modality* of propositions. In *De interpr.* 12 (beginning) he mentions:

δυνατὸν καὶ μὴ δυνατὸν

ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον

(what may and may not happen: contingent)

ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.

The same distinction is made in *An. pr.* I 2, 25 a¹⁻²:

assertoric,
apodeictic,
problematic


Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις ἔστιν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

Again in *An. pr.* I 8, 29 b²⁹⁻³⁰:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἑτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

c. Between the four kinds of propositions which are mentioned sub a the following relations are possible.

relations
between
propositions



tessara
logica

1. From the truth of the general proposition follows the truth of the subaltern particular ("All men are mortal"—"Some men are mortal"), but not inversely.

In modern terminology the general proposition is also called *superimplicant* to the subaltern particular, while the latter is called *subimplicant* to the former¹.

2. From the untruth of the particular follows the untruth of the subaltern general ("Some Romans are not brave"—"All Romans are not brave"), but not inversely.

3. *Contradictory propositions cannot be both true or both untrue.*

4. *Contrary propositions cannot both be true; they can both be untrue.*

5. *Subcontrary propositions cannot both be untrue; they can both be true.*

The third rule is the fundamental law of thinking, on which all reasoning is built: the *principium contradictionis*.

Principium
contra-
dictionis

Ar. does not formulate it in his *De interpr.*, nor at the beginning of his *Anal.* But the principle itself is presupposed in his whole doctrine of the syllogism. It is mentioned as such in *An. post.* I 11, a chapter which deals with axioms (fundamental theses, which are presupposed without any proof).

444—a. The classical formula of the principium contradictionis is found in *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b^{19, 32}:

Τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· — αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιότης τῶν ἀρχῶν· — ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὄντινόν ταύτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. — διὸ πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικνύντες εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν.

b. Cp. *An. post.* I 11, 77 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:

Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι οὐδεμία λαμβάνει ἀπόδειξις.

c. *Ib.*, 77 a²²⁻²⁴:

Τὸ δ' ἅπαν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἢ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξις λαμβάνει. καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' αἰεὶ καθόλου, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἱκανόν, ἱκανόν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους.

principium
exclusi tertii

¹ Consult: S. Stebbing, *A modern introduction to logic*, London 1948, p. 58 f.

For instance, a mathematician will not say in general that either the affirmation or the negation is true, but that this or that line is straight or not straight.

This is the so-called *principium exclusi tertii*, another formulation of the princ. contradictionis.

apodeictical and dialectical premisses 445—a. *Anal. pr. I 1* continued (24 a²²⁻²⁵):

Διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ πρότασις τῆς διαλεκτικῆς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀποδεικτικὴ λῆψις θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστίν (οὐ γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ, ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀποδεικνύων), ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστίν.

This passage shows us which method of reasoning was exercised in the Academy and was called *dialectical* by Ar. A dialogue is carried on by two persons. One of them has the part of questioner, the other that of respondent and opponent. The question dealt with is called πρόβλημα. Every proposition can become a "problem": you have just to give the form of an ἀντίφασις to it: "Is it in this or in that way?" E.g.: "Is *two-footed animal* the definition of man, or not?" Or: "Is *animal* the genus of (the species) man, or not?"¹—The simple question "Is two-footed animal the definition of man?" is a proposition. The ἀντίφασις makes a "problem" out of it. Now the questioner makes his partner choose his position: the responder says yes or no. That is: he "grasps one part of the ἀντίφασις". Then the questioner takes the other position. He continues asking. The responder has to see that he does not contradict himself; the questioner tries to get from the answers of his opponent a syllogism for his own thesis.

This, then, is the "reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us" (συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων), as it was said in *Top. I 1* (cited supra, nr. 435b), for which the author said that he was seeking the right method in that work—a method which, in fact, has been found later in the *An. pr.*

b. The same passage continued (24 a²⁵-b¹²):

Οὐδὲν δὲ διοίσει πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸν ἑκατέρου συλλογισμόν· καὶ γὰρ 25 ὁ ἀποδεικνύων καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν συλλογίζεται² λαβὼν τι κατὰ τινος ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν³. ὥστε ἔσται συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις⁴ ἀπλῶς κατὰφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις τινος κατὰ τινος τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, ἀποδεικτικὴ δέ, ἐὰν ἀληθὴς 30 ᾖ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη⁵, διαλεκτικὴ δὲ πυνθανομένῳ 24 μὲν ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως⁶, συλλογιζομένῳ δὲ λῆψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ ἐνδόξου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς εἴρηται.

¹ Examples taken from *Top. I 4*, 101 b²⁸⁻³⁷.

² συλλογίζεται - draws a conclusion.

³ λαβὼν e.q.s. - "by first assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject" (H. Tredennick).

⁴ συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις - the premiss of a syllogism.

⁵ διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη - "if it is based on fundamental postulates".—ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεις are unprovable first principles, which are assumed in science: axioms or postulates. Ar. defines them in *An. post. I 2*, 72 a¹⁴.

⁶ ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως - a question to his partner, which of the two possibilities propounded to him the latter will accept.

A definition of *proof* and *dialectical syllogism* is given in *Top.* I 1, directly after the definition of *syllogism*. We have to cite it later.

446—*An. pr.* I 1, 24 b¹⁸⁻¹⁸:

term defined

“Ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, οἷον τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται, ἢ προστιθεμένου ἢ διαιρουμένου τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

447—a. *Ib.*, 24 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Syllogism defined

Συλλογισμὸς δὲ ἐστὶ λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδενὸς ἕξωθεν ὅρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

Nearly the same definition occurs in *Top.* I 1.

b. *Ib.*, 24 b²²⁻²⁶:

Perfect and imperfect syllogisms

Τέλειον μὲν οὖν καλῶ συλλογισμόν τὸν μηδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεόμενον παρὰ τὰ εἰλημμένα πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀτελῆ δὲ τὸν προσδεόμενον ἢ ἐνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ᾧ ἐστὶ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὅρων, οὐ μὴν εἴληπται διὰ προτάσεων.


I.e.: when the premisses have been formulated incompletely, so that something must be added in order to make the form of the syllogism complete.

c. *Ib.*, 14 b²⁶⁻³⁰:

“To be wholly contained in”

Τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατέρου θατέρου ταῦτόν ἐστιν. λέγομεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ἢ λαβεῖν τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ’ οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται· καὶ τὸ κατὰ μηδενὸς ὡσαύτως.

An example of τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι: All men are mortal. Represented in a diagram:



448—*An. pr.* I 2, 25 a¹⁻¹³:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασις ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχασθαι ὑπάρχειν, τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν καταφατικαὶ αἱ δὲ ἀποφατικαὶ καθ’ ἑκάστην πρόσησιν, πάλιν δὲ τῶν καταφατικῶν καὶ ἀποφατικῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου αἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει αἱ δὲ ἀδιόριστοι, τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καθόλου στερητικὴν ἀνάγκη τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιστρέφειν, οἷον εἰ μηδεμία ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ’ ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔσται ἡδονή· τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον,

Conversion of terms

οὐ μὴν καθόλου ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἷον εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι ἡδονήν· τῶν δὲ ἐν μέρει τὴν μὲν καταφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν ἀνάγκη κατὰ μέρος¹⁰ (εἰ γὰρ ἡδονὴ τις ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι ἐστὶ ἡδονή), τὴν δὲ στερητικὴν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ζῳῳ, καὶ ζῳον οὐχ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.

On the modal, qualitative and quantitative division of premisses, see *supra*, 443a, b.

τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καθόλου etc. - "It is necessary that in universal attribution the negative premiss should be convertible in its terms".—In these and the following lines rules are given for the conversion of terms in assertoric premisses (ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν)¹.

τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν - the (assertoric) affirmative premiss.

In ch. 3 rules are given for the conversion of terms in apodeictic and problematic premisses.

Figures and moods of syllogism

449—*An. pr.* I 4, 25 b²⁶-26 a².

Kapp² writes on this passage:

"It is one of the most impressive passages in Aristotle's writings, unsurpassed in its proud objectivity, when after careful preparation he introduces his syllogistical principle, which has predetermined the history of logic for more than two thousand years".

Syllogism and proof

a. 25 b²⁸⁻³⁰:

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγομεν ἤδη διὰ τίνων καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς γίνεται²⁶ πᾶς συλλογισμός· ὕστερον δὲ λεκτέον περὶ ἀποδείξεως. πρότερον δὲ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ λεκτέον ἢ περὶ ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον εἶναι τὸν συλλογισμόν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός τις, ὁ συλλογισμός δὲ οὐ πᾶς³⁰ ἀπόδειξις.

Cp. *Top.* I 1, 100 a²²⁻³³: 'Απόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων³ ὁ συλλογισμός ᾗ, — διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμός ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος ("which draws its conclusion from probable premisses").

We shall see proof more precisely defined in the *An. post.*

The first Figure

b. 25 b³²-26 a²:

"Ὅταν οὖν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥστε τὸν ἔσχατον ἐν³² ὅλῳ εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸν μέσον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄκρων εἶναι συλλογισμόν τέλειον. καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ³⁵ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὁ καὶ τῇ θέσει γίνεται μέσον· ἄλλα δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τε ἐν ἄλλῳ ὅν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἄλλο ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Β καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖσθαι· πρότερον

Barbara

¹ The above sentence might be translated also as: "The assertoric universal negative premiss is necessarily convertible in its terms".

² *Gr. Foundations* etc., p. 66.

³ πρώτων is defined in *An. post.* I 2 as ἐξ ἀρχῶν οικείων.

40 γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς τὸ κατὰ παντὸς λέγομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν A κατὰ μη- *Celarent*
 26 a δυνός τοῦ B, τὸ δὲ B κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ὅτι τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.

Instance of a syllogism of the first Figure:

Example

All men are mortal — (propositio) maior — πρότασις μείζων.
 Kings are men — „ minor — „ ἐλάττων.
 Therefore Kings are mortal — conclusio — συμπεράσμα.

Each syllogism contains three terms:

the 3 terms

τὰ ἄκρα (the extremes), namely

τὸ πρῶτον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ μεῖζον (terminus maior),

τὸ ἔσχατον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ ἐλάττων (terminus minor),

and τὸ μέσον (middle term, terminus medius), which occurs in both premisses but not in the conclusion.

The minor extreme (kings) is the subject of the conclusion (S),


the major extreme (mortal) is the predicate (P).

The middle term is indicated by M.

So S must be wholly contained in M, and M must be wholly contained in P. **First mood:**

Scheme: $\begin{array}{l} M a P \\ S a M \\ \hline S a P \end{array}$

Diagram:



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Or M must be excluded from P.


Second mood:

Instance: No man is sincere
 Philosophers are men
 Therefore etc.

Celarent

Scheme: $\begin{array}{l} M e P \\ S a M \\ \hline S e P \end{array}$

Diagram:



c. Two other moods are possible, namely *aii* and *eio* (second premiss particular), which are called by the names *Darii* and *Ferio*.

d. Ar. concludes his exposition of the First Figure thus (ib. 26 b²⁸⁻³³):
 28, 29 Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ συλλογισμοὶ τέλειοί εἰσι. — καὶ ὅτι
 31 πάντα τὰ προβλήματα δεικνύται διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ παντὶ
 καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ καὶ τὸ τινὶ καὶ τὸ μὴ τινὶ ὑπάρχειν. καλῶ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα
 33 πρῶτον.

**Second
Figure**


450—a. *An. pr.* I 5, 26 b³⁴-27 a³:

"Όταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ μὲν παντὶ τῷ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, ἡ ἑκατέρῳ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ δεύτερον, μέσον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω τὸ 35 κατηγορούμενον ἀμφοῖν, ἄκρα δὲ καθ' ὧν λέγεται τοῦτο, μεῖζον δὲ ἄκρον τὸ πρὸς τῷ μέσῳ κείμενον, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ μέσου. τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, πρῶτον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται 27 συλλογισμὸς οὐδαμῶς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ' ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων.

Instance of this figure:	Every living being moves	<i>a</i>
(<i>camestres</i>)	No stone moves	<i>e</i>
	No stone is a living being	<i>e</i>

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} P M \\ S M \\ \hline S P \end{array}$

Diagram:



b. In this figure there will be only negative syllogisms. *Ib.* 28 a⁷⁻⁹:

Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι οὐ γίνεται καταφατικὸς συλλογισμὸς διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος, ἀλλὰ πάντες στερητικοί, καὶ οἱ καθόλου καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

**Third
Figure**

451—a. *An. pr.* I 6, 28 a¹⁰⁻²⁰:


Ἐὰν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν παντὶ τὸ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχη, ἡ ἀμφω παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ, 10 τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ τρίτον, μέσον δ' ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω καθ' οὗ ἀμφω τὰ κατηγορούμενα, ἄκρα δὲ τὰ κατηγορούμενα, μεῖζον δ' ἄκρον τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ μέσου, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἐγγύτερον. τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, ἔσχατον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὐδ' ἐν 15 τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ' ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὄρων ὄντων πρὸς τὸ μέσον. καθόλου μὲν οὖν ὄντων, ὅταν καὶ τὸ Π καὶ τὸ P παντὶ τῷ Σ ὑπάρχη, ὅτι τινὶ τῷ P τὸ Π ὑπάρξει ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

Darapti

Instance of this figure:	Every seal is a marine animal	<i>a</i>
	Every seal has lungs	<i>a</i>
	Some marine animals have lungs	<i>i</i>

Scheme: $\begin{array}{c} \dot{M} P \\ M S \\ \hline S P \end{array}$

Diagram:



b. In this figure will occur only particular syllogisms. Ib., 29 a¹⁴⁻¹⁸:

Φανερόν δὲ . . . ὅτι συλλογισασθαι τὸ καθόλου διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος οὐκ ἔσται, οὔτε στερητικὸν οὔτε καταφατικόν.

452—The principal rules of the syllogism have been formulated explicitly by Ar. in the later chapters of the same book. Rules of the syllogism

a. *An. pr.* I 25, 41 b³⁶⁻³⁷:

Δῆλον δὲ . . . ὅτι πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις ἔσται διὰ τριῶν ὅρων καὶ οὐ πλειόνων. three terms required for demonstration

b. Ib., 42 a³²⁻³³:

Τούτου δ' ὄντος φανεροῦ δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐκ δύο προτάσεων καὶ οὐ πλειόνων· οἱ γὰρ τρεῖς ὅροι δύο προτάσεις. two premisses required

c. *An. pr.* I 32, 47 a^{39-b 6}:

39 Ἀνάγκη . . . τὸ μέσον ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ὑπάρχειν (sc. ταῖς προτάσεσιν) ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς σχήμασιν. ἐάν μὲν οὖν κατηγορῇ¹ καὶ κατηγορῇται τὸ μέσον, 47 b ἢ αὐτὸ μὲν κατηγορῇ, ἄλλο δ' ἐκείνου ἀπαρνῇται, τὸ πρῶτον ἔσται σχῆμα· ἐάν δὲ καὶ κατηγορῇ καὶ ἀπαρνῇται ἀπὸ τινος, τὸ μέσον². ἐάν δ' ἄλλα ἐκείνου κατηγορῇται, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀπαρνῇται τὸ δὲ κατηγορῇται, τὸ ἔσχατον³. οὕτω 5, 6 γὰρ εἶχεν ἐν ἐκάστῳ σχήματι τὸ μέσον. the middle term in both premisses

d. *An. pr.* I 24, 41 b⁶⁻¹³:

6 Ἔτι τε ἐν ἅπαντι (sc. συλλογισμῶ) δεῖ κατηγορικόν⁴ τινὰ τῶν ὅρων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ὑπάρχειν· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον⁵ ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτήσεται⁶. Κεῖσθω γὰρ τὴν μουσικὴν 10 ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀξιώσειεν⁷ ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν, μὴ προσθεῖς τὸ »πᾶσαν«, οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός· εἰ δέ »τινὰ ἡδονήν«, εἰ μὲν ἄλλην, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ κείμενον, εἰ δ' αὐτὴν ταύτην, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει⁸. In every syllogism one premiss must be affirmative, and one universal

453—Syllogisms of the second and third figures are to be controlled by reducing them to the first.

¹ ἐάν κατηγορῇ - if it is a predicate.

² τὸ μέσον - you have the middle figure.

³ τὸ ἔσχατον - then you will have the third figure.

⁴ κατηγορικόν - affirmative.

⁵ οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον - the conclusion will be unrelated to the assumption.

⁶ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαι - *petere id quod ab initio ad demonstrandum propositum est*; what is called a *petitio principii*. See our nr. 454.

⁷ ἀξιώσειεν - If we postulate or assume.

⁸ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει - there is a *petitio principii*.

All imperfect
syllogisms
are validated
in the first
figure

a. *An. pr.* I 7, 29 a³⁰⁻³⁹:

Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἀτελεῖς συλλογισμοὶ τελειοῦνται διὰ τοῦ 30
πρώτου σχήματος. ἢ γὰρ δεικτικῶς ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου περαίνονται πάντες ¹.
ἀμφοτέρως δὲ γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα, δεικτικῶς μὲν τελειουμένων, ὅτι
διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς ² ἐπεραίνοντο πάντες, ἢ δ' ἀντιστροφή τὸ πρῶτον ἐποίει
σχῆμα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δεικνυμένων, ὅτι θεθέντος τοῦ ψευδοῦς ὁ συλλο- 35
γισμὸς γίνεται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος, οἷον ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ σχήματι,
εἰ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, ὅτι ³ τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει. εἰ γὰρ
μηδενί, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Α. ἀλλ' ἦν παντί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 39

In the second and third figures syllogisms are reduced to the first "by means of conversion", i.e. by transposing the terms of one of the premisses. E.g. in a syllogism of the form

$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} M P \\ M S \end{array} \right.$ (third figure) the terms of the second premiss should be converted.

We then get a syllogism of the form $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} M P \\ S M \end{array} \right.$ (first figure).

Every de-
monstration
reducible to
the first
figure

b. *An. pr.* I 23, 41 b¹⁻⁵.

In the preceding passage Ar. has spoken of the procedure of hypothetical proof. Now in this case too a demonstration is to be reached by proving some proposition syllogistically. Ar. continues:

Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πάντα συλλογισμόν ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι b
διὰ τριῶν τῶν προειρημένων σχημάτων. τούτου δὲ δειχθέντος δῆλον ὡς ἅπας
τε συλλογισμὸς ἐπιτελεῖται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος καὶ ἀνάγεται εἰς τοὺς
ἐν τούτῳ καθόλου συλλογισμούς. 5

Petitio
principii

454—*An. pr.* II 16, 64 b²⁸⁻⁶⁵ a⁴:

Τὸ δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἔστι μὲν, ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν ⁴, ἐν 28
τῷ μὴ ἀποδεικνύειν τὸ προκείμενον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐπισυμβαίνει πολλαχῶς· καὶ
γὰρ εἰ ὅλως μὴ συλλογίζεται, καὶ εἰ δι' ἀγνωστοτέρων ἢ ὁμοίως ἀγνώστων, 31
καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων τὸ πρότερον· ἢ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ πιστοτέρων τε καὶ
προτέρων ἐστίν. τούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἀλλ'
ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν δι' αὐτῶν πέφυκε γνωρίζεσθαι τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλων (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ 35
δι' αὐτῶν, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς δι' ἄλλων), ὅταν μὴ τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ γνωστὸν
δι' αὐτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῇ δεικνύειν, τότε αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν

¹ περαίνονται πάντες - all the conclusions are reached.

δεικτικῶς - by demonstration.

ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου - or by reduction ad impossibile.

² διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς - by means of conversion.

³ ὅτι - we get a syllogism to the effect that —.

⁴ ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν - to take the expression in its widest sense.

οὕτω ποιεῖν ὥστ' εὐθὺς ἀξιῶσαι τὸ προκείμενον, ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάντας
 40 ἐπ' ἄλλα ἄττα τῶν πεφυκότων δι' ἐκείνου δείκνυσθαι διὰ τούτων ἀποδεικνύναι
 65 α τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α δεικνύοιτο διὰ τοῦ Β τὸ δὲ Β διὰ τοῦ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ
 πεφυκὸς εἶη δείκνυσθαι διὰ τοῦ Α· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ τὸ Α δεικνύναι
 4 τοὺς οὕτω συλλογιζομένους.

Strictly speaking there is *petitio principii* when the conclusion is included in one of the premisses.

455—a. *Top.* I 12, 105 a¹³⁻¹⁹:

Induction

Ἐπαγωγή δ' (ἐστίν) ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος, οἷον
 εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κρᾶτιστος καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁ
 ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγή πιθανώτερον καὶ
 σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν¹,
 ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον² καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον.

b. It is clear from the preceding passage, that induction, by which we conclude a general law from a number of particular cases, is no syllogism. Yet Ar. treats it as a kind of syllogism in the following passage.

An. pr. I 23, 68 b¹⁵⁻³⁷:

15 Ἐπαγωγή μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου³ dealt with
by Ar. as a
kind of
syllogism
 θάτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ συλλογίσασθαι⁴, οἷον εἰ τῶν ΑΓ μέσον τὸ Β, διὰ τοῦ
 Γ δεῖξαι τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ ποιούμεθα τὰς ἐπαγωγὰς. οἷον ἔστω
 τὸ Α μακρόβιον, τὸ δ' ἐφ' ᾧ Β τὸ χολὴν μὴ ἔχον, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ Γ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
 20 μακρόβιον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ ἡμίονος. τῷ δὲ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ
 Α· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἄχολον μακρόβιον⁵. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β, τὸ μὴ ἔχον χολὴν, παντὶ
 ὑπάρχει τῷ Γ. εἰ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Γ τῷ Β καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον⁶,
 25 ἀνάγκη τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· δέδεικται γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι ἂν δύο ἄττα τῷ αὐτῷ
 ὑπάρχη καὶ πρὸς θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀντιστρέφῃ τὸ ἄκρον, ὅτι τῷ ἀντιστρέφοντι
 καὶ θάτερον ὑπάρξει τῶν κατηγορουμένων⁷. δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν τὸ Γ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων
 29 τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον συγχεόμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπαγωγή διὰ πάντων.

¹ κοινόν - accessible.

² βιαστικώτερον - has more force to overcome opposition.

³ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου - by one extreme term, sc. the minor extreme, namely concrete cases.

⁴ συλλογίσασθαι - establishing a relation between the other extreme and the middle term.

⁵ This remark is a *petitio principii*. Tredennick has seen rightly that these words cannot be attributed to Ar. Ross explains them by suggesting that a copyist has substituted ἄχολον for Γ.

⁶ εἰ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον - if the middle term is not wider in extension.

⁷ Constr. θάτερον τῶν κατηγορουμένων - the other predicate.

“Ἔστι δ’ ὁ τοιοῦτος συλλογισμὸς τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀμέσου προτάσεως· ὧν μὲν 30 γὰρ ἔστι μέσον διὰ τοῦ μέσου ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν δὲ μὴ ἔστι, δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἐπαγωγή τῷ συλλογισμῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ τρίτῳ δείκνυσιν, ἡ δὲ διὰ τοῦ τρίτου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμός, 35 ἡμῖν δ’ ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

“This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or immediate premiss” (l. 30). Ar. means to say that induction supplies, without the aid of a middle term, the universal proposition which may stand as major premiss of a demonstrative syllogism. Concretely speaking: by means of some special cases (man, horse and mule) the universal proposition is established.:

Every bileless animal is long-lived.

Now this proposition might be used as the major of the following demonstrative syllogism:

Every bileless animal is long-lived
Man, horse and mule have no bile
Therefore: man, horse and mule are long-lived.

Induction is clearer for us, Ar. says, because it starts from observation; but objectively speaking—φύσει—the syllogism, which proceeds deductively, from the universal to the particular, is clearer and “more knowable”.

By his theory of induction Ar. has given an answer to the question which has been left open in the *Pr. Anal.*: How do we get our first premisses?—Consequently we might expect that he would introduce induction as another means of getting knowledge next to the syllogism. In fact, induction has this meaning in *An. post.* I 18 and 31 (vid. infra). Cp. also *An. post.* II 19.—On the other hand, if induction is treated as a syllogism, it is a bad kind of syllogism, and therefore its conclusions cannot be true. For this reason then only the syllogism is treated by Ar. in his doctrine of demonstration, while induction is dealt with in the book on *dialectical* syllogism.

Induction
non-demon-
strative but
dialectical

c. In this sense we have to understand Ar. when he says, in *An. pr.* II 23, 68 b¹⁴:

“Ἀπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς.

5—THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF DEMONSTRATION

The student's
need of
pre-existing
knowledge

456—a. *An. post.* I 1, 71a¹⁻¹¹:

Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ¹ ἐκ προῖπαρχούσης γίνεται α γνώσεως. φανερόν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν· αἳ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τεχνῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἳ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἳ δι’ ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφοτέροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν,

¹ διανοητικὴ - “by means of discursive thinking”, as opposed to the intuitive “seeing” of the nou̐s.

οἱ μὲν ¹ λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ ² δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν·
 10 ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων ³, ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων ⁴, ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός.

b. Ib., 71 a¹¹⁻¹⁶:

Its nature

Διχῶς δ' ἀναγκαῖον προγινώσκειν· τὰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἔστι ⁵, προῦπολαμβάνειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι ⁶, ξυνιέναι δεῖ, τὰ δ' ἄμφω, οἷον ὅτι μὲν ἅπαν ἢ φῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἔστι ⁷, τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον, ὅτι τοδὶ σημαίνει ⁸, τὴν δὲ μονάδα ἄμφω, καὶ τί σημαίνει καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν.

457—a. *An. post.*, I 2, 71 b⁹⁻¹²:

Knowledge

Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἴομεθ' ἕκαστον ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τὴν τ' αἰτίαν οἴωμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστὶ, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Real knowledge is according to Ar.: (1) knowledge of the causes; (2) knowledge of the necessary, where we can see that it cannot be otherwise. So also in *Metaph.* A 1-2.

In *An. post.* II 1 Ar. says: We can ask ourselves four kinds of questions, namely: τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι and τί ἐστίν. Now the knowledge of the simple fact (τὸ ὅτι) is, according to Ar., not yet true knowledge. We then have to know the διότι, and in such a way, that we see that the thing cannot be otherwise.

The last point means that knowledge in the strict sense of the word is only possible of what is necessary, not of the contingent. See our next cited passage.

b. Ib., I 33, 88 b³⁰⁻³⁵:

Τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. ἔστι δὲ τινα ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ ὄντα, ἐνδεχόμενα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι περὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν τὰ δυνατὰ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

¹ οἱ μὲν e.q.s. - "In the first case (i.e. with syllogism) we take premisses supposing that they are known and accepted by our opponent".

² οἱ δὲ - "In the other case (i.e. with induction) the universal is exhibited through the fact that the particular is clear".

³ The instance infers the particular from the particular, and therefore is called by Ar. an imperfect form of induction, by which the universal is inferred from the particular (See *An. pr.* II 24).

⁴ In *An. pr.* II 27 enthymema is defined as a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs.

⁵ ὅτι ἔστι - "that the matter in question exists", i.e.: the fact must be assumed.

⁶ τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι - "the meaning of the term used".

⁷ "E.g. to say that in every question truth lies in the affirmation or negation, that is to assume the fact" (First case).

⁸ Second case: the meaning of the term.

458—a. Ib. I 2, 71 b^{16, 25}:

demonstration

Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τρόπος, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν ¹, φαμέν 16 δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν. ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν 20 τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖται τοῦ δεικνυμένου ². συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ' οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην.

25

Its conditions examined

b. The same passage continued (71 b²⁵-72 a⁵):

1. The premisses must be true.

Ἀληθῆ μὲν οὖν δεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὃν ἐπίστασθαι, οἷον ὅτι ἡ διά- 25 μετρος σύμμετρος ³.

2. They must be primary and indemonstrable.

Ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδείκτων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστήσεται μὴ ἔχων ἀπόδειξιν αὐ- 26 τῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ὧν ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ ἔχειν ἀπόδειξιν ἐστίν.

3. They must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it.

Λιτία τε καὶ γνωριμώτερα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ πρότερα, αἷτια μὲν ὅτι τότε ἐπι- 29 στάμεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶμεν, καὶ πρότερα, εἵπερ αἷτια, καὶ προγινωσκόμενα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον τῷ ξυνιέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ εἰδέναι ⁴ ὅτι ἔστιν.

What is meant by "prior" and "better known".

Πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει 33 καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον. λέγω 72 a δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον. ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῦτ' ⁵ ἀλλήλοις.

Cp. *Metaph.* Δ 11, 1018 b³²⁻³⁴: Κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἰσθησιν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

¹ He means: knowledge of the first, non-demonstrated principles. The question is dealt with in I 3, I 10, and most of all in II 19. See our nrs. 459, 460 and 465.

² "Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic truths will not be appropriate to the conclusion" (G. R. G. Mure).

³ "that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side" would be a μὴ ὄν, and as such it cannot be the object of demonstration.

⁴ Not only in the second sense mentioned in 456b, namely that of understanding the term used, but also in the first sense: that of knowledge of the fact.

459—"The premisses must be primary and immediate", i.e. not deducible from other premisses. This leads directly to the question how we can know our first premisses and whether there is another kind of knowledge which does not depend on demonstration. Ar. states first that we have to start necessarily from indemonstrable first principles.

An. post. I 3, 72 b⁵⁻⁷, 18-25:

**First
principles
indemon-
strable**

- 5 'Ενίοις μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ δεῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπίστασθαι οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, τοῖς δ' εἶναι μὲν, πάντων μέντοι ἀποδείξεις εἶναι. —
18 'Ημεῖς δὲ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν 20 ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον. καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἴσταται δὲ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ' ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ταῦτά τ' οὖν οὕτω λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον 25 ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναι τινὰ φαμεν, ἥ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν.

Ar. means that beside demonstrative science there exists a higher and more fundamental science, which precedes demonstration, namely the intuitive knowledge of the first principles (ἀρχαί) by the nous.

460—Ar. deals with first principles in chapters 10 and 11 of *An. post.* I.

a. *An. post.* I 10, 76 a³¹⁻³²:

Λέγω δ' ἀρχὰς ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει ¹ ταύτας ἃς ὅτι ἔστι μὴ ἐνδέχεται δεῖξαι.

**First
principles
defined**

b. *Ib.*, 76 a^{37-b16}:

**What are
special
ἀρχαί?**

- "Ἔστι δ' ὧν χρῶνται ἐν ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἐκάστης ἐπιστήμης τὰ δὲ κοινά, κοινὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἐπεὶ χρησιμὸν γε ὅσον ἐν τῷ 40 ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γένει ². ἴδια μὲν οἷον γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδί, καὶ τὸ εὐθύ ³, κοινὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων ἂν ἀφέλῃ, ὅτι ἴσα τὰ λοιπά. ἱκανὸν δ' ἕκαστον 76 b τούτων ὅσον ἐν τῷ γένει· ταῦτό γὰρ ποιήσῃ, καὶ μὴ κατὰ πάντων λάβῃ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν μόνον, τῷ δ' ἀριθμητικῷ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν.

"Ἔστι δ' ἴδια μὲν καὶ ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι ⁴, περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ τὰ

¹ ἐν ἐκάστῳ γένει - in every branch of science.

² What Ar. means by the analogous character of the κοινά, is clear from the example given *infra*: "Take equals from equals and equals remain". This rule can only be applied "in the genus which constitutes the province of the science in question"; e.g. geometrical magnitudes cannot be subtracted from numbers, nor numbers from geometrical magnitudes. But "the geometer may apply it to magnitudes and the arithmetician to numbers"; i.e. magnitudes can be subtracted from magnitudes, and numbers from numbers.

³ γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδί κ. τὸ εὐθύ - the definitions of line and straight.

⁴ ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι - sc. by the special sciences.

ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτά ¹, οἷον μονάδας ἢ ἀριθμητική, ἡ δὲ γεωμετρία σημειᾷ καὶ 5 γραμμάς. ταῦτα γὰρ λαμβάνουσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοδὶ εἶναι. τὰ δὲ τούτων πάθη ¹ καθ' αὐτά, τί μὲν σημαίνει ἕκαστον, λαμβάνουσιν, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ τί περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον ἢ τετράγωνον ἢ κύβος, ἡ δὲ γεωμετρία τί τὸ ἄλογον ἢ τὸ κεκλᾶσθαι ἢ νεύειν ², ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ, δεικνύουσι διὰ τε τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν 10 ἀποδεδειγμένων. καὶ ἡ ἀστρολογία ὡσαύτως. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τι εἶναι τίθεται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, οὗ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητική), καὶ τὰ κοινὰ λεγόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν πρῶτων ³ ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη, ὧν τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον λαμβάνει. 15

In the next paragraph Ar. qualifies these three elements shortly as περὶ ὅ τε δείκνυσι καὶ ᾧ δεικνύσι καὶ ἐξ ὧν, i.e. the subject of the demonstration (περὶ ὅ), its object (ᾧ), and its basis or starting-point (ἐξ ὧν).

**Thesis,
hypothesis
and axiom**

461—Not all things which are assumed without demonstration are called by Ar. *axiomata*. He speaks of *θέσεις*, *ὑποθέσεις* and *ἀξιώματα*.

Thesis is what is accepted without proof as basis of a demonstration. *Theseis* are of two kinds: (1) those which posit the meaning of a term (τί σημαίνει). These are definitions (ὀρισμοί). (2) Those which posit also the existence of the matter. These are *hypotheses*.

Axioms are truths which intrude upon the mind. They include existence, but differ from hypotheses by being known from themselves and by being absolutely necessary for whomsoever wishes to learn anything.

An. post. I 2, 72 a¹⁴⁻¹⁷:

Ἀμέσου δ' ἀρχῆς συλλογιστικῆς θέσιν μὲν λέγω ἣν μὴ ἐστὶ δεῖξαι μηδ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενον τι. ἣν δ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον, ἀξιῶμα.

From this definition of axiom appears clearly that Ar. does not only think of mathematical axioms, such as "Take equals from equals" etc., but also of the universal laws of logic: the *principium contradictionis* and *exclusi tertii*. We found supra (nr. 444b, c) that they are mentioned in *An. post.* I 11.

See on Ar.'s doctrine of first principles: Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 43 ff.

¹ περὶ ᾧ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ - the subjects, the existence as well as the meaning of which the science in question assumes, and the essential attributes (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτά) of which it investigates. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are called later in the same passage τὰ πάθη.

² τὸ κεκλᾶσθαι ἢ νεύειν - "deflection or verging of lines". "κλᾶσθαι is used of a straight line deflected at a line or surface; νεύειν is used of a straight line tending to pass through a given point when produced" (W. D. Ross, Comm. in *An. post.*, p. 539).

³ ἐξ ὧν πρῶτων ἀποδείκνυσι - "which are the primary premisses of its demonstration".

462—According to Ar. strict science knows not only the fact, but also the cause. Now practically a science often does not know the causes. In this case the science which knows both the facts and the causes is “more precise and prior” to that which only knows the facts. And generally the more abstract science is to be ranked higher than that which studies a more concrete object. A hierarchy of sciences

An. post. I 27, 87 a³¹⁻³⁷:

Ἀκριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἢ τε τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ ἡ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου ¹, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ ἀρμονικῆς, καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως ², οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητικῆς. λέγω δ' ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος, στιγμὴ δὲ οὐσία θετός ³. ταύτην ἐκ προσθέσεως.

We shall find the same ideas again in the opening chapters of *Metaph.* A.

463—In ch. 31 of the same book Ar. deals with the question whether science can be reached by sense-perception. As we might expect from his treatment of induction in *An. pr.* II 23, he answers this question in the negative. Strictly speaking the syllogism is in his opinion the only means by which knowledge can be acquired by man. This chapter, however, must be compared with *An. post.* I 18, if we want to understand rightly the author's view of the function of sense-perception with regard to knowledge. Science and sense-perception

a. *An. post.* I 18, 81 a^{38-b} ⁹:

38 Φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἰσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει. 40 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος. 81 b ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως Sense-perception a necessary condition to acquiring knowledge

¹ A science is μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it studies νοητά and ὅλως (e.g. arithmetic); it is καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it is concerned with concrete objects (αἰσθητά καὶ ὕλικά). Thus harmonics consider numerical relations ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς.

² ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων is a science which starts from less undemonstrated principles; i.e. which studies simpler entities. Such a science is, Ar. says, more exact and therefore prior to those sciences which study more complex entities and therefore have to assume more “theses” or “hypotheses”. E.g. arithmetic is prior to geometry, which adds the principles of extension to those of number.

³ The unit is οὐσία ἄθετος: “substance without position”, while the point is οὐσία θετός: “substance with position”.

λεγόμενα ¹ ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἐκάστω γένει ² ἓνια ³, καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ἥ τοιονδὶ ἕκαστον. ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας ⁵ αἰσθησιν ἀδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ αἰσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

8, 9

"It is also clear that the loss of any of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge".—This sentence indicates the existence of a certain necessary relation between sense-perception and knowledge: the former is a necessary condition to acquiring the latter, for it procures (indirectly) the universals by induction. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. Cp. the larger exposition of II 19 (our nr. 465).

The position of *An. pr.* II 23 is sustained: knowledge of the particular is not possible. Therefore, science is only of the universal and by demonstration. But to the question "How do we come to knowledge of the universal?" Ar. answers clearly: *by induction*. And this is only possible by sense-perception.

No
knowledge
through
sense-
perception

b. *An. post.* I 31, 87 b²⁸-88 a⁸.

In the preceding chapter the author has stated that no science can be acquired by chance conjunctions. He now continues:

Οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν ἐπίστασθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἰσθησις τοῦ τοιοῦδε ²⁸ καὶ μὴ τοῦδέ τινος, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαι γε ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν. τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ τόδε οὐδὲ νῦν· ³⁰ οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ αἰεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαιμέν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἰ μὲν ἀποδειξεῖς καθόλου, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερόν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ³⁵ τρίγωνον ὅτι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ φασὶ τινες ἠπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ σελήνης ὄντες ἑωρῶμεν ἀντιφράττουσαν τὴν γῆν, οὐκ ἂν ᾔδειμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκλείψεως. ⁴⁰ ἡσθανόμεθα γὰρ ἂν ὅτι νῦν ἐκλείπει, καὶ οὐ διότι ὅλως· οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ καθόλου ^{88 a} αἰσθησις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο πολλὰκις συμβαῖνον τὸ καθόλου ἂν θηρεύσαντες ἀπόδειξιν εἴχομεν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα πλείονων τὸ καθόλου δῆλον. τὸ δὲ καθόλου τίμιον, ὅτι δηλοῖ τὸ αἴτιον· ὥστε περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ ⁵

¹ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα - By these "products of abstraction" the objects of mathematics are meant. In opposition to Plato and the Pythagoreans Ar. considers them not as existing καθ' αὐτά (separate entities), but as properties of sensible objects. They can be isolated only by abstraction and thus constitute the subjects of mathematical demonstration. Cp. *De anima* III 7, 431 b¹²⁻¹⁹.

² E.g. line or solid.

³ ἓνια - certain properties which can be treated as separate though they are not χωριστά.

καθόλου τιμιωτέρα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς νοήσεως ¹, ὧσων ἕτερον τὸ αἷτιον ².
περὶ δὲ τῶν πρώτων ἄλλος λόγος.

The end of the passage refers to II 19, where knowledge of non-demonstrated first principles is dealt with.

See on Ar.'s theory of induction: L. Robin, *Aristote*, p. 56 ff., where the instance of the eclipse is cited in order to prove that in Ar.'s opinion "induction is alien to science" (*L'induction est étrangère à la Science*);—a thesis which is right in this sense that induction in itself is no demonstration and therefore does not lead *in itself* to science. It would be wrong, however, if it were taken in the sense that induction has *nothing to do with* science. The above-cited passage clearly shows that such was not the opinion of Ar., and so does the final chapter of the *An. post.* (II 19), with which we have to deal in our nr. 465.

464—The second book of the *An. post.* is concerned with definition. As we found before, of the four questions man can ask himself that of the ὅτι is preliminary to that of the διότι. In the same way that of the εἰ ἔστι leads on to that of the τί ἔστι.

Answering the last question is defining a thing. But true definition is not only nominal (e.g. eclipse is στέρησις φωτός); it has to mention also the cause (στέρησις φωτός ἀπὸ σελήνης ὑπὸ γῆς ἀντιφράξεως). In this sense then A. can say that the τί ἔστι and the διὰ τί are one and the same (*An. post.* II 2, 90 a¹⁵).

a. As we have seen supra, definitions belong, according to Ar., to the first principles, which are assumed in the sciences without proof.

**Definitions
first
principles**

An. post. II 3, 90 b^{24, 25}, 30, 33.

Αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὁρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον ³. —

Ὅρισμός μὲν γὰρ τοῦ τί ἔστι καὶ οὐσίας· αἱ δ' ἀποδείξεις φαίνονται πᾶσαι ὑποτιθέμεναι καὶ λαμβάνουσιν τὸ τί ἔστιν, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τί μονὰς καὶ τί τὸ περιττόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως.

b. Nominal and causal definitions distinguished.

**Nominal and
causal
definitions**

Ib. II 10, 93 b^{29, 32}, b 38-94 a⁷:

29 Ὅρισμός δ' ἐπειδὴ λέγεται εἶναι λόγος τοῦ τί ἔστι, φανερόν ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις ἔσται λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης ⁴, οἷον τί 32 σημαίνει [τί ἔστιν] τρέγωνον.

¹ What is called here νόησις anticipates the exposition of II 19, where grasping the universal from a multiplicity of concrete *data* is attributed to the *noûs*, a faculty which surpasses discursive thinking.

² περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὧσων - in the case of facts like these which have a cause other than themselves.

³ Our nr. 459.

⁴ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης - an equivalent nominal formula.

“Ἄλλος δ’ ἐστὶν ὅρος λόγος ὁ δηλῶν διὰ τί ἐστίν. ὥστε ὁ μὲν πρότερος σημαί- 38
νει μὲν, δείκνυσιν δ’ οὐ, ὁ δ’ ὕστερος φανερόν ἐστι ἔσται οἷον ἀπόδειξις τοῦ τί 94 a
ἐστίν, τῇ θέσει ¹ διαφέρων τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διαφέρει γὰρ εἰπεῖν διὰ τί βροντᾶ
καὶ τί ἐστὶ βροντή· ἐρεῖ γὰρ οὕτω μὲν ² διότι ἀποσβέννυται τὸ πῦρ ἐν τοῖς
νέφεσι· τί δ’ ἐστὶ βροντή; ψόφος ἀποσβεννυμένου πυρὸς ἐν νέφεσιν. ὥστε ὁ 5
αὐτὸς λόγος ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται, καὶ ὥδι μὲν ἀπόδειξις συνεχῆς ³, ὥδι δὲ
ὀρισμός.

Parts of the
definition

c. The formula that definition proceeds *per genus et differentiam* (*specificam*) is not in the *Analytics*, but in the *Topica*.

Top. I 8, 103 b¹⁵:

‘Ὁ ὀρισμός ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν.

465—The final chapter of the *An. post.* deals with the question of how we come to the apprehension of first principles.

the
apprehension
of first
principles

An. post. II 19, 99 b¹⁷-100 b¹⁷:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν, πῶς τε γίνονται γνώριμοι καὶ τίς ἡ γνωρίζουσα ἔξις,
ἐντεῦθεν ἐστὶ δῆλον προαπορήσασιν πρῶτον ⁴.

Difficulties

“Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι’ ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς 99 b³⁰
πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους, εἴρηται πρότερον. τῶν δ’ ἀμέσων τὴν γνώσιν,
καὶ πότερον ἢ αὐτὴ ἐστίν ἢ οὐχ ἢ αὐτὴ, διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις, καὶ πότερον ἐπι-
στήμη ἐκατέρου ⁵ ἢ οὐ, ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δ’ ἕτερον τι γένος, καὶ πότερον
οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἔξεις ἐγγίνονται ἢ ἐνοῦσαι λεληθασιν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτάς, 25
ἄτοπον ⁶. συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λανθάνειν.
εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντας πρότερον, πῶς ἂν γνωρίζοιμεν καὶ μαθησώμεθα
ἐκ μὴ προπαρχούσης γνώσεως; ἀδύνατον γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως 30
ἐλέγομεν. φανερόν τοίνυν ἐστὶ οὐτ’ ἔχειν οἷον τε, οὐτ’ ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν
ἔχουσιν ἔξιν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μὲν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ’
First stage: αἰσθησις
ἐστὶν ἢ ἔσται τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ’ ἀκρίβειαν. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν
ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζώοις. ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἰσθησίν. 35
Ἐνούσης δ’ αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζώων ἐγγίνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθηματος,

¹ τῇ θέσει - in the arrangement of its terms.

² οὕτω μὲν - in the first case.

³ “Demonstration, like a line, is continuous, because its premisses are parts which are continuous (as linked by middle terms), and there is a movement from premisses to conclusion. Definition resembles rather the indivisible simplicity of a point” (G. R. G. Mure).

⁴ προαπορήσασιν πρῶτον - by raising some preliminary problems.

⁵ πότερον ἐπιστήμη ἐκατέρου - whether there is scientific knowledge of both, sc. as well of the primary premisses as of demonstrative knowledge.

⁶ ἄτοπον - it leads to impossible consequences.

- τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ αὐτὸ μὴ ἐγγίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνώσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς δ', ἔνεστιν αἰσθανομένοις
- 100 a ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἡδὴ διαφορὰ τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μὴ.
- 3 Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλὰ μνημαὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν.
- 6 Ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἡ ἐκ παντὸς ἡρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἐνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἐν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.
- 10 Οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι ¹ αἱ ἔξεις, οὔτ' ἀπ' ἄλλων ἔξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ἐν μάχῃ τροπῆς γενομένης ἐνὸς στάντος ἕτερος ἔστη, εἴθ' ἕτερος, ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἦλθεν ². ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὔσα οἷα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο.
- 15 Ὁ δ' ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν. στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐνός ³, πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου (καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἰσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ
- 100 b Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου) πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἴσταται, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῇ στῇ καὶ τὰ καθόλου ⁴, οἷον τοιονδὶ ζῶον, ἕως ζῶον· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως ⁵. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἰσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.
- 5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν αἰεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθὴ δ' αἰεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ
- 10 τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ ⁶, τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν
- 15 ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. καὶ

Second
stage:
μνήμη

Third stage:
ἐμπειρία

Fourth stage:
τέχνη
and
ἐπιστήμη

Knowledge
of primary
premises
by induction

Intuition
apprehends
the primary
premises

¹ οὔτε - ἀφωρισμέναι: these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor —.

² ἕως - ἦλθεν: until the original formation has been restored.

³ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἐνός - one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars.

⁴ τὰ ἀμερῇ - καὶ τὰ καθόλου: "the indivisible concepts, the true universals", i.e. the categories, which are *par excellence* universal and are indivisible because not constituted of genus and differentia. Cp. *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 b¹⁴; Δ 25, 1023 b²⁴ (Note of G. R. G. Mure).

⁵ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως - "which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization" (Mure).

⁶ μετὰ λόγου ἐστὶ: "and all scientific knowledge is discursive"—.

ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα ¹.

From this passage it is clear, (1) that indeed in Ar.'s opinion sense-perception is at the basis of all human knowledge (the scholastic adagium: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*. Cp. Kant, the opening sentence of the Kr. d. r. V.: "Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfangt, daran ist gar kein Zweifel";

(2) that knowledge is reached only by the function of a higher intellectual faculty, which he calls *noûs* (the *intellectus agens* of the scholastics). This faculty grasps directly the intelligible, which is one, out of the multiplicity of sense data.

Two remarks must be made in this place.

I. When we ask the question how the *noûs* can do this, Ar. answers: *The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process*. Which means: he traces this function back to the organization of the human mind. Now by this acknowledgement what is called an *a priori*-element is introduced in Ar.'s theory of knowledge.

II. It is not sufficiently clear from the above passage that, according to Ar.'s doctrine, the intelligible appears only at the fourth stage of the process of knowledge. Between *μνήμη* and *ἐμπειρία* he speaks of a *logos* which arises out of the persistence of sense-impressions. By no means could this term be translated here by "notion", a notion being reached, according to Ar.'s account, only after experience, "when the universal has come to rest within the soul", being "one beside the many", and "residing as an identity in all the particular subjects".

Instead of the word *logos*, which is used by Ar. somewhat vaguely in 100 a², he uses later (in the *De anima*) the term *phantasma*, which indicates the sensible image resulting from sense-perception by memory. In this way Thomas Aquinas says: "Phantasma est intelligibile in potentia", and: "Abstrahit intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatis" ².

III. A third remark must be added. In 100 b¹⁻³ Ar. speaks very shortly of that process of generalization, which he calls elsewhere *ἀφαίρεσις*. Mathematical abstraction, which is called "abstraction of the second degree" by scholastics, is dealt with in two passages of the *De anima*, namely II 6, 418 a⁷⁻²⁵ and III 1, 425 a¹³⁻²⁰. See our chapter XVI, § 2, nr. 641.

6—THE TOPICS AND DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS

Topica **466**—We had to cite the *Topics* several times in dealing with the *Analytics*. On the general character of the work see our nr. **435a, b**.

De soph. el. **467**—The Π. σοφ. ἐλ. deals with fallacies.

a—*De soph. el.* I 1, 164 a²⁰⁻²²:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλέγχων λέγωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.

¹ ἡ δὲ πᾶσα - πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα: "while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact" (Murel).

² S. Th. I 85, 1, ad 4.

Καὶ adds a defining expression.

b. Ib., 164 b²⁷-165 a⁴:

What are
ἐλεγχοί

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἐλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οἱ δὲ ¹ τοῦτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὐ, δοκοῦσι δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας.

468—Ar. divides them into two main groups: (1) the *sophismata in dictione* (παρὰ ² τὴν λέξιν), where the deceitfulness appears in the form; (2) *sophismata extra lectionem* (ἐξω τῆς λέξεως), where the fallacy can be seen only when the contents is regarded.

a. *De soph. el.* I 4, 165 b²³⁻²⁴:

Two main
groups

Τρόποι δ' εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχειν δύο· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δ' ἐξω τῆς λέξεως.

b. Ib., b ²⁴⁻²⁷:

Sophismata
in dictione

Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν ² ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἐξ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσωδία, σχῆμα λέξεως.

Ar. explains them in the following pages (165 b³⁰-166 b²⁰).

(1) *Equivocation*: ambiguity in a word. When a term is used in a double sense in a syllogism, this syllogism has not three but four terms (*quaternio terminorum*), which is a breach of one of the first rules of the syllogism.

(2) *Amphiboly*: ambiguity in a sentence, e.g. when we cannot see which word is subject and which is object.

(3) *Composition*: when words are wrongly combined, e.g. "A man can walk while sitting, and can write while not writing".

(4) *Division*: by wrong separation of the words. E.g. 5 is 2 and 3.

(5) *Accent*: wrong interpretation of written words by changing the accent, e.g. pronouncing οὐ in stead of οὔ.

(6) *Figura dictionis*: misunderstanding caused by the grammatical form of a word, e.g. a masculine word with a female ending, etc.

c. Ib., 166 b²¹⁻²⁷:

Extra
dictionem

Τῶν δ' ἐξω τῆς λέξεως παραλογισμῶν εἶδη ἐστὶν ἑπτὰ, ἐν μὲν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δευτερόν δὲ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρὸς τι λέγεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι, ἑβδομον δὲ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν.

¹ sc. the sophists.

² An analogy with the expression σοφίσματα παρὰ τὴν λέξιν might be found in *Metaph.* E 4, 1027 b¹⁹: τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθές ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν ὡς ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ σύνθεσιν ἐστι καὶ διαίρεσιν,—("since they depend upon"—).

These fallacies are explained in ch. 5.

(1) *Accidens*: whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in a like manner to a thing and to its accident. E.g.: "If Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he is a man".

(2) *A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*: whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely. E.g.: "If what is not is the object of an opinion, then what is not *is*".

(3) *Ignoratio elenchi*: to give a merely apparent refutation, e.g. by contradicting not really the same attribute but merely the name, or by proving that the attribute cannot be predicated of the subject, but not in the same respect and in the same way in which it was asserted.

(4) *Consequens*: whenever people suppose that the relation of consequens is convertible. E.g. bile is supposed to be honey because honey is attended by a yellow colour; also, since after rain the ground is wet in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining.

(5) *Petitio principii*: assumption of the original point to be proved.

(6) *Non causa pro causa*: whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the argument as though the refutation depended on it. I.e.: people try to refute a thesis by refuting a premiss which had not been assumed as such.

(7) *Facere ex pluribus interrogationibus unam*: whenever the plurality is undetected and a single answer is returned as if to a single question. E.g., when part is good and part bad, "Is the whole good or bad?"

Some instances of σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι may be found in our nr. 197.

THIRTEENTH CHAPTER ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

I—INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

469—Ar.'s philosophy of nature is not only found in his physical treatises (*Phys.*, *De caelo*, *De gen. et corr.*, *Meteor.*), in which anorganic nature is treated of, but also in those which deal with organic nature, the biological works. Nature is, according to Ar., principle of motion. Now the theory of motion is expounded by Ar. in his *Phys.*, and books I and II of this work, forming a general introduction to this theory, are at the same time a philosophical introduction to the whole of Ar.'s physical and biological works. On the other hand, the general philosophical principles, which have been expounded in the introductory books of the *Physics*, can be illustrated not only by the cosmological theory of the *De caelo*, by the theory of generation and passing away of beings and their qualities in *De gen. et corr.* and by that of atmospheric phenomena in the *Meteor.*; they can as well be commented on by numerous passages from the biological works. As A. Mansion put it in his excellent *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne*: "Aristote se commente excellemment lui-même".

Philosophical unity of Ar.'s works on nature

That this whole group of treatises was conceived by Ar. as a unity, can be seen from the introduction to the *Meteorologica*:

Meteor. I 1, 338 a²⁰-b²², 339 a⁵-10.

20 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄνω φορὰν διακεκοσμημένων ἄστρον καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν σωματικῶν, πόσα τε καὶ ποῖα, καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς κοινῆς εἴρηται πρότερον. λοιπὸν
25 δ' ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἔτι θεωρητέον, ὃ πάντες οἱ πρότερον μετεωρολογίαν ἐκάλουν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ἀτακτοτέραν μέντοι τῆς τοῦ πρώτου στοιχείου τῶν σωμάτων, περὶ τὸν γειννιῶντα μάλιστα τόπον τῇ φορᾷ τῶν ἄστρον. — (Follows an enumeration of this kind of phenomena: the Milky Way, comets and shooting stars, ἀέρος κοινὰ πάθη καὶ ὕδατος, 19a5 winds and earthquakes etc.). Διελθόντες δὲ περὶ τούτων, θεωρήσωμεν εἴ τι δυνάμεθα κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν,

καθόλου τε καὶ χωρὶς· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ῥηθέντων τέλος ἂν εἴη γεγονὸς τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως πάσης. ὥδ' οὖν ἀρξάμενοι λέγωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν πρῶτον.

10

Division of the Physics The opening sentence of this passage (Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς — εἰρηται πρότερον) points to a division of the *Phys.* into two parts: (1) *on the causes* (bb. I and II), (2) *on motion* (bb. III-VIII). The distinction is not so clearly made by the ancient commentators. It has been re-established by A. Mansion.

2—THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

Introductory chapter 470—*Phys.* I 1, 184 a¹⁰-b¹⁴:

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτία ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἰτία γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρῶτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ¹.

15

Πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς ². Διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφέστερων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. Ἔστι δ' ὅταν ἡμῖν πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα ³. Διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προῖέναι. Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστίν· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου ⁴.

Πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτ' οὗτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος· ὁ δὲ ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἀνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

One ἀρχή or many? 471—*a.* *Phys.* I 2, 184 b¹⁵⁻²²:

Ἀνάγκη δ' ἥτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἥτοι ἀκίνητον, ὡς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀεὶ φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ' ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχὴν· εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἢ πεπερασ-

¹ The principle that we can only be said to have knowledge if we know the causes of a phenomenon, is more than once repeated by Ar. Cp. *Metaph.* A 1, where the difference between ἐμπειρία and τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη is marked in this way, that the first knows only the ὅτι, the latter also the διότι.

² ἀπλῶς - absolutely.

³ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα - "if we analyse them".

⁴ "For the universal comprehends many things within it, like parts".

μένας ἢ ἀπείρους, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένους πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἓν, σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἶδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.

b. Ib., 184 b²⁵-185 a⁵; ib., a¹²⁻¹⁴:

The Eleatic
thesis
excluded

Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἐν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὃν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν·
185 a ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῳ οὐκέτι λόγος ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς,
ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν· οὐ
γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχὴ ἐστίν, εἰ ἐν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἐστίν. Ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν ¹.—
'Ἡμῖν δ' ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ
τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς ².

472—a. Ib., 185 a²⁰-b⁵:

Refutation
of the Eleatic
thesis ex
parte entis

10, 21 Ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὃν, ἰδεῖν πῶς
λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἐν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ
ποιά, καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἓνα ἢ ἵππον
25 ἓνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἐν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι
τῶν τοιούτων. Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν. Εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ' ἀπολελυμένα ἀπ'
30 ἀλλήλων εἴτε μὴ, πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα. Εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἴτ' οὕσης οὐσίας
εἴτε μὴ οὕσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων
χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας
λέγεται. Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὃν ἄπειρον εἶναι φησιν. Ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὃν· τὸ γὰρ
185 b ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἅττα εἶεν· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος
τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία
5 ἐστὶ καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἐν τὸ ὃν· εἰ δ' οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ
μέγεθος ἔξει οὐδέν· ποσὸν γὰρ τι ἔσται.

b. Ib., 185 b⁵⁻²⁵:

Refutation
ex parte
unius

5, 6 Ἔτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὃν, σκεπτέον τίνα
τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἐν τὸ πᾶν. Λέγεται δ' ἐν ἢ τὸ συνεχές ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ
ὦν ὁ λόγος ³ ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἰς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥσπερ μέθυ καὶ οἶνος. Εἰ μὲν
10 τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἐν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαίρετόν τὸ συνεχές.

Ἐχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ⁴

¹ I.e.: an inquiry into principles—or into *the* first principle—always presupposes a multiplicity.

² Which means: Ar. starts from the concrete reality of movement. A hypothesis which destroys this elementary fact has no sense.

³ λόγος - definition, essence.

⁴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον - relevant to the present argument.

ἀλλ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτήν, πότερον ἐν ἡ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἐν ἡ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν· καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἐν ἐκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. 15

Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσός φησιν, οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης· τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἐν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὡς λώπιον¹ καὶ ἱμάτιον, τὸν Ἡρα- 20 κλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς· ταύτην γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθὴ καὶ κακὴ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀκαθὴ, ὥστε ταύτην ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀκαθὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν, καὶ τὸ τοιῷδὲ εἶναι καὶ τοσῷδὲ ταύτόν². 25

Anaxagoras
criticized

473—Having refuted the Eleatic hypothesis, Ar. examines the opinions of older physicists about the principles of physical bodies. Anaxagoras is discussed rather amply (ch. 4). He too admits, as Democritus did, an infinite number of first principles. To this thesis Ar. opposes the remark that the infinite cannot be known. There are several difficulties with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. Ar. concludes that it is better to assume

A finite
number of
principles
should be
assumed

a smaller and finite number of principles, as Empedocles did.

Phys. I 4, 188 a¹⁷⁻¹⁸:

Βέλτιόν τε ἐλάττω καὶ πεπερασμένα λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ποιεῖ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς.

474—Another correct view of the ancient physicist is, that opposites should be assumed as ἀρχαί. This is done e.g. by those who explained the genesis of the elements by rarefaction and condensation (we know this of Anaximenes, and it is said of Heraclitus too), even by Parm., who assumed two principles relative to the world of doxa, and by Democr. in his doctrine of the πλῆρες καὶ κενόν.

Opposite
principles
should be
assumed

Phys. I 5, 188 a²⁸⁻³⁰:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τάναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. Καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πάντα· τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

How many
ἀρχαί?

475—A pair of opposites, however, is not sufficient. A third principle should be added, namely a subject, somewhat as the substratum of the contraries.

¹ λώπιον - raiment.

² "There will be no difference between quality and quantity".

a. *Phys.* I 6, 189 a²¹-b³:

- 21 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεπερασμένοι, τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν τις πῶς ἢ ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μακρότητα ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν ἢ αὕτη τὴν πυκνότητα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιοῦν ἐναντιότης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία τὸ
25 νεῖκος συνάγει καὶ ποιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' ἄμφω ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. Ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ πλείω λαμβάνουσιν ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσιν τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. Πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις ἔτι καὶ τόδε τις ἀπορήσειεν, εἰ μὴ τις ἐτέραν ὑποτίθῃσι τοῖς ἐναντίοις φύσιν· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν
30 τάναντία¹. Τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου δεῖ λέγεσθαί τινος. Ἔσται γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἀρχή, καὶ πρότερον δοκεῖ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου εἶναι. Ἐτι οὐκ εἶναι φαμεν οὐσίαν ἐναντίαν οὐσίᾳ². πῶς οὖν ἐκ μὴ οὐσίαν οὐσία ἂν εἴη; ἢ πῶς ἂν πρότερον μὴ οὐσία οὐσίας εἴη;
- 35 Διόπερ εἴ τις τὸν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ τοῦτον, ἀναγ-
189 b καῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασῶσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων.

Three
principles
necessary

Ar. seems here to come near to the conception of the older physicists—not Emped.—who admitted some primary element and then differentiated it by rarefaction and condensation. We shall see, however, in the following chapters that his own theory is elaborated in a very different way.

b. Rejection of any theory of four elements.

Ib., 189b¹⁹-²⁷:

- 19, 20 Εἰ δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων δύο ἔσονται ἐναντιώσεις, δεήσει χωρὶς ἐκατέρας ὑπάρχειν ἐτέραν τινὰ μεταξὺ φύσιν· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀλλήλων δύνανται γεννᾶν δύο οὔσαι, περίεργος ἂν ἡ ἐτέρα τῶν ἐναντιώσεων εἴη. Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον πλείους εἶναι ἐναντιώσεις τὰς πρώτας. Ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἓν τι γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε
25 τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ γένει· αἰ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ γένει μία ἐναντιώσις ἐστίν, πᾶσαι τε αἱ ἐναντιώσεις ἀνάγεσθαι δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν.

Not four

476—Ar. now begins to expound his own theory of the principles of “becoming” in the broadest sense. He introduces three principles: *the form* (εἶδος), *privation of the form* (στέρησις), and a *subject* (ὑποκείμενον) or matter (ὕλη). These three principles occur in every form of production.

The three
principles

¹ See the definition of οὐσία in *Categ.* 5, 2 a¹¹.¹³ (our nr. 438a).

² *Categ.* 5, 3 b²⁵ (439a).

First the distinction is made between “becoming” in the absolute sense (ἀπλῶς) and “becoming this or that”. The first is the coming-into-being of substances, e.g. ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται or τὸ μὴ μουσικόν (what is called in scholastic terminology *generatio simpliciter*), the latter the arising of a certain determination of a subject which already existed (*generatio secundum quid*), e.g. τὸν μὴ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον. Now in all these cases, Ar. says, there is always some pre-existing subject.

1. The
ὑποκείμενον

a. *Phys.* I 7, 190 a³¹-b¹⁰:

Πολλὰ καὶ δὲ λεγόμενον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τότε 31
τι γίγνεσθαι, ἀπλῶς δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνων, κατὰ μὲν ἄλλα φανερόν
ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαι τι τὸ γιγνόμενον· καὶ γὰρ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ πρὸς
ἕτερον καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ποῦ γίνεται ὑποκειμένου τινὸς διὰ τὸ μόνην τὴν οὐσίαν 35
μυθηνὸς κατ’ ἄλλου λέγεσθαι ὑποκειμένου, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας·
ὅτι δὲ καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀπλῶς ὄντα ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς γίνεται, 190 b
ἐπισκοποῦντι γένοιτ’ ἂν φανερόν. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι τι ὃ ὑποκεῖται, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται
τὸ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῶα ἐκ σπέρματος. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ γιγνό-
μενα ἀπλῶς τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίζει, οἷον ἀνδριάς ἐκ χαλκοῦ, τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, 5
οἷον τὰ αὐξάνόμενα, τὰ δ’ ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὁ Ἑρμῆς, τὰ δὲ συνθέσει,
οἷον οἰκία, τὰ δ’ ἀλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Πάντα δὲ τὰ
οὕτω γινόμενα φανερόν ὅτι ἐξ ὑποκειμένων γίνεται. 10

It can not
always be
directly
known

b. We may not conclude from this passage that, according to Ar., the ὑποκείμενον can always be directly stated. At the end of the same chapter he tells us that, sometimes, it can be known only κατ’ ἀναλογίαν.

Ib., 191 a⁷⁻¹²:

Ἡ δ’ ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν. Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα
χαλκὸς ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφήν ἢ ὕλη καὶ
τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν, οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὸ
τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν. *

As he himself will explain later: the substratum, being undetermined, is not yet a “being” in the full sense: it is only *potentially* a being. It must be brought to being in the full sense by the determining form.

The term
ὕλη

c. The term ὕλη is not used in this passage. Ar. here speaks of the ὑποκείμενον or ὑποκειμένη φύσις. In the *Metaph.* the term ὕλη is generally used. E.g.:

Metaph. Z 3, 1029 a²⁰⁻²¹:

Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἢ καθ' αὐτὴν μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὄρισταί τὸ ὄν.

d. The classical definition of ὕλη occurs in *Phys.* I 9, 192 a³¹⁻³²: **Its classical definition**

Λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἐκαστῷ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκότος.

"The primary substratum of each thing, an immanent principle from which a thing comes into being in a non-accidental way" (i.e. so that matter persists in the object which comes into being).

See further sub 496.

477. Ar. continues, *Phys.* I 7, 190 b¹⁰⁻²³:

10 "Ὡστε δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ γινόμενον ἅπαν ἀεὶ σύνθετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἔστι μὲν τι γινόμενον, ἔστι δὲ τι ὃ τοῦτο γίνεται, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι μὲν τὸ ἄμουσον, ὑπο-
15 κεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀμορφίαν καὶ τὴν ἀταξίαν τὸ ἀντικείμενον, τὸν δὲ χαλκὸν ἢ τὸν λίθον ἢ τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ὑποκείμενον.

Φανερόν οὖν ὥς, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων
εἰσὶ καὶ γεγόνασι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκότος ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν,
20 ὅτι γίγνεται πᾶν ἐκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς· σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μου-
σικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόπου τινά· διαλύσεις γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων¹. Δῆλον οὖν ὥς γίνονται² ἂν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τούτων.

2. the form:
μορφή
or εἶδος

For a definition of the different meanings of εἶδος Ar. refers at the end of this book (*Phys.* I 9, 192 a^{34-b1}) to the *Metaph.* Cp. our nr. 497.

478—a. The same passage continued, 190 b²³⁻²⁹:

"Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἓν, εἶδει δὲ δύο. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρω-
25 πος καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς καὶ ὅλως ἡ ὕλη ἀριθμητὴ· τόδε γάρ τι μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ
συμβεβηκότος ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον· ἢ δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις
συμβεβηκότος· ἐν δὲ τὸ εἶδος, οἶον ἡ τάξις ἢ ἡ μουσικὴ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν
οὕτω κατηγορουμένων.

3. The
negative
aspect of the
subject:
στέρησις

The third principle is introduced here in very concise terms. The meaning of the passage might be paraphrased as follows.

Things come to be, as it seems, by two principles: form and matter. The subject, however, has two succeeding states, which might be called the terms of the process of becoming: (1) the original state, from which it comes to be, e.g. μὴ μουσικός;

¹ "You can analyze it into the definitions of its elements" (Hardie). About the omission of the first τοὺς λόγους see the commentary of W. D. Ross on this place (p. 493).

(2) the opposite state, that which is to become, namely μουσικός. The first or negative state is called στέρησις (*privatio*), the privation of the form. The subject is in this state; it is identical with it, but *accidentally* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), for it makes way for the form and thus it does not enter as a constituent element into the being which comes to be. So, in a certain sense, the στέρησις is no real principle of the generated being. E.g. a man is generated. Before there is "something unqualified", which is not-man.

In metaphysics the στέρησις means hardly anything; but in physics, for the explanation of coming to be, it takes a very important place, as important as that of the two other principles.

b. Ar. continues, ib. 190 b²⁹-191 a³:

Διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δύο λεχτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἔστι δ' ὡς τρεῖς· καὶ ἔστι μὲν 30 ὡς τάναντία, ὅλον εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄμουσον ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἢ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ· ὑπ' ἀλλήλων γὰρ πάσχειν τάναντία ἀδύνατον. Λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐναντίον. "Ὡστε οὔτε πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ 35 ἀρχαὶ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ δύο ὡς εἰπεῖν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὔτ' αὖ παντελῶς δύο διὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπων καὶ 191 a τὸ ἀμούσων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀσχηματίστω καὶ χαλκῷ.

479—In the next chapter Ar. states that his theory is the true solution of the difficulties, which his predecessors were unable to solve.

Difficulties
of predecessors
solved
by this
theory

a. Phys. I 8, 191 a²³⁻³⁴:

"Ὅτι δὲ μοναχῶς οὕτω λύεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπορία, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα. Ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν 25 τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐξεστράπησαν ὅλον ὁδὸν τινὰ ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ φασὶν οὔτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθεῖρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὄν γίνεσθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἔκ τε μὴ 30 ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑποκεῖσθαι γὰρ τι δεῖ. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὖξοντες¹ οὐδ' εἶναι πολλὰ φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ταύτην ἔλαβον τὴν δόξαν διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.

This is the Eleatic aporia: what comes to be must come forth either from being or from non-being. Both are impossible. Ergo —.

Ar. replies: it is possible, namely if both are admitted at the same time and in a special sense. If it is taken in the absolute sense, then, surely, nothing springs from non-being; but *accidentally* it does. For a being springs from στέρησις, which in itself is non-being. It springs from privation accidentally, because the pre-existing non-being is not admitted into the being that becomes.

And in the same way being springs from being, not essentially, but accidentally. For it is not the pre-existing being which is generated in that which comes to be.

¹ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὖξοντες - they exaggerated the consequence of this.

But the new being springs from the pre-existing, as far as the latter contained a non-being in itself, which is now filled with a new determination.

This is expressed by Ar. in the following text.

b. Ib., 191 b¹³⁻²³:

**Solution of
the Eleatic
aporia**

Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ φαμεν γίγνεσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὅμως
15 μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς στερήσεως,
ὃ ἐστὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος ¹ γίγνεται τι. Θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο
καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ, γίγνεσθαι τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ὄντος
οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν γίγνεσθαι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζῶου ζῶον γίγνοιτο καὶ ἐκ τινός ζῶου τι ζῶον,
20 οἷον εἰ κύων <ἐκ κυνός ἢ ἵππος> ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο ². Γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ
μόνον ἐκ τινός ζῶου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζῶου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ζῶον· ὑπάρχει γὰρ
ἤδη τοῦτο·

The above solution borrows its terms from logic: the distinction between using a term *essentially* and *accidentally* is referred to in this chapter and illustrated by the instance "The doctor builds a house, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* housebuilder, and turns grey, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* dark-haired" (191 b⁴⁻⁵).

c. Beside this solution Ar. gives a metaphysical one: in his theory of potency and act, which is explained at length in *Metaph.* Θ. The theory is referred to here, perhaps with reference to some older treatise.

**Metaphysical
solution**

Ib., 191 b²⁷⁻²⁹:

Εἰς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δ' ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα λέγειν κατὰ τὴν
δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται δι' ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον.

480—In his last chapter of this book Ar. compares his own theory of becoming with that of Plato in the *Timaeus* and shows the superiority of his own theory. He reproaches Plato for not having acknowledged the principle of στέρησις: relative non-being, which is *accidentally* identical with matter, but *essentially* different. Because Plato neglected this distinction, he could not solve the difficulties of Eleatic philosophy: he formally attributed to matter a kind of non-being which does not belong to it and seems to reduce it to absolute non-being.

**This theory
compared
with Plato's**

Phys. I 9, 192 a³⁻¹²:

Ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἕτερόν φαμεν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν
5 οὐκ ὄν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθ' αὐτήν, καὶ τὴν

¹ οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος - "this not surviving as a constituent of the result".

² About the insertion of the words ἐκ κυνός ἢ ἵππος see the comment of Ross on these lines (p. 495 f.).

μὲν ἐγγύς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν οὐδαμῶς. Οἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως, ἢ τὸ συναμφοτέρων ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἐκάτερον. "Ὡστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος ἀκακείνου. Μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν ποιουσιν· 10 καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις δυάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων μέγα καὶ μικρὸν αὐτήν, οὐθὲν ἤττον ταῦτο ποιεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν παρεῖδεν.

The meaning of Ar. is clear: by introducing his third principle (the *χώρα*) in *Tim.* 48 e-50 d, Plato did assume a substratum, but he did not make any distinction between the substratum as a real principle *in* things (see Ar.'s definition of ὕλη sub 476 d), a potential being, which *can* be in the full sense and only *per accidens* does not do so now, and, on the other hand, a second principle, which is in itself a non-being, namely the privation of the form which is still to be realized.

To this we might reply, that by Plato *χώρα* is not introduced at all as "matter" in the sense of a substratum, which is an immanent principle; but only as *space*, wherein coming to be happens to take place. Consequently, Ar. does not introduce a second principle next to Plato's principle of the Great-and-small. He introduces two totally different principles.

It should be granted, certainly, that Plato's description of becoming is difficult to understand and far from clear. On the other hand, Ar.'s hypothesis of a totally unqualified substratum contains certain difficulties. It is, finally, a purely logically construed hypothesis: a theory, which can serve as a basis for the explanation of becoming. But what corresponds with it in the order of reality, remains problematical.

3—THE SECOND BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

481—Ar. now begins to define "physis".

Phys. II 1, 192 b⁸⁻²³:

What is
φύσει
and what
is not

Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τὰ τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ 10 πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν· κλίνη 15 δὲ καὶ ἱμάτιον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἐστίν, ἢ μὲν τετύχηκε τῆς κατηγορίας ἐκάστης καὶ καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, οὐδεμίαν ὁρμὴν ἔχει μεταβολῆς ἐμφυτον, ἢ δὲ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς εἶναι λιθίνοις ἢ γητῖνοις ἢ μικτοῖς ἐκ 20 τούτων, ἔχει, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον, ὥς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἡρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Definition of
φύσις

"Nature is a principle of motion and rest for the thing in which it is immediately present, in virtue of itself (i.e. *essentially*) and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute" (i.e. *per accidens*).

The latter restriction excludes certain cases where nature comes very near to art. With art namely the cause works from without, with nature from within. But there are some cases where art works from within, e.g. the physician who treats himself. Yet these cases do not come within the definition of nature, Ar. says, for here art does not belong to the subject essentially, but *per accidens*.

482—a. Ib., 192 b³²⁻³⁴:

Φύσις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ῥηθέν· φύσιν δὲ ἔχει ὅσα τοιαύτην ἔχει ἀρχήν. Καὶ ἐστὶ πάντα ταῦτα οὐσία· ὑποκείμενον γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αἰεί.

Natural things are always realized in a subject

"Each of them is a substance; for it is a subject, and nature is always realized in a subject".

Mansion¹ calls this "an expression of peripatetic realism, which indeed attributes a reality to abstract principles, but on condition of finding them in a material substratum, of which they can be separated only by thought".

b. These things, then, and their essential qualities are "according to nature".

What is called κατὰ φύσιν

Ib. 192 b³⁵⁻³⁷:

Κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὑπάρχει καθ' αὐτά, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ φέρεσθαι ἄνω· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει φύσιν, φύσει δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.

483—Ar. now proceeds to explain his theory of the *two aspects of nature*: (1) there is a lower nature, *matter*, which is undetermined and "potential" with relation to the form; (2) a higher nature, *form*, which is intelligible (because determinate) and, by its presence, brings matter to full being (see nr. 484).

Two aspects of nature

a. Ib., 193a¹⁰⁻²¹; 28-30:

Matter

10 Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐνίοις εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἐκάστῳ ἀρρύθμιστον ² <ὄν> καθ' ἑαυτό, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δ' ὁ χαλκός. Σημεῖον δὲ φησιν Ἀντιφῶν ³ ὅτι, εἴ τις κατορύξει κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἢ σηπεδῶν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι
15 κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὡς τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ὑπάρχον, τὴν κατὰ νόμον διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οὖσαν ἐκείνην ἢ καὶ διαμένει ταῦτα πάσχουσα συνεχῶς. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕτερόν τι ταῦτ' οὗτο πέπονθεν, οἷον ὁ μὲν χαλκός καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς πρὸς ὕδωρ, τὰ δ' ὅσα καὶ ξύλα πρὸς

¹ *Introd.*, p. 100.

² τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἐκάστῳ ἀρρύθμιστον <ὄν> καθ' ἑαυτό - "that immediate constituent of it which taken by itself is without arrangement" (Hardie & Gaye).

³ Diels, VS⁶ 87, B 15. Cf. Zeller I 2⁶, pp. 1324-28.

γῆν ¹, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτιοῦν, ἐκεῖνα ² τὴν φύσιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ²⁰ αὐτῶν. —

"Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἐκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη ²⁸ ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς.

"The immediate material substratum of things which gave in themselves a principle of motion or change".

Form

b. Ib., 193a³⁰⁻³¹:

"Ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

"The form and the type, sc. the definable form" (τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον: "which is specified in the definition of the thing". Hardie and Gaye).

c. In the next passage Ar. explains what he means by this definition.

Ib. 193 a³¹-b ⁵:

**Matter with-
out form is
not yet
φύσει** "Ὡσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις ³¹ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν. Οὕτε δὲ ἐκεῖ πω φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην οὐδέν, εἰ δυνάμει μόνον ἐστὶ κλίνη, μὴ πω δ' ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τῆς κλίνης, οὐδ' εἶναι τέχνην, οὐτ' ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνισταμένοις· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ³⁵ σὰρξ ἢ ὅστωι οὐτ' ἔχει πω τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ ^{193 b} τὸν λόγον, ὃ ὀρίζοντες λέγομεν τί ἐστὶ σὰρξ ἢ ὅστωι, οὕτε φύσει ἐστίν. "Ὡστε ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὐτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωριστὸν ὄν ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. 5

"So, in another sense, nature is the form or type of things which have in themselves a principle of motion, a form not separable from them except in thought".

484—Real things, then, are the composites of these two constituents.

Ib. 193 b⁵⁻⁸:

**The
compositum**

Τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, φύσει δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ μᾶλλον αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε λέγεται ὅταν ἐντελεχεία ᾖ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὅταν δυνάμει.

**Relation to
Plato's doc-
trine of
nature**

485—A. Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 82-92, explained excellently how this Aristotelian conception of nature is related to that of Plato, especially in his later works, the *Tim.* and *Laws*. Plato was deeply convinced that coming to be and passing away and the existence of things cannot be caused by matter. He sought a reasonable ground for them: "that it is best for things to be as they are" (*Ph.* 96 a ff.), and, seeking this, assumed his "hypothesis" of Ideas. In *Laws* X again Pl. delivers a severe verdict on materialistic philosophy of nature: the regularity of the celestial movement can only be caused by an intelligence, a soul. Therefore, if we mean by

³ Plato in the *Tim.* derived gold and bronze from water (59 b) and bones (64 c, 73 e) from earth.

² ἐκεῖνα - the stable element.

"nature" what is original and wants no further explanation, we should say that soul is "natural" (φύσει), not the material elements (981 c-892 c; our nr. 388).

In *Tim.* 52 d-53 b Pl. describes the χώρα before the creation of the kosmos as being filled with formless elements, in which irregular forces work and shocks occur. So there exists, according to Plato, some irrational element, next to soul and independent of it. But Pl. does not call this physis. As to Aristotle, he starts from such a physis and calls it by this name. But he does not adopt Plato's doctrine of soul. Instead of this he gives another explanation: above the irrational nature, called *hylè*, he superposed not soul, but a superior nature, *form*. This form is *not an intelligent principle*, not a thinking and deliberating being, but it is *intelligible*: the rational element in corporeal beings.

Thus it may be said in a certain sense that to Ar. nature is rational; only not in any personal sense.

486—Ar. now asks himself three questions:

Three questions

(1) Where is the border-line between physics and mathematics? For physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics.

(2) Where is the place of astronomy? Does it belong to physics, or not?

(3) Since nature has two senses, form and matter, with which is the physicist concerned?

a. *Phys.* II 2, 193 b^{22,25}:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται ποσαχῶς ἡ φύσις λέγεται, μετὰ τοῦτο θεωρητέον τίνι διαφέρει ὁ μαθηματικὸς τοῦ φυσικοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα καὶ μήκη καὶ στιγμάς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικὸς.

1. Where is the border-line between phys. and math.?

b. *Ib.*, 193 b^{25,26}:

Ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀστρολογία ἑτέρα ἢ μέρος τῆς φυσικῆς.

2. The place of astronomy

c. *Ib.*, 194 a^{12,13}, 15¹¹:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, — ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, — περὶ ποτέρας τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀφοῦν. Ἀλλ' εἰ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀφοῦν, καὶ περὶ ἐκατέρας. Πότερον οὖν τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης ἐκατέραν γνωρίζειν;

3. Which is the object of natural science?

These questions are answered here by Ar. very shortly. They have been broadly treated by Mansion in his fifth chapter (*Introd.*, pp. 122-205).

487—The first question should be understood starting from Platonism.

First question

a. According to Ar. in *Metaph.* A 6 Plato distinguished three degrees of being: αἰσθητά — μαθηματικά — εἶδη, corresponding with three kinds of knowledge. As to the introduction of εἶδη — an imperishable and non-changing kind of being, on which the αἰσθητά depend by μέθεξις —, we

Plato's tripartition of being

gave the texts of A 6 and M 4 in our nr. **204a** and **b**. In A 6 Ar. continues (987 b¹⁴⁻¹⁸):

Ἦτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἶδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φησι μεταξὺ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀίδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἅττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἑκάστων μόνον.

We know this doctrine from Pl., *Rep.* VI, 509-511¹ and VII 533-534: dialectic is placed at the top; it reaches up to true Reality and the Good. Next follows mathematical knowledge, which does not extend to contemplation of the highest Reality, because it cannot render an account of its first principles ("hypotheses"). Finally there is *doxa*, which is no knowledge in the strictest sense and cannot be so, because its object is the ever-changing nature of the sensible things. Plato has come very near to a science of nature. The essential purpose of his theory of Ideas was to explain how rational knowledge of sensible things is possible. But in the strictest sense Pl. denied it up to the end².

b. Ar. gives to physics a place in the system of sciences. True knowledge of physical objects is possible, because they contain an intelligible element within them, which is their essence: the form.

In physical objects this form is essentially joined to matter. In his *Metaph.* we shall see Ar. occupied with the question whether there exists any purely intelligible being, not joined to matter (what Ar. called "separate", χωριστόν). He answers in the affirmative. This, then, is the object of metaphysics, which is called by Ar. "first philosophy" or "theology". So we get the following tripartition of sciences:

Metaph. E 1, 1026 a¹³⁻¹⁶:

Ar.'s tri-
partition of
sciences

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἄλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἓν ἐστὶ περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἄλλ' ὥς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.

The tripartition itself is Platonic, but Ar. connects it with a different theory of knowledge, namely, his doctrine of abstraction. The objects of mathematics are the result of a further degree of abstraction than are those of physics. Physical objects, which are essentially joined to matter, cannot be separated from it, even in thought; mathematical objects, which are according to Ar. not "separate"

¹ Our nr. **294**.

² *Phil.* 59 a-b. In my *Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme* (*Revue de Métaph.* 1951, pp. 249-268) I argued that in later platonism the opposition of an unchanging and immovable ideal World to that of ever-changing sensible things has been essentially broken down. If it is true that in *Parm.* and *Soph.* motion was introduced by Plato in the ideal World—as I think it was—this statement should be accepted. It does not take away the fact that, on the point in question, sc. the establishing of the possibility of natural science, Ar. has completed what Plato had begun.

(as Plato thought they are), but "somehow connected with matter", can be separated from it *in abstracto*.

This is what Ar. explains in the next passage of *Phys. II*, ch. 2.

c. *Phys. II* 2, 194 a¹⁻⁷:

Γίγνεται δ' ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἰ τις ἐκατέρων πειρῶτο λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους, καὶ αὐτῶν ¹ καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται ² καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἄνευ κινήσεως, σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὅστουν καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥίς σιμὴ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὥς τὸ καμπύλον λέγεται.

Difference
between
phys. and
math. objects

The latter are defined like "snub nose", not like "curved". σιμόν is with Ar. a classical instance of an accidens, and at the same time of a form which is realized in matter. E.g. the next passage.

d. *Metaph. E* 1, 1025 b³⁰⁻³⁴:

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὀρίζομένων καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ὥς τὸ σιμόν τὰ δ' ὥς τὸ κοῦλον. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν σιμόν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἐστὶ γὰρ τὸ σιμόν κοίλη ῥίς), ἡ δὲ κοιλότης ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς.

488—What is the place of applied mathematics: of astronomy, optics, harmonics? In other places mechanics, too, are mentioned.

Second
question

These sciences have to do with natural bodies; they also treat the accidents of them. Therefore Ar. calls them τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων. E.g. his work *De caelo* is a truly physical treatise. Yet the method of these sciences is a mathematical one. Where, then, are they to be placed?

Ar. answers: The position of astronomy is similar to that of geometry. Both deal with bodies, but from a special point of view, namely, making abstraction of corporeal reality. In the same way optics are a system of geometrical relations, harmonics of arithmetical propositions, mechanics an application of stereometry. But the method of astronomy is in a certain sense the inverse of that of geometry.

Ar. explains this in the passage following that which has been cited sub 487c.

a. *Phys. II* 2, 194 a⁷⁻¹²:

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων, οἷον ὀπτική καὶ ἁρμονική καὶ ἀστρολογία· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ τρόπον τιν' ἔχουσι τῇ γεωμετρίας. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρία περὶ γραμμῆς φυσικῆς σκοπεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ φυσική, ἡ δ' ὀπτική μαθηματικὴν μὲν γραμμὴν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ μαθηματικὴ ἀλλ' ἡ φυσική.

The method
of applied
mathematics

What he means to say is: astronomy etc. follow a mathematical method, but they have to return to physical reality and there apply the mathematical relations found by abstraction. Cp. *Metaph. B* 2, 997 b¹⁴⁻³⁶, where Ar. argues (against the platonic hypothesis of an intermediate world of mathematical objects, existing separately) that astronomy has to deal with the actual heavens of our world.

¹ αὐτῶν - the subjects.

² ἔσται - to be linked with ἄνευ κινήσεως.

b. On the other hand, Ar. repeatedly teaches that sciences, the object of which is realized in phenomena and which therefore have to do directly with concrete things, are by this very reason less accurate, because the object is more complicated. E.g.

Metaph. A 2, 982 a²⁶⁻²⁸:

Ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσὶν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων¹ ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων², οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας).

Nearly the same is said in *An. post.* I 27, 87 a³¹.

Third
question

489—Which “nature” is the object of physics: form or matter?
Ar. answers: both.

Both matter
and form
are the
object of
physics

Phys. II 2, 194 a¹²⁻¹⁵:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὥς ἂν εἰ περὶ σιμότητος σκοποῖμεν τί ἐστίν, οὕτω θεωρητέον. Ὡστ' ὄντ' ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.

Pre-socratic philosophers dealt almost exclusively with matter, e.g. Empedocles and Democritus. To their view Ar. opposes the subordination of matter to form. Hence follows that for the physicist form is of primary importance.

Matter and
form are
they object
of the same
science?

490—Ar. also asks the question whether the two aspects of nature belong to one and the same science or to a different one. He answers that both belong to the same, and illustrates this by the analogy of art; e.g. the building of a house.

First
argument:
the analogy
of art

a. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a²¹⁻²⁷:

Εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὕλην μέχρι τοῦ (οἷον ἱατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγμα, ἐν οἷς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμου τό τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὅτι πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀμφοτέρας τὰς φύσεις.

Second
argument:
teleology in
nature

b. *Ib.*, 194 a²⁷⁻³⁶; 194 b⁷⁻⁸:

Ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα³. Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα· ὦν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὕσης ἐστὶ τι τέλος τῆς κινήσεως, τοῦτο ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. Διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς⁴ γελοῖως

¹ αἱ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων - those which involve fewer principles.

² αἱ ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγόμεναι - those which involve additional principles (Ross).

³ τῆς αὐτῆς (sc. ἐπιστήμης) καὶ - eiusdem ac.

⁴ ὁ ποιητής - sc. Euripides, in a play unknown to us.

προήχθη εἰπεῖν »ἔχει τελευτήν, ἥσπερ οὐνεκ' ἐγένετο«. Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἀπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν¹, καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων. Ἐσμὲν γὰρ πως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα². — Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὐσα.

c. Ib., 194 b⁸⁻⁹:

Ἔτι τῶν πρὸς τι ἡ ὕλη· ἄλλω γὰρ εἶδει ἄλλη ὕλη.

Which means: Form and matter are correlatives. They claim each other mutually. But form can exist without matter (not in physical objects, but as object of metaphysics), matter cannot without form. Therefore Ar. says that matter belongs to the πρὸς τι.

**Third
argument:
matter and
form are
correlatives**

491—Hence, in the final passage of our chapter the author speaks about metaphysics, as it should be distinguished from physics.

**The border-
line between
phys. and
metaph.**

Phys. II 2, 194 b⁹⁻¹⁵:

Μέχρι δὴ πόσου τὸν φυσικὸν δεῖ εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστίν; ἥ ὥσπερ ἱατρὸν νεῦρον ἢ χαλκέα χαλκόν, μέχρι του. Τινὸς γὰρ ἕνεκα ἕκαστον, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ ἐστὶ χωριστὰ μὲν εἶδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ. Ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος. Ὡς δ' ἔχει τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τί ἐστὶ, φιλοσοφίας τῆς πρώτης διορίσαι ἔργον.

The meaning of this passage is: physics have to do with the *eidōs* up to a certain point, namely, until the physicist understands the purpose of each thing. He has not to do with the *eidōs* as far as this can exist in itself, not joined to matter. For in that sense the *eidōs* is the object of a different science: metaphysics. Physical objects, however, are always form joined to matter. "Man is begotten by man, and by the sun as well".—The author means to say: physical generation can be explained from itself. A metaphysical man-in-himself is of no use to it. Organic beings generate themselves, "together with the sun"—because the heavenly bodies, especially the sun, have an important part in the physical process of generation.

492—The next chapter (3) deals with the four causes, a subject which is continued in ch. 7 and 8, where the author argues that form is properly the cause of things. Having treated the questions of *τύχη* and *αὐτόματον*, which are also considered as causes of things, in chapters 4-6, he applies in his last chapter (9) the principle of the final cause to the problem of

**Chapters
3-9**

¹ Some arts make the matter (from something different), others make it more serviceable (e.g. when iron is melted).

² From *De anima* 415 b² we know what Ar. means by this distinction: τὸ δ' οὐ ἕνεκα διττόν· τὸ μὲν οὐ, τὸ δὲ ὤ. E.g. in one sense health is the οὐ ἕνεκα of the medical art; in another sense the patient is.

the necessity of physical phenomena. This necessity does not proceed from antecedents to consequences, but inversely: the final cause is of primary importance.

This is the main thesis of Ar.'s natural philosophy.

the four causes 493—*Phys.* II 3, 194 b²³-195 a³:

- causa materialis** "Ἐνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἷτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιᾶλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη. 25
- c. formalis** "Ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη, οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἓν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ¹.
- c. efficiens** "Ἐτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἡρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας 30 αἷτιος, καὶ ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου.
- c. finalis** "Ἐτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιαίνη, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἷτιον. Καὶ ὅσα δὴ κίνησαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίνεται τοῦ τέλους, 35 οἷον τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἰσχυνασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστι, διαφέρει δ' ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ δ' ὄργανα.

Instances 494—a. *Metaph.* H 4, 1044 a³²-1044 b¹:

"Ὅταν δὴ τις ζητῇ τὸ αἷτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἷτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἰτίας. Οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἰτία ὡς ὕλη; ἄρα τὰ καταμήνια; τί δ' ὡς κινεῖ; ἄρα τὸ σπέρμα; τί δ' ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. τί δ' ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα; τὸ τέλος.

b. *Metaph.* B 2, 996 b⁵⁻⁸:

Ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντα τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν αἰτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἡ τέχνη καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δ' ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον ², ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, τὸ δ' εἶδος ³ ὁ λόγος.

In the last example it is clear that the formal cause is identical with the final, only seen from a different point of view. In a sense the form is the efficient cause, too. For the notion of "house" *works* as an idea which is present in the mind of the architect and directs his activity.—The

¹ τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ - the parts in the definition.

² Final cause is the ἔργον, i.e. the *function* of the house: "giving shelter to things and bodies", as is said in the definition of *Metaph.* H 2, 1043 a¹⁶ (ἀγγεῖον οἰκαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων), and again in *De anima* I 1, 403 b³.

³ Formal cause is the notion "house", the definition.

same might be remarked as to the first instance, and so it is generally with natural beings. For the form, which is within them, is the cause of their motion (growth), and it is at the same time the end.

This is expressed by Ar. in the next passage.

495—*Phys.* II 7, 198 a²²⁻²⁹:

The three
non-material
causes often
coincide

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ οὐ 25 ἔνεκα. Ἐρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἓν πολλάκις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα ἓν ἐστὶ, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἢ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἶδει ταῦτ' οὗτοις· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Καὶ ὅλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ· ὅσα δὲ μὴ, οὐκέτι φυσικῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδ' ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

496—We saw the definitions of matter sub **476c, d**. Matter there appeared as a perfectly undetermined substratum, which has to receive its determination from the form. So matter is potential, form the actualizing principle.

In other places Ar. makes a distinction between matter in the absolute sense, which is called by the scholastics *materia prima*, and matter on a higher level, called δευτέρα ὕλη by the commentators. The first is perfectly undetermined and potential; the second, though it received a certain (elementary) determination, is still potential in relation to a higher form.

Relative
character of
matter

Thus, prime matter is the substratum of elementary bodies (fire, air, water, earth). In a second stage these elementary substances become in their turn "matter" for some more complicated substance of a superior determination: homogeneous parts are formed (ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις) in organic beings, e.g. bone and flesh. Then, in the third and last stage, heterogeneous parts are formed (ἢ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν), such as face and hand.

a. De part. anim. II 1, 646 a¹²⁻²⁴:

Τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν τῶν συνθέσεων πρώτην μὲν ἂν τις θεῖη τὴν ἐκ τῶν κα- 15 λουμένων ὑπὸ τινων στοιχείων, οἷον γῆς ἀέρος ὕδατος πυρός. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων λέγειν, καὶ τοῦτων οὐκ ἐξ ἀπασῶν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὕλη τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἷον 20 βάρος καὶ κουφότης καὶ πυκνότης καὶ μαλότης καὶ τραχύτης καὶ λειότης καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῶν σωμάτων. δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἢ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστίν, οἷον ὁστοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. τρίτη δὲ καὶ τελευταία κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἢ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, οἷον προσώπου καὶ χειρὸς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μορίων.

Therefore, matter is called by Ar. something relative (490 c: τῶν πρὸς τι ἢ ὕλη).

**Reaction
of matter
against
form**

b. Though matter is essentially passive, it does possess a certain activity. This might be inferred from the existence of monstrosities. In a sense these are natural beings, because they are generated by living beings according to a natural process. Yet they deviate from the normal type. Why?—Ar. replies: Because matter offers resistance to form and prevents it from realizing itself perfectly.

De gen. anim. IV 4, 770 b⁹⁻¹⁷:

Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ τέρας τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τι, παρὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἰο
ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ· περὶ γὰρ τὴν αἰεὶ καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐθὲν γίνεται παρὰ φύσιν,
ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μὲν οὕτω γινομένοις, ἐνδεχομένοις δὲ καὶ ἄλλως,
ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτων ἐν ὅσοις συμβαίνει παρὰ τὴν τάξιν μὲν ταύτην, αἰεὶ μέντοι
μὴ τυχόντως, ἦττον εἶναι δοκεῖ τέρας διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τρόπον 15
τινα κατὰ φύσιν, ὅταν μὴ κρατήσῃ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος φύσις.

See Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 114-116.

**Matter
a limiting
element
in nature**

c. Generally speaking, matter sets bounds to the possibility of production of nature; for not every matter can adopt every determination.

Metaph. H 4, 1044 a¹⁷:

Ἔστι τις οἰκεία — sc. ὕλη — ἐκάστου.

**Form
parallel to
matter**

497—Form is used in parallel senses to matter.

Now, "matter" is sometimes used by Ar. to indicate the corporeal object, as our senses can grasp it. Form, then, is *the intelligible type*, which is, opposite to the sensible substratum, the determining element in the order of knowledge.

the essence

Form, therefore, is *the essence*. Ar. often speaks of it with the terms τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία and λόγος (notion, definition). Cp. the passage about the four causes (493).

a. Cf. *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 a²⁶:

Τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοῦτου γένη etc.

Exactly the same words as in *Phys.* II 3.

b. *De gen. et corr.* II 9, 335 b⁶:

ἡ μορφή καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἐκάστου οὐσίας.

In general μορφή indicates a visible form, εἶδος an intelligible form or structure.

498—a. *Nature acts for the sake of an end, and it is itself an end.* **teleology**
 This is Ar.'s main thesis as to his doctrine on nature.

Phys. II 2, 194 a²⁸:

Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.

This view of nature is closely connected with that of Plato in *Nom.* X and is directed against pre-socratic materialism, especially against Empedocles' doctrine on the forming of organisms (our nr. **111a-d**).

b. Not every thing can claim to be an end, but only that which **The end is what is best**
 is best. We saw this in **490b** (194 a³²: Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον
 τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον).

Again in *Phys.* II 3, 195 a²³⁻²⁵:

Τὰ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλος καὶ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων (sc. αἰτία ἐστίν)· τὸ γὰρ οὗ
 ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι.

The same in *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 b²⁵⁻²⁷.

c. An ἀγαθόν is to Ar. always a certain plenitude of being, never **always a plenitude of being**
 a non-being.

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b²⁸⁻²⁹:

Βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι.

d. Hence a being never can strive after its own extinction, nature **never non-being**
 striving always for "what is best", i.e. a fuller development. Ar. therefore
 finds fault with Platonism, which would lead up to the impossible conse-
 quence that "the contrary would strive after its own extinction".

Phys. I 9, 192 a¹⁹⁻²⁰:

Τοῖς δὲ (sc. Πλατωνικοῖς) συμβαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ
 φθορᾶς.

e. Passing-away of individuals should be positively valued, as **Positive value of passing-away**
 passing up the universal order.

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b¹⁰:

— ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορά καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν.

"The natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy
 equal periods of time" (Joachim).

499—Ar. gives four arguments for the finality of nature.

a. The first stands against Empedocles' theory of the forming of **First argument for finality**
 organisms. Ar. argues: natural facts happen regularly; but what happens
 regularly, cannot be ascribed to chance.

Phys. II 8, 198 b³⁵-199 a⁸:

Πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ αἰεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἢ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὕειν 199 a πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνᾳ · οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνᾳ, ἀλλ' ἂν χειμῶνος. Εἰ οὖν ἢ ὥς ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἶόν τε ταῦτ' εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ' ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, ἕνεκά του ἂν 5 εἶη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γ' ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα ¹, ὥς καὶ αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

**Second
argument**

b. *Ib.*, 199 a⁸⁻¹⁵:

Ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἐστὶ τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πράττεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ἑφεξῆς. Οὐκοῦν ὥς πράττεται, οὕτω πέφυκε, καὶ ὥς πέφυκεν, οὕτω πράττεται 10 ἕκαστον, ἂν μὴ τι ἐμποδίζῃ. Πράττεται δ' ἕνεκά του · καὶ πέφυκεν ἄρα τούτου ἕνεκα. Οἶον εἰ οἰκία τῶν φύσει γινομένων ἦν, οὕτως ἂν ἐγίνετο ὥς νῦν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης · εἰ δὲ τὰ φύσει μὴ μόνον φύσει ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνοιτο, ὥσαύτως ἂν γίνετο ἢ πέφυκεν. Ἔνεκα ἄρα θατέρου θάτερον. 15

Mansion paraphrases lines 8-12 as follows.

"With all things that have a final term which is their completion, the development leading to that final term is the result of an action which aims at that term as an end. With a natural action, however, corresponds a natural agents, and the nature of this agents shows itself in the character of the development. Therefore, if the development aims at an end, then the nature which is its agents, does too".

**Third
argument**

c. *Ib.*, 199 a¹⁵⁻²⁰:

Ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἢ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. Εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἕνεκά του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν · ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν τὰ ὕστερα πρὸς τὰ πρότερα.

**Fourth
argument**

d. *Ib.*, 199 a²⁰⁻³⁰:

Μάλιστα δὲ φανερόν ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνη οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε βουλευσάμενα πυνεῖ · ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῶ ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργάζονται οἱ τ' ἀράχνη καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Κατὰ μικρὸν δ' οὕτω προϊόντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γινόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἶον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης. Ὡστ' εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά 25 του ἢ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνηον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα

¹ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα - e.g. teeth (mentioned in the preceding passage) and other parts of the body, which seem manifestly to have been made for some special use.

ἐνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω ἐνεκα τῆς τροφῆς, φανερόν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

Mansion remarks: It might seem from the third argument, that Ar. conceives of nature, on the analogy of art, as a deliberating and consciously acting being. If this were true, Ar.'s teleology would be anthropomorphist, as it is usually thought to be by modern critics. That it is not so, appears from the fourth argument: to Ar. finality implies neither deliberation nor intelligence. The cosmic order is *intelligible*, but *impersonal*. There is in nature *a coordination of certain activities and certain essences*, in such a manner, that those forms of activity assure to each species a regular development, repeated in innumerable individuals. This, and nothing else, appears to be the meaning of Ar.'s teleological explanation of nature.

Finality is impersonal according to Ar.

500—Nevertheless, a great number of passages might be cited in which Ar. speaks of nature as of an intelligent and consciously acting being¹. We give some instances.

Nature often represented by Ar. as an intelligent being

a. *De gen. anim.* II 6, 744 b¹⁶:

"Ὡσπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαι τι χρηστόν.

b. *De part. anim.* IV 10, 686 a²⁰⁻²⁴:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐστὶ καμπτὸς καὶ σφονδύλους ἔχων², οἱ δὲ λύκοι καὶ λέοντες μονόστουν τὸν αὐχένα ἔχουσιν· ἐβλεψε γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὅπως πρὸς τὴν ἰσχὺν χρήσιμον αὐτὸν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας βοηθείας.

c. *Ib.*, III 8, 670 b^{33-671 a}⁹:

Κύστιν δ' οὐ πάντ' ἔχει τὰ ζῷα, ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις βουλομένη ἀποδιδόναι α τοῖς ἔχουσι τὸν πλεύμονα ἔναιμον μόνον, τούτοις δ' εὐλόγως. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς φύσεως, ἣν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτῳ, διψητικά τε ταῦτ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τῶν ζῴων, καὶ δεῖται τροφῆς οὐ μόνον τῆς ξηρᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγρᾶς 5 πλείονος, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ περίττωμα γίνεσθαι πλεῖον καὶ μὴ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅσον ὑπὸ τῆς κοιλίας πέττεσθαι καὶ ἐκκρίνεσθαι μετὰ τοῦ ταύτης περιττώματος. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν εἶναι τι δεκτικὸν καὶ τούτου τοῦ περιττώματος. διόπερ ὅσα πλεύμονα ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἅπαντ' ἔχει κύστιν.

d. *Ib.*, IV 5, 682 a⁶⁻⁸.

Ar. is speaking here about insects which continue to live after they have been

¹ Mansion, p. 261, notes 31-36, cites 20 passages, and in addition the whole treatise on *The Parts of Animals*.

² Sc. αὐχὴν.

cut into pieces. The reason of this is, he says, that in such insects as have long bodies the central organ, which is the seat of perception, consists of several parts.

Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν πᾶσι μόνον ἐν ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ¹, οὐ δυναμένη δ' ἐνεργεῖα ποιεῖ μόνον ἓν, δυνάμει δὲ πλείω· δῆλον δ' ἐν ἐτέροις ἐτέρων μᾶλλον.

e. *De gen. anim.* III 2, 753 a⁷⁻¹¹:

Ἦτοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἴσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν ² παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν χείροσι τοῦτ' ἐμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκεῖν μόνον, τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελέωσιν, ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφήν.

f. *Ib.*, IV 10, 778 a⁴⁻⁹.

In the preceding lines the author has spoken about the influence of the so-called natural periods (day and night, month and year) on the generation of living beings. He continues:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς ³ ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκριβοῦς δὲ ⁴ διὰ τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀοριστίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλὰς ἀρχάς, αἱ τὰς γενέσεις τὰς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς φθοράς ἐμποδίζουσαι πολλάκις αἵτιαι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμπιπτόντων εἰσίν.

Cp. *Phys.* II 8, 994 b⁴: καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἀμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἐνεκά του.

How to explain this

501—How, then, to explain this?—

Mansion ⁵ answers,—and we think he is right—: The theory, expounded in *Phys.* II, is not anthropomorphic, the application is. However, as all those passages are of a later date than *Phys.* II, so that it is not possible to explain them as expressing a more primitive stage in the thought of Ar., while, on the other hand, the author passes extremely severe judgment on Plato in the *Tim.*, we must conclude that the anthropomorphic version is with Ar. rather a form of expression, which should not be taken too literally.

Cp. *De caelo* II 9, 291 a²⁴:

—ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως.

"As if nature foresaw the consequences".—Here it is explicitly indicated, that we have only to do with an image. Wherever, then, the ὥσπερ has not been added, we have yet to understand this kind of expressions metaphorically.

To this, M. adds the argument that anthropomorphic expressions are especially numerous in the fragments of Ar.'s literary works (those of II. φιλ. in *De caelo*).

¹ The said organ.

² τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἴσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν - a special sense of care for their young.

³ "by the measure of these periods".

⁴ "but she does not bring this to pass accurately".

⁵ *Introd.*, p. 262-263.

Many instances of the same metaphorical use might be adduced from modern writers, and this not in popular works only.

Cp. in Bergson's *Evolution créatrice* the frequent use of terms like "nature has to triumph over resistances"; she "finds" or "tries different solutions for the same problem"¹; she "operates not in this, but in that way"²; etc.

502—*De caelo* I 4, 271 a³³:

Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσι.

'God and
nature' in
De caelo I

"God and nature"—almost as synonyms. What does this mean? Mansion answers: Not much, or rather *nothing*. It is just an expression, a metaphor. For it does not harmonize at all with Ar.'s conception of God in his scientific treatises on this subject (see § 5 of this chapter).

Now, certainly, M. is right. Only, when we remember that in the dialogue II. φιλ. the aspect of our visible world and of cosmic order seemed to Ar. a proof for the existence of gods³, it might become clear to us that the author of *De caelo* I, which is of an early date, still adhered to, or at least was not far away from, Plato's religious conviction that a god or a divine Mind must have created the order of the sensible world. We can imagine that, only a few years later, the same author detached himself from this conviction.

503—Chapters 4-6 deal with chance and spontaneity (τύχη and αὐτόματον), which are generally considered as causes of many things in nature.

First, they are said to be neither the cause of things which always come to pass in the same way, nor of those which mostly do so.

The next distinction made by Ar. is that between things which happen *τινὸς ἕνεκα* and others which do not. Chance and spontaneity occur in the first group. We cite the text.

a. *Phys.* II 5, 196 b¹⁷⁻³²:

Τῶν δὲ γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, τὰ δ' οὐ· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, τὰ δ' οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄμφω δ' ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του, ὥστε 20 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ὥς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἔστιν ἕνια περὶ ἃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. Ἔστι δ' ἕνεκά του ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας ἂν πραχθεῖη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως.

Τύχη
and
αὐτόματον

Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύχης φασὲν εἶναι. 25 Ὡς περ γὰρ καὶ ὃν ἔστι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, οὕτω καὶ αἷτιον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίας καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν αἷτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μουσικόν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὐτὸ αἷτιον ὠρισμένον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον· ἅπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίῃ.

¹ Reason (in man) and instinct (in animals) are, according to Bergson, "different solutions for the same problem".

² Not by composition or construction, like a human artisan, but by division. The "method" of nature is put in opposition to the method of man. Yet, nature "operates" after some intelligible method!

³ Our nr. 427.

Καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἔνεκά του γιγνομένοις τοῦτο γένηται, 30 τότε λέγεται ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. Αὐτῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων ὕστερον διοριστέον.

So both chance and spontaneity are in the sphere of things which happen ἔνεκά του. I.e.: chance is not against the finality of nature; it is subordinate to it, being an accidental cause.

Instance

b. Ib., 196 b³³-197 a³: an instance of chance.

Οἶον ἔνεκα τοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν τὸ ἀργύριον ἦλθεν ἄν, κομιζομένου τὸν ἔρανον, εἰ ἦδει¹. ἦλθε δ' οὐ τούτου ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ συνέβη αὐτῷ ἔλθεῖν, καὶ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα². τοῦτο δὲ οὐθ' ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὐτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἔστι δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἡ κομιδή, οὐ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ τῶν προαιρετῶν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας· καὶ λέγεταί γε τότε ἀπὸ τύχης ἔλθεῖν.

**Definition
of chance**

c. Ib., 197 a⁵⁻⁶:

Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἔνεκά του.

**Automaton
a larger
notion than
tychê**

504—a. *Phys.* II 6, 197 a³⁶-b⁸; b^{13,18}:

Διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλείον ἔστι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ 197 b τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις. Διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἦτοι ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἢ εὐτυχίᾳ ἢ ἐγγύς, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξις τις· εὐπραξία γάρ. 5 "Ὡσθ' ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· —

Τὸ δ' αὐτόματον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἀψύχων, οἶον ὁ ἵππος αὐτόματος, φαμέν, ἦλθεν, ὅτι ἐσώθη μὲν ἐλθὼν, οὐ τοῦ σωθῆναι δὲ 15 ἔνεκα ἦλθεν. Καὶ ὁ τρίπους αὐτόματος κατέπεσεν· ἔσθη μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἔνεκα, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἔνεκα κατέπεσεν.

¹ If the reading κομιζομένου is right, we must render: "A man gets back his money from his debtor who (at the very moment the other enters the market) is receiving contributions for a feast. He could have gone to the spot for the purpose of getting back his money, but"—etc.

² If the words τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα must be kept here, it is necessary to put a comma after ἐλθεῖν: "But he went for some other reason, and now, (in fact), he has done it for the sake of receiving his money".—The expression of this idea might seem to us rather strange. Bonitz simply ejected τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἔνεκα, and this might appear to the modern reader a highly attractive solution. Yet, I do think it possible that Ar. wrote these words. Cf. 197 b¹⁷ (our next nr.), where he says of the tripod that it "came to stand there so as to serve for a seat", though it did not fall for that use.

b. *Ib.*, 197 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Definition

"Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἀπλῶς ἕνεκά τοῦ γινομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἕνεκα γένηται οὐ ἕξω τὸ αἷτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου λέγομεν· ἀπὸ τύχης δέ, τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου γίνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.

505—Finally, is necessity in nature absolute, or is it hypothetical?—*Ar.* answers: the material cause is ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, but the final cause is the real and decisive cause.

Necessity
in naturea. *Phys.* II 9, 199 b^{34-200 a}¹⁰:

Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἀπλῶς; νῦν μὲν
200 a γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ
ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ
κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἢ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κου-
φότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γάρ.

5 'Ἄλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς δι'
ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν ἅττα καὶ σώζειν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις
πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά τοῦ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαῖαν ἔχόντων τὴν
10 φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἕνεκά τοῦ.

b. *Ib.*, 200 a³⁰⁻³⁴:

Φανερόν δὴ ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ
κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης. Καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ
τινὸς ἕνεκα· αἷτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους.

Mansion ¹ concludes: Finality, then, is according to *Ar.* the normal rule of nature, a necessity of an intelligible character. What is not governed by this law is what we call contingent, and is ascribed to accidental causes. But *Ar.* is not so much interested in the accidental and contingent as in the regular order of normal phenomena, by which the universe is sustained in that being which is its agathon.

4—DEFINITIONS OF MOTION, SPACE AND TIME

506—*Ar.* now tries to define motion. The definition is preceded by some preliminary remarks.

Motion

a. *Phys.* III 1, 200 b¹⁶⁻²¹:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν
τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀριζομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς συμβαίνει προσχρήσασθαι
πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχὲς ὂν.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

¹ *Introd.*, p. 327.

b. Ib., b²⁶⁻²⁸:

Ἔστι δὴ [τι] τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχεῖα μόνον¹, τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχεῖα, τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ τὸσόνδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως.

Definition**c.** Ib., 201 a¹⁰⁻¹¹:

ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἥ τοιοῦτον, κίνησις ἐστίν.

the definition explained**d.** Ib., 201 a¹¹⁻¹⁵:

Οἷον τοῦ μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ἥ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοιώσις, τοῦ δὲ αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν) αὐξήσις καὶ φθίσις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά.

E.g.: something is actually x (stones, wood and mortar), potentially y (a house). Now motion is: actualizing the y-ness (the building of the house).

Space**507—a.** *Phys.* IV 4, 212 a²¹⁻²²: definition.

τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦ τ' ἐστίν ὁ τόπος.

Space is motionless**b.** Ib., 212 a¹⁴⁻²⁰:

Ἔστι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τόπος ἀγγεῖον ἀμετακίνητον. Διὸ ὅταν μὲν ἐν κινουμένῳ τι κινῆται καὶ μεταβάλλῃ τὸ ἐντός, οἷον ἐν ποταμῷ πλοῖον, ὡς ἀγγεῖω χρῆται μᾶλλον ἢ τόπῳ τῷ περιέχοντι. Βούλεται δ' ἀκίνητος εἶναι ὁ τόπος· διὸ ὁ πᾶς μᾶλλον ποταμὸς τόπος, ὅτι ἀκίνητος ὁ πᾶς.

Time**508—Preliminary remarks on time.**

a. Time has to do with motion, but it is not motion.

Phys. IV 10, 218 b⁹⁻¹⁸:

not=motion

Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή τις ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη σκεπτέον. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐκάστου μεταβολή καὶ κινήσις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἥ οὐ ἂν τύγῃ ὅν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. Ἐτι δὲ μεταβολή μὲν ἐστὶ πᾶσα θάπτων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ¹⁵ χρόνῳ ὥριται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥριται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. Ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστι κινήσεις, φανερόν.

¹ τι is bracketed by Ross; Spengel, Bonitz and Prantl inserted τὸ δὲ δυνάμει after μόνον, a correction which has been adopted by Hardie in his translation.

b. Ib., 218 b²¹⁻²³:**yet not
without
change**

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ γε μεταβολῆς· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος.

509—a. Time, then, appears to be a certain aspect of motion.**Time an
aspect of
motion****Ib., 219 a²⁻⁴:**

Ληπτέον δέ, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν τί ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχομένοις, τί τῆς κινήσεως ἐστίν. Ἄμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου.

b. Ib., 219 a¹⁰⁻¹⁴:**Motion
goes with
magnitude**

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἔκ τινος εἰς τι καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος συνεχές, ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἢ κίνησις· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχές καὶ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστι συνεχής, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος· ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος αἰεὶ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι.

c. Ib., 219 a¹⁴⁻²¹:**πρότερον
and
ὑστερον**

15 Τὸ δὲ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν ἐστιν. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ. Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν αἰεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον
20 αὐτῶν. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει, ὃ μὲν ποτε ὄν κινήσις
ἐστίν¹. τὸ μέντοι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον καὶ οὐ κίνησις.

**not identical
with motion****d. Ib., 219 a²²⁻²⁵:****Yet connect-
ed with the
apprehension
of time**

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν, ὅταν ὀρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὀρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμέν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἰσθησιν λάβωμεν.

510—a. Ib., 219 b¹⁻²:**Definition**

Τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

b. Ib., 219 b⁵⁻⁹:**the definition
explained**

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ὧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ὧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. Ἔστι δ' ἕτερον ὧ ἀριθμοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον.

So time is "the countable aspect of movement". If an event comes to pass "in time", this means that it is measurable ("countable") by time.

¹ As to its substratum it is identical with motion; yet it differs from it in essence.

**Existence
in time**

511—a. *Phys.* IV 12, 221 a⁴⁻⁹:

Καὶ ἔστι τῇ κινήσει τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ μετρεῖσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς· ἅμα γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῇ κινήσει μετρεῖ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι αὐτῇ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι.

Δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου.

**Eternal
things are
not in time**

b. *Ib.*, 221 b³⁻⁷:

Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι τὰ αἰεὶ ὄντα, ἣ αἰεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται ὑπὸ χρόνου, οὐδὲ μετρεῖται τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου· σημειῶν δὲ τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσχει οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου ὡς οὐκ ὄντα ἐν χρόνῳ.

**Rest, too, is
in time**

c. *Ib.*, 221 b⁷⁻¹²:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἡρεμίας μέτρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ. Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κινήσει ὃν ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως· ἐν ἀριθμῷ δὲ κινήσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἡρεμοῦν.

**Would there
be time if
there were
no soul?**

512—At the end of this book Ar. raises the important question whether there would be time if there were no soul, i.e. if there were no knowing subject which could "count" or measure. He replies by saying that, in this case, there would still be movement, which is the "substratum" of time (τοῦτο ὃ ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος), but not its measurable aspect, which is "time".

Phys. IV 14, 223 a²¹⁻²⁹:

Πότερον δὲ μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὐ, ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις· ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητόν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀριθμός· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἡριθμημένον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητόν. Εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἐφέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς 25 μὴ οὔσης, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο ὃ ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ἄνευ ψυχῆς. Τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν· χρόνος δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀριθμητὰ ἐστίν.

5—THE THEORY OF THE FIRST UNMOVED MOVER

513—Ar. starts from the fact of movement in the sensible world. Now whatever is in movement is moved by something else. There must, then, be a First Mover, which is itself unmovable. This first Mover must be eternal, because movement is eternal—and such it is, in Aristotle's opinion, necessarily. It can have no parts nor magnitude, because

in a finite magnitude resides a finite force, and this could not be the cause of eternal motion. The first Movent, then, is incorporeal.

Ar. finally argues that the first Movent must be at the circumference of the world, because here the movement is quickest and therefore nearest to the Source.

We cite the end of Ar.'s exposition, where he resumes his main argument.

Phys. VIII 10, 267 a²¹-b⁹:

the theory of
the Prime
Mover in
Phys. VIII

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀνάγκη κίνησιν εἶναι συνεχῇ, αὕτη δὲ μία ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη
δὲ τὴν μίαν μεγέθους τέ τινος εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ κινεῖται τὸ ἀμέγεθες), καὶ ἐνὸς
καὶ ὅφ' ἐνός (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται συνεχής, ἀλλ' ἐχομένη ἐτέρα ἐτέρας καὶ διηρημένη),
25 τὸ δὴ κινεῖν εἰ ἔν, ἣ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἣ ἀκίνητον ὄν. Εἰ μὲν δὴ κινούμενον,
συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει¹ καὶ μεταβάλλειν αὐτό, ἅμα δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τινος.
267b Ὡστε στήσεται² καὶ ἥξει εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ ἀκινήτου· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ
ἀνάγκη συμμεταβάλλειν, ἀλλ' αἰετὸς δυνήσεται κινεῖν (ἄπονον γὰρ τὸ οὕτω³
κινεῖν) καὶ ὁμαλῆς αὕτη ἡ κίνησις, ἣ μόνῃ ἣ μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει μεταβολὴν
5 τὸ κινεῖν οὐδεμίαν. Δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ κινούμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἔχειν μεταβολήν,
ἵνα ὁμοία ἦ ἡ κίνησις.

Ἀνάγκη δὴ ἡ ἐν μέσῳ ἢ ἐν κύκλῳ εἶναι⁴. αὗται γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαί⁵. Ἀλλὰ τά-
χιστα κινεῖται τὰ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ κινούντος, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ τοῦ ὅλου κίνησις·
9 ἐκεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινεῖν.

514—The conclusion of the preceding passage leaves us with two problems: (1) How can a non-corporeal First Movent have its place at the outside of the universe? (2) How can it impart a physical movement?

To these questions Ar. gives the answer himself in the famous words in *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b³:

Κινεῖ δὴ ὥς ἐρώμενον.

It works as
a final cause

"It produces motion as being loved" or striven after.

Now this again leaves some difficulties: (1) If there is eternal movement, i.e. circular movement, which is the first and most perfect of motions, why then a First Mover? (2) If this First Mover, whom Ar. calls God (in *Metaph.* Λ), produces motion "as being loved", than a soul must be attributed to the first heaven; and,

¹ συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει - "it will have to be subject to the same conditions as that which it moves".

² "So we have a series that must come to an end".

³ οὕτω - sc. μὴ συμμεταβάλλον.

⁴ sc. τὸ κινεῖν. ἐν κύκλῳ - at the circumference.

⁵ αἱ ἀρχαί - sc. the first principles from which a sphere is derived. In ch. 8 Ar. has argued that only circular movement can be continuous and infinite.

if more unmoved movers are admitted (as Ar. teaches in Λ 8), so for each heavenly sphere.

Now the first point is against logic, the second against the view of modern science.

the Prime
Mover in
Metaph. Λ

515—What Ar. says further in *Metaph.* Λ , must be seen in connection with his doctrine of matter and form and of potency and act, which is expounded in the books Z- Θ (see our next chapter). We met with these principles in *Phys.* I-II.

(1) Matter is the indefinite, form the determining. In the physical world form and matter are united in the physical objects. But form can exist by itself, not in physical, but in metaphysical reality. The highest being, which as prime cause is at the beginning of all motion, must be pure form without matter.

(2) In order to explain the fact of physical change, Ar. assumes a *potential being*. This is something real (e.g. an acorn can become an oak, never a beech), but it must be brought to full reality (*ἐνέργεια* or *ἐντελέχεια*) by an efficient cause. Therefore the definition of motion, given sub **506c**. God, then, as supreme being, must be full reality or completion, and therefore absolutely necessary.

God as the
absolutely
necessary
being

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b⁴⁻¹¹:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ' εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη 4, ἢ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ἣ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινουὶν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργεία ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλω· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ἡ ἀνάγκη, 10 καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή.

b. As absolutely necessary being, then, it is the First Principle, on which the universe depends.

Ib., 1072 b¹³⁻¹⁴:

On this
principle
the universe
depends

Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἡρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.

One might justifiably call this a monotheistic principle. We find it expressed again at the end of the same book:

c. *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1076 a³⁻⁴.

In the preceding lines Ar. rejects the theory of Speusippus, who assumed mathematical number as first principle, instead of the Platonic Ideas and ideal Numbers. He rejects it on the ground, that by this theory a multiplicity of *ἀρχαί* would be introduced.

Τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς.

»Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω«.

516—Ar. now undertakes to describe the life and character of his Prime Mover.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b^{14,30}:The life of
the Prime
Mover

4, 15 Διαγωγῇ δ' ἐστὶν οἷα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ αἰεὶ ἐκεῖνο (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγγήγορσις αἰσθησις νόησις ἡδιστον¹, ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνημαὶ διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. 20 αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων² καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταῦτόν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ' ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο³ ὁ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἡδιστον καὶ ἀριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ 25 ἔχει, ὥς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς αἰεὶ, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δὲ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωὴ⁴, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ αἰδῖος. φαιμέν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῶν ἀίδιον ἀριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχῆς καὶ 30 αἰδῖος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

If the question is asked: what is the relation of this God of Ar. to the world, our answer must be: Certainly not that of Creator to creation. First, Ar. assumes eternal matter; so he does not know creation in the biblical sense of the word. Secondly, his God does not know the world. He only knows Himself, and to Ar. this knowledge does not include any knowledge of the world⁵; on the contrary, it excludes it.

b. Cp. *Metaph.* Λ 9, 1074 b^{33,35}:Νόησις
νοήσεως

Αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

517—We could read chapters 7, 9 and 10 of *Metaph.* Λ as a unity, in which we find one line of thought: the establishment of the principle of the Prime Mover, who is the one ἀρχή on which depends the whole of the universe and nature. theory of
a multiplicity
of unmoved
movers

Ch. 8 introduces a theory, which might appear to us as harmonizing rather badly with the preceding, namely, that, as there are 47 or 55 celestial spheres, for each of them an unmoved mover should be assumed.

¹ On the value of knowledge and perception in itself cp. *Metaph.* A 1.

² θιγγάνων - in coming into contact with its objects. Cp. nr. 559b (*Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b 24 f.).

³ τοῦτο - the actual possession of its object is rather the θεῖον which thought seems to contain in itself, than "that" (ἐκείνου),—sc. than the mere δεκτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ νοητοῦ.

⁴ These words have been chosen by Werner Jaeger as a motto for his *Aristotle*.

⁵ S. Thomas Aquinas, who explained Ar. with great benevolence, found the way to a larger interpretation: directly the divine Mind knows only itself, but in Himself God knows all things. ("Nec sequitur quod omnia alia a se ei sunt ignota; nam intelligendo se intellegit omnia alia.") So also in Brentano, who christianizes Ar. even far more than S. Thomas did.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1073 a¹⁴⁻¹⁵; a^{23-b1}:

Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν ¹. —

15

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινουὺν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀττίδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν · ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινου- 25 μενον ἀνάγκη ὑπὸ τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινουὺν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' αὐτό, καὶ τὴν ἀττίδιον κίνησιν ὑπὸ ἀττίδιου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ' ενός, ὁρῶμεν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντός τὴν ἀπλὴν φορὰν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμέν τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὐσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων ἀττίδιους (ἀττίδιον γὰρ καὶ 30 ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα · δέδεικται δ' ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ¹ περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἐκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ ἀττίδιου οὐσίας. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρον φύσις ἀττίδιος οὐσία τις οὔσα, καὶ τὸ κινουὺν 35 ἀττίδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τε φύσιν ἀττίδιους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αὐτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον. b

b. The numbers of these substances, then, must be determined by astronomy.

Ib., 1073 b¹⁻⁸:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρον, φανερόν · τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίας τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς 5 ἀστρολογίας · αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀττίδιου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας ², οἷον ἢ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν.

c. Astronomical calculation leads Ar. to the following result.

Ib., 1074 a¹⁰⁻¹⁶:

Ὅ δὲ ἀπάσῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν ³ ταύτας 10 πεντήκοντά τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθεῖν τις ἄς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἐπτὰ τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. — τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς 15 ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητάς] τοσαύτας εὐλογον ὑπολαβεῖν.

¹ Cf. *Phys.* VIII 8, 9; *De caelo* I 2, II 3-8.

² Ar. states here without any hesitation, that mathematics have no οὐσίαι as their object. In E 1 (cited sub 487b) the formula is by no means so categorical. Our passage, then, seems to have been written rather late, at any rate at some posterior date than E 1.

³ ἀπάσῶν - sc. τῶν σφαιρῶν, both those which move the planets and those which "roll them back", counteracting the motion of certain spheres admitted by Eudoxus and Callippus, so that the first motion is restored. Vid. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, p. 217 ff.

518—This chapter ¹ is generally considered as being of a later date than the rest of book *Λ*. Jaeger, who devotes a whole chapter to this question ², estimates the interval at some twenty years at least; Mansion does not think it so long.

Place of
this theory

The question has been treated lately in an original way by Ph. Merlan in *Traditio* IV (1946), pp. 1-30. The author argues that Ar. was not concerned with the question of monotheism or polytheism at all; that indications for the latter might be found in *Phys.* VIII 6 and in *De caelo* I 9³ as well, and that *Metaph.* *Λ* 8 harmonizes perfectly well with its surroundings. This chapter, therefore, should not be considered as a later addition. The unmoved movers of Ar. have taken the place of the ideal Numbers of Plato, as is clearly shown in the beginning of *Λ* 8, where Ar. finds fault with Pl. for not having determined the number of these beings with any satisfying argument.

Metaph. *Λ* 8, 1073 a¹⁴⁻²³:

Ἰότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, δεῖ μὴ
 15 λανθάνειν ⁴ ἀλλὰ μεμνησθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους
 οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ιδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδε-
 μίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμούς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ιδέας οἱ λέγοντες ιδέας,
 20 περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὅτε μὲν ὡς περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὅτε δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς
 δεκάδος ὠρισμένων ⁵. δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν,
 οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς)· ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ
 διωρισμένων λεκτέον.

Then follows the rest of the text given sub **517a**.

Now there can be little doubt that, in *Phys.* VIII too, Ar. admitted of more *ἀκίνητα*. But (1) this book is not of an early date, and (2) chapter 8 of *Metaph.* *Λ* makes the impression of a later addition. So probably Mansion is right in supposing that there is some interval between this chapter and its surroundings, but not as long a one as Jaeger thought.

¹ Except the passage 1074 b³¹⁻³⁸ ("Ὅτι δὲ εἰς οὐρανός, φανερόν E.q.s."), which seems to be an early fragment, embedded in a chapter written rather late in Ar.'s life.

² *Aristotle*, p. 342-367.

³ The reference is to 279a¹⁹⁻²⁴, where Ar. speaks of *τάκεῖ*, i.e. that which is outside the heaven, as being above place and time, immutable and immovable.

⁴ This part of the opening sentence has been cited above, sub **517a**.

⁵ We dealt with this text in **366**.

FOURTEENTH CHAPTER THE METAPHYSICS

I—THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

519—What is the object of metaphysics (in *Metaph.* A indicated by the term σοφία)?—Ar. answers in the opening chapters of this book: Wisdom is knowledge of the first causes.

Metaph. A, 1 and 2, 980 a²¹-983 a²³:

**Value of
knowledge**

Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. σημεῖον δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ⁹⁸⁰ ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι' αὐτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ^{a21} ἄλλων ἢ διὰ τῶν ὁμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἰρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων. αἷτιον δ' ὅτι ²⁵ μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δημοῖ διαφοράς.

Its genesis ¹

Φύσει μὲν οὖν αἰσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῶα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ' ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονιμώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστὶ, φρόνιμα μὲν ἄνευ τοῦ μανθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῶων ἐστι), μανθάνει δ' ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ^{b25} ἔχει τὴν αἰσθησιν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοῖς. γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνημαὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμη καὶ ^{981a} τέχνη ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ². ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ Πῶλος, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τέχνην. 5

**Difference
between
experience
and science**

Γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων ³ μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλιὰ κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω

¹ The following passage should be compared with *Anal. post.* II 19 (our nr. 465). See also 457a.

² ἀποβαίνει δὲ - τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: "but really science and art come to man *through* experience".

³ τ. ἐμπειρίας ἐννοήματα - empirical notions.

10 πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ' εἶδος ἐν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τῇδὲ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσιν [ἢ] πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυχάνουσιν¹ οἱ ἐμπειροὶ τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον² 15 ἐχόντων (αἷτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ 20 Καλλιάν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων ὅς συμβέβηκεν³) ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτῆσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον)· ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ 25 ἐπάτειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἴομεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπειρῶν ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὥς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ' οὐ· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειροὶ τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασιν, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν 30 αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

Science
knows the
causes

Διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι 981b νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν (τοὺς δ', ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια ποιεῖ μὲν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ 2 ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ — τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινὲ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον 5 τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι' ἔθος), ὥς οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρακτικὸν εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν. ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος καὶ μὴ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δὲ οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν.

He who
knows can
teach

10 "Ἐτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι σοφίαν· καίτοι κυριώταταί γ' εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γνώσεις· ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός, οἷον διὰ τί θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι θερμόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν 15 ὁποιοανοῦν εὐρόντα τέχνην παρὰ⁴ τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι τι τῶν εὐρεθέντων ἀλλ' ὥς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· πλείονων δ' εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν

¹ ἐπιτυχάνουσι - "hit the mark", succeed.

² λόγον - theory.

³ ὅς συμβέβηκεν - Ross rightly remarks that it is "of course not an accident of Callias, as opposed to his essence and his properties, that he is a man". The term is used simply to indicate that it is not directly "man" that the doctor cures, but directly Callias and indirectly man because C. is a man.

⁴ παρὰ - that went beyond the common perceptions of man.

Purely
theoretical
science was
invented
last

πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν ¹ οὐσῶν, αἰ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. 20

"Ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἥδονην μηδὲ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὐπερ ἐσχόλασαν· διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς ² τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν 25 ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὐ δ' ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτι τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν ³ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες· ὥστε, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, χειρο- 30 τέχνου δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν ⁴ μᾶλλον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περὶ τινὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον. 982a

With what
causes
wisdom is
concerned

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτόμενον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι τις τὰς 5 ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ' ἂν ἐκ τούτου φανερόν γένοιτο μᾶλλον. ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται ⁵, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν· εἴτα τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γινῶναι δυνά- 10 μενον καὶ μὴ ῥάδια ἀνθρώπων γιγνώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥᾶδιον καὶ οὐδὲν σοφόν)· ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν διδασκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτιῶν σοφώτερον εἶναι περὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἰρετὴν οὐσαν μᾶλλον 15 εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον σοφίαν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἄλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἐτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἥττον σοφόν.

Τὰς μὲν οὖν ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ 20 τῶν σοφῶν· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν (οὗτος γὰρ οἶδὲ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα) ⁶, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου (πορρωτάτα γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐστίν), ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπι- 25 στημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσὶν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων ⁷, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλική γε ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον (οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν,

¹ πρὸς διαγωγὴν - πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.

² *Eth. Nic.* VI 3, 1139 b¹⁴-1141 b⁸.

³ τ. ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν - elsewhere called first philosophy.

⁴ τ. ποιητικῶν - those which produce concrete results.

⁵ ὡς ἐνδέχεται - as far as possible.

⁶ πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα - all the instances that fall under the universal.

⁷ We explained this sentence sub 488b.

30 οἱ τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἐκάστου), τὸ δ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν
 ἕνεκα ¹ μάλιστα ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ (ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἐπί-
 982b στασθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἰρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα αἰρήσεται,
 τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ), μάλιστα δ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα
 καὶ τὰ αἰτία (διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα γνωρίζεται ἄλλ' οὐ ταῦτα
 5 διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς
 ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκὲν ἐστὶ πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ'
 ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐκάστου, ὅπως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ ².

Especially
with the
final cause

Ἐξ ἀπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητού-
 μενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικὴν·
 10 καὶ γὰρ τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα ἐν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν.

Ἄρα δ' οὐ ποιητικὴ, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων· διὰ γὰρ
 τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν. ἐξ ἀρχῆς
 μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων ³ θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες
 15 καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περὶ τε τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων
 καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ δ'
 ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἄγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφος πῶς
 ἐστίν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων)· ὥστ' εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεῦγειν τὴν
 20 ἄνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερόν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ
 οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός ⁴. σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων
 ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἡ τοιαύτη φρό-
 νησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι ⁵. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητούμεν χρεῖαν
 25 ἐτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου
 ὦν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὔσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ
 αὕτη αὐτῆς ἕνεκὲν ἐστίν.

Phil. no
science with
practical use

Therefore the
only free
science

Διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις· πολλαχῇ γὰρ
 30 ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην «θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ'
 ἔχοι γέρας», ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐπιστήμην ⁶.

¹ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα = pursued for their own sake.

² On the primary importance of the final cause see nrs. 492 ff., 498 ff.

³ τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων - Alexander of Aphrodisias cites the following examples: why amber attracts chaff-like substances (a question which interested Thales), the nature of the rainbow (discussed by Anaximenes and by other early thinkers), and other meteorological problems.

⁴ τὸ συμβεβηκός - what really has happened; "the course of events".

⁵ I think τῶν must be inserted: in 981 b²⁷ two groups are mentioned, namely (τέχνη) αἱ μὲν πρὸς ἀνάγκη, αἱ δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὔσαι, the last being partly for the material, partly for the spiritual or mental εὖ ζῆν (καὶ πρὸς ῥαστώνην κ. διαγωγὴν).

⁶ ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον e.q.s. - The quotation, known to us by Plato's *Protagoras* 341 e, continues: ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἐμμεναι (Edmonds, *Lyrici* II, p. 284).— οὐκ ἄξιον - "it is unfitting". Ar. again refers to this question in *Eth. Nic.* X, at

the most
divine and
honourable

εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι 983a
μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττούς ¹. ἀλλ' οὕτε τὸ θεῖον
φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἄνθρωποι,
οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν. ἡ γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτά- 5
τη· τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνη· ἥν τε γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, καὶ εἴ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. μόνη δ' αὕτη τούτων ἀμφοτέρων
τετύχηκεν· ὁ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσιν ² εἶναι καὶ ἀρχὴ τις, καὶ
τὴν τοιαύτην ἢ μόνος ἢ μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός. ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι 10
ταύτης, ἀμείνων δ' οὐδεμία.

Its final
result

Δεῖ μέντοι πως καταστῆναι ³ τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς εἰς τοῦναντίον ἡμῖν τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ζητήσεων. ἄρχονται μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες
εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ <περὶ> τῶν θαυμάτων ταυτόματα ⁴ [τοῖς μήπω τε-
θεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν] ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμ- 15
μετρίαν ⁵ (θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι <τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν
αἰτίαν> εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται). δεῖ δὲ εἰς τοῦναντίον καὶ τὸ ἄμεινον
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀποτελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν μάθωσιν·
οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως θαυμάσειεν ἄνθρωπος γεωμετρικὸς ὥς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος 20
μετρητὴ. τίς μὲν οὖν ἢ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς
ὁ σκοπὸς οὗ δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.

520—After having given an account of earlier philosophy (the rest of book A), Ar. now proceeds to state the main problems of metaphysics.

Metaph. B 1, 995 a²⁴-996 a¹⁷:

List of
ἀπορίαι

Ἄναγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον περὶ 995a
ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί 25
τινες, καὶ εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι
βουλομένοις προὔργον τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις
τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, 30
ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ἡ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ,
ταύτη παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελ-

the end of ch. 7 (1177 b²⁸): 'Ο δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, where he answers to this objection: Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ (nr. 606b).

¹ πάντας τοὺς περιττούς - "all those who occupy themselves with things which do not concern them".

² πᾶσιν - of all things.

³ δεῖ καταστῆναι - must end in.

⁴ ταυτόματα - marionettes.

⁵ The incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side.

θεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας θεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον,
 τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους
 35 εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητού-
 15b μενον εὗρηκεν ἢ μὴ γινώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον τῷ δὲ προ-
 ηπορηκότι δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρίναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων
 καὶ τῶν ἀμφοισθητόντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων. — ἔστι δ' ἀπορία πρώτη
 5 μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς περφορμασμένους διηπορήσαμεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν
 ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας· καὶ πότερον τὰς τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας
 ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἰδεῖν μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἔξ ὧν δεικνύουσι πάντες,
 οἷον πότερον ἐνδέχεται ταῦτ' οὐ καὶ ἐν ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἢ οὐ, καὶ περὶ
 10 τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· εἴ τ' ἔστι περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, πότερον μίᾳ περὶ πάσας
 ἢ πλείονές εἰσι, καὶ εἰ πλείονες πότερον ἅπασαι συγγενεῖς ἢ τὰς μὲν σοφίας
 τὰς δὲ ἄλλο τι λεκτέον αὐτῶν· καὶ τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι,
 15 πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μόνον φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ
 πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείονα γένη τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ ποιοῦντες τά τε εἶδη καὶ
 τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. περὶ τε τούτων οὖν,
 καθάπερ φαμέν, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἢ θεωρία μόνον
 20 ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ
 ταύτου καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου καὶ ἐναντιότητος, καὶ περὶ προτέρου
 καὶ ὑστέρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν τοιούτων περὶ ὧν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ
 πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνων ποιούμενοι τὴν σκέψιν, τίνος ἐστὶ
 25 θεωρῆσαι περὶ πάντων· ἔτι δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὅσα καθ' αὐτὰ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ
 μὴ μόνον τί ἐστὶ τούτων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄρα ἐν ἐνὶ ἐναντίον· καὶ πότερον αἱ
 ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον·
 καὶ εἰ τὰ γένη, πότερον ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις λέγεται τελευταῖα ἢ τὰ πρώτα,
 30 οἷον πότερον ζῶν ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχή τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον.
 μάλιστα δὲ ζητητέον καὶ πραγματευτέον πότερον ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην αἷτιον
 καθ' αὐτὸ ἢ οὐ, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ἐν ἢ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμὸν,
 35 καὶ πότερον ἐστὶ τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον (λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ
 τι τῆς ὕλης) ἢ οὐθέν, ἢ τῶν μὲν τῶν δ' οὐ, καὶ ποῖα τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων. ἔτι αἱ
 96a ἀρχαὶ πότερον ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἶδει ὀρισμέναι, καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν ὑπο-
 κειμένῳ; καὶ πότερον τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, καὶ
 πότερον ἀφθαρτοὶ πᾶσαι ἢ τῶν φθαρτῶν φθαρταί; ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώ-
 5 ταν καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πότερον τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγό-
 ρειοὶ καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐσία τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὐ,
 ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησι φιλίαν ἄλλος δὲ τις
 πῦρ ὃ δὲ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα· καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα
 10 τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔτι πότερον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ κίνησιν·
 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν ἂν παράσχοι πολλήν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ

the chief
problem

the most
difficult one

καὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὐ, καὶ εἰ οὐσίαι πότερον κεχωρισμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τοῖτοις; περὶ 15 γὰρ τούτων ἀπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥάδιον καλῶς.

These questions are dealt with throughout the following work.

521—There is a science which investigates being as being, and is different from the sciences that investigate special parts of being.

Metaph. Γ 1, 1003 a²¹⁻³²:

Philosophy
the science
of being
as such

Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἣ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὄν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὐτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾶ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἢ αὐτῇ· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμύμεναι 25 περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ' αὐτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦν- 30 τες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλ' ἢ ὄν· διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον.

522—Ar. continues speaking about the manifold senses of the term "to be". As, then, science everywhere deals chiefly with that which is primary, the philosopher has first to do with substances.

Ib. 2, 1003 b¹⁸⁻¹⁹:

Therefore
substances
the first
object of
phil.

Πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἢ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἡρτῆται, καὶ δι' ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δεοί τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.

523—a. The philosopher must also consider the things that are in mathematics called axioms, for these are true of all existing things, and therefore no special science inquires into their truth.

Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 a^{19-b}²:

Phil. must
also study
the axioms

Λεκτέον δὲ πότερον μιᾶς ἢ ἐτέρας ἐπιστήμης περὶ τε τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωματῶν καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας. φανερόν δὴ ὅτι μιᾶς τε καὶ τῆς 20 τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶ οὐκ ἐπιβεβαιωτική· ἀπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὐσίαις ἀλλ' οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ χρῶνται μὲν πάντες, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἢ ὄν, ἕκαστον δὲ τὸ γένος ὄν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ χρῶνται ἐφ' ὅσον αὐτοῖς 25 ἱκανόν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὅσον ἐπέχει τὸ γένος περὶ οὗ φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἢ ὄντα ὑπάρχει πᾶσι (τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινόν), τοῦ

περὶ τὸ δὲ γνωρίζοντος καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία. διόπερ οὐθεὶς τῶν κατὰ
 30 μέρος ἐπισκοπούντων ἐγχειρεῖ λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἀληθὴ ἢ μὴ, οὔτε γεω-
 μέτρης οὔτ' ἀριθμητικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, εἰκότως τοῦτο δρῶντες·
 μόνοι γὰρ ὦντο περὶ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ
 35 τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων
 ἂν εἴη σκέψις· ἐστὶ δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη.

b. He must also study the law of contradiction, which is the most fundamental principle of all.

Ib., 1005 b⁵⁻²³:

5, 6 "Οτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ τοῦ περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας θεωροῦντος **and the law of contra-**
 ἢ πέφυκεν, καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι, δῆλον· **diction**
 προσήκει δὲ τὸν μάλιστα γνωρίζοντα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἔχειν λέγειν τὰς
 10 βεβαιωτάτας ἀρχὰς τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ ὄντα τὰς
 πάντων βεβαιωτάτας. ἐστὶ δ' οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος. βεβαιωτάτη δ' ἀρχὴ πασῶν
 περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον· γνωριμωτάτην τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν
 15 τοιαύτην (περὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ γνωρίζουσιν ἀπατῶνται πάντες) καὶ ἀνυπόθετον.
 ἣν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὸν ὅτιοῦν ξυνιέντα τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπόθεσις·
 ὁ δὲ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ὅτιοῦν γνωρίζοντι, καὶ ἔχειν ἔχοντα ἀναγκαῖον.
 ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιωτάτη ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν ἀρχή, δῆλον· τίς δ' ἐστὶν αὕτη,
 μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον
 20 τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· — αὕτη δὲ πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν·
 ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.

In the following chapters of this book the law of contradiction is established by proofs, and objections to it are refuted.

524—In E I Ar., having first divided all intellectual work into three main groups—theoretical, practical and productive—¹, next divides the theoretical sciences into three other provinces: physics, mathematics and first philosophy or theology², the last having the ἀκίνητος οὐσία as its object.

Metaph. I I, 1026 a¹⁸⁻³²:

20 "Ὅστε τρεῖς ἂν εἴεν φιλοσοφαί θεωρητικάι, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική **First phil. or theology**
 (οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει), καὶ **has the im-**
 τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικάι τῶν **mutable sub-**
 ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἰρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἂν **stance as its**
object

¹ Our nr. 432a.

² 432b.

τις πότερόν ποθ' ἢ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καθόλου ἐστὶν ἢ περὶ τι γένος καὶ φύσιν
 τινὰ μίαν (οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν γεω- 25
 μετρία καὶ ἀστρολογία περὶ τινὰ φύσιν εἰσὶν, ἢ δὲ καθόλου πασῶν κοινή).
 εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἢ φυσικὴ
 ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη. εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλο-
 σοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη¹. καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ἢ ὄν ταύτης 30
 ἂν εἴη θεωρησai, καὶ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἢ ὄν.

There might seem to exist a contradiction between this definition of the object of metaphysics and that of Γ 1 (cited sub 521). Duns Scotus², who had the interpretations of Avicenna and Averroës before him, regarded them as a dilemma: Avicenna, who follows Γ 1, says that *being as such* is the object of metaphysics,—Averroës, according to E 1, teaches that this object is *God and the intelligences*. Duns Scotus, after a long hesitation, takes the part of Avicenna. Aristotle himself, however, seems not to have considered the two views as contradictory: in Γ 2 (cited sub 522) he gives, if not a synthesis, yet a transition from the first to the second.

2—PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS CRITICIZED

Chapters
A 6 and 9

525—In *Metaph.* A 6 the author gives an outline of the theory of Ideas: the introduction of supra-sensible Forms as the true object of knowledge, because sensible things are always changing³; the assumption of mathematical objects as existing between Forms and sensibles⁴, and the theory of first principles, the One and the great-and-small, from which the Numbers were deduced⁵. He compares this doctrine with that of the Pythagoreans, from which it is distinguished by a few features, and concludes that Plato knew only the material and the formal cause⁶.

In ch. 9 of the same book he gives a more elaborate criticism of the theory.

First
objection

526—*Metaph.* A 9, 990 a³³-b⁸:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν (ἱκανὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἔψασθαι τοσοῦτον). οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τῶνδ' ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις

¹ "and it will be universal in this sense, because it is first".

² *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* I, qu. 1 (Ed. Wadding, t. IV, p. 510-518).

³ Our nr. 204a; cp. 204b and 268a.

⁴ Nr. 362b, with n. 1.

⁵ Nr. 365a.

⁶ 365b.

ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἷοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη (σχεδὸν γὰρ ἴσα — ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω — ἐστὶ τὰ εἶδη τούτοις 5 περὶ ὧν ζητοῦντες τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα προῆλθον· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ὁμώνυμόν τι ἔστι καὶ παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, τῶν τε ἄλλων ¹ ἔστιν ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰδίοις ²).

527—Ib., 990 b⁸⁻¹⁷:

The proofs
of the theory
examined

Ἔτι δὲ καθ' οὐς τρόπους δείκνυμεν ³ ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἶδη, κατ' οὐθένα φαίνεται 10 τούτων· ἐξ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι συλλογισμόν, ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἶδη γίγνεται ⁴. κατὰ τε γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ⁵ εἶδη ἔσται πάντων ὧν ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσί, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν ⁶ καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος ⁷ τῶν φθαρτῶν· 15 φάντασμα γὰρ τι τούτων ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων ⁸ οἱ μὲν τῶν πρὸς τι ποιοῦσιν ιδέας ⁹, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον ¹⁰ λέγουσιν.

528—Ib., 990 b²²⁻³⁴:

There should
be only
Ideas of
substances

Ἔτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόληψιν καθ' ἣν εἶναι φαμεν τὰς ιδέας οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔσται εἶδη ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἐτέρων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ νόημα ἐν οὐ μόνον

¹ τῶν τε ἄλλων - "so also in the case of all other groups", i.e. even for those things other than substances.

² τοῖς αἰδίοις - i.e. the heavenly bodies.

³ δείκνυμεν - "we", disciples of Plato.

⁴ "others would prove the existence of Ideas of things of which we Platonists think there are none" (Ross).

⁵ The argument "from the sciences" would imply the existence of Ideas of *artefacta*, which were probably not recognized by the Platonists of Aristotle's time.

The arguments here referred to are given in a very concise form. We need the comments of Alexander of Aphrodisias to understand their sense fully.

⁶ τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν is the argument for the existence of Ideas from the existence of groups of particulars.

καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων - On the positive sense of negations according to Plato, see *Soph.* 257 d-258 b (our nr. 342). W. D. Ross comments: "There was no need to suppose bare negative Ideas; anything that could be explained by participation in a negative Idea could be explained more simply by non-participation in the positive Idea".

⁷ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος - the argument from the fact that it is possible to think an object even when the thing has perished. Ar. argues that according to this argument there must be an Idea of each perishable thing.

⁸ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων - Ross, citing Jackson, explains: Ar. has previously pointed out certain *consequences* of Platonic arguments; he now points out certain *implications actually stated* in Plato's more accurate arguments, though unwelcome to his successors.

⁹ τῶν πρὸς τι - e.g. in the *Phaedo* the Idea of τὸ ἴσον (74 a-77 a).

¹⁰ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον - See on this argument *Parm.* 132 d-133 a (our nr. 327c).

περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς 25 οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐτέρων, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μυρία συμβαίνει τοιαῦτα). κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴ ἐστι μεθεκτὰ τὰ εἶδη, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχονται ¹ ἀλλὰ δεῖ ταύτην ἐκάστου μετέχειν ἢ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ² (λέγω δ' 30 οἶον, εἴ τι αὐτοδιπλασίου μετέχει, τοῦτο καὶ αἰδίου μετέχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῷ διπλασίῳ αἰδίῳ εἶναι), ὥστ' ἔσται οὐσία τὰ εἶδη.

529—Ar. now presents his main objection: Forms do not contribute anything to sensible things, nor to our knowledge of them.

Plato's
Ideas are
of no use

a. Ib., 991 a⁸⁻¹⁹:

Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἶδη τοῖς αἰδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν ³ ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ φθειρομένοις· οὔτε γὰρ κινή- 10 σεως οὔτε μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν αἷτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐδὲν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσία ἐκεῖνα τούτων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἂν ἦν), οὔτε εἰς τὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως αἷτια δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς τὸ λευκὸν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ, 15 ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος ⁴, ὃν Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν πρῶτος Εὐδοξος ⁵ δ' ὕστερον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἔλεγον (ῥᾶδιον γὰρ συναγαγεῖν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν).

b. Ib., a¹⁹-b¹:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τᾶλλα κατ' οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων 20 λέγεσθαι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τᾶλλα κενο- λογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικὰς. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον ⁶; ἐνδέχεται τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὅμοιον ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ⁷, ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σωκράτους καὶ μὴ ὄντος 25 γένοιτ' ἂν οἷος Σωκράτης· ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἴ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης αἰδῖος, ἔσται τε πλείω παραδείγματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἶδη, οἶον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου

¹ "for participation per accidens does not exist".

² "but a thing must share in its Form as in something not predicated of a subject".

³ τ. αἰδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν - as in 526: the heavenly bodies.

⁴ λίαν εὐκίνητος - easily refutable. On the doctrine of Anaxagoras referred to, see our nr. 124.

⁵ Eudoxus of Cnidus, the famous astronomer, who spent long years in Plato's Academy (± 365), seems to have taught that the Ideas are immanent in things, though he held that they are substances. On the last point he did not agree with the (later) theory of Ar.

⁶ These words refer to the Demiurgus in Plato's *Timaeus*.

⁷ "without being copied from it".

τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἀμα δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτοάνθρωπος. ἔτι οὐ μόνον τῶν αἰσθητῶν
30 παραδείγματα τὰ εἶδη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ γένος, ὥς γένος εἰδῶν¹.
ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται παράδειγμα καὶ εἰκὼν.

530—Ib., 991 b¹⁻⁹:

How can
Ideas exist
separately?

Ἔτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωρὶς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία· ὥστε
πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων οὔσαι χωρὶς εἶεν; ἐν δὲ τῷ Φαίδωνι οὕτω
λέγεται, ὥς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίνεσθαι αἷτια τὰ εἶδη ἐστίν· καίτοι τῶν
5 εἰδῶν ὄντων ὅμως οὐ γίγνεται τὰ μετέχοντα ἂν μὴ ᾗ τὸ κινῆσον, καὶ πολλὰ
γίγνεται ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὐ φαμεν εἶδη εἶναι· ὥστε δῆλον
ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἷας καὶ
τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν.

531—Ib., 991 b⁹⁻²¹:

If Ideas are
numbers,
how can they
be causes?

Ἔτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἶδη, πῶς αἷτιοι ἔσονται; πότερον ὅτι ἕτεροι
10 ἀριθμοὶ εἰσι τὰ ὄντα, οἷον ὁδὶ μὲν <ὁ> ἀριθμὸς ἀνθρώπος ὁδὶ δὲ Σωκράτης ὁδὶ
δὲ Καλλίας; τί οὖν ἐκείνοι τούτοις αἷτιοί εἰσιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ οἱ μὲν ἀτίδιοι οἱ
δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσει. εἰ δ' ὅτι λόγοι ἀριθμῶν² τάνταῦθα, οἷον ἡ συμφωνία,
δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν γέ τι ὧν εἰσὶ λόγοι. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ὕλη, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ
15 οἱ ἀριθμοὶ λόγοι τινὲς ἔσονται ἐτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον. λέγω δ' οἷον, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ
Καλλίας λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, καὶ ἄλλων
τινῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἰδέα ἀριθμός· καὶ αὐτοάνθρωπος, εἴτ' ἀριθμός
20 τις ὧν εἴτε μή, ὅμως ἔσται λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τινῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀριθμός, οὐδ'
ἔσται τις διὰ ταῦτα ἀριθμός.

532—a. Ar. repeats his main objection to the theory of Ideas, and reproaches the Academy for having abandoned the chief task of philosophy: to seek the cause of sensible phenomena.

Ib., 992 a²⁴⁻²⁹:

Ideas do not
explain
phenomena

Ὅλως δὲ ζητοῦσης τῆς σοφίας περὶ τῶν φανερῶν³ τὸ αἷτιον, τοῦτο μὲν
εἰάκαμεν (οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς),
τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οἴομενοι λέγειν αὐτῶν ἐτέρας μὲν οὐσίας εἶναι φαμεν, ὅπως δ'
ἐκεῖναι τούτων οὐσίαι, διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν⁴· τὸ γὰρ μετέχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον
εἴπομεν, οὐθὲν ἐστίν.

b. Ib., a²⁹-b¹:

They have
nothing to do
with the final
cause

Οὐδὲ δὲ ὅπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὁρῶμεν ὄν αἷτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ

¹ In the sense of genus of various species.

² λόγοι ἀριθμῶν - ratios of numbers.

³ τ. φανερῶν - sensible things.

⁴ διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν = κενολογοῦμεν (is empty talk).

πᾶσα φύσις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, ἣν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐθὲν ἄπτεται τὰ εἶδη, ἀλλὰ γέγονε τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν ¹ ἡ φιλοσοφία, φασκόντων ἄλλων χάριν αὐτὰ δεῖν πραγματεύεσθαι.

3—SUBSTANCE

What "is" in the primary sense is substance

533—a. *Metaph. Z* I, 1028 a¹⁰⁻²⁰, 29-31:

Τὸ δὲ λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς ². σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστὶ καὶ τόδε τι ³, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερόν ἐστι τούτων πρῶτον ὅτι τὸ τί ἐστίν, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν (ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπωμεν ποῖόν τι τόδε, ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν ἢ κακόν, ἀλλ' οὐ ¹⁵ τρίπηχυν ἢ ἀνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστίν, οὐ λευκὸν οὐδὲ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τρίπηχυν, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρωπον ἢ θεόν), τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητες εἶναι ⁴, τὰ δὲ ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. — Δῆλον ²⁰ οὖν ὅτι διὰ ταύτην ⁵ ἡ κακείνων ἕκαστον ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ πρῶτως ὃν καὶ οὐ τί ὃν ἀλλ' ὃν ἀπλῶς ἢ οὐσία ἂν εἴη.

Substance is primary in definition, in knowledge and in time

b. *Ib.*, 1028 a³¹-b ²:

Πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον· ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ μόνη· καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότε οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον ³⁵ μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστίν ὁ ἀνθρώπος γινώμεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσμεν, ὅταν τί ἐστὶ τὸ β ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γινώμεν.

The eternal question "What is being" means "What is substance"

c. *Ib.*, 1028 b²⁻⁴:

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ αἰεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἢ οὐσία.

¹ τοῖς νῦν - The reference is certainly to Speusippus, head of the Academy since the death of Plato.

² Sc. in Δ 7.

³ τί ἐστὶ καὶ τόδε τι - It should be noticed that the author, before coming to his definitive conception of οὐσία, in the beginning of this very book uses the term in exactly the same way as it is used in *Categ.* 5 (our nr. 438a), namely, not only in the sense of essence or quiddity (τί ἐστὶ), but also in the sense of *the individual being*.

⁴ τῷ - εἶναι: "by the fact that they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it", etc.

⁵ διὰ ταύτην - sc. τ. πρῶτην κατηγορίαν.

534—Having first qualified οὐσία as τί ἐστὶ or as τὸδε τι, Ar. now proceeds to ask whether, then, natural bodies and their parts are substances (as he seems inclined to admit ¹), or something else next to them (e.g. Ideas and mathematical objects), or even not these but some other things.

Metaph. Z 2, 1028 b⁸⁻¹⁵:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν (διὸ τὰ τε ζῶα
10 καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν οὐσίας εἶναι φαμεν, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, οἶον πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἡ μόρια ἢ
τούτων ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ μορίων ἢ πάντων, οἶον ὃ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια
αὐτοῦ, ἄστρα καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἥλιος) · πότερον δὲ αὐταὶ μόναι οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ἢ καὶ
15 ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐθὲν ἕτεροι δὲ τινες, σκεπτέον.

Are natural
bodies and
their parts
substances?

535—a. Four possibilities must be considered.

Metaph. Z 3, 1028 b³³⁻³⁶:

Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα · καὶ γὰρ
τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐκάστου, καὶ
τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

Four
meanings
of the term
"substance"

b. *Ib.*, 1028 b³⁶-1029 a²:

Τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι
κατ' ἄλλου · διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον · μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι
οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον.

Can the sub-
stratum be
substance?

c. Now matter is defined as that which is nothing in itself: neither a definite being, nor a quantity nor any other thing by which being is qualified (our nr. **476c**). "For there is something of which each of this is predicated" . . .

Ib., 1029 a²⁶⁻³³:

Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην · ἀδύνατον δέ ·
καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ
εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν
30 ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἐκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὕστερα
γὰρ καὶ δῆλη · φανερά δὲ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη · περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη
γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη.

In fact, this
consequence
is impossible

536—Ar. now proceeds to study essence. He begins with some logical remarks.

Substance
as essence

¹ Note the expressions φανερώτατα μὲν and φαμεν.

a. The first question is: What is the τί ἦν εἶναι?

Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b¹³⁻¹⁶:

Meaning of
essence

— ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθ' αὐτό. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῶ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ μουσικός. ὃ ἄρα κατὰ σαυτὸν.

b. Only those things have an essence whose account is a definition.

It belongs
only to things
which can
be defined

Ib., 1030 a⁶⁻⁷:

— τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐστὶν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός.

E.g. "white man" cannot be defined, because it is a compound of substance and another category, the essence being "just what something is".

Species only
have a
definition

c. Ib., 1030 a⁷⁻¹⁴:

‘Ορισμός δ’ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταυτό σημαίνει (πάντες γὰρ ἂν εἶεν οἱ λόγοι ὅροι· ἔσται γὰρ ὄνομα ὑποφῶν λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ Ἰλιάς ὁρισμός ἐσται), ἀλλ’ ἐὰν πρώτου τινὸς ἦ· τοιαῦτα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅσα λέγεται μὴ τῷ ἄλλῳ κατ’ ἄλλου 10 λέγεσθαι. οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶν μὴ γένους εἰδῶν ὑπάρχον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τούτοις μόνον (ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν λέγεσθαι καὶ πάθος οὐδ’ ὡς συμβεβηκός).

Other things
only in a
secondary
sense

d. Ib., 1030 a¹⁴⁻³²:

Ἀλλὰ λόγος μὲν ἔσται ἐκάστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τί σημαίνει, ἐὰν ἦ ὄνομα, ὅτι 15 τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἀντὶ λόγου ἀπλοῦ ἀκριβέστερος· ὁρισμός δ’ οὐκ ἔσται οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. ἢ καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἓνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσὸν ποιὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ 20 γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ’ ἐπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πῶς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐροίμεθ’ ἂν τί ἐστὶν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστὶν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασὶν τινες εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, 25 οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιόν. — δεῖ μὲν οὖν σκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ πῶς δεῖ λέγειν περὶ ἕκαστον, οὐ μὴν μαλλόν γε ἢ τὸ πῶς ἔχει· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ λεγόμενον φανερόν, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ὁμοίως ὑπάρξει πρώτως μὲν καὶ ἀπλῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν, οὐχ ἀπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι 30 ἀλλὰ ποιῶ ἢ ποσῶ τί ἦν εἶναι.

Conclusion

e. So in fact definition and essence belong primarily to substance, secondarily to the other categories.

Ib., 1030 b⁴⁻⁷:

Ἐκεῖνο δὲ φανερόν ὅτι ὁ πρώτως καὶ ἀπλῶς ὁρισμός καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἐστὶ, πλὴν οὐ πρώτως.

537—In the next chapter (5) Ar. deals with some difficulties concerning the definition of τὰ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ, ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασμένα, such as σιμότης, where the definition of “snub” always implies a reference to the substance to which it belongs (“nose”). Ultimately all terms in categories other than substance are shown to be in principle of this type, the definition of them being ἐκ προσθέσεως, i.e. involving a reference to the substance to which they belong.

Metaph. Z 5, 1031 a¹⁻⁵:

Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ προσθέσεως εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ ἡποιοῦ¹ καὶ περιττοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ 0ῆλυ ἄνευ ζώου (τὸ δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως λέγω ἐν οἷς συμβαίνει δις τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις).

The definition of compounds always ἐκ προσθέσεως

538—Ar. now raises the question whether a thing is identical with its essence. He answers: Not always. E.g. not in terms formed by a substance coupled with an accidental predicate, such as “white man”. But in terms καθ’ αὐτό they are the same. E.g. “the Good” itself cannot differ from its essence, nor can “living being”.

a. *Metaph. Z 6, 1031 a¹⁵⁻¹⁸:*

Πότερον δὲ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτόμεν. ἔστι γὰρ τι πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν· ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἢ ἐκάστου οὐσία.

Is each thing = its essence?

b. *Ib., 1031 a¹⁹⁻²⁴:*

Ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δόξειεν ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ.

Not in the case of accidental unities

c. *Ib., 1031 a^{28-b⁴}, b¹¹⁻¹⁵:*

30 Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ’ αὐτά λεγομένων ἄρ’ ἀνάγκη ταῦτό εἶναι, οἷον εἴ τινες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι ὧν ἕτεραι μὴ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι μηδὲ φύσεις ἕτεραι πρότεραι, οἷας φασὶ
b τὰς ιδέας εἶναι τινες; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, καὶ ζῶον καὶ τὸ ζῶν, καὶ τὸ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἔσονται ἄλλαι τε οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις καὶ ιδέαι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας, καὶ πρότεραι οὐσίαι ἐκεῖναι, εἰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία ἐστίν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπολελυμένοι ἀλλήλων, τῶν μὲν² οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη

but in the case of self-subsistent beings

¹ ποιοῦ codd. Bonitz conjectured ἀρτίου.

² τῶν μὲν - the οὐσίαι.

τὰ δ' ¹ οὐκ ἔσται ὄντα. — Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἐν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, <καὶ> ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ πρῶτα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν ἂν ὑπάρχη, καὶ μὴ ἦ εἶδη, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως καὶ ἦ εἶδη.

Other
argument
for the
identity

d. Ib., 1031 b¹⁸⁻²²:

Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων ἐν καὶ ταὐτὸ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐκθεσιν ² ἀνάγκη ἐν τι εἶναι ἄμφο.

The case of
accidental
terms

e. Ib., 1031 b²²⁻²⁸:

(τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἶπεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός ³, ὥστ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταὐτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταὐτό, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταὐτό ⁴).

Conclusion

f. Ib., 1032 a⁴⁻⁶:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ λεγομένων τὸ ἐκάστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν ἐστι, δῆλον.

Essence and
definition

539—After a digression on the various kinds of becoming (ch. 7-9), Ar. now raises the question as to what belongs to the essence, and therefore to the definition. Should the definition of a whole contain the definitions of the parts?

Whole and
parts

a. *Metaph. Z* 10, 1034 b²⁰⁻²⁸:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος ⁵ ἐστὶ, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος 20 πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὐ. ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνονται ἐνόντες ἐνίων δ' οὐ. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν 25 στοιχείων· καίτοι διαιρεῖται καὶ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα.

¹ τὰ δὲ - the Ideas themselves, e.g. the Good.

² It becomes clear by the exhibition of instances.

³ "For both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white" (Ross).

⁴ But it will be the same as the quality "white".

⁵ Ross translates "formula", with reference to *De interpr.* 16 b³⁶ (our nr. 442a).

b. Then, are the parts prior to the whole?

Ib., 1034 b²⁸⁻³²:

Ἔτι δὲ εἰ πρότερα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου, τῆς δὲ ὀρθῆς ἢ ὀξείας μέρος καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ζώου, πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἢ ὀξεία τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. δοκεῖ δ' ἐκεῖνα εἶναι πρότερα· τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ λέγονται ἐξ ἐκείνων¹, καὶ τῷ εἶναι δὲ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων πρότερα².

Are the parts prior?

540—Why, then, is man prior to the finger and a circle to its segments, whereas individual letters are prior to the syllable?—Ar. answers: material parts are not prior, parts of the form are.

a. Ib., 1035 a¹⁻¹²:

Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἢ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὐ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἶδους λόγος³. οἷον τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι μέρος ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ σιμότητος μέρος· καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος μέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δ' ὡς εἶδους λεγομένου ἀνδριάντος οὐ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον⁴, τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ' αὐτὸ λεκτέον⁵)· διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, 10 ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἶδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ τμήματα οὕτως μέρη ὡς ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς ἐπιγίγνεται.

Material parts not prior

b. So parts of the definition are prior. E.g. the acute angle is not a preceding part of the right angle, but the right angle is logically prior. For the acute angle is defined as being smaller than the right angle.

Ib., 1035 b⁴⁻⁸:

Ὅσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καὶ εἰς αὐτὰ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἓν α· ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας λόγον⁶, ἀλλ' <ὁ> τῆς ὀξείας εἰς ὀρθήν· χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὀρίζομενος τὴν ὀξείαν τῇ ὀρθῇ· »ἐλάττων« γὰρ »ὀρθῆς« ἢ ὀξεία.

E.g. the acute angle

¹ The parts are explained by reference to the whole (ἐξ ἐκείνων λέγονται).

² "in respect also of the power of existing apart from each other the wholes are prior to the parts" (Ross).

³ ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν etc. - but only the elements of which the formula of the form exists.

⁴ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ εἶδος ἔχει - "the form, or the thing as having form, should be said to be the thing".

⁵ τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε - "but the material element by itself must never be said to be so".

⁶ The formula of the right angle does not include the formula of the acute angle.

c. Other examples and conclusion. Ib. 1035 b⁹⁻¹⁴:

Parts of the
definition
prior

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον ἔχουσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἡμικύκλιον τῷ κύκλῳ ὀρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὄλῳ· »τὸ« γὰρ »τοιόνδε μέρος ἀνθρώπου« δάκτυλος. ὥστ' ὅσα μὲν μέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα· ὅσα δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἕνια.

d. Thus in living beings, too: parts of the soul have priority, material parts have not.

So in the case
of living
beings

Ib., 1035 b¹⁴⁻²²:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζώων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἐκαστον γοῦν 15 τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὀρίζεται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὀριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἕνια τοῦ συνόλου ζώου, καὶ καθ' ἑκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μέρη ὕστερα ταύτης 20 τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον.

541—To the question whether matter should be admitted into the definition of physical beings, these being essentially composed of form and matter, Ar. answers: no, matter does not enter into the definition.

a. Ib., 1035 b²⁷⁻³¹:

matter the
individuating
principle

Ὁ δ' ἀνθρώπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστα, καθόλου δέ ¹, οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τουδὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδὶ τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου· καθ' ἑκαστον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ὃ Σωκράτης ἤδη ἐστίν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

In the last sentence (καθ' ἑκαστον δὲ e.q.s.) matter is qualified as the principle of individuation: "As to the individual, immediately after the ultimate matter Socrates comes in".

Only parts of
the form are
parts of the
definition

b. Ib., 1035 b³¹-1036 a²:

Μέρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ εἶδους (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) καὶ τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης <καὶ τῆς ὕλης> αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅλον γοῦν μέρη τὰ τοῦ εἶδους μόνον ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ κύκλῳ εἶναι καὶ κύκλος καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴ ταυτό.

Concrete
things not
definable

c. Ib., 1036 a²⁻⁸:

Τοῦ δὲ συνόλου ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστά τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ

¹ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστα etc. - terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally.

ἡ νοητοῦ — λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἶον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἶον τοὺς χαλκοὺς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους — τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας¹ οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσὶν· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ.

d. Ib., 1036 a⁸⁻¹²:

Ἡ δ' ὅλη ἀγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν. ὅλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστὶν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητή μὲν οἶον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὅλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ἢ αἰσθητά, οἶον τὰ μαθηματικά.

ὅλη αἰσθητή
and
ὅλη νοητή

ὅλη νοητή is identified by Alexander with extension.

542—Ar. now proceeds to discuss the question why that, the account of which is a definition, is one.

E.g.: why is "two-footed animal" one and not two? "Man" and "white" are two when the one does not belong to the other, one when it does. But in "two-footed animal" one element does not share in the other; the genus does not share in the differentiae (else it would share in contraries at the same time). And even if it were to share in its differentiae, the same difficulty would arise, for the differentiae of man are more than one: possessed of feet, two-footed, wingless. Why, then, are these one?

Ar. answers: ζῶον is the genus, διποὺν the differentia. But this difference is to be divided again, and again, until the indivisible species is reached. The last difference will be the substance and definition of the thing.

Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a¹⁶⁻²⁰:

Οὕτως αἰεὶ βούλεται βαδίζειν ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα· τότε δ' ἐσονται τοσαῦτα εἶδη ποδὸς ὅσαι περ αἱ διαφοραί, καὶ τὰ ὑπόποδα ζῶα ἴσα ταῖς διαφοραῖς. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερόν ἐστι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὀρισμός.

So the last difference constitutes the unity of the subject of a definition.

543—The author now comes to his conclusions from the preceding points (ch. 13-17).

a. First, the universal cannot be a substance.

Ib. *Z 13*, 1038 b⁸⁻¹⁶:

No universal
a substance

Ἦοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐσίαν εἶναι ὅτι οὖν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων.

10 Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐσία ἐκάστου ἢ ἴδιος ἐκάστῳ, ἢ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. τίνος οὖν οὐσία τοῦτ' ἐστίν; ἢ γὰρ πάντων ἢ οὐδενός, πάντων δ' οὐχ οἶόν τε·

First
reason

¹ ἀπελθόντες ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας - as soon as they are no more actuated by νόησις or by αἰσθησις.

ένος δ' εἰ ἔσται, καὶ τᾶλλα τοῦτ' ἔσται· ὧν γὰρ μία ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἔν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἔν.

Second
reason

Ἔτι οὐσία λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειμένου 15
τινὸς λέγεται αἰεί.

b. No substance can consist of substances.

Ib., 1039 a³⁻¹⁰:

No substance
consists of
substances

Ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχεία· τὰ γὰρ
δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχεία οὐδέποτε ἐν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ἦ, ἔσται 5
ἔν (οἶον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε· ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει),
ὥστ' εἰ ἡ οὐσία ἔν, οὐκ ἔσται ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν
τρόπον, ὃν λέγει Δημόκριτος ὁρθῶς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι φησιν ἐκ δύο ἐν τῇ ἐξ
ένος δύο γενέσθαι.

10

544—The next consequence concerns the theory of Ideas.

Absurd con-
sequences as
to the Ideas

Metaph. Z 14, 1039 a^{30-b6}, b¹⁷⁻¹⁹:

Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τις ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸν τόδε τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον, ἀνάγκη
καὶ ἐξ ὧν, οἶον τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ εἶναι χωριστὰ
καὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῶον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τῷ
ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, πῶς τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι χωρὶς ἐν ἔσται, καὶ διὰ τί b
οὐ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἔσται τὸ ζῶον τοῦτο; ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν μεθέξει τοῦ δίποδος
καὶ τοῦ πολypoδoς, ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει, τάναντία γὰρ ἅμα ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ
ἐνὶ καὶ τῷδέ τινι ὄντι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὸ ζῶον εἶναι δίπουν 5
ἢ πεζόν; ἀλλ' ἴσως σύγκειται καὶ ἄπτεται ἢ μέμικται· ἀλλὰ πάντα ἄτοπα. —

Therefore,
Ideas no
substances

Εἰ δὲ ἀδύνατον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εἶδη αὐτῶν οὕτως ὥς
τινές φασιν.

545—Another consequence: concrete individual beings are not definable;
—therefore, the Ideas, which are said to be separate particulars (!),
cannot be defined.

Individual
beings not
definable

a. *Metaph. Z* 15, 1039 b²⁰⁻³¹:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οὐσία ἐτέρα, τό τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος (λέγω δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὕτως 20
ἐστὶν οὐσία, σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειληγμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δ' ὁ λόγος ὅλως), ὅσαι μὲν
οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἔστι φθορά (καὶ γὰρ γένεσις), τοῦ δὲ λόγου
οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθεῖρεσθαι (οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις, οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκία
εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ), ἀλλ' ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ 25
εἰσὶν· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ταῦτα γεννᾷ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν
οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔτε ὀρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν,
ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ· διὸ
φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αὐτῶν.

30

b. Ib., 1040 a⁸⁻⁹:

Οὐδὲ δὴ ἰδέαν οὐδεμίαν ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς φασί, καὶ χωριστή.

Therefore,
no definition
of Ideas

A very strange conclusion, which, really, does not redound to the credit of its author.

546—Two wrong views about substance.

a. *Metaph.* Z 16, 1040 b⁵⁻¹⁰:

5 Φανερόν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις εἰσί, τὰ τε μόρια τῶν ζώων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐν 10 ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ πεφθῇ καὶ γένηται τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐν.

Most
so-called
substances
are
potentialities

b. Ib., b 16²⁷:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἐν λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἐνός μία, καὶ ὧν μία ἀριθμῶ ἐν ἀριθμῶ¹, φανερόν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἐν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ στοιχείω εἶναι ἡ ἀρχῇ· ἀλλὰ ζητοῦμεν 20 τίς οὖν ἡ ἀρχή, ἵνα εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀναγάγωμεν. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τούτων² οὐσία τὸ ὄν καὶ ἐν ἢ ἡ τε ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχείον καὶ τὸ αἷτιον, οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μὴδ' ἄλλο κοινόν μὴδὲν οὐσία· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἄλλ' 25 ἢ αὐτῇ τε καὶ τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἐστὶν οὐσία. ἔτι τὸ ἐν πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἅμα πολλαχῇ ὑπάρχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα χωρίς.

Unity and
being are no
substances

To the question why a thing is, and why it is one, Plato answered: because it participates of being and of unity. Ar. rejects this answer, for the "one" and "being" are no substances. They are κοινά, being predicated of all things.

547—Ar.'s final view of substance: substance is "form" or "quiddity".

a. Ar. now again asks the question: Why is a thing what it is? E.g. why are these stones etc. a house?

Metaph. Z 17, 1041 a²⁶⁻³²:

Διὰ τί ταδί, οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ λίθοι, οἰκία ἐστίν; φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ αἷτιον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν ἐστὶ τίνος ἕνεκα, οἷον ἴσως ἐπ' οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον· 30 αἷτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἷτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται καὶ φθείρεσθαι, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

Why is a
thing
what it is?

¹ ὧν μία ἀριθμῶ ἐν ἀριθμῶ - as things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, —

² τούτων - partitively: of these concepts.

b. The question really means: why is this material a certain thing?

Because the
quiddity
belongs to it

Ib., 1041 b⁴⁻⁹:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τί> ἐστίν· οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί; ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὁ ἦν οἰκία εἶναι. καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδί ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἷτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ὧς τί ἐστίν· τοῦτο δ' ἡ οὐσία.

This, then, is Ar.'s final answer to the question: what substance is.

4—POTENCY AND ACTUALITY

548—a. A definition of “potency” in its primary sense (“power”) is given in

Primary
sense of the
term
δύναμις

Metaph. Θ 1, 1046 a¹¹:

ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο.

“a source of change in another thing, or in the thing itself *qua* other”.

b. From this primary sense the author derives (a) the potency of being acted on by another or by the thing itself *qua* other; and (b) insusceptibility to change for the worse by the agency of another thing, etc.

Derivated
notions

Ib., 1046 a¹¹⁻¹⁶:

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο· ἢ δ' ἔξις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ἢ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς. ἐν γὰρ τοῦτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς πρῶτης δυνάμεως λόγος.

c. Ar. wants to distinguish the notion of “power” of the term δύναμις from the notion of “potentiality”. This sense of the term is explained in ch. 6 of the same book,

Potentiality

1048 a³²⁻³⁵:

Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει (sc. ὑπάρχειν τὸ πράγμα) οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἐρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὄλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθεῖη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἄν δυνατὸς ἦ θεωρῆσαι.

549—Ar. continues speaking on potency in the sense of “power”.

Rational and
non-rational
powers

Metaph. Θ 2, 1046 a^{36-b⁹}, 15-20:

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν b δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου· διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσὶν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαὶ εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἢ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία

5 ἐνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον ἢ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγίειας.
αἷτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ
τὴν στέρησιν. — Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἢ δ' ἐπιστήμη
δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγίειν
17 ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα,
ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω.

550—The existence of any “potential being” when there is no actuality, is denied by the Megarian school¹. Ar. defends his theory against this attack.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 3, 1046 b²⁹⁻³³:

The attack
of the Mega-
rian school

Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἳ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι²,
ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδο-
μεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.

b. *Ib.*, 1046 b³³-1047 a¹⁷:

Absurd
consequences
of this theory

Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐτ' οἰκοδόμος ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομῇ (τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδόμῳ
35 εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναι ἐστὶν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.
εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτέ καὶ λαβόντα, καὶ
1047a μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γὰρ λήθῃ ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ
τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔστιν), ὅταν παύσῃται, οὐχ ἕξει τὴν
τέχνην, πάλιν δ' εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών;
5 Καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὴ ὁμοίως· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε
ὅλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἔσται μὴ αἰσθανομένων· ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον³
συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἰσθησιν ἕξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται
μηδ' ἐνεργῇ. εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἔτι
10 ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ κωφοί.

Ἔτι εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐστερημένον δυνάμει, τὸ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον
ἔσται γενέσθαι· τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἡ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται
15 (τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ἐσήμαινεν), ὥστε οὔτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαίρουσι καὶ κίνησιν
καὶ γένεσιν. αἰεὶ γὰρ τό τε ἐσθηκὸς ἐσθῆξεται καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καθεδεῖται·
οὐ γὰρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθέζεται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔσται ἀναστῆναι ὅ γε μὴ
δύναται ἀναστῆναι.

551—Ar. now proceeds to explain what actuality is.

Actuality

a. *Metaph.* Θ 6, 1048 a³⁰⁻³², 35:

¹ See our nrs. 234 and 235.

² ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι - “that there is only δύναμις when there is ἐνέργεια”.

³ τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον - see our nr. 171.

Ἦστί δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει ¹. — τὸ δὲ ² ἐνεργεία.

b. The author wishes to explain the thing by instances, not by definition. He apologizes for this method.

Explained
by instances

Ib., 1048 a³⁵-b⁵:

Δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἑκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ ³⁵
παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν
πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν ³, καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὀρών πρὸς ^b
τὸ μῦον μὲν ὅψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ
τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θατέρω μορίῳ
ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρω δὲ τὸ δυνατόν. 5

Difference
between
movement
and actuality

552—Potential being must be actualized by a moving cause; but movement as such is not really action, or not complete action. It is actuality only when the end is present in it.

Ib., 1048 b¹⁸⁻³⁵:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος,
οἷον τὸ ἰσχυαίνειν ἢ ἰσχυασία [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ ⁴ ὅταν ἰσχυαίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν ²⁰
κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις ⁵, οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία
γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος)· ἀλλ' ἐκείνη <ῆ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ [ῆ] πρᾶξις. οἷον
ὁρᾶ ἅμα <καὶ ἐώρακε>, καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε>, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν·
ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ' ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγιάσται. εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ²⁵
ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἂν ποτε παύεσθαι
ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχυαίνῃ, νῦν δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν
κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πᾶσιν γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχυασία μάθησις
βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὲ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει ³⁰
καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ὠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ
κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἐώρακε δὲ καὶ
ὁρᾶ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω,
ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν. 35

553—When is one thing the potency of another? E.g. can we say that earth is potentially a man, or even that sperma is?

¹ Here follows the description of the δυνάμει ὄν, cited sub **548c**.

² The thing which stands in contrast to this.

³ τὸ οἰκοδομικόν - that which is capable of building.

⁴ αὐτὰ δὲ - the bodies.

⁵ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα etc. - without being already that at which the movement aims.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 7, 1048 b³⁷-1049 a⁵:

When does a thing exist potentially?

Πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὐ, διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὁποτεοῦν. οἷον ἡ γῆ ἄρ' ἔστι δυνάμει ἀνθρωπος; ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως; ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ὑπὸ ἱατρικῆς ἅπαν ἂν ὑγιασθεῖη οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι ὃ δυνατόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὑγιαίνον δυνάμει.

b. Ar. distinguished two ways of passing from potentiality into actuality: (1) ἀπὸ διανοίας, i.e. by art, (2) in natural beings by an immanent principle (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι).

Ib., 1049 a⁵⁻¹²:

In products of art

5 "Ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν βουλευθέντος γίγνηται μηθενὸς καλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ, ὅταν μηθὲν καλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· ὁμοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία· εἰ μηθὲν καλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι οἰκίαν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ δεῖ
10 προσγενέσθαι ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τοῦτο δυνάμει οἰκία· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως.

c. Ib., 1049 a¹³⁻¹⁸:

In natural beings

Καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι' αὐτοῦ· οἷον τὸ σπέρμα οὕτω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ <πεσεῖν> καὶ μετα-
15 βάλλειν), ὅταν δ' ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς ἢ τοιοῦτον, ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει· ἐκεῖνο δὲ ¹ ἐτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ οὕτω ἀνδριάς δυνάμει (μεταβαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός).

554—Actuality is prior to potency in the broadest sense.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 8, 1049 b⁴⁻¹²:

Actuality prior to potency

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρότερον διώριστα ποσαχῶς λέγεται ², φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον
5 ἐνέργεια δυνάμει ἔστιν. λέγω δὲ δυνάμει οὐ μόνον τῆς ὠρισμένης ἢ λέγεται ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ἡ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταύτῳ [γίγνεται· ἐν ταύτῳ γὰρ] γένει τῇ δυνάμει·
10 ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητικὴ, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ αὐτό. — πάσης δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης προτέρα ἔστιν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ· χρόνῳ δ' ἔστι μὲν ὥς, ἔστι δὲ ὥς οὐ.

b—First it is logically prior. Ib., 1049 b¹²⁻¹⁷:

1. logically

Τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρῶτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικόν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν,

¹ ἐκεῖνο δὲ - in the former state.

² διώριστα - namely, in Δ 11.

καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ 15 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως).

c. Next, it is prior in time in the following sense.

2. in time Ib., 1049 b¹⁷⁻²⁷:

τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ὦδε· τὸ τῷ εἶδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ' οὐ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος κατ' ἐνέργειαν 20 καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὀρώντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὁρατικόν, ἀ δυνάμει μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ σῖτος καὶ ὀρών, ἐνεργεία δ' οὐπω· ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργεία ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο· αἰ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργεία ὃν ὑπὸ ἐνεργεία ὄντος, 25 οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, αἰεὶ κινουντός τινας πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργεία ἤδη ἐστίν.

3. in substance

d. Thirdly, it is prior in substance. Ib., 1050 a⁴⁻¹⁰:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσία γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἶδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ' οὐ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος ¹ (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὐ ἔνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἔνεκα ἢ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἢ δύναμις λαμβάνεται.

Actuality either in the object, or in the agent

555—a. Actuality can either be in the object which is made, or in the agent.

Ib., 1050 a^{30-b3}:

Ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν 30 ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἢ τε οἰκοδομήσις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὕφαινομένῳ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ)· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἐστὶν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἢ ὁρασις ἐν τῷ ὀρώντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ 35 θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία ²· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιὰ τίς ἐστίν). ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνεργεία ἐστίν.

b. In time, one actuality precedes the other, straight back to the First Mover.

the First Mover first actuality

Ib., 1050 b³⁻⁶:

Κατὰ τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερόν ὅτι πρότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνέργεια δυνά-

¹ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν . . . καὶ τέλος - to a principle, i.e. an end.

² That eudaimonia is an "energy" of the soul, is the starting-point or basis of Ar.'s treatise on the virtues in the *Eth. Nic.* See our nr. 566 (EN I 7, 15, 1098a¹⁵⁻¹⁷).

μεως, και ὥσπερ εἴπομεν¹, τοῦ χρόνου ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἐτέρα πρὸ ἐτέρας ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινουῦντος πρώτως.

c. The eternal is always actual. It cannot be potential, for the potential is contingent, and therefore perishable.

Ib., 1050 b⁶⁻¹⁴; 16¹⁷, 18:

Eternal
beings
always
actual

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰδία πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἔστι δ' οὐθὲν δυνάμει αἰδίων. λόγος δὲ ὅδε· πᾶσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς 10 ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατόν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τὸ δυνατόν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. τὸ ἄρα δυνατόν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατόν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δυνατόν μὴ εἶναι 14, 16 ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν. — Οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἀπλῶς δυνάμει ἔστιν ἀπλῶς. — Ἐνεργεῖα ἄρα πάντα.

556—a. *Metaph.* Θ 9, 1051 a⁴⁻¹⁵:

The good
actuality
more
valuable
than the
good
potency

Ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, 5 ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταῦτόν ἐστι δυνατόν τάναν- 10 τία², οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταῦτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα³· ἡ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἡρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, 10 καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τάναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει· τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὰς ἐνε- 15 γείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τάγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἢ οὐδέτερον· 15 ἡ ἄρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων.

b. Ib., 1051 a¹⁵⁻¹⁹:

A bad
actuality
worse than
bad potency

Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χειρόν τῆς 10 δυνάμεως· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταῦτόν ἄμφω τάναντία. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· ὕστερον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως.

c. From this fact the author draws an important conclusion, namely, that there is no evil among eternal things.

Ib., 1051 a¹⁹⁻²¹:

No evil
among
eternal

Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῖς αἰδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἀμαρτήματα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον⁴ (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφθορά τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν).

¹ Vid. supra (554b, the end).

² "Ὅσα γὰρ etc. - "Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries" (Ross).

³ καὶ ἅμα - "and it has both potencies at one and the same time".

⁴ διεφθαρμένον - perverted; διαφθορά - perversion.

5—BEING AND TRUTH

557—In the last chapter of *Metaph.* Θ the author gives his definition of truth, which has become so famous in the history of human thought. It is presented as follows.

Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 a³⁴-b⁹:

Definition
of truth

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τάναντία, τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὄν] b ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διηρῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος διηρησθαι καὶ τὸ συγκεῖμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ' ἐστὶν ἢ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς 5 λεγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος; τοῦτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθεῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἰ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν.

558—a. In *Metaph.* E 4 Ar. separated truth from the province of Metaphysics, because truth and falsity are not “in things”, but merely a πάθος τῆς διανοίας.

Truth
excluded
from meta-
physics in E 4

E 4, 1027 b²⁵-1028 a¹:

Οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθύς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστὶν οὐδ' ἐν διανοίᾳ. — ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὸ οὕτως ὄν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ συμπλοκή ἐστὶν καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ 30 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δ' οὕτως ὄν ἕτερον ὄν τῶν κυρίως¹ (ἢ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι ποιοῦν ἢ ὅτι ποσὸν ἢ τι ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ διαιρεῖ ἢ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν ἀφετέον — τὸ γὰρ αἷτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας τι πάθος.

To this view our passage in Θ 10 adds a new element, namely that, with the συμπλοκή in thought, a συμπλοκή in reality must correspond.

The same view has been expressed with some emphasis by Plato, at the end of his *Sophist*, as a solution of the difficulty concerning ψευδὴς δόξα. See our nr. 343.

b. That truth and falsity depend on combination, is also said in *Categ.* 4, at the end. Immediately after having enumerated the ten categories, with a few instances of each, the author continues (*Categ.* 4, 2 a⁴⁻¹⁰):

¹ τὸ οὕτως ὄν ἕτερον τῶν κυρίως - since which is in this sense is a different sort of “being” from the things that are in the full sense.

"Ἐκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις γίνεται. ἅπαντα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἥτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψευδὸς ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

Truth and falsity depend on combination

559—In Θ 10 Ar. develops the consequences of this view.

Considering first truth and being in the case of "composites" ¹, he states: "Being is being-united; not-being is not-being-united. About things which may be either united or divided the same opinion is at different times false and true; not so with regard to things that must be as they are" (Ross).

a. *Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b⁹⁻¹⁷:

Εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν αἰεὶ σύγκειται καὶ ἀδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, τὰ δ' αἰεὶ διήρηται
 10 καὶ ἀδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἐνδέχεται τάναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐστὶ τὸ συγκεῖσθαι
 καὶ ἐν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι· περὶ μὲν οὖν
 τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ² ἢ αὐτῇ γίγνεται ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός,
 15 καὶ ἐνδέχεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὅτε δὲ ψευδεσθαι· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἄλλως
 ἔχειν οὐ γίγνεται ὅτε μὲν ἀληθὲς ὅτε δὲ ψευδός, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ταῦτά ἀληθῆ καὶ
 ψευδῆ.

Truth and being in the case of composites

Bonitz (*Metaph.* 409) remarked that the meaning of "composites" in this passage is not "quae ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt"—and in this he was right—but "in quibus cum substantia coniungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens, diagonalis irrationalis et similia". Now, if this last point were true, the whole class of composites would consist of ἐνδεχόμενα, and those things which "are always composed" or "cannot be divided" could not belong to them. By σύνθετα then is rather meant: *judgments*, in which a subject is copulated with a predicate, be it accidental or not; so that the "truth" intended here is what is called the *veritas logica* by the schoolmen (adaequatio rei et intellectus).

b. Since being and non-being, truth and falsehood then depend on combination, the question arises: what is being and non-being; what truth and falsity, in the case of incomposites.

Ib., 1051 b¹⁷⁻³⁰:

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψευδός;
 οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἂν διηρη-
 μένον ᾗ, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκόν <τὸ> ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον· οὐδὲ
 20 τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψευδός ὁμοίως ἔτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ

Truth and being in the case of incomposites

¹ For the meaning of this term see our explanation under the text. It has been suggested to the author by Mr. L. M. de Rijk, who deals with it in the first chapter of his thesis, *The Categories of being*, Assen 1952.

² τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα - "contingent things", i.e. composed things, consisting of a substance and an accidental attribute, e.g. "white man".

τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν¹ καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταῦτο κατάφασις καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν (ἀπατηθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ 25 κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετάς οὐσίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι· καὶ πᾶσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργεῖαι, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθείροντο, νῦν δὲ τὸ ὄν αὐτὸ οὐ γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται, ἔκ τινος γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο). 30

By ἀσύνθετα, as opposed to the σύνθετον, is meant: being as the object of thinking, before the act of judging; i.e. being as the object of *simple apprehension*. Thought "grasps" a thing without any affirmative or negation. This apprehension is called by Ar. θιγγάνειν. Rightly he says that, strictly speaking, there is no question of falsehood in this case: things do not lie (i.e.: they do not cause an untrue image of themselves in our mind). "Truth" may then be spoken of here as far as things are the causes of images in our mind. This is what is called by scholastics *veritas ontologica*.

c. The author concludes: About all things that are essences and "actualities" (i.e. actually existing beings) we cannot err. Either we know them or we do not.

In this case
error is
excluded

Ib., 1051 b^{30,33}:

"Ὅσα δὴ ἐστὶν ὅπερ εἶναι τι καὶ ἐνεργεῖαι, περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ' ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μὴ· ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστὶ ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἢ μὴ.

d. So "being" in the sense of truth, and non-being in the sense of falsity, is one group (depending on combination); the other (that of the ἀσύνθετα) is "true" only in this sense that it is known, the opposite being not "falsity" or "error", but "ignorance".

Ib., 1051 b³³-1052 a⁴:

Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, ἓν μὲν ἐστὶν², εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τὸ δ' εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεῦδος· τὸ δὲ ἓν³, εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως 35 ἐστὶν⁴· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἔστιν; τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος α οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἄγνοια, οὐχ οἷα ἡ τυφλότης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυφλότης ἐστὶν ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις.

560—As to eternal being, something has been said of it in the books on Substance (Z H) and in that on Potency and Actuality. The existence and nature of the unmoved Movers is dealt with in Λ 6-10. We have treated this part of Ar.'s first philosophy in connexion with *Phys.* VIII (nrs. 515-518).

¹ θιγεῖν - Ar. means by this: an apprehension which is infallible and direct.

² ἓν μὲν - is one group.

³ τὸ δὲ ἓν - the other —.

⁴ οὕτως ἐστὶν - it exists in the sense as indicated *supra*.

FIFTEENTH CHAPTER

THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES

I—THE THREE ETHICS AND THEIR INTERRELATION

561—The three Ethics of the Corpus Aristotelicum are first mentioned as works of Ar. by Atticus, a Platonist in the days of Marcus Aurelius, cited by Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XV 4, 9, p. 795 d: **Three works on ethics attributed to Ar.**

αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδῆμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχειοι καὶ Μεγάλων Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι . . .

562—a. Five books of Ethics are mentioned in the list of Aristotle's works in Diog. Laert. V 1, 23:

Ἠθικῶν α' β' γ' δ' ε'.

the *Eth. Eud.*

By these five books the *Eudemian Ethics* must have been meant.

b. A work on ethics in ten books is mentioned in the list of Hesychius: the *Nicomachean Ethics*. the *Eth. Nic.*

From these data we may infer that books Δ Ε Ζ of the *Eud. Eth.*, which are identic with *Eth. Nic.* Ε Ζ Η, belonged to the last work, and not to the *Eud. Eth.*

563—a. That the *Eth. Nic.* were in earlier Antiquity generally considered as a work of Ar., may be inferred from Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 12.

Who is the author of these works?

(One should not concede too much space to Fortune, the author says; for in doing so you encroach upon the force and dignity of virtue).

Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius.

b. In later Antiquity traces may be found here and there of the opinion that Eudemus and Nicomachus were the authors of the works named after them. E.g. Diog. Laert. VIII 88:

φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν — sc. Εὐδοξον — Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Here a passage from *Eth. Nic.* X is referred to under the name of N.

**Difference
in character**

564—The reason why these works have been attributed to different authors, may have lain in the fact that they show a remarkably different conception of life. In the *Eud. Eth.* we find a platonic view of life, of a clearly religious character. Philosophy is directed to the contemplation of the highest Being, the Good. And it is this contemplation which endows man with the force and the power of acting virtuously. On the other hand, in the *Nic. Eth.* the bond with religion is severed: moral life depends on itself.

See for this difference Jaeger, *Ar.*, p. 238 ff. Of great importance is the meaning of the term *φρόνησις* in both works. In the *Eud. Eth.* it means philosophical insight into the highest Being, while in the *Nic. Eth.* it indicates practical wisdom, which is not even limited to man, but may be attributed to animals too. Cp. our nr. **420a**, remark II.

**Modern
judgment
about the
authenticity**

565—a. The authenticity of the *Eud. Ethics* was first defended by P. von der Mühl (Göttingen thesis, 1909), next by E. Kapp (Freiburg thesis, 1912). W. Jaeger adopted Kapp's results and determined the place of the *Eud. Eth.* as a platonizing work of Ar.'s early years, between the *Protr.* and the *Nic. Eth.*

This view has been generally accepted, e.g. by Ross and by A. Mansion.

Recently E. J. Schächer, *Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Aristotelicum*, Paderborn 1940¹, has come back to the ancient hypothesis which makes Eudemus the author of the *Ethics* named after him. Schächer tries to prove by a comparison of the passages on *φιλία*, that the *Eud. Eth.* depend on the *Nic.*, not inversely, and that the *Magna Mor.* were written before the *Eud. Eth.*, this work being apparently unknown to the author of the *M. M.* The arguments used by Sch. are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet he has re-opened the discussion on the authenticity of the *Eud. Eth.*, and further inquiry must decide whether his solution is correct.

b. As to the *Magna Mor.*, modern research has led to reliable results: this work dates from the first generation of the Peripatetic School, the years of Theophrastus and before the influence of the Stoa.

The question has been hotly debated by W. Jaeger and H. von Arnim, during the years 1924 - 1929. This discussion has been amply reported by A. Mansion, *Around the Ethics attributed to Aristotle*, in the *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 1931, p. 80-107, 216-236 and 360-380.

E. J. Schächer, in the first of his above-cited Studies, begins with Schleiermacher and deals too with the studies of Brink (an analysis of the style of the *MM*, Berlin thesis, 1933) and Theiler (1934).

If any doubts were still possible as to the date of the *MM*, they have been definitely removed by the thesis of Brink.

¹ *Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur des Altertums*, herausgeg. von der Görresgesellschaft, XXII. Band, 1. u. 2. Heft.

2—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. FORMAL PRINCIPLES
(the Books I-III 5)

566—Ar. qualifies all human action as being directed towards a purpose, and defines the final purpose as *well-being* (eudaemonia), which consists of *an activity of the soul in accordance with reason*, i.e. in accordance with virtue.

Eth. Nic. I, 1-7, 1094 a¹-1098 a²⁰.

994a Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ
τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ¹. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφάνησαντο τὰγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται.
Διαφορὰ δὲ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ'
5 αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. Ὡν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω
πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ
ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἱατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ
πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. Ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιού-
10 των ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποιητικὴ καὶ
ῥσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις
ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικὴν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας, — ἐν ἀπάσαις
15 δὴ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά. Τούτων
γὰρ χάριν ἀκεῖνα διώκεται. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ
τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεῖσων ἐπι-
στημῶν.

All human
activities
aim at
some good

A hierarchy
of ends

Εἰ δὴ τι τέλος ἐστὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο,
20 καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἰρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ'
εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὁρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ
ἄριστον. — Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλῃν ἔχει ῥοπήν,
καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος;
25 Εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτὸ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονι-
κῆς. Τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
994b ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἐκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει.²
ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὖσας, οἷον στρατη-

The supreme
end

It is the
object of
politics

¹ W. D. Ross rightly remarked that, according to the division of *πᾶσα διάνοια* in *Metaph. E 1*, we might have expected that Ar. would have distinguished between productive and moral activity, the first being *ποιητική*, the second *πρακτική*; and that, if this distinction had been made, a very different system of ethics would have resulted.

² Which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and up to what point they should be learned, is a question which has been dealt with at length in the *Republic* of Plato. To a disciple of the Academy it was indeed a major point of politics.

γικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικὴν. Χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετοῦσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι ¹, 5 τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχει ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἐνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σφῆζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν. 10

Different
degrees of
precision in
different
sciences

Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτικὴ τις οὕσα· λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθεῖη. Τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ 15 πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. Τοιαύτην δὲ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ ἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. Ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ² λέγοντας παχυλῶς ³ καὶ τύπῳ τάληθες ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ 20 τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεισθαι ⁴. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεῶν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθη- 25 ματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

The student
should have
reached
riper years

Ἐκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἀπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. Διὸ 1095 τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ἐτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὧν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν 5 οὐ γνώσις ἀλλὰ πράξις. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. Τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνώσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσι· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὁρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ 10 περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.

What is the
supreme
good?

Καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροϊμά- σθω τοσαῦτα· λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνώσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὁρέγεται, τί ἐστὶν οὗ λέγωμεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ 15 πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθόν. Ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν

¹ "What we are to do and what we are to abstain from" has been minutely prescribed in the *Laws* of Plato. Ar. again shows himself a true disciple of the Academy in regarding this point as the normal task of legislation.

² ἐκ τοιούτων - with such premisses.

³ παχυλῶς - roughly.

⁴ It is a basic law of the syllogism that the conclusion cannot contain more than the premisses.

πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες ¹
λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταῦτόν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν·
20 περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς
σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν
ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον (νοσήσας
25 μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον), συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς
μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν· ἔνιοι δ' ὄντο παρὰ τὰ
πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἰτιόν ἐστι
τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ. Ἀπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιώτερον ἴσως ἐστίν,
30 ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. Μὴ λανθα- **A methodical
remark**
νέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ² λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ³.
Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο, καὶ ἐζήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ
1095b τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστίν ἡ ὁδός ⁴, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας
ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς ⁵. Ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.
5 Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἡχθαι καλῶς ⁶ τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλων τῶν
πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο
ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν
ἀρχὰς ῥαδίως ⁷. Ὡς δὲ μῆδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου ⁷.

10 οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κακεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται,
ὃς δὲ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὃ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήϊος ἀνὴρ.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμο-
15 νίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκάσιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτι-

¹ οἱ χαρίεντες - people of superior refinement.

² "Arguments from the first principles" are *deductive* or *apodeictic* arguments; those to the first principles are *inductive*. See our nrs. 447-455.

³ Ross points to *Rep.* VI 511 b, the passage about the ἀνυπόθετον (our nr. 294, p. 203). But in fact, neither Plato's ascent from the hypotheses, used as ἀρχαί, upward to the anhypotheton is anything like Aristotle's deductive argument, nor is his descent from the anhypotheton back to the inferior εἶδη of the same kind as a λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς with Ar. Mark also the use of the imperfect: ἠπόρει and ἐζήτει. Evidently there are frequent λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς in the Socratic dialogues. And whenever things are explained by participation in Ideas, what else is this than a λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν?

⁴ On the distinction between γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν and γνωριμώτερα ἀπλῶς see our nr. 406, n. 5.

⁵ "must have been brought up in good habits".

⁶ The man who is trained by good habits possesses moral principles implicitly.

⁷ *Erga* 293, 295-297 Rzach.

**Three main
types of life**

κώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. Τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προέχοντες, ὃ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικός καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός¹. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκη- 20 μάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλω². Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες³ καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμῇ. Τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, 25 τάγαθόν δ' οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσσφαίρετον εἶναι μαντεύομεθα. Ἔτι δ' εὐόκασι τὴν τιμῇ διώκειν ἵνα πιστεῦσασιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καὶ ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρίνεται. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτι- 30 κοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. Φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέ- χεσθαι καὶ καθεῦδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτως ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμο- 1096a νίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλως (ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν)· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἐπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τις 5 ἐστίν⁴, καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ

¹ Ar.'s three βίοι are clearly of Pythagorean origin. Cp. our nr. 4.

² Athenaeus mentions two epitaphs of Sardanapallus (336 a and 530 b, c). The first is: Ἔσθιε, πῖνε, παῖζε· ὥς τᾶλλα τούτου οὐκ ἄξια, sc. τοῦ ἀποκορητήματος (is not worth a snap of the fingers).

The second was probably cited by Ar. in his *Protrept.*, and by this quotation it became famous in Antiquity. It runs:

Κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος
τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὀλβια πάντα λέλυνται.

Cic. translates it in *Tusc. Disp.* V 35, 101:

Haec habeo quae edi quaeque exsaturata libido
hausit; at illa iacent multa et praeclara relictæ.

He adds to it these lines of Ar., which Jaeger thinks were taken from the *Protr.*: "Quid aliud, inquit Ar., in bovis, non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur".

He refers again to it in *De finibus* II 32, 106.

³ See p. 137, note 1.

⁴ The text as we read it contains some difficulties. Modern interpreters mostly supply βίος with χρηματιστής and translate: "The life of money-making is a life of compulsion" or "constraint"; by which they mean either that this life is undertaken only under compulsion (Ross), or that in this life a man cannot follow his natural inclinations, or perhaps both. Yet there remains some doubt as to the question whether the text is sound. We have no other instances of χρηματιστής used adjectively. And even if this is right, I think it would be better to supply the word <βίος> after χρηματιστής, because in copying it could be easily dropped before βίαιος.

A former generation made some conjectures. G. Ramsauer in his edition of the *Eth. Nic.* of 1878 proposed to write βάνυσός τις instead of βίαιός τις. James Watt,

ἄλλου χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. Φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ
10 καταβέβληνται.

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου¹ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ
διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γιγνομένης
διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἶδη. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ
15 δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν², ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλο-
σόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν³. Οἱ δὲ
κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ιδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
ἔλεγον⁴ (διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ιδέαν κατεσκεύαζον)· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται
20 καὶ ἐν τῷ τι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῶ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία
πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι⁵ (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι
τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὴ τις ἐπὶ τούτων ιδέα. "Ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ τὰγαθὸν
ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τι λέγεται, οἶον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ
25 ἐν τῷ ποιῶ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῶ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρὸς τι τὸ χρή-
σιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαίτα⁶ καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον
ὥς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἓν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετο ἐν πάσαις ταῖς
30 κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. "Ἐτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν μία καὶ ἐπι-

The Good of
Plato
criticized

1. Argu-
ments from
the doctrine
of the
categories

followed by Burnet, read the text as it stands in this way: βίᾳ ὅστις ἐστίν ("the business-man is by compulsion whatsoever he is"). C. M. Mulvany (in *Class. Quart.* XV 1921, p. 85-98) suggests that βίσιος should be explained as βαιός: little, trifling. He translates: "The business-man is a little person"—sc. of minor importance towards happiness.

¹ τὸ δὲ καθόλου - sc. ἀγαθόν. In the conception of Ar. the Platonic Ideas are "universals", which are abstracted from the concrete things or phenomena. In this case "the good" as a universal should be abstracted from many concrete ἀγαθά. But this is impossible, Ar. says; since these good things fall under different categories, no κοινόν could be found here.

² τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν - to sink our personal feelings.

³ This maxim, which has become famous by the above words of Ar., has been expressed as clearly and explicitly by Plato in criticizing Homer: 'Ἄλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ (*Rep.* X, 595 c).

⁴ Plato and his followers do not admit of Ideas of things within which they recognize a priority and a posteriority. Well, Ar. says, this is exactly the case with the categories: substance is prior to the others.—He means priority in the hierarchy of being: like two presupposes the monad and three the dyad; again, like body presupposes the plane, and plane presupposes the line. In the same way to Ar. the more primitive soul has priority of being over the more developed soul: the vegetative soul over the sensitive, the sensitive over the rational. And that is why there does not exist a "soul" in general, which is a reality in itself (*De anima* A 1, 402 b⁵⁻⁸; B 3, 414 a^{29-b¹⁹}). So it is with substance and the other categories: substance can exist without the others, not inversely.

⁵ See the doctrine of the categories in 437b and 438a.

⁶ δίαίτα is used here for the good in the category of place. Heliodorus explains: τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγομεν.

στήμη¹, καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρικὴ, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ 35 ἔν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. 1096b

2. "Man" and "man himself" fall under one definition

Ἡ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἡ ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ αἰτίδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μὴδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. Πιθανώτερον δὲ εἰκόασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ 5 αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἔν². οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

Distinction between primary and secondary goods

Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησις τις³ ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων 10 ἢ φυλακτικὰ πῶς ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τὰγαθὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. Χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ 15 λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. Καθ' αὐτὰ δὲ ποῖα θεῖη τις ἄν; Ἡ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; Ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θεῖη τις ἄν. Ἡ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ιδέας; Ὡστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος⁴. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' 20 ἐστὶν τῶν καθ' αὐτά, τὸν τὰγαθοῦ λόγον⁵ ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφανέσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. Τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἢ ἀγαθὰ. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι <κατὰ> κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν. 25

No common good

Whence then the homonymy?

Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; Οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. Ἀλλ' ἄρ' ἄρα γε τῷ ἀφ' ἐνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἐν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ ἀναλογίαν⁶; Ὡς

¹ This is a Platonic principle. Cp. *Laches* 198 d-199 a; *Parm.* 134 a.

² ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ - See our nr. 42, the Pythagorean table of opposites.— Ar. means: it is more acceptable to range the one in a series of good things than to identify it with the Good itself.

So this text of the *Eth. Nic.* provides evidence for the identification of the "Ἐν and the 'Αγαθόν by Plato. Cp. our nr. 364c.

³ ἀμφισβήτησις τις - room for dispute.

⁴ Ὡστε μάταιον - "In that case the form will be empty".

⁵ λόγον - notion, definition.

⁶ Ar. distinguishes three kinds of homonymy. The first is what is called in scholasticism equivocation: mere identity of names, the notions being different (see our nr. 436a). The second is what is called by Ar. τὸ ἀφ' ἐνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἐν: things are called by the same name because they are related to the same object or the same idea; e.g. we speak of a healthy person (who possesses health), a healthy sleep (which is a symptom of health), a healthy climate (which preserves health), etc.

γάρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν
 30 ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν, ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον·
 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ιδέας. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἐν τι καὶ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον
 ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό¹, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ
 35 κτητὸν ἀνθρώπων· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. Τάχα δὲ τῷ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον
 1097a εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παρά-
 δεῖγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπι-
 τευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, εἰκεν δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστή-
 5 μαις διαφωνεῖν². πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τιнос ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι
 παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ³. Καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικούτων⁴ τοὺς τεχνίτας
 ἀπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μὴδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὐλογον. Ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφελήθη-
 σεται ὑφάντης⁵ ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην εἰδῶς αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ
 10 πῶς ἱατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ιδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος.
 Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως⁶ ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἱατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν
 ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἱατρεῖει.
 15 Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ
 ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ
 τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἱατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. Τί
 οὖν ἐκάστης τάγαθόν; Ἡ οὐ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; Τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἱατρικῇ
 20 μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν
 ἀπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι
 πάντες. Ὡστε εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν

Return to
 our theme:
 what is the
 supreme
 practical
 Good?

In the same way the word "medical" indicates that which is relative to the medical art, the doctor because he possesses it, a treatment because it is a function of it, etc. (*Metaph.* Γ 1, 1003 a³⁸-b¹¹; Z 4, 1030 a³²-b³). In scholasticism this is called *analogia attributionis*.—This third kind is the *analogia proportionalitatis*. It is defined in *Poet.* 21, 1457 b¹⁸ ff. as a transference from analogy, which is possible "whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu of D." E.g. old age is to life as evening is to day. Now evening may be called old age of the day, or old age the evening of life.—It seems to be the author's intention to qualify the good as homonymous in the second sense.

¹ "Even if the good is universally predicable, or if there is a Good existing separately and absolute",—

Souilhé rightly remarks that the first and the second part of the sentence are not the same: a thing might be a common predicate but not an Idea. The ἢ then must be understood disjunctively, not in the copulative sense.

² "But it seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences" (Ross).

³ "But they do not trouble about the knowledge of the ideal Good" (Rackham).

⁴ βοήθημα τηλικούτων - sc. if it existed.

⁵ ὑφάντης - as in Plato's *Cratylus*.

⁶ οὕτως - "not in this way", i.e. not in abstracto.

The supreme good = the supreme end ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφίκεται ¹. τοῦτο δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον.

25

Happiness
the supreme
end

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ αἰρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοῦς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. "Ὡστ' εἰ μὲν ἔστιν ἓν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. Τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν ³⁰ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἰρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἰρετῶν, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἰρούμεθα αἰεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονήν ^{1097b} καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἰρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθεὶς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἰρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσιν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται ⁵ τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὐταρκὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δὲ αὐταρκὲς λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ ¹⁰ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαυθις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὐταρκὲς τίθεμεν ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον ¹⁵ καὶ μηδενὸς ἔνδεα· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην ². Συναριθμουμένην γὰρ δῆλον ὡς αἰρετωτέραν μετὰ ³ τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἰρετώτερον αἰεὶ. Τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται ²⁰ καὶ αὐταρκὲς ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὕσα τέλος.

What is
happiness?

Ἄλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἔστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. Τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ ληφθεῖ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ ²⁵ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τὰγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.

¹ "So the argument has by a different way reached the same point"—i.e. the same as in ch. 1, namely, that the supreme good is identical with the supreme end.

"By a different way"—in ch. 1 the argument was: "Every art and every inquiry etc. aims at some good; therefore, the supreme good is the supreme end, which is aimed at by every human activity". Here the argument runs: "The good and the end are identical in all individual cases; therefore, the supreme good and the supreme end will be also identical" (the stress being laid on τὸ οὐν ἐκ αὐτῆς τὰγαθὸν and τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων).

² μὴ συναριθμουμένην - "without being counted as one good thing among others" (Ross); i.e. not as a number of a series.

³ μετὰ - by the addition of —.

Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου
 30 δ' οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἄργον πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς
 καὶ ὅλων ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεται τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ
 πάντα ταῦτα θεῖη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
 κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. Αφοριστέον ἄρα
 1098a τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωὴν¹. Ἐπομένη δὲ αἰσθητικὴ τις ἂν εἴη,
 φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοῖ καὶ παντὶ ζῳῷ. Λείπεται δὴ
 π ρ α κ τ ι κ ῆ τ ι ς τ ο ὕ λ ο γ ο ν ἔ χ ο ν τ ο ς (τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς
 5 λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον²). διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης
 τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ' ἔστιν
 ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἀνευ
 λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου³,
 10 ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἀπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων,
 προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ
 τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὔ). εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον
 ζωὴν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δὲ
 15 ἀνδρὸς εὔ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δὲ εὔ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται·
 εἰ δὴ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεταί κατ'
 ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην
 καὶ τελειοτάτην. Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελεῖται. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν
 ἕαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία
 20 ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

Happiness
to be
defined by
the special
function
of man

Definition

567—Book II deals with moral virtue in general. It is engendered in us not by nature, but by habit. By nature man possesses a capacity to receive virtues; he receives them actually by the habit of right action.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II, 1103 a¹⁴-b²:

Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἡθικῆς, ἡ μὲν δια-
 15 νοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὐξήσιν, διόπερ
 ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δὲ ἡθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται⁴, ὅθεν καὶ
 τοῦνομα ἔσχηκεν μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. — Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον

The nature
of virtue.
Moral virtue
results from
habit

¹ θρεπτικὴν κ. αὐξητικὴν etc. - See *De anima* II 3, 414 a²⁹-b⁶; 415 a¹-7, on the faculties of the soul (our nr. 639).

² This parenthesis has been condemned by Burnet. Rackham follows him somewhat hesitatingly, and declares the sentence to be "an irrelevant anticipation of ch. 13, 9". Souilhé defends it.

³ τὸ δ' αὐτὸ φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι etc. - "and if we acknowledge the function of an individual (τοῦδε) and of a good individual (τοῦδε σπουδαίου) to be generically the same" (τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ γένει). —

⁴ περιγίγνεται - results from.

ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθῇ 20 ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθῇ. Οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίγονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκότες μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι 25 αὐτάς, τελειούμενοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. — Ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ 30 χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δὲ ἀρετάς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Ἄ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μαθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίνονται καὶ καθαρίζοντες καθαρισταί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα 1103b σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι.

b. Since, then, virtue results from habit, and habit is formed by action, it is incumbent on us to exhibit activities of a certain quality.

Practical
consequence

Ib., 1103 b²²⁻²⁵:

Διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιᾶς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

568—How, then, are we to act rightly?—Ar. answers this question by developing his theory that virtue is the mean between two extremes.

Moral
qualities
destroyed
by excess and
by deficiency

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 2, 1104 a¹¹⁻²⁷:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ 1104a ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ¹ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι), ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ὁρῶμεν· τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπερβᾶλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ 15 καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γιγνόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὖξει καὶ σφίξει. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. Ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ 20 μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίγνεται, ὃ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθίρεται δὴ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς 25 καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σφίζεται.

¹ ὑπὲρ - in illustration of.

b. Not only man *becomes* virtuous by acting in a certain way, but virtue is also exercised by the same actions.

Ib., 1104 a²⁷-b³:

Virtue
exercised in
the actions
by which it
was formed

Ἄλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ
ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ
30 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται
γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα
δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. Οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἐκ τε γὰρ
τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνά-
35 μεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ
1104b καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενό-
μενοι μάλιστα δυνήσόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

569—Pleasure in acting virtuously is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been acquired. For there is an essential connexion of moral virtue with pleasure and pain.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 3, 1104 b³-11:

Pleasure
and pain
the test of
virtue

Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξωον τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς
5 ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων
σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων
ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονᾶς γὰρ καὶ
10 λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ. Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ
δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα.

b. Again, this view leads to a practical consequence.

Ib., 1104 b¹¹-13:

Consequence
for
education

Διὸ δεῖ ἡχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὥς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ
λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

570—Against Ar.'s theory that a man becomes virtuous by doing virtuous actions, the objection could be made: How can anyone do just actions when he is not yet just, or temperate when he is not yet temperate? On the contrary, if he does just actions, he is already just.—To this objection Ar. answers: No, only by doing just actions a man is not yet just. Three other conditions must be fulfilled.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 4, 1105 a¹⁷-33:

How can a
man do just
actions when
he is not just?

1105a Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἂν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους
γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας. Εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώ-
he is not just?

φρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μου- 20
σικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. "Ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; "Ενδέ-
χεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου.
Τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς·
τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικὴν. "Επι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ 25
τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινό-
μενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ 30
πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδῶς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος,
καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως
ἔχων πράττῃ.

Conclusion**b. Ib., 1105 b⁹⁻¹⁸:**

Εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ b 10
τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε
γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. "Αλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον
καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι ὁμοίον τι
ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἱ τῶν ἱατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' 15
οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. "Ὡσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἔξουσιν τὸ σῶμα
οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

571—Ar. now proceeds to define virtue.

a. Its genus is: a state of character, not a passion, nor a faculty.

Eth. Nic. II 5, 1105 b^{19-1106 a¹²}:

**Virtue
defined.
Its genus**

Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐξῆς σκεπτέον. "Επεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία 20
ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις, τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. Λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυ-
μίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως
οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα,
οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἔξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς 25
τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνει-
μένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰλλα. Πάθη μὲν
οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὐθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὐθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη
σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ 30
μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτε ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος
οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἀπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ 1106
τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. "Ετι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ
φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς 5
καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαι πως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις

εἰσὶν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἀπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. Καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μὲν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ 10 ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἵπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθῃ εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτάς εἶναι.

b. Its differentia: it is a disposition to choose the mean between two extremes.

Ib. 6, 1106 a¹²-1107 a⁸:

15 "Ο τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετὴ, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὐ ἂν ἦ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό 20 τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. Ὅμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ 25 ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολέμιους. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἀνθρώπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. Πῶς δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται, ἥδη μὲν 30 εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἡ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. Λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον 35 τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἁκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὁ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἓν, οὐδὲ ταῦτὸν πᾶσιν. Οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἕξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ 40 πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ τῷ 1106b δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἕξ μναῖς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληφόμενῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολὺ. Ὅμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. Οὕτω δὴ πᾶς 5 ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἐλλείψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἰρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτως τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο 10 ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτε ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὥς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθει- ρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σωζούσης), εἰ δὴ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῶνται, ὥς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ 15 ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικὴν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθῃ καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλείψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι

Its
differentia

Virtue in
general

Virtue of man

It seeks the
mean

καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὀλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον 20 καὶ ἡττον, καὶ ἀμφοτέρα οὐκ εὖ, τὸ δὲ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἔνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις 25 ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. Μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι¹ εἰκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ 30 καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥάδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπὸν, ῥάδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης.

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί².

35

Definition of
moral virtue

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑξὶς προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρό- 1107a νιμος ὀρίσειε. Μεσότης δὲ δύο κακίων, τῆς μὲν κατ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῶν τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δὲ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἐν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὕρισκειν καὶ αἰρεῖσθαι. Διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν 5 λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

572—This definition applied to the particular virtues.

Eth. Nic. II 7, 1107 a³³-1108 b¹⁰:

Table of moral
virtues as
means
between two
extremes

Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ 1107b μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἡττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, 5 μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθερίότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. Ἐναντίως δ' ἐν 10 αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσιν καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. Νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι

¹ See our nr. 42, the table of Pythagorean opposites.

² A quotation of unknown origin.

15 αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τὰ
 χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσὶ, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγα-
 λοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά),
 ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία ¹ καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι
 20 δ' αὐταὶ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.

Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις
 λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὥς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέ-
 25 πειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσιν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν
 μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ
 ὥς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἡττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων

30 ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. Ἀνών-
 νυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. "Ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται
 οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας ², καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον
 καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον
 1108a ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς
 ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.

"Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ
 5 ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα
 καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ-
 γιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ

10 ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μὲν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι
 δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γὰρ εἰσὶ περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνιάν, διαφέρουσι
 δὲ ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἔστι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ
 μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων,

15 ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὐτ'
 ὀρθὰ οὐτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. "Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα,
 πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας
 ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου ³. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής
 20 τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποιήσις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον
 ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων.

Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδύ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτρα-
 25 πελία, ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων
 ἀγροῖκος τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδύ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν
 ὥς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος ⁴ καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς

¹ ἀπειροκαλία - tastelessness.

² ἐπιδικάζονται etc. - the extreme characters lay claim to the middle place.

³ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου (ἕνεκα) - so that we may be easily followed.

⁴ φίλος - amiable.

Means in
the passions

ἐνεκα, ἄρεσκος ¹, εἰ δὲ ὠφελείας τῆς αὐτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερις τις καὶ δύσκολος. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ 30 πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδῶς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδῆμων. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλήξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος 35 αἰδῆμων. Νέμεσις ² δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην 1108b καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινόμενας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικός λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερός ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι 5 ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἀπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητες εἰσὶν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν. 10

The author presented this table to his students in a διαγραφή. It may have been a scheme such as this:

<i>province</i>	<i>excess</i>		<i>mean</i>		<i>defect</i>
φόβος κ. θάρρη	<θράσος>	←	ἀνδρεία	→	<δειλία>
	θρασύς		<ἀνδρεῖος>		δειλός
ἡδοναί κ. λύπαι	ἀκολασία	←	σωφροσύνη	→	<ἀναισθησία>
	<ἀκόλαστος>		<σώφρων>		ἀναισθητος
δόσις κ. λήψις χρημάτων	ἄσωτία	←	ἐλευθεριότης	→	ἀνελευθερία
	<ἄσωτος>		<ἐλευθέριος>		ἀνελεύθερος
id. (περὶ μεγάλα)	{ ἀπειροκαλία } { βαναυσία }	←	μεγαλοπρέπεια	→	μικροπρέπεια
	ἀπειρόκαλος, βάνανσος		μεγαλοπρεπής		μικροπρεπής
τίμη κ. ἀτιμία (μεγάλοι)	χαυνότης	←	μεγαλοψυχία	→	μικροψυχία
	χαῦνος		μεγαλόψυχος		μικρόψυχος
id. (μικραί)	φιλοτιμία	←	<normal attitude towards honour>	→	ἀφιλοτιμία
	φιλότιμος				ἀφιλότιμος
ὀργή	ὀργιλότης	←	πραότης	→	ἀοργησία
	ὀργίλος		πράος		ἀόργητος
τὸ ἀληθές τὸ ἐν τῇ λόγων	ἀλαζονεία	←	ἀλήθεια	→	εἰρωνεία
κ. πράξεων κοινωνία	ἀλαζών		ἀληθής		εἴρων
τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ	βωμολοχία	←	εὐτραπέλια	→	ἀγροικία
	βωμολόχος		εὐτράπελος		ἀγροϊκος
τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ	<ἀρέσκεια ἢ κολα- κεία>	←	φιλία	→	δυσκολία
	ἄρεσκος ἢ κόλαξ		φίλος		δύσερις, δύσκολος
τὰ περὶ τὰ πάθη	—	←	αἰδῶς	→	<ἀναισχυντία>
	καταπλήξ		αἰδῆμων		ἀναίσχυντος
id., sc. λύπη κ. ἡδονή, αἱ	φθόνος	←	νέμεσις	→	ἐπιχαιρεκακία
ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι	φθονερός		νεμεσητικός		ἐπιχαιρέκακος
τοῖς πέλας γινόμενα					

¹ ἄρεσκος - obsequious.

² νέμεσις - righteous indignation. In this instance the application of the theory of the mean is very unfortunate.

573—a. By this theory the author is led to a remarkable consequence, namely, that the opposition between the extremes (being two vices) is sharper than that between virtue and vice.

Eth. Nic. II 8, 1108 b¹¹⁻¹⁵, 26-30.

1108b Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς
δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταιί
πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέσῃ
15, 26 ταῖς ἄκραις. — Οὕτως δὲ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης
ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστη-
κεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου
30 ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.

The
opposition
between the
extremes is
the sharpest

b. Sometimes the excess, sometimes the defect is more opposed to the mean.

Ib., 1108 b³⁵-1109 a¹⁹:

1109a Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ
ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρεία μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολή οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία
ἔλλειψις οὔσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἐνδεια οὔσα, ἀλλ' ἡ
5 ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή οὔσα. Διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ
αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον
τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον
10 εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἢ θρασύτῃ καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλίᾳ,
ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα
δοκεῖ εἶναι. Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ
ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία
15 τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. Οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ
εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. Ταῦτ' οὖν
μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολή οὔσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

574—In the next chapter Ar. gives some practical rules for attaining the mean.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 9, 1109 a³⁰⁻³³:

30 Δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου,
καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραίνει

Three rules
for
attaining
the mean

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔργε
νῆα.

33 τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἀμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἥττον.

b. Ib., b¹⁻⁷:

Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα ἰιο9b πεφύκαμεν. Τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνῶριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. Εἰς τούναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες 5 τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἤξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.

c. Ib., b⁷⁻¹²:

Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. Ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· ἰο οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἤττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα.

Conditions of responsibility for action 575—In book III, ch. 1-5, the conditions of responsibility for action are defined. First, the action must be voluntary (ἐκούσιον), i.e. done (1) not under compulsion, and (2) with knowledge of the circumstances.

The voluntary and involuntary

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 1, 1109 b³⁰-1110 a⁴:

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐκούσιοις 30 ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκούσιοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρὸς τε τὰς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. 35

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γιγνόμενα. Βίαιον δὲ οὐ ἡ 1110a ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ἧ μὴδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων, οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.

Compulsory acts

b. Ib., 1110 b¹⁻⁵, 9-11:

Τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἀπλῶς μὲν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἦ καὶ 1110b ὁ πράττων μὴδὲν συμβάλληται; Ἄ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἔστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἰρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκούσια ἔστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἐκούσια. — Εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη 5. 9 βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἶη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.

Acts done through ignorance are involuntary only when regretted

c. Ib., 1110 b¹⁸⁻²⁴:

Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μὴδὲν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ 20 τῇ πράξει, ἐκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὃ γε μὴ ἤδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός γε. Τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος, ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἐκὼν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.

d. Ib., IIIIO b³⁰-IIII a⁶:Knowledge of
the circum-
stances
required

Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διὰ γε ταύτην), ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ αἱ
 IIIIIa ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἡ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, 5 καὶ ἔνεκα τίνος οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἡρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.

e. Ib., IIIII a^{22, 29}, bI³:Voluntary
acts

Ὅντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδῶσι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς 25 λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἐκουσίως πράττει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἴτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἐκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἐκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχροῦ ἀκουσίως; Ἡ γελοῖον ἐνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; — δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἥττον
 IIIIIb ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας· ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

576—Moral virtue further implies that the action is done by choice.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 2, IIIII b^{4, 10}:

Choice

Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἐκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται 5 διελεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἥθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. — Ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτ' ὅν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα κοινωνοῦν, 10 προαιρέσεως δ' οὐ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὐ.

b. Ib., IIIII b^{10, 19}:It is neither
desire nor
passion

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ εἰκόασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. Καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὐ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς 15 δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μὲν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὐ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμία δ' ἐπιθυμία οὐ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. — Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἥττον· ἥμισυ γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

c. Ib., IIIII b^{19, 30}:

Neither wish

20 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἡλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησις ἔστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτὴν τινα νικᾶν

ἡ ἀθλητήν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' 25
αὐτοῦ. Ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς
τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ
εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει·
ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. 30

nor opinion d. Ib. IIII b³⁰-III2 a¹¹:

Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν 30, 31
ἦττον περὶ τὰ αἰδία καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ
διαίρεται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. — Ὅλως
μὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταῦτόν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τίιν. Τῷ γὰρ προαι- 1112a
ρεῖσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοῖ τινές ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὐ. Καὶ προαιρού-
μεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστὶν ἢ τίιν
συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δὲ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις 5
ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὐ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ
προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἀ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἀ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν.
Δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαι τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν
μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἰρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἀ δεῖ. 10

Choice
defined

e. Ib., III2 a¹³⁻¹⁷:

Τί οὖν ἡ ποῖόν τί ἐστὶν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν; Ἐκ οὐ σι ο ν μὲν
δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. Ἄλλ' ἄρα γε τὸ π ρ ο β ε β ο υ - 15
λ ε υ μ έ ν ο ν ; Ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. Ὑποσημαίνειν
δ' ἔοικεν καὶ τοῦνομα ὡς ὃν πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν.

577—Choice having been defined as “the Voluntary preceded by deli-
beration”, the question arises: on which objects does deliberation bear.
Ar. answers: (1) We deliberate about things that are in our power and
can be done; (2) not about ends, but about means.

Not every
thing is
object of
deliberation

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 3, III2 a¹⁸⁻³⁴:

Βουλευόνται δὲ πότερα πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστὶν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ
ἐστὶ βουλή; Λεκτέον δὲ ἴσως βουλευτόν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλευσάιτ' ἂν τις ἡλίθιος 20
ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. — Περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰδίων οὐδείς βου-
λεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμ-
μετροι. — Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, αἰεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταῦτα γινομένων, εἴτ'
ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διὰ τινὰ αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. — 25
Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. — Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ
τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὐρέσεως. — Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων,
οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδείς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλευεται.
Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐδὲν δι' ἡμῶν. — Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ' 30

ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. Αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλευόνται περὶ τῶν δι' αὐτῶν πρακτῶν.

b. Ib., III 2 b^{11,21}:

We deliberate
not about
ends, but
about means

III 2b Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὔτε γὰρ
15 ἱατρὸς βουλευέται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν
ποιήσῃ, οὔδ' ἂν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι,
πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσιν, καὶ διὰ πλείονων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι
διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς
20 διὰ τούτου ἔσται κάκεινο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ
ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικεν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν
τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα.

578—After these preliminaries choice can be defined more precisely.

Eth. Nic. III 3, III 3 a^{9,12}:

Final
definition
of choice

Ὅντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὁρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις
ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλευσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες
ὁρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

579—a. Since, then, good and bad actions depend on choice, virtue and vice are in our power.

Eth. Nic. III 5, III 3 b^{9,16}:

We are
responsible
for good and
for bad
actions

III 3b Ὅντος δὲ βουλευτοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς
5 τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἴεν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. Αἱ δὲ
τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἡ κακία. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ
μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστε εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν
10 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχροὺς ὃν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ
πράττειν αἰσχροὺς ὃν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Εἰ δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ'
ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὥς

15 οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ ¹

ἔοικεν τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δὲ ἀληθεῖ. Μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία
ἐκούσιον.

¹ With this ancient Greek wisdom (the verse may be of Solon) the Socratic maxim that "nobody does wrong willingly" is implicitly condemned. Cp. our nr. 204c, d.

This is
presupposed
by legislation

b. Ib., III3 b^{21,30}:

Τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι 25 μὴ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἵτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὥς τοὺς μὲν προτρέφοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. Καίτοι ὅσα μῆτε ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μῆτε ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὄν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἤττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά.

29, 30

580—a. The truth that character is formed by action is not contradicted by the fact that a vice once formed cannot be thrown off at will.

Ib., III4 a^{9,31}:

Vice cannot
be thrown
off at will,
but is formed
voluntarily

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομι- 10 δῇ ἀναισθητόν· ἔτι δὲ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἐκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη. Οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἐκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς 15 βιοτεῶν καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς· τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γίνεσθαι, διὸ ἐκόντες εἰσὶν· γενομένοις 20 δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν μὴ εἶναι.

Οὐ μόνον δὲ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἐκούσιοι εἰσὶν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πῆρωσιν· 25 οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειεν τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεῆσαι· τῷ δὲ ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσῃ. Τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐ. Εἰ δ' οὕτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἴεν. 30

The objec-
tion that
conduct is
determined
by innate
character

b. Ib., III4 a^{31-b}25:

Εἰ δὲ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας III4b οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος αὐτῷ τῆς ἐξεώς ἐστὶ πως αἷτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἷτιος, εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς αὐτῷ αἷτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὐτῷ τὸ ἄριστον 5 ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ἢ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἰρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυῆς ὃ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν (τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὁ παρ'

10 ἐτέρου μὴ οἶόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἶον ἔφω τοιοῦτον ἔξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ
καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἢ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινῇ ἂν εἴῃ εὐφυῖα), εἰ δὴ ταῦτ'
ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἢ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἐκούσιον; Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως,
τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὅπως δὴποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται,
15 τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὅπως δὴποτε. Εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος
μὴ φύσει ἐκάστω φαίνεται οἷον δὴποτε, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ
μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἐκούσιως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἢ ἀρετὴ
ἐκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἤττον καὶ ἢ κακία ἐκούσιον ἂν εἴῃ. Ὅμοίως γὰρ καὶ
20 τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτόν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. Εἰ οὖν,
ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἐκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἔξεων συναίτιοι πως
αὐτοὶ ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοὶ τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι
25 ἐκούσιοι ἂν εἴεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

c. Ib., III 4 b³⁰-III 5 a³:

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοι εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἔξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων
ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοι ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἔξεων δὲ
1115a τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἢ πρόσθεσις οὐ γινώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστικῶν·
ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως χρῆσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκούσιοι.

Actions and
states of cha-
racter not in
the same
sense
voluntary

3—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VIRTUE (Books III 6-X)

581—Ar.'s treatment of courage gives a good instance of his method in defining moral virtues. It has been rightly remarked by Ross that this method is the reverse of that followed by Plato. Plato tends to interpret every virtue so widely that it is essentially identified with virtue as a whole—we have seen this in the *Laches* concerning courage (our nr. 210), and again in the *Republic* concerning justice (nrs. 284-285)—; by Ar. the spheres of the particular virtues are narrowed as much as possible.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 6, III 5 a⁶⁻³⁵:

Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερόν γεγένηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακὰ· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα
10 τὰ κακὰ, οἶον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφίλιαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἐνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἶον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικῆς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος
15 ἀναίσχυντος. Λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γὰρ τι ὁμοιον τῷ ἀνδρεῖ· ἀφοβος γὰρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Πενίαν δὲ ἴσως οὐ δεῖ

Courage
defined

φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος, λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. Ἐνιοὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοι εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παιῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλὸς ἐστίν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; Ἡ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; Οὐθίς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. Ἐν τίσιν οὖν; Ἡ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; Τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. Ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. Κυρίως δὲ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον.

35

b. Ib. 7, 1115 b¹⁵⁻²⁴:

Γίνεται δὴ τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι ὁ οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὥς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἡ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἂν δεῖ^{b15} καὶ οὐ ἔνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὥς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος (κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὥς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος· τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ὁ ἀνδρεία καλὸν· τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὀρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. Καλοῦ δὲ ἔνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Its motive
is its own
nobility

Again, W. D. Ross¹ has made an interesting remark here: in his actual treatment of the virtues, he says, Ar. somewhat forgets his formal view; (namely, that all human action aims at an end other than itself); he nowhere attempts to deduce the necessity of any single virtue from the supreme end to be attained. He treats the agent as being moved to action by the contemplation of the "fineness" of the good act itself, and thus becomes in his detailed treatment an intuitionist.

582—a. The sphere of temperance is limited to the pleasures of touch and taste, but especially to those of touch.

Temperance *Eth. Nic.* III 10, 1117 b²⁰–1118 b¹:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω (τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων)· μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν.^{1117 b20} Δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης

¹ Aristotle, p. 204/5.

25 ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν (ἤττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως
 περὶ τὰς λύπας ἐστίν) · ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ ποίας
 οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. Διηρῆσθωσαν δὴ καὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ αἱ
 ψυχικαὶ, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομαθία · ἐκότερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὐ φιλητικός
 30 ἐστίν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας. Οἱ δὲ περὶ
 τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται · ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ'
 οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαὶ εἰσιν. Τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικούς
 35 καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκόλαστους δ'
 1118a οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπούμενους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς σω-
 ματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας · οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς
 διὰ τῆς ὕψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε
 5 ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται · καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις,
 καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν · τοὺς
 γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεις ἀκόλαστους λέγει,
 οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὁσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός ·
 10 τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μύλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὁσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολά-
 στους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὕψων · χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι,
 ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. Ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ
 τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὁσμαῖς · τὸ δὲ
 15 τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου. Τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ
 οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
 Οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὁσμαῖς τῶν λαγῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν
 20 δ' αἰσθήσιν ἡ ὁσμὴ ἐποίησεν · οὐδὲ ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ,
 ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ἤσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται ·
 ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἔξει. Περὶ τὰς
 τοιαύτας δὲ ἡδονὰς ἢ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία
 ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραπο-
 25 δῶδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται · αὐταὶ δ' εἰσὶν ἀφῆ
 καὶ γεῦσις. Φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι ·
 τῆς γὰρ γεύσεως ἐστὶν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιῶσιν οἱ τοὺς οἶνους δο-
 κιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὕψα ἀρτύοντες · οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἱ γε
 30 ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἢ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν
 ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. Διὸ καὶ ἠὔξατό τις ὁσοφάγος ὦν τὸν
 φάρυγγα αὐτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γινέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἀφῇ.

b. Ib., II, 1118 b²⁷⁻²⁸, 1119 a⁵⁻¹¹:

1119a Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον. —
 5 Ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ἤττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται.
 Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπικὴ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα διακρίνει

Excess and
defect

τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὐ· εἰ δέ τῳ μὴθὲν ἐστὶν ἡδὺ μὴδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἐτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἶναι. Οὐ τέτευχε δ' ἰο νόματος ὁ τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.

W. D. Ross¹ remarks on this passage: "Apart from the excessive narrowness of the conception of temperance, the main point to be noted here is the breakdown of the doctrine of the mean".

583—The crown of virtues is, according to Ar., that particular virtue which he calls "greatness of soul". It is described as follows.

Greatness
of soul

Eth. Nic. IV 3, 1123 a³⁴-1125 a¹⁶:

Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μέγала μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν 1123b ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγας ὡς αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀξίος ὢν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἡλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν² οὐδείς ἡλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. (ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἀξίος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος 5 δ' οὐ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὐ)· ὁ δὲ μέγας ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος (ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἀξίος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος)· ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἀξίος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μέγας ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἀξίος 10 ὢν ἐτι ἐλαττόνων αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ· καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μέγας ἀξίος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἀξίος;

Ἔστι δὲ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος (τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸν ἀξιοῖ)· οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν. 15

It is related
to honour
and
disgrace

Εἰ δὲ ὁ μέγας ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἀξίος ὢν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἐν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμεμεν, καὶ οὐ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμὴ (μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο 20 τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν)· περὶ τιμᾶς δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ἐστὶν ὡς δεῖ. Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς· κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλόψυχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς 25 ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον.

Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἀξίος, ἀριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ αἰεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἀξίος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἀριστος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειεν δ' <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλόψυχου τὸ ἐν ἐκάστη ἀρετῇ 30

¹ Aristotle, p. 207.

² τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν - sc. ἀξιούντων ἑαυτούς.

μέγα. Οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἀρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασεῖσαντι¹, οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ὅ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα; Καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνεται ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὢν.

35 Οὐκ εἶη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῖλος ὢν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἡ τιμὴ, καὶ
1124a ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. Ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι
τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο
χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.

A crown of
the virtues

5 Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμᾶς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν
ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὥς τῶν οἰκείων
τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἄξια τιμὴ·
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέχεται γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· τῆς δὲ
10 παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει, οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν.

Attitude
towards
honour

Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἶρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμᾶς, οὐ μὴν
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως
15 ἔξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτε εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτε ἀτυχῶν περι-
λυπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὥς μέγιστον ὂν (αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ
πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν
βούλονται)· ὅ δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστιν, τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Διὸ ὑπερόπται
20 δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν.

towards
other
external
goods

Οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπερο-
χῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλο-
25 ψυχότερους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. Κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος
τιμητέος· ὅ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. Οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ
τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς
μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται. Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ὑπερόπται
30 δὲ καὶ ὕβρισταὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίγνονται. Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ
ῥᾶδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
124b ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχῳσιν πράτ-
τουσιν. Μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν
ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσιν, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν
5 ἄλλων. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς),
οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.

Οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλο-
κίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν.

towards
danger

10 Καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δὲ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος,
τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. Καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλείονων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ

in conferring
and receiving
benefits

¹ παρασεῖσαντι - "swinging his arms by his side".

ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, <ὕφ> ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὐ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν 15
 Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἂ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν 20
 δὲ ῥάδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι¹, ἢ οὐ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἄργον εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἄλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστικόν. 25

in speaking
and acting
openly

Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβούμενου. Καὶ μέλει τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερώς· παρρησιαστής γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. Διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἰρωνά δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ 30
 δύνασθαι ζῆν² ἄλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικόν γάρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοὶ 1125a καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. Οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος³· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὐτοῦ 5
 ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἐτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῇται μέλει αὐτῷ οὐθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστίν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. Καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ 10
 καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρχους γὰρ μᾶλλον.

Outward
appearance

Καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικός ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἴομενος· ἢ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων. 15

We share the impression of Ross, who states that "as a whole the picture is an unpleasing one".

Justice

584—Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is devoted to justice. Contrary to Plato, Ar. follows the common use of language. Doing so, he distinguishes two main senses of the terms "just" and "unjust".

Two senses
of the terms
"just" and
"unjust"

Eth. Nic. V 1, 1129 a³²-b¹:

Δοκεῖ δὲ ὁ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος, ὥστε

¹ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι - he does not strive after the things commonly held in honour.

² ζῆν πρὸς ἄλλον - living at the will of another.

³ ἀνθρωπολόγος - a gossip.

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὃ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. Τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον.

585—In the first sense “justice” is perfect virtue, containing all other virtues and displayed in society.

Ib., 1129 b¹¹-1130 a⁸:

Justice in
the general
sense

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστὶ πῶς δίκαια· τὰ τε γὰρ ὠρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ
15 ἀπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἓνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικά καὶ φυλακτικά εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. Προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ
20 λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ρίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν
25 κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχε- διασμένος¹. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μὲν ἐστὶν τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὐθ' ἔσπερος οὔτε ἐῷος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμια- ζόμενοί φαμεν

30 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶς ἀρετὴ ἐνι².

Καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετὴ, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσις ἐστὶν, τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὐτὸν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς
1130a ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι »ἀρχὰ ἀνδρα δείξει«· πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἥδη ὁ ἄρχων. Διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότρινον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον
5 ἐστίν· ἄλλω γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῶ. Κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὐτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.

586—a. There also exists a sort of “justice” in a special sense, which is a part of virtue in general.

Eth. Nic. V 2, 1130 a^{14,34}:

Justice in
the special
sense

Ζητοῦμεν δὲ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην. Ἔστι γάρ τις, ὥς φαμέν.

¹ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος - if it has been made at random.

² Theognis, 147.

Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν 15 γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μὲν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινὰ (ψέγομεν γάρ) 20 καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. Ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθείς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυ- 25 μίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἀδικός, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὐ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίγνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπὶ τινι μοχθηρίαν αἰεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπεν τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ 30 ἐπάταξεν, ἐπὶ ὀργήν, εἰ δὲ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. Ὡστε φανερόν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἐν μέρει.

1. distributive, b. Justice in this sense is divided into two kinds: (1) distributive,
2. corrective (2) corrective.

Ib., 1130 b³⁰-1131 a¹:

Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἐν μὲν ἔστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἐν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν.

- Corrective justice subdivided c. Corrective justice again is subdivided into two divisions.
Ib., 1131 a¹⁻⁹:

Τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐκούσιά ἐστιν τὰ δὲ 113 ἀκούσια, ἐκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις, ὦνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις (ἐκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων 5 τούτων ἐκούσιος), τῶν δὲ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπῇ, μοιχείᾳ, φαρμακείᾳ, προαγωγείᾳ ¹, δουλαπατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἀρπαγὴ, πῆρωςις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.

587—In a certain sense justice may be called a mean between two extremes. First distributive justice is considered.

Justice
a mean

Eth. Nic. V 3, 1131 a⁹⁻³²:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τ' ἀδικός ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστι 10 τοῦ ἄνισου. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἑλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ

¹ Prostitution.

ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη.
 15 Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσὶν. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ
 ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρὸς τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ἥ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον
 καὶ ἑλαττον), ἥ δ' ἴσον ἐστί, δυοῖν, ἥ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ
 20 ἐν οἷς [τὰ πράγματα], δύο. Καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὥς γὰρ
 ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἔξουσιν, ἀλλ'
 ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ
 25 νέμωται. Ἐτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς
 ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν
 λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ
 πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετὴν. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον
 30 ἀνάλογόν τι. Τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως
 ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις.

a sort of
proportion

E.g.: the wages of A and B should be in proportion to the merits of A and B.
 Thus $\alpha : \beta = \gamma : \delta$, and $\alpha : \gamma = \beta : \delta$. Now $\alpha : \beta = (\alpha + \gamma) : (\beta + \delta)$.

This is called geometrical proportion.

588—Next, corrective justice is to be dealt with. Here the proportion is *arithmetical*, the same being rendered for the same.

Eth. Nic. V 4, 1131 b²³-1132 a¹⁹:

In corrective
justice the
proportion is
arithmetical

25 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἐν τὸ διορθωτικόν,
 ὃ γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἐκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. Τοῦτο
 δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον
 τῶν κοινῶν αἰεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην (καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων
 30 κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι
 πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ
 τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν)· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον
 1132a τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν
 ἀριθμητικήν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος
 ἐπιεικῇ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν
 5 διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος (καὶ χρῆται ὥς ἴσοις), εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ'
 ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἐβλάψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. Ὡστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον
 ὃν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ
 καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διήρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται
 10 τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. (Λέγεται γὰρ ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ
 τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μὴ τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι,
 καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία
 τὸ δὲ κέρδος.) Ὡστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ

In this case,
too, justice
is a mean

κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλεόν τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ 15
πλεόν τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ
ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον
ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.

589—Ἐπιείκεια and the ἐπιεικές. *Eth. Nic.* V 10, 1137 a³¹-b²⁷:

Equity

Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιο-
σύνην τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικές πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς
ταῦτόν ἀπλῶς οὔτε ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπούμενοις, καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ
ἐπιεικές ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες 35
μεταφέροντες ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες, ὅτε δὲ 1137b
τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικές παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὄν
ἐπαινεῖτον ἐστιν· ἡ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἡ τὸ ἐπιεικές οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ
ἄλλο· ἡ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταῦτόν ἐστιν. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει 5
διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δὲ ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν
ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικές δικαίου τινὸς ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον,
καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὄν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. Ταῦτόν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ
ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαῖον ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν 10
ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικές δίκαιον μὲν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρ-
θωμα νομίμου δικαίου. Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δὲ
οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. Ἐν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου,
μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ 15
ἀμαρτανόμενον. Καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἥττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ
νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ
τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτικῶν ὕλη ἐστιν. Ὅταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ 20
δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἢ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης
καὶ ἡμαρτεν ἀπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ καὶ ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς
εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἥδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν. Διὸ δίκαιον μὲν ἐστιν, καὶ βέλτιόν
τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἀπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀμαρτήματος. Καὶ 25
ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ἢ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ
καθόλου.

The intellec-
tual virtues
treated in
book VI

590—According to the definition of virtue given sub 571b, the φρό-
νιμος has the arbitrium in determining the μεσότης. Therefore, the in-
tellectual virtues, σοφία and φρόνησις, have to be dealt with, too. They
are treated in *Eth. Nic.* VI.

The author distinguishes two faculties in the rational part of the soul, namely
the ἐπιστημονικόν (which has to do with that which is of necessity, and therefore
eternal and invariable), and the λογιστικόν (a deliberating faculty, which has to
do with the contingent). The latter has a task towards practical action, since
choice must be preceded by deliberation.

There are five qualities by which the soul reaches truth: ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, νοῦς and σοφία. The first having been defined as demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal, and the second as a rational quality, concerned with producing, which reasons truly (ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική), φρόνησις is considered in the following passage.

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 a²⁴⁻³³, b²⁰⁻²¹:

What is
φρόνιμος

1140a Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς
25 φρονίμους. Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς
βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα,
οὐ κατὰ μέρος, ὅλον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα
πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως¹. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περὶ τι φρονίμους
30 λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μὴ ἐστὶ τέχνη.
"Ωστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.

Βουλευέται δ' οὐθεις περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχο-
b 20 μένων αὐτῷ πράξαι. — "Ωστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἐξίς εἶναι
μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακ-
τικήν.

φρόνησις
defined

b. It is neither an art, nor a purely intellectual quality.

Ib., 1140 b²¹⁻³⁰:

It is neither
an art.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ ἐν μὲν
τέχνῃ ὁ ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνων αἰρετώτερος², περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἤττον, ὥσπερ καὶ
περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετὴ τίς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τέχνη.

25 Δυσκοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή,
τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις.
Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐξίς μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης
30 ἐξεώς ἐστὶ, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

nor a purely
intellectual
quality

In this passage Ar. rightly distinguishes practical reason from theoretical, as we shall again find in his definition of wisdom (our next nr.). By this distinction he is correcting Plato, who—doubtlessly by the ethico-religious character of his contemplation of the Ideas—mixed them willingly.

¹ Book X, where the contemplative life is treated, makes clear what the author means by the above formula: "to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, e.g. what is good for his health or strength, but what is expedient as a means to the good life in general", this is the mark of a man who possesses practical wisdom. For this man acknowledges that the contemplative life is the supreme good for man, because it makes him most happy (by "contemplative life" being meant a life of scientific research).

² In Plato's *Hippias Minor* Socrates came to the strange conclusion that the man who does wrong willingly is better than the one who does it unwillingly (our nr. 212). To this famous theory Ar. replies: *In art*, indeed, the man who errs willingly is to be preferred; in φρόνησις, which is half an intellectual, half a practical quality, less. And so it is in the case of the other virtues. See our explanation of the text.

591—Again, νοῦς having been defined in the next chapter (6) as “knowledge” of the first principles from which science proceeds” (cp. our nr. 465), wisdom is treated in the following passage.

Wisdom a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, 1141 a⁹⁻²⁰:

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, 1141a
οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν 10
οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δὲ
τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος; οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφοὺς, ὥσπερ Ὀμηρός
φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτη

τὸν δ' οὐτ' ἄρ' σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὐτ' ἀροτῆρα 15
οὐτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν
a combination of intuitive Reason and Science μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. “Ὡς τε
εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν
ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων. 20

“The highest objects” were to Ar., at least in the visible world, the heavenly bodies, which he calls τὰ αἰδία τῶν αἰσθητῶν. They are far superior to man. Therefore, Ar. stresses the speculative character of wisdom, which is illustrated by the instances of Thales and Anaxagoras (our next cited passage).

Speculative character of wisdom b. *Ib.*, b³⁻⁸:

Διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ' 1141b
οὐ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ 5
μὲν καὶ θαυμαστά καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτοὺς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ',
ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

592—As such, then, wisdom ought to be superior to phrónesis, which has a practical character. And yet, phrónesis, being practical, is directly concerned with those things which can make man happy, and could, therefore, seem to be more important. What, then is the relation of wisdom to phrónesis?

Relation of phronesis to wisdom *Eth. Nic.* VI 12, 1144 a¹⁻⁹:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ' αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἰρετάς αὐτὰς εἶναι, 1144a
ἀρετάς γ' οὐσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου¹, καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν
μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. Ἐπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μὲν, οὐχ ὡς ἱατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ'
ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν². μέρος γὰρ οὐσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5

¹ ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου - he means: of each of the two faculties of the rational soul, sc. the ἐπιστημονικόν and the λογιστικόν.

² “In the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health”, i.e. wisdom is the formal cause of happiness.

τῷ ἔχασθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. "Ἐτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον.

593—Since, then, man becomes good by doing good actions—if, at least, he does them by choice and for the sake of the good—, practical wisdom, which has the leading part in choice, plays a prominent rôle in the genesis of virtue. But this is not all. Whenever a man is virtuous, he possesses practical wisdom; for there is no true virtue without phrónesis.

In the following passage Ar. explains the relation of practical wisdom (phrónesis) to virtue (in the proper sense) by comparing it to that of a certain intellectual ability (δεινότης), which is the capacity for doing the things that conduce to the aim we propose, to natural virtue. "Cleverness" is not identical with practical wisdom, but practical wisdom implies it. Now natural virtue is related in the same way to Virtue in the proper sense.

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 13, 1144 b¹⁻³²:

Relation of
phrónesis to
moral virtue

1144b Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει, ὥς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα (οὐ ταυτό μέν, ὅμοιον δέ), οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. Πᾶσιν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τᾶλλα ἔχομεν εὐθύς ἐκ 5 γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἑτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὔσαι. Πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὀρᾶσθαι, ὅτι 10 ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὀψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει, ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὔσα τότε ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετὴ. "Ὡστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἶδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ 15 ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.

Διόπερ τινές φασιν πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ὥςτο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. Σημεῖον δέ· 20 καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὀρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετὴν, προστιθέασιν τὴν ἕξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἐστὶ, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. 'Εοίκασι δὲ μαντεύεσθαι πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ 25 τὴν φρόνησιν. Δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἐστὶν. Ορθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησις ἐστὶν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ὥςτο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας),

Not all the
virtues are
phrónesis,
but none of
them is
without it

ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἶόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι 30 κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἡθικῆς ἀρετῆς.

b. Nevertheless, this does not prove that phrónesis is superior to wisdom.

**Phrónesis
not superior
to wisdom**

Ib., 1145 a⁶⁻⁸:

Ἄλλα μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγείας ἡ ἱατρική.

594—Selfrestraint (ἐγκράτεια) and Unrestraint (ἀκρασία) are treated in Book VII, ch. 1-10. The last five chapters of this book (11-15) deal with ἡδονή, a much-discussed subject in the Academy in the later years of Plato. A summary of these discussions is given by Ar. in the following passage.

**Three main
views about
pleasure**

a. *Eth. Nic.* VII 11, 1152 b⁸⁻¹²:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ 1152b συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔναι μὲν εἶναι, 10 αἱ δὲ πολλὰι φαῦλαι· ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.

Of these three views, the first is that of Speusippus; the second is Plato's view in in the *Philebus*. The third appears at the end of this dialogue. It is represented by Ar. in book X, *infra*.

b. For the first thesis it is argued that pleasure is not a good because it is a process (namely the filling of a void).

**An argument
for the first
thesis**

Ib., 1152 b¹²⁻¹⁴:

Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσις ἐστὶν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητῇ ¹, οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκία.

c. The same argument is adduced for the third view.

**and for the
third**

Ib., 1152 b²²⁻²³:

Ὅτι δ' οὐ τῷ ἄριστον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις.

595—To this argument Ar. opposes that pleasure is neither a process nor always linked up with a process; it is an activity and an end.

**This
argument
refuted**

Eth. Nic. VII 12, 1153 a⁷⁻¹⁵:

Οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἑτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασὶ τὸ τέλος 1153a τῆς γενέσεως. Οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι

¹ γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητῇ - "a conscious process towards a natural state" (Rackham).

10 καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν
ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. Διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς
ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐν ἐρ -
5 γειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως¹, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπό-
διστον.

Definition
of pleasure

596—a. To the view of Speusippus that no pleasure is a good, Ar. opposes the thesis that pleasure as such is a good.

Eth. Nic. VII 13, 1153 b¹⁻⁷:

Pleasure
a good

1153b Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς
κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. Τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ
κακόν, ἀγαθόν. Ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. Ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος
5 ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον².
οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

b. But not only pleasure as such is a good; against the third view mentioned in ch. 11 Ar. now argues (1) that *some pleasure* may be the supreme Good, and (2) that in fact the supreme Good will be a certain kind of pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b⁷⁻¹³:

The supreme
Good a cer-
tain kind
of pleasure

10 Τᾶριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονὴν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔναι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινα ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἐκάστης
ἐξέως εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία
εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾗ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἰρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστιν
ἡδονή. Ὡστε εἴη ἂν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν,
εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἀπλῶς.

c. This theory is confirmed by the fact that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b²⁵⁻²⁸:

This theory
confirmed by
experience

25 Καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι
τοῦ εἶναι πῶς τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.

The argument is of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who according to *Eth. Nic.*

¹ "an activity of our natural state".

² The argument of Speusippus is more fully exhibited in X 2, 5: "They say, if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is a good; for evil can also be opposed to evil and to a thing which is neither good nor evil"—(if we follow the reading of Hackforth, who bracketed the word ἄμφω. According to the traditional text the meaning of the last words is: "and both are opposed to the neutral state"—which is, of course, true, but not exactly *ad rem*).

X 2, held that "pleasure is the Good", because "all creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it". To this account Ar. adds the remark that the argument was believed more because of the excellence of Eudoxus' character than for its own sake. "For he (E.) had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding this view because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true" ¹.

597—Pleasure is treated again by Ar. in book X, ch. 1-5. The later exhibition goes further than that of book VII. We find the author's final view of pleasure in the following passage.

Pleasure is
not a process

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 4, 1174 a¹¹⁻²³, b⁵⁻⁶, b¹⁰⁻¹³:

Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ² περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω· τί δ' 1174a
ἐστὶν ἢ ποιόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. Δοκεῖ
γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὄρασις καθ' ὅντινον χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐνδεῆς οὐδενὸς 15
ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γεγόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιοῦτ' ὁμοίει καὶ ἡ
ἡδονή. "Ὅλον γὰρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἥς
ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. Διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησις
ἐστὶν. Ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, ὅλον ἢ οἰκοδομική, καὶ 20
τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὐ ἐφίεται, ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἔτεραι τῷ εἶδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων.
— Τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὅτῳ χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. — Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον b 5, 6
καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τῆς ἡδονῆς ³. Οὐ γὰρ πάντων 10
ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι
γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις·
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γὰρ τι.

neither the
result of a
process

b. Positively, pleasure is defined as something which accompanies and completes activity.

Definition
of pleasure

Eth. Nic. X 4, 1174 b¹⁴⁻³⁴:

Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακει-
μένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστα) εἶναι 15
δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μὴθὲν διαφερέ-
τω), καθ' ἕκαστον δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἀρίστα διακειμένου πρὸς
τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. Κατὰ 20

¹ Translation of Rackham.

² τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα - the current opinions.

³ τῆς ἡδονῆς is a necessary correction, first made by Ramsauer and adopted by W. D. Ross and H. Rackham. The mss. have τὴν ἡδονήν.

πᾶσαν γὰρ αἰσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐν ἐργεῖαν ἢ ἡδονή. Οὐ τὸν
 25 αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἢ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. Καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἰσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· φαμέν γάρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὴν ἢ τε αἰσθησις ἢ κρατίστη καὶ
 30 πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, αἰεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐν ἐργεῖαν ἢ ἡδονή οὐχ ὥς ἕξις ἐν ὑπάρχουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, ὅλον τοῖς ἀχμαίσις ἢ ὥρα.

598—Consequences of this definition are:

a. Pleasures differ in kind, since activities differ.

1175a *Eth. Nic. X 5, 1175 a²⁰⁻²⁸:*

Consequences of this definition

20 Ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνεργεῖαν τελειοῖ ἢ ἡδονή. Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἶδει διαφέρειν. Τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει ὑπ' ἐτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. Οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, ὅλον ζῶα καὶ
 25 δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος. Ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἶδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἶδει τελειοῦσθαι. Διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.

b. Activities have their own pleasures which stimulate them.

Ib., 1175 a^{28-b¹}:

30 Φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνωκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ ἢν τελειοῖ. Συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνεργεῖαν ἢ οἰκεία ἡδονή. Μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, ὅλον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδάσκειν εἰς
 35 τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. Συναύξουσι δὴ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύζοντα οἰκεῖα. Τοῖς ἐτέροις δὲ τῷ εἶδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἶδει.

599—Good pleasures are those in which the φρόνιμος takes a delight.

What are good pleasures?

1176a *Eth. Nic. X 5, 1176 a¹⁵⁻²²:*

15 Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασιν τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστου μέτρον ἢ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ἢ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναί εἶναι ἂν αἱ τοῦτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς

οὗτος χαίρει. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῇ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· 20
πολλὰ γὰρ φθορὰ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ
τούτοις καὶ τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις.

600—In Books VIII and IX friendship is dealt with.

The author proceeds to determine its conditions by answering these two questions: (1) Is friendship only possible between good men? (2) Is it of one kind or of more than one?

Friendship
defined

Eth. Nic. VIII 2, 1155 b¹⁷-1156 a⁵:

Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερόν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ 1155b
γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον.
Δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν 20
εἴη τάγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. Πότερον οὖν τάγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὐτοῖς
ἀγαθόν; Διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. Ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. Δοκεῖ δὲ
τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἀπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλητόν,
ἐκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἐκάστῳ. Φιλεῖ δὲ ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὄν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινό- 25
μενον. Διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητόν φαινόμενον.

Τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται
φιλία. Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀντιφιλήσις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ
ἴσως τῷ οἶνῳ βούλεσθαι τάγαθά, ἀλλ' εἴπερ σφῆζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα 30
αὐτὸς ἔχῃ)· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ
ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. Τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τὰγαθὰ
εὔνοους λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου
γίγνηται· εὔνοϊαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσιν φιλίαν
εἶναι. Ἡ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσιν; Πολλοὶ γὰρ
εἰσιν εὔνοοι οἷς οὐχ ἐωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· 35
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐκείνων τις πάθος πρὸς τοῦτον. Εὔνοοι μὲν οὖν οὗτοι 1156a
φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἂν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὥς ἔχουσιν
ἑαυτοῖς; Δεῖ ἄρα εὔνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας
δι' ἓν τι τῶν εἰρημένων. 5

So friendship is defined by four characteristics:

(1) it is goodwill (εὔνοια), (2) mutual (ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι), (3) known to the other (μὴ λανθάνουσα), (4) for the sake of the other (τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα).

By the last characteristic, strictly speaking, friendships of utility and of pleasure are excluded. They may be called friendship only by analogy, or (as Ar. calls it in the next chapter) *accidentally*.

The point is discussed by Schächter in his work cited sub **565a**, where he compares the passages on φιλία in the three Aristotelian treatises on ethics.

601—a. According to the three kinds of φιλητά, three species of friendship are distinguished

Eth. Nic. VIII 3, 1156 a⁶⁻²⁴:

Three species
of friendship

1156a Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἶδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλαί. Τρία
δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλαίας εἶδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀντι-
φιλήσεις οὐ λανθάνουσα. Οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τάγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις
10 ταύτῃ ἢ φιλοῦσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ'
αὐτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ἢ γίγνεται τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
οἱ δι' ἡδονήν. Οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ'
ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. Οἱ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν
15 στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ἢ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν
«ὅσπερ ἐστίν», ἀλλ' ἢ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. Κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλαί
αὐταῖ εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ
πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. Εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν,
20 μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ᾖσιν, παύονται
φιλοῦντες. Τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται. Ἀπολυθέντος
οὖν δι' ὁ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλαία, ὡς οὕσης τῆς φιλαίας πρὸς ἐκείνα.

b. Friendships of utility occur most frequently between the old.

Ib., 1156 a²⁴⁻²⁶:

Friendships
of utility

25 Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἢ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλαία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ
ἡδύ οἱ τηλικούτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον).

c. Friendships of pleasure seem to occur mostly between the young.

Ib. 1156 a³¹⁻³⁵:

Friendships
of pleasure

Ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλαία δι' ἡδονήν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι,
καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδύ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτού-
35 σης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. Διὸ ταχέως γίγονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται.

d. The perfect kind of friendship is that which is based on virtue.

Ib., 1156 b⁷⁻¹²:

Perfect
friendship

1156b Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλαία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. Οὗτοι γὰρ
τάγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ εἰσι καθ' αὐτούς·
10 οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τάγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι (δι' αὐτοὺς
γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλαία
ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ᾖσιν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον.

e. Friendships of virtue occur rarely, those of utility or pleasure are frequent.

1158a *Eth. Nic.* VIII 6, 1158 a¹⁰⁻¹⁸:

Perfect
friendship
occurs
rarely

10 Πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ
ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα· οἷκεν γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ πρὸς ἓνα πέφυκε

γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥάδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὁ παγγά- 15 λεπον. Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

602—Self-love the type of and basis for love of others.

Self-love
the basis for
friendship

Eth. Nic. IX 4, 1166 a¹⁻³³:

Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φίλαι ὀρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ 1166a τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. Τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τάγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων 5 οἱ προσκεκρουκότες ¹. οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταῦτ' αἰρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγούντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας οὐμβαίνει. Τούτων δὲ τινὲς καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὀρίζονται. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν 10 εἶναι. Ἐοικεν δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἐκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχὴν. Καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τάγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ 15 γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τάγαθόν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ δικνοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῶζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. Ἐκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τάγαθὰ, γινόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἰρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο 20 τὸ γινόμενον] ² (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τάγαθόν), ἀλλ' ὅν τι ποτ' ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. Συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνημαί, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. Καὶ 25 θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἴπειν. Τῷ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν [μέν] ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος 30 ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναι τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.

603—a. An objection to this view is mentioned in ch. 8 of the same book, 1168 a²⁸⁻³⁵:

An objection
to this view

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. Ἐπι-
τιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχυρῷ φιλαύτους ἀπο-

¹ Those who have quarrelled.

² Secl. Vermehren, followed by Rackham.

30 καλοῦσι· δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν
μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσοῦτῳ μᾶλλον (ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ ὅσον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄφ'
ἑαυτοῦ πράττει), ὁ δὲ ἐπεικῆς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον
35 διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίσιν.

b. Ar.'s reply to this objection. Ib., 1168 a³⁵-1169 a¹⁵:

Aristotle's
reply

1168b Τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. Φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν
μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλούμενος ᾧ βούλεται τάγαθὰ
ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται. Ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς
5 αὐτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάντα οἷς ὁ φίλος ὀρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἅπ' αὐτοῦ
πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. Καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι
ὁμογενωμονοῦσιν, ὅσον τὸ »μία ψυχὴ«¹ καὶ »κοινὰ τὰ φίλων« καὶ »ἰσότης
φιλότης« καὶ »γόνυ κνήμης ἑγγιον«². πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτόν μάλιστ'
10 ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὐτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν. Ἀπο-
ρεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεῶν ἔπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντων τὸ πιστόν.

Ἰσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαρρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον
ἐκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. Εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἐκάτεροι
15 λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους
καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς
ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασιν περὶ
αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. Οἱ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται
20 χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς.
Τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ
φαύλου ὄντος. Δικαίως δὲ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. "Οτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ
τοιαῦθ' αὐτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασιν λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον·
25 εἰ γὰρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζει τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ
σώφρονα ἢ ὅποια οὖν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ
περιποιεῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. — Δόξεις δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος
μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθὰ,
30 καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ
πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ
ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος.
35 Καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τοῦτου
1169a ἐκάστου ὄντος καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου
μάλιστα. "Οτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἐκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ
ἐπεικῆς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. Διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος
5 τοῦ ὀνειδίζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ

¹ "Friends have one soul between them". Euripides, *Orestes*, 1046.

² "Charity begins at home" (Ross).

πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστῳ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, 10 εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. — Ὡστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἐπόμενος.

15

604—The question whether friendship is necessary for happiness, is answered by Ar. in the affirmative.

Is friendship
necessary for
happiness?

Eth. Nic. IX 9, 1169 b³⁻¹³, b¹⁶⁻²², 1170 a¹¹⁻¹³.

Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεῖσεται φίλων ἢ μή. Οὐθὲν 1169b γὰρ φασὶ δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς 5 τὰγαθὰ· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, πορίζειν ἃ δι' αὐτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

ἔοικεν δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντα ἀπονέμοντας τὰγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. — Εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλον ἐστὶ 10 τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεῖσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. — Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἔλοιτ' ἂν 16 καθ' αὐτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθὰ· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. Καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. Δῆλον δ' 20 ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεῖν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. — Γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς 1170a ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θεογνίς φησιν.

12, 13

605—Having dealt with the problem of ἡδονή in the first part of Book X, the author speaks of the happy life in the following chapters (6-8).

Happiness
an activity
chosen for its
own sake

a. Recapitulation of preceding statements on the character of happiness.

Eth. Nic. X 6, 1176 a¹⁰-b⁹.

Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ 1176a εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. Εἴπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθευδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἂν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς 35

1176b ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἰρεται αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτάς αἰρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ 5 ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. Καθ' αὐτάς δ' εἰσιν αἰρεται ἀφ' ὧν μὴδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὐτά αἰρετῶν.

Cp. to this definition that of I 7 (our nr. 566, at the end).

b. Is not play an activity chosen for its own sake?—To this **Is not play chosen for its own sake?** question Ar. answers that play can never be an absolute end, only a means for further activity.

Ib., 1176 b¹⁰⁻¹¹, b³²–1177 a¹:

10 Καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδέει· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτάς αἰροῦνται. — Σπουδά-
32 ζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἡλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. Ἀναπαύσει γὰρ 35 ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιὰ, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. Οὐ δὲ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.

c. Serious things contribute more to happiness.

The happy life is serious

Ib., 1177 a¹⁻⁶:

1177a Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαιμόνων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. Βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν 5 ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη.

606—a. Perfect happiness is that activity which exercises the highest virtue, i.e. that of the highest function of man, i.e. the intellect.

Eth. Nic. X 7, 1177 a¹²⁻¹⁸:

Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὐλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. Εἴτε δὲ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν 15 δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἕννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῶν ὧν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. "Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται.

Perfect happiness lies in contemplation

b. The reasons for this statement are given in the next passage. **Reasons**

Ib., 1177 a^{20-b⁶}, b²⁶–1178 a⁸:

20 Κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ᾧ ὁ νοῦς. "Ετι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὅτιοῦν. Οἰόμεθα τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολο-

(1) It is the activity of the nous

γούμενως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστάς ἡδονάς ἔχειν καθαριότητι 25
καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὖλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδῖα τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

(2) most self-
sufficient

"Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ
τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς δικαιοπραγίῃσι 30
καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος,
ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν ὧν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ,
μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος.

(3) an end in
itself

Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὐτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται 1177b
παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα
παρὰ τὴν πράξιν. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ
ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνῃν ἄγωμεν. 5

(4) a divine
life

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπον· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπός 26
ἐστὶν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο
τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. Εἰ δὲ θεῖον
ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον 30
βίον. Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα
οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν
πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, 1178a
δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι
ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἅμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τὸν
αὐτοῦ βίον αἰροῖτο ἀλλὰ τινος ἄλλου. Τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἀρμόσει καὶ νῦν·
τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἐκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ᾗδιστόν ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ. Καὶ 5
τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἀνθρώπος. Οὗτος
ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

Cp. *Metaph.* A 2, 982 b²⁸⁻³² (our nr. 519).

c. The life of moral virtue takes the second place.

Moral virtue
ranged as
secondary

Ib. c. 8, 1178 a⁹⁻¹⁴:

Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρω-
πικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 10
πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρεῖαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἐν τε τοῖς
πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἐκάστῳ, ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρω-
πικά.

607—Further reasons for superiority of the contemplative life.

Contempla-
tion needs
few external
goods

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 8, 1178 a²³⁻³⁴:

Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρόν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς
ῥηθικῆς. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεῖα καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον 25
διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρόν γὰρ ἂν τι διαφέρει·

πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὲ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ 30 γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμει, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίᾳ. Πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις;

b. Ib. 1178 b^{27,23}:

1178b Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητικὴ τίς ἐστὶν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. Τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας 10 εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; Πότερα τὰς δικαιοπραγίας; Ἡ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; Ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερά καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν; Ἡ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; Τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; Ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς 15 νόμισμα ἢ τι τοιοῦτον. Αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; Ἡ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; Διεξιούσι δὲ πάντα φαίνονται ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτούς, 20 καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα. Τῷ δὲ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρίας; Ὡστε ἢ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. Καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὲ ἢ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτῃ εὐδαιμονικωτάτῃ.

The sole activity conceivable in God

c. Ib., 1178 b^{24,32}:

Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης 25 ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. Ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ διατείνει ἢ θεωρία, καὶ ἢ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ 30 εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν τιμία. Ὡστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

It distinguishes man from the animals

d. The man who lives for the intellect must be dearest to the Gods and therefore happiest.

Final conclusion

Ib., 1179 a^{22,32}:

1179a Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν· εἰ γὰρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, 25 ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὐλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὁρθῶς τε καὶ 30 καλῶς πράττοντας. Ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. Θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε καὶ οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

4—THE POLITICS

608—In Aristotle's opinion the supreme science in the province of practical reason is not ethics, but politics, since its object is to secure the well-being, not of the individual, but of a whole community or state (*Eth. Nic.* I 2, our nr. 566).

The first Book of the Politics inquires into the structure and the aims of the state.

Family
the germ-cell
of the state

a. *Polit.* I 2, 1252 a²⁶⁻³⁴, b⁹⁻¹²:

Ἀνάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, 1252a
οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,
ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον
αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν 30
σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόμενον
φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον·
διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτό συμφέρει. — Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινω- 34
νίων οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὁρθῶς Ἡσίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα b 10
γυναϊκά τε βοῦν τ' ἄροτῆρα· ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησιν ἐστίν.

b. *Ib.*, 1252 b¹⁵⁻¹⁶, 27-30:

Structure of
the state,
and its aim

Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου
κώμη. — Ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἥδη πάσης ἔχουσα
πέρας τῆς αὐταρκειᾶς ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὔσα
δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.

The state
exists by
nature

609—a. *Ib.*, 1252 b³⁰-1253 a⁴:

Διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη 30
ἐκείνων, ἥ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεί-
σης, αὐτὴν φαμέν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἔππου, οἰκίας.
ἔτι τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον· ἥ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. 1253a
ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερόν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει
πολιτικὸν ζῶον, καὶ ὁ ἀπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἦτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν ἢ
κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος.

Man a
political
animal

b. *Ib.*, 1253 a⁷⁻¹⁸:

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου
ζώου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γὰρ, ὥς φαμέν, μάτην ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ
μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζώων· ἥ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ 10
σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζώοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν
ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἰσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις),

ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
 15 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον,
 τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθησιν
 ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

610—Since the slave is a part of the household, slavery must be dis-
 cussed first.

a. *Polit.* I 4, 1253 b²³⁻³³, 1254 a¹⁻², 5-8:

The slave
 a living
 tool

1253b Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτήσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας
 25 (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὠρι-
 μέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀπο-
 τελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν
 ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἶαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρῶρεὺς
 30 ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπρέτης ἐν ὀργάνῳ εἶδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ
 <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωὴν ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ κτήσις πλῆθος
 ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον. καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων
 1254a πᾶς ὑπρέτης. — Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ
 5 κτῆμα πρακτικόν. — Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἶδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ
 δέονται ἀμφοτέραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν.
 ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν
 πρᾶξιν.

b. *Polit.* I 5, 1254 a¹⁷⁻²⁴, b¹⁶⁻²³:

Some men
 are slaves
 by nature

Πότερον δ' ἐστὶ τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ἢ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν
 τινι δουλεύειν ἢ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί, μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον.
 20 οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ
 γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων
 ἐστί. καὶ εὐθύς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ
 b 16 ἄρχειν. — Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος
 θηρίου (διάκεινται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἢ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις,
 καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μὲν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν
 20 ἐστὶν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει
 δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου
 τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.

c. *Ib.*, 1254 b²⁷-1255 a¹:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων
 καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ

ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον 30 (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρεῖαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικὴν),
Exceptions συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὸναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὥς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιντο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν 35 ἂν ἀξιόους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δίκαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾶδιον ἰδεῖν τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

611—In the final chapter of this Book the author raises the question whether the slave can have virtue. He treats it in a larger framework: the same question namely must be asked concerning women and children, since they too are ἀρχόμενοι, though in another sense than slaves.—Ar. gives the answer of Gorgias, who said that the virtue of a woman is different from that of a man, and the virtue of slaves different from that of free-born people (Plato, *Meno* 72 a; our nr. **267b**).

Can the
slave have
virtue?

Polit. I 13, 1259 b²¹-1260 a², a¹⁰⁻²⁸, 33-36:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετὴ τις 1259b δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιοῦτων ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφο- 25 τέρως· εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὴ ταυτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ 30 τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστι καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὐ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἀρχοντος, πότερον ἢ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι 35 καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἶδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον οὐδέν)· εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μὴ, θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἀρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος, πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθήσεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ 40 ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. — Καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ 1260a μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν. τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, 15 δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἐκάστω πρὸς τὸ αὐτοῦ ἔργον. διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετὴν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων

20 ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν
 εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ'
 ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ
 δ' ὑπηρετικὴ, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος
 25 μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν. καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ
 εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετὴ, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ
 ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως
 33 ὀρίζομένων. — Ἐθεμεν δὲ πρὸς τὰναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε
 δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν
 μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων.

Only of an
inferior kind

612—a. Property is considered by Ar. as an indispensable substratum of the household, and there is a kind of acquisition which he called natural.

Polit. I 8, 1256 a¹⁻⁵, 10.²¹, b⁸⁻¹⁰, 28.³⁴:

Property and
acquisition

1256a "Ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν
 ὑψηλότερον τρόπον, ἐπεὶπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον
 μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις πότερον ἢ χρηματιστικὴ ἢ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστὶν
 5, 10 ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετικὴ. — "Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ,
 δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρη-
 σιμένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικὴν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς
 ἐστὶ τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ
 15 θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτήσις ἐστὶ, . . . ἢ δὲ κτήσις πολλὰ περιείληφε
 μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἢ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς
 ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος; καὶ καθόλου ἢ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτήσις. Ἀλλὰ
 20 μὴν εἶδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων
 εἰσὶν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους
 b πεποιήκασιν διαφέροντας τῶν ζώων. — "Ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεῖα συναναγκάξῃ, τοῦτον
 τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἢ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτήσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως
 9, 10 διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρῶτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν.
 26, 27 — "Ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστὶν, καθὼς
 δεῖ ἥτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχει, ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημά-
 30 των πρὸς ζώων ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ
 ἔοικεν ὁ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἢ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως
 αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας
 »πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέμμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται«· κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ
 34 καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις.

A certain
kind is
natural

b. Wealth pursued for its own sake is unnatural.

Another is
unnatural

Ib. I 9, 1256 b⁴⁰⁻¹²⁵⁷ a²¹. a³¹⁻³⁴, a^{41-b}⁸, b²³⁻²⁴, b³⁰⁻³¹:

"Ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν,

χρηματιστικὴν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἦν ὡς 1257a
 μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν· ἔστι δ'
 οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει
 αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας τινὸς καὶ γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 5
 τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἐκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσις ἐστίν, ἀμφοτέραι
 δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία
 τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἢ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ. ἀμφοτέραι
 γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος 10
 ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ἢ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν
 χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονε. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 15
 ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς
 ἀνθρώπους. ἢ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική·
 ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγὴν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ
 πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερόν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἔργον αὐτῆς, 20
 ἀλλ' ἡδὴ πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὐσης. — Ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς 31
 βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις. — Πορισθέντος οὖν ἡδὴ νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς 1257b
 ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
 μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἡδὴ τεχνικώτερον,
 πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματισ- 5
 τικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι
 ποθεν ἔσται πλῆθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων.
 — Καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. — 23, 24
 Τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς 30, 31
 ἔργον.

613—Of the second Book the first part (ch. 1-8) is concerned with ideal commonwealths, particularly with Plato's (see our nr. **310**). In the second part (ch. 9-12) the best existing states are discussed (Sparta, Crete and Carthage), and a word is said about the most famous lawgivers.

614—The first part of the third Book (ch. 1-5) is devoted to the citizen and his relations to the state.

a. The citizen is defined as the man who has political power, however acquired.

Definition of a citizen *Polit.* III 1, 1275 a²²⁻²³:

Πολίτης δ' ἀπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.

b. Since constitutions differ from one another, the citizens corresponding to each form of constitution will also be different. Hence the definition of a citizen should be formulated more precisely.

Ib., 1275 a³⁸⁻³⁹, b⁸⁻²¹:

1275b Τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἶδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, . . . ὥστε καὶ τὸν
πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς
5 ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστα' ἐστὶ πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μὲν, οὐ
μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. <ἐν> ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν
ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι
10 τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς
φονικάς, ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχὴ τις ἐτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδὸνα·
πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου
διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής
15 ἐστὶ καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὠρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἡ πᾶσιν ἡ
τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἡ περὶ πάντων ἡ περὶ τινῶν.
τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ὅ γ α ρ ἐ ξ ο υ σ ί α κ ο ι -
ν ω ν ε ἶ ν ἀ ρ χ ῆ ς β ο υ λ ε υ τ ι κ ῆ ς ἡ κ ρ ι τ ι κ ῆ ς , π ο λ ί τ η ν ἢ δ η
20 λ έ γ ο μ ε ν ε ἶ ν α ι τ α ύ τ η ς τ ῆ ς π ό λ ε ω ς , πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων
πληθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἶπεῖν.

This
definition
corrected

The author remarks, that this definition is better than the usual formula, which defines the citizen as one of whom both the parents are citizens. For this formula cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

615—Similarly the state is defined by reference to the distribution of political power: when the mode of distribution is changed, a new state comes into existence.

a. In *Polit.* III 3 the question is raised: what exactly is the identity of the state, 1276 a¹⁷⁻²⁰:

What is the
identity of
the state?

. . . Πῶς ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν; ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιωτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν.

b. Ib., 1276 b¹⁻¹³:

Ar.'s reply

1276b Εἴπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας,
γινόμενης ἐτέρας τῷ εἶδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
δόξεσθαι ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν. ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὅτε μὲν κωμικὸν
5 ὅτε δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναι φαμεν, τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ἢ
τῆς συνθέσεως, οἷον ἀρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἐτέραν εἶναι λέγομεν, ἂν

ὅτε μὲν ἡ Δωριος ὅτε δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερόν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν ἰοῦ ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτόν ἐξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ ἀάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων.

616—a. The question may be raised whether a good citizen is always a good man. Ar. answers in the negative: the good citizen has some special ἀρετή for some particular purpose; he has not, as such, *the* ἀρετή which is proper to the good man.

The good
citizen may
be not a good
man

Polit. I 4, 1276 b²⁸⁻³⁴:

Τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστὶ, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς 30 τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἐστὶ πλείω πολιτείας εἶδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμέν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν.

b. So in general the virtue of the good man and the good citizen is not the same. In one particular case however they are identical, namely in the good ruler.

The good
ruler always
a good man

Ib., 1277 a¹²⁻¹⁷:

Διότι μὲν τοῖνυν ἀπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἄρα ἐστὶ τινὸς 1277a ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμέν δὲ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον 15 εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθύς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τοῦ ἄρχοντος.

c. The good citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler.

The virtue of
the subject
and the virtue
of the ruler

Ib., 1277 b^{13-21, 25-32}:

Δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ 1277b ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' 15 ἀμφοτέρα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὲ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετὴ, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἶδη ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία. — 20 Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον 25, 26 εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δὲ γε οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητής ὁ χρώμενος. Πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς 30 ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων.

617—Constitutions are good or bad according as the common welfare is, or is not, their aim. There are three good constitutions: Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity. Of bad ones there are also three: Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy.

Polit. III 7, 1279 a²²-b¹⁰:

Classifica-
tion of con-
stitutions

1279a Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι
τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσὶ, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὁρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις
25 ἔσονται φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα
σημαίνει ταύτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι
κύριον ἢ ἓνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ
πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὁρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολι-
30 τείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις.
ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος.
καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν
συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλειόνων δ' ἐνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν
35 (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς
κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον,
καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως·
40 ἓνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν
1279b ἡκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν (ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικὴν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν
πλήθει γίγνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολε-
μοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα). παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-
5 μένων τυραννίς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ
πολιτείας. ἢ μὲν γὰρ τυραννίς ἐστὶ μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρ-
χοῦντος, ἢ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἢ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-
10 φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

618—a. Against this classification the objection might be made that in a state the majority of the citizens might be wealthy and the minority poor. In this case the distinction which has been made between oligarchy and democracy would not hold good.

Polit. III 8, 1279 b²⁰⁻²⁶:

An objection
to this clas-
sification

20 Πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμὸν ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ πλείους ὄντες
εὖποροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ἢ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος,
ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν καὶ εἴ που συμβαίνει τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν
εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ' ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύριον
25 πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναι φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν
πολιτειῶν.

b. To this objection Ar. replies: not number, but wealth or poverty of the rulers is the specific difference of these constitutions.

Ar.'s answer
to this
objection

Ib., 1279 b³⁴⁻³⁶, b³⁹-1280 a⁶:

Ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, . . . ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἢ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτός ἐστιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ 1280a πλοῦτον ἂν τ' ἐλάττους ἂν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς. εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι 5 πάντες. δι' ἃς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφοτέροι τῆς πολιτείας.

619—a. The next chapter deals with the principles of the distribution of power in democratic and in oligarchic states, i.e. with the conception of justice on both sides.

Justice
according to
democratic
and oligar-
chic princi-
ples

Polit. III 9, 1280 a⁷⁻¹⁶, 22-25:

Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινός προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως 10 δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι ¹, καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι ², καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίστοις· οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλείστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκειῶν. 15 — Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατὰ τι ἄνισοι ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἷονται ἄνισοι 22 εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατὰ τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν.

25

Ar.'s own
view

b. The standard should be: the true aim of the state. I.e.: the citizens have a claim to power according to their contribution to the εὖ ζῆν.

Ib., 1280 b³⁹-1281 a⁸:

Τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥς 1281a φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον

¹ "Ὅτι δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι is the democratic view of justice. Ar. says: It is, but not for everybody—only for equals.

² Oligarchs, on the other hand, hold that inequality is justice, namely, that political rights should be unequal and proportionate to wealth. To this view Ar. opposes again: granting that inequality is just, it is so not for everybody, but only for unequals. And by what standards are the qualifications of the persons concerned to be judged?—This is what Ar. calls "the main point", the κυριώτατον, and on this point most people are in error.

εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται
5 πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ
τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μεῖζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν
ἀρετὴν ἀνίστοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

620—Monarchy is only desirable in one case.

Polit. III 17, 1287 b⁴¹-1288 a²⁹:

1288a Ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε ¹ φανερόν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε
συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἓνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων,
ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ
5 ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ᾖ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ
τρόπος, λεκτέον· εἴρηται δὲ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ
βασιλευτόν ² καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικόν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν ³. βασιλευτόν μὲν
οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος δὲ πέφυκε φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς
10 ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικὴν, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος [δὲ πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος]
ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ⁴ ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν
πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχὴν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος [ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε ἐγγίγνεσθαι πλῆθος]
πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανεμόντα
15 τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἡ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἓνα τινὰ συμβῇ
διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν
ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάν-
των καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἓνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον, οὐ μόνον
20 οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, δὲ προφέρειν εἰώθασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες
οἷ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικάς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικάς καὶ ἄλλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικάς·
πάντη γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν ⁵. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὁστρακίζειν δὴ που
25 τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, οὐτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε
τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο
συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι
μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἅπλῳς.

Monarchy
desirable
only in an
exceptional
case

621—In the first part of Book IV (ch. 1-10) the main types of constitutions are dealt with.

a. There are four kinds of democracy, the fourth of which is a perversion. True democracy is described as follows.

¹ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε - sc. about just and unjust, in ch. 9 (619a).

² βασιλευτόν - fit for being ruled by a king.

³ πολιτικόν - fit for what is called by Ar. a polity (constitutional government).

⁴ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν secl. Immisch.

⁵ Sc. according to the right of merit, expounded in ch. 9 (619b).

Democracy *Polit.* IV 4, 1291 b³⁰-1292 a⁴:

Δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ πρώτη μὲν ἢ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. 1291b
 ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον¹ ὑπερέχειν
 τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὅποτερουσοῦν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους
 ἀμφοτέρους. εἶπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστ' ἐστὶν ἐν δημοκρατία καθάπερ ὑπο- 35
 λαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούντων ἀπάντων
 μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν
 τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας
 τοῦτο· [ἄλλο δὲ] τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων 40
 ὄντων· δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ
 μετέχειν· ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι 1292a
 ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετ-
 εἶναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ἢ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον.

Its perversion **b.** The fourth kind. Ib., 1292 a⁴⁻¹³, 15-18, 30-37:

Ἐτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τᾶλλα μὲν εἶναι ταύτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 5
 καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ἢ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος.
 συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημο-
 κρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν
 προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μὴ εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρ- 10
 χος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοι εἰσιν
 οὐχ ὥς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. — 'Ο δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὢν, 13, 15
 ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε
 οἱ κόλακες ἐντιμοί, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ
 τυραννίδι. — Εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι 18, 30
 δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία.
 δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχὰς, καὶ ταύτην
 πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστ' εἶπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερόν
 ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ἣ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία 35
 κυρίως· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου.

622—Of oligarchies, too, there are four kinds, of which the fourth is the worst.

Oligarchy *Polit.* IV 5, 1292 a³⁹-b¹⁰:

Ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἶδη ἐν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων
 ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν 40

¹ The expression μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ means simply "as much as" and is in practice often used in places where μηδὲν ἥττον ἢ could be logically expected. Some striking examples of this use have been adduced by L. M. de Rijk in *Mnemosyne* 1950, pp. 314-318.

1292b τῆς πολιτείας, ἄλλο δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὧσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν) · 5 ἕτερον εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσὶν, τέταρτον δ', ὅταν ὑπάρχη τό τε νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντί-στροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἶπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις · καὶ καλοῦσι 10 δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.

623—a. Of aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form.

Polit. IV 7, 1293 b¹⁻⁷:

Aristocracy

1293b Ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἀπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ¹ μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν · 5 ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὐτῶν).

b. *Ib.*, 1293 b⁷⁻¹⁹:

Mixed forms

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰσὶ τινες αἱ πρὸς τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας ἔχουσι διαφορὰς [καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι] καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ 10 μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἰροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατικὴ καλεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἷς τε πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, 15 οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι, αὕτη ἀριστοκρατικὴ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἷς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. Ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἶδη.

624—“Polity” or constitutional government.

Polit. IV 8, 1293 b³¹⁻³⁸, 1294 a¹⁵⁻²⁵:

“Polity”

Νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. Εἰώθασι δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν 35 ἀποκλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς 1294a εὐπορωτέροις. — Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείστοις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος

¹ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν τινα ἀγαθῶν - good according to some arbitrary standard.

καλεῖται¹. μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, 16
 πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας² σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὐποροὶ τῶν καλῶν
 ἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς
 ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν 20
 εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσὶν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστὶν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ
 ἀρετή), φανερόν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων,
 πολιτεῖαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων (παρὰ
 τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην). 25

625—Tyranny, too, must have its place. Two moderate forms of it have been considered before, in dealing with monarchy. A third kind, which is the extreme, is added here.

Tyranny *Polit.* IV 10, 1295 a¹⁻⁴, 7-23:

Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὥς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ 1295a
 αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν
Moderate πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. — Τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας 7, 8
forms ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πῶς αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασι-
 λείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἐν τε γὰρ τῶν 10
 βαρβάρων τισὶν αἰροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς
 ἀρχαίοις Ἑλλήσιν ἐγίγνοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν
 αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δὲ τινες πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὐταὶ διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν 15
 τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἐκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ
The strict δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ
form μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δ'
 ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἣτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων 20
 καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ
 τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων
 τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν.

626—Books VII and VIII are devoted to a description of the best state. The material conditions (size of the population, extent and nature of the territory, site of the city and national character of the population) having been determined, the author proceeds to treat the internal structure of the state. First he distinguishes its members (the citizens) from those who are necessary as its servants, but not a part of it.

¹ The text is probably not sound. Immisch reads καλλωπίζεται instead of καλεῖται. Ross retains καλεῖται and translates: "Now in most states the form called polity exists".

² Ross explains rightly: "for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich".

a. *Polit.* VII 8, 1328 a²¹-b²³:

Not all the
necessary
elements
are parts of
the state

1328a Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταῦτά ἐστι μόρια
τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρος
θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς
25 ἐξ ἧς ἐν τι τὸ γένος (ἐν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταῦτ' οἷς κοινωνοῖς, ἂν
τε ἴσον ἂν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν) · οἶον εἴτε τροφή τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας
πληθὸς εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. ὅταν δ' ἡ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἔνεκεν τὸ δ'
30 οὐ ἔνεκεν, οὐθὲν ἐν γε τούτοις κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἡ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν ·
λέγω δ' οἶον ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς ·
οἰκία γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθὲν ἐστίν ὃ γίγνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τῆς οἰκίας
χάριν ἢ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν
35 ἢ κτήσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεώς ἐστιν. ἢ δὲ
πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης.
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἀριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσις τις
τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ
40 μικρὸν ἢ μηδὲν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἶδη καὶ διαφοράς
καὶ πολιτείας πλείους · ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες
1328b τοὺς τε βίους ἐτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα
ταυτὶ ἐστὶν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη · καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως,
ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν.

5 Ληπτέον τοίνυν τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμὸν · ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ
ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὄπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν
ὄπλα πρὸς τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἐξωθεν ἀδικεῖν
10 ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ'
αὐτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον
ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαῖό-
τατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

The
necessary
functions

15 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἶπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις
πληθὺς ἐστὶν οὐ τὸ τυχόν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζῶν αὐταρκές, ὡς φαμεν, ἐὰν δὲ τι τυγ-
χάνῃ τούτων ἐκλείπον, ἀδύνατον ἀπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι ταύτην) ·
20 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν · δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν
τ' εἶναι πληθὺς, οἱ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον,
καὶ τὸ εὐπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

Six
correspond-
ing classes

b. *Ib.* 9, 1328 b²⁴-1329 a³⁹:

Has
everybody
to share in
all of these
occupations?

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι κοινωνητέον πάντων
25 τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ
τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας), ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους

ὑποθετόν, ἥ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταῦτο πολιτεία. καθάπερ γὰρ εἵπομεν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων 30 καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοῦναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαιμόνων, τὴν δ' εὐδαι- 35 μονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται πρότερον, φανερόν ἐκ τούτων ὥς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένην δικαίους ἀνδρας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάνουσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννῆς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), 40 οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν 1329a γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς).

Mechanics,
traders and
husbandmen
excluded
from
citizenship

The citizens
will be
warriors
and rulers

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πρότερον ἕτερα <ἐτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θετόν ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; 5 φανερόν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μὲν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δὲ τινα καὶ ἐτέροις. ἥ μὲν γὰρ ἐτέρας ἀκμῆς ἐκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἐτέροις· ἥ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους αἰεὶ, ταύτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. 10 οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσ- 15 βυτέροις εἶναι, ἔοικεν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

They will
possess land

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ περὶ τούτους <εἶναι>. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ γὰρ βάνουσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς 20 πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐθὲν γένος ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαιμόνα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερόν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι 25 τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἢ] περιοίκους.

and be
priests

Λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάνουσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς)· ἐπεὶ δὲ διήρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς 30 δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε ὀλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τὴν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

Ὡν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται 35

(γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικόν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὀπλιτικόν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν αἰεὶ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος).

627—a. Marriage and procreation ought to be regulated by strict laws.

Polit. VII 16, 1334 b²⁹-1335 a¹, a¹¹⁻¹⁷, ²⁸⁻³⁵:

**Laws about
marriage
and
procreation**

1334b Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα
30 γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ
ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. Δεῖ δ'
ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ
35 ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ
διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,
ἣ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μὴ (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχὴν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπο-
40 λείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσ-
βυτέροις ἢ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἢ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς
1335a τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν ἀπρεγγυς εἶναι. — Ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς φαῦλος
12 πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζώοις ἀτελεῖ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυ-
τόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ταῦτ' οὗτο συμβαίνειν
15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δὲ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται
τὸ νέους συζευγνύειν καὶ νέας, ἀτελεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματά εἰσιν. — Διὸ
28 τὰς μὲν ἀρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύειν, τοὺς
δ' ἐπτά καὶ τριάκοντα ἢ μικρόν. ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώμασι
30 σύζευξις ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς
χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς
ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἢ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς
35 ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἐβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν.

b. Deformed infants ought to be exposed, and the number of children should be limited by procuring abortion in the case of excess, before sense and life have begun.

Ib., 1335 b¹⁹⁻²⁶:

**Exposure of
infants and
abortion in
special cases**

b 20 Περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων ἔστω νόμος μὴδὲν πεπηρω-
μένον τρέφειν· διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, (ἡ γὰρ τάξις ¹ τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύει μὴθὲν
ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων) ὠρίσθαι δὴ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν
δέ τισι γίγηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθῆσιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ
25 ζῶην, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ
αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται.

¹ ἡ γὰρ τάξις - Wallies. The Mss have: ἐὰν ἡ τάξις - κωλύει.

c. Adultery during the time of procreation should be punished with a loss of privileges.

**Adultery
punished**

Ib., 1335 b³⁸-1336 a²:

Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον (sc. ὁμιλίας), ἔστω μὲν ἀπλῶς μὴ καλὸν ἀπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ἢ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας ἐάν τις φαίνεται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμία ζῆμιούσθω πρεπούση πρὸς τὴν ἀμαρτίαν.

628—On these and on the following points Ar. is not far from the ideas of his master, Plato.

Physical training of infants and young children should be prescribed by law. Moral education of children up till the age of five years is to be placed under state-supervision.

**Education
of young
children
settled by law**

Polit. VII 17, 1336 a³⁰-b¹⁶, b²⁰⁻²³:

Καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, 1336a ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προσδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδίας εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδαζομένων. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμούς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· 35 συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν· γίγνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινα γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὃ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινόμενοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τὴν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ 40 τὴν ἡλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. 1336b εὐλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν ¹ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὖν τῶν αἰσchrῶν 5 γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεργος)· μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μῆτε λέγωσι μῆτε ἀκούωσι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐάν δέ τις φαίνεται τι λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἡξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [ἀτιμίαις] κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας 10 ταύτης ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερόν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφὰς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν μηθὲν μῆτε ἄγαλμα μῆτε γραφὴν εἶναι 15 τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν. — Τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὐτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμωδίας 20 θεατὰς ἐατέον, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ἣ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἢ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.

¹ The codd. indicated by Immisch as Π² have ἀπελαύνειν.

629—In Book VIII the treatment of ideal education is continued.

a. That education should be regulated by law and should be a public affair, is generally accepted; but people by no means agree as to what subjects are to be taught.

General
remarks on
education

Polit. VIII 2, 1337 a³³-b³:

1337a "Οτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινὴν ποιητέον,
35 φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν.
νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτά πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι
δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἀριστον,
οὐδὲ φανερόν· πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
40 ἥθος· ἐκ τε τῆς ἐμποδῶν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἢ σκέψις καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πό-
τερον ἀσχεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ
1337b περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας)· περὶ τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν
οὐθέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθύς πάντες
τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν αὐτῆς).

Present dis-
agreement

b. Vulgar occupations should be excluded, and likewise all paid employments.

Ib., 1337 b⁴-16:

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἄδελον· ὅτι
5 δὲ οὐ πάντα, διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερόν
ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ
βάνουσον. βάνουσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ
10 μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον
ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς
τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χειρὸν διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους
καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. ἄσכולον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν
καὶ ταπεινὴν.

Vulgar
occupations
excluded

630—There might be some doubt as to the paedagogical value of one of the four traditional branches of education, namely music. Ar. defends it, on this ground, that it is highly important that people should be able to use leisure well.

Polit. VIII 3, 1337 b²³-35:

"Ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν
25 καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικὴν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν
ὥς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὐσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν
ὥς συντείνουσιν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἂν τις.
νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὥς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς

4 traditional
disciplines

Difficulties
concerning
music

ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ 30 μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἰρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον τί ποιοῦντας δεῖ σχολάζειν. 35

631--The author warns against a one-sided physical training:

**Gymnastics
and athletics**

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1338 b⁹⁻¹⁶:

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ 1338b μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἔξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τὰ τε εἶδη καὶ τὴν αὖξησιν τῶν 10 σωμαμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα 15 ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

b. Our leading principle should be, that what is noble, not what is brutal, ought to have the first place.

**The leading
principle**

Ib., 1338 b²⁹⁻³⁴:

“Ὡστε τὸ καλὸν ἄλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος 30 οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα ¹ ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγωγήτους ποιήσαντες βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατὰ γε τὸ ἀληθές.

632--The question of the paedagogical value of music is more amply treated in chapters 5 and 6.

**What is
exactly the
paedagogical
value of
music?**

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1339 a¹¹⁻²⁶:

Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δ' 1339a ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται ² τοῖς λόγοις οὓς ἂν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν ῥάδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον 15 παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα παύει μέριμναν, ὥς φησιν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ 20 καὶ μουσικῇ· τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἷητέον πρὸς ἀρετὴν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικὴν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσιν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν 25 (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων).

¹ ταῦτα - sc. gymnastics.

² ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται etc. - “that our remarks may serve as a prelude to further discussions on the subject”.

b. Ib., 1339 a²⁶-b¹⁰:

Should
children be
taught to
perform
music
themselves?

“Οτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ
παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἢ μάθησις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγὴν ¹ γε
30 παισὶν ἀρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ
προσῆκει τέλος). ἀλλ’ ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἢ τῶν παίδων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι
χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος
ἂν ἕνεκα δέοι μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων
35 βασιλεῖς, δι’ ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιοούντων μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως;
καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεπονημένους ἔργον
καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον.
εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτοὺς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὧψων πραγματείαν
40 αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ’ ἄτοπον.

Τὴν δ’ αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἥθη βελτίω ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ
1339b τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ
δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὁμῶς δύνανται
κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὥς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς
5 λόγος καὶ εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ
μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δ’ ἔξεστι
τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀεῖδει καὶ κιθαρίζει
τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιοῦτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν
10 οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

c. Ib., 1339 b¹⁰-27:

Music can
serve three
purposes:
1. relaxation

Ἄλλ’ ἴσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη ζήτησις ἐστὶ
πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν
διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιάν ἢ διαγωγὴν. εὐλόγως δ’ εἰς
15 πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἡ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστὶ,
τὴν δ’ ἀνάπαισιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία
τίς ἐστίν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ
καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)· τὴν δὲ
20 μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναι φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελωδίας
(φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι »βροτοῖς ἡδιστον ἀεῖδειν«· διὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς
συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὥς δυναμένην
εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς
25 νέωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἀρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος
ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαισιν.

d. Ib., 1339 b⁴²-1340 a²³, a⁴⁰-b¹³:

2. the
forming of
the
character

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μὴ ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ’ αὐτῆς

¹ διαγωγὴ is used to indicate intellectual enjoyment.

ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς 1340a
μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἥς ἔχουσι πάντες αἰσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν
φυσικὴν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστὶ προσφιλέης), 5
ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν εἰ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἥθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν
εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοὶ τινες τὰ ἥθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα
ποιοὶ τινες, φανερόν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἐτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν
'Ολύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικὰς, 10
ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμός τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι
τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν
μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἄρετὴν
περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μαυθάνειν καὶ συνεθί- 15
ζεσθαι μὴθὲν οὕτως ὥς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπεικίεσιν ἡθεσι καὶ
ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις
ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ 20
σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἡθικῶν (δῆλον
δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων). —

Εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις. ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατί- 40
θεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἐκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν
ἐνίας ὀδυρτικώτερος καὶ συνεστηκώτως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιζολυδιστί 1340b
καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρας τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας,
μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκώτως μάλιστα πρὸς ἐτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστί
μόνη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικούς δ' ἡ φρυγιστί. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν 5
οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια
τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς
ῥυθμούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἥθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων
οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας). ἐκ μὲν οὖν 10
τούτων φανερόν ὅτι δύναται ποιεῖν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἥθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρα-
σκευάζειν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι προσαχτέον καὶ παιδευτέον
ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους.

About the third purpose of learning music, which was called διαγωγή, Ar. does not speak explicitly. But we may admit that this function of music is implied in the first purpose, or perhaps even in the second.

e. Finally an answer is given to the question whether children should be taught to perform music themselves.

Children
should
learn to per-
form music
themselves

Polit. VIII 6, 1340 b²⁰⁻³³:

Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μαυθάνειν αὐτοὺς ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μή, καθά- 20
περ ἡπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον. οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν
πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινες, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἐν γὰρ τι

τῶν ἄδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστὶ μὴ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι
 25 σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβὴν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου
 πλαταγὴν¹ οἷεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδύασι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως χρώμενοι
 ταύτῃ μὴδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχά-
 30 ζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τοῖς νηπίοις ἀρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἣ δὲ παιδεία
 πλαταγὴ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως
 ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερόν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων.

¹ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν - "the rattle of Archytas" seems to have been a popular toy in the days of Aristotle.

SIXTEENTH CHAPTER THE PSYCHOLOGY

1—SOUL AND ITS VARIOUS FUNCTIONS

The aporiai **633**—In his first book *De anima*, according to his usual method, Ar. begins by stating the *aporiai*.

a. Is soul a substance, or to which of the other categories does it belong? Is it potential, or rather an actuality?

1. Is soul a substance?

De anima I 1, 402 a²²-b¹:

Πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστὶ, λέγω δὲ 402a
πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καὶ τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν
κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· 25
διαφέρει γὰρ οὗ τι σμικρόν.

b. Can soul be defined in one general formula?

2. Is there one definition of soul?

Ib., 402 b¹⁻⁸:

Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπαντα ψυχὴ 402b
ἢ οὐ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἶδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ
λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης εἰκόασιν ἐπι-
σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστὶ, 5
καθάπερ ζώου, ἢ καθ' ἑκάστην ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ,
τὸ δὲ ζῶον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον.

c. Are there any affections of the soul in itself?

3. Is soul capable of separate existence?

Ib., 403 a³⁻¹⁶:

Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ 403a
ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστὶ τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, 5
οὐ ῥάδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθέν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν
οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. μάλιστα
δ' ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας,
οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τι τῶν τῆς 10
ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴθὲν

ἐστὶν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἄπτεσθαι τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἄψεται
 15 οὕτω χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ αἰ μετὰ σώματός τινός ἐστιν.

d. Aristotle decides the question in the negative, and concludes that, since all the affections of soul involve a body, the study of soul must belong to the science of nature.

Ib., a^{16,28}:

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων
 20 συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἁμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζεται. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν· μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη
 25 λόγῳ ἐνυλοὶ εἰσιν. ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιοῦδὲ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἔνεκα τοῦδε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.

634—The problem of the affections of the soul is treated again in relation with the problem of its movement. In this passage the author states that it would be better not to say that “the soul is angry” etc., but the man.

a. *De An.* I 4, 408 a³⁴-b¹⁸:

Εὐλογώτερον δ' ἀπορήσειεν ἂν τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὥς κινουμένης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα
 408 ἀποβλέψας. φαμὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ ὀργίζεσθαι τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. ὅθεν οἰηθεῖ τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον.
 5 εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἕκαστον κινεῖσθαι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαι ἐστὶν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὥδὲ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσως ἢ
 10 ἕτερόν τι, (τούτων δὲ συμβαίνει τὰ μὲν κατὰ φοράν τινῶν κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος)· τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον καὶ εἰ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν. βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν
 15 ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὥς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὕσης, ἀλλ' ὅτε μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὅτε δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης, οἷον ἢ μὲν αἰσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδὲ, ἢ δ' ἀνάμνησις ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ μονάς.

Is the soul
 the subject
 of its
 affections?

b. The case of mind is different.

Mind is impossible

Ib., 408 b¹⁸⁻³⁰:

‘Ο δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὐσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ’ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρα ἁμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ’ ἴσως ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθη- 20 τηρίων συμβαίνει· εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. ὥστε τὸ γῆρας οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ’ ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ ἐν μέλαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν 25 οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τοῦ δι’ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.

The unity of the soul

635—*De an.* I 5, 411 b⁵⁻¹⁴:

Λέγουσι δὴ τινες μεριστὴν αὐτὴν, καὶ ἄλλω μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλω δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί 5 οὖν δὴ ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχὴν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τούναντίον μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξεληούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ’ ἂν εἴη ψυχὴ. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κάκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἐν ἡ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ 10 ἐν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἅπειρον.

636—After having discussed in the first Book the views of his predecessors, Ar. now proceeds to define soul in a general formula.

De an. II 1, 412 a^{3-b9}:

Definition of soul

Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω· πάλιν 412a δ’ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστὶ ψυχὴ καὶ τίς 5 ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς. λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἐν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ’ αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφήν καὶ εἶδος, καθ’ ἣν ἡδὴ λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. ἔστι δ’ ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δ’ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, 10 τὸ δ’ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ’ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί. τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωὴν, τὰ δ’ οὐκ ἔχει· ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φιλίαν. ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία δ’ 15 οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιονδί τοῦτο, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχὴ· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ’ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν 20 οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει 20 ζῶντος. ἡ δ’ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια.

The form of a natural body

αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερόν οὖν
 ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐργήγορσις
 25 ἔστιν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐργήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ
 ἐνεργεῖν· προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐστὶν
 ἐν τελέχεια ἡ πρῶτη σῶματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν
 412b ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν. ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη,
 ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἀπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικάρπιον
 καρποῦ· αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον· ἄμφω γὰρ ἔλκει τὴν τροφήν. εἰ δὲ
 5 τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐν τελέχεια ἡ πρῶτη
 σῶματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἐν ἡ
 ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν ἐκάστου
 ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὐ ἢ ὕλη· τὸ γὰρ ἐν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως
 ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν.

First
entelechy

637—This definition implies (1) that soul is the essence of a natural body, (2) that it is not separable from body.

a. *De an.* II 1, 412 b⁹⁻¹⁵:

10 Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.
 τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιωδὲ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν
 ᾗ σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ
 ψυχὴ τοῦτο· χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν, ἀλλ' ἡ ὁμωνύμως.
 15 νῦν δ' ἐστὶ πέλεκυς.

Soul is the
essence of
a natural
body

b. *Ib.*, 413 a⁴⁻⁵:

"Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς,
 εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον.

Not
separable
from body

638—Soul is characterized by life. Now this term has various meanings, of which the most general is self-nutrition and growth.

a. *De an.* II 2, 413 a²⁰⁻³¹:

20 Λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ
 ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, καὶ ἐν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχει
 μόνον, ζῆν αὐτὸ φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον,
 25 ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφήν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξεισις. διὸ καὶ τὰ φθόμενα πάντα
 δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι'
 ἧς αὔξεισιν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τρόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω
 μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω δ' οὐ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ πάντη ἐκτρέφεται καὶ
 30 ζῆν διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν.

Life

Its most
general
sense

b. *Ib.*, 413 b¹⁻⁴:

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ

Animals
characterized
by sensation

τὴν αἰσθησιν πρῶτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μὴδ' ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἰσθησιν ζῶα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον.

Mind, or the
thinking
power

c. Ib., 413 b²⁴⁻²⁷:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ.

639—A survey of the various psychic powers.

a. *De an.* II 3, 414a^{29-b⁶}, b¹⁶⁻¹⁹:

The five
psychic
powers

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ 414a εἵπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. δυνάμεις δ' εἵπομεν θρεπτικόν, 3ο ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικόν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικόν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὅρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, 414b τὰ δὲ ζῶα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἀφῆν· ᾧ δ' αἰσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ 5 ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὅρεξις αὕτη. — Περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον 16 δ' ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τοῦτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον ἐστὶν ἢ τιμωτέρον.

b. The higher power cannot exist apart from the lower, the lower can exist apart from the higher power.

Ib., 415 a¹⁻¹²:

The higher
ones presup-
pose the
lower

Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικόν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ 415a χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικόν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ' ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἀπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἀφῆ δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ζώων οὗτ' ὅψιν οὗτ' ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν οὗτ' ὁσμῆς αἰσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν 5 δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τοῦτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμὸς, ἀλλὰ 10 τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ ἕτερος λόγος.

640—The nutritive soul.

The nutritive
soul

a. *De an.* II 4, 415 a²²⁻²⁵:

Ὡστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δυνάμις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς καθ' ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.

b. This first soul ought to be named the reproductive soul.

Ib., 416 b^{20,25}:

20 Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ὃ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον
ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ὃ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ
τροφή. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ
25 γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό.

Cp. *De gen. an.* II 4, 740 b³⁴-741 a³: Ἡ γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὕλη ἣ αὐξάνεται
35 καὶ ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ποιοῦσα δύναμις ταῦτό τῳ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς. μείζων δὲ αὕτη ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ, αὕτη ἐστὶ
καὶ ἡ γεννώσα· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἐκάστου, ἐνυπάρχουσα καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς
741a καὶ ἐν ζώοις πᾶσιν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς δ' οὐχ
ὑπάρχει τῶν ζώων.

2—SENSE-PERCEPTION

641—Distinction between special and common objects of the senses.

De an. II 6, 418 a^{10,20}:

10 . . . τὸ μὲν ἰδίον ἐστὶν ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν. λέγω δ'
ἰδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθῆσαι αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται
ἀπατηθῆναι, οἷον ὅψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ φόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ. ἡ δ' ἀφῇ
πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφορὰς· ἀλλ' ἐκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται
15 ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ' ὅτι φῶς, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ φοφοῦν ἢ
ποῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἐκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἡρεμία, ἀριθμός,
σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις. καὶ
20 γὰρ ἀφῇ κίνησις τίς ἐστὶν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὅψει.

**Special and
common
sensible**

The same distinction is made by S. Thomas Aquinas, who speaks of *sensibilia propria* and *communia* in *S. th.* I, qu. 17, art. 2, and in qu. 78, art. 3.

642—The object of sight.

a. Ib., II 7, 418 a^{27-b3}:

Οὐ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὅψις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. ὁρατὸν δ' ἐστὶ χρῶμα μὲν,
καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν¹. δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέ-
γομεν προελθοῦσι μάλιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ
30 καθ' αὐτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ οὐ τῳ λόγῳ², ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἶτιον
τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς,
418b καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ
ἐκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁράται.

**The object
of sight**

¹ He alludes to phosphorescing objects, which can be seen only in darkness.

² It is visible, not by its essence, but per accidens.

Light **b.** What is light. *Ib.*, 418 b³⁻¹³, b¹⁸⁻²⁰:

Διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστίν. ἔστι δὴ τι διαφανές. διαφανές δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' 5 ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δὲ ἐστὶν ἀήρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ὕδωρ οὐδ' ἢ ἀήρ, διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶ φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἢ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι¹. φῶς δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἢ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ σκότος. 10 τὸ δὲ φῶς οἶον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ἢ ἐντελεχεία διαφανές ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιοῦτου οἶον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν. —

Darkness Δοκεῖ τε τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει· ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς 18 τοιαύτης ἑξέως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστίν.

Sound **643—a.** *De an.* II 8, 419 b⁹⁻¹³:

Γίνεται δ' ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφος αἰεὶ τινος πρὸς τι καὶ ἐν τινι· πληγὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἢ ποιοῦσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον· ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρὸς τι ψοφεῖ· πληγὴ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορέας.

Voice **b.** *Ib.*, 420 b¹³-421 a⁴:

Φωνὴ δ' ἐστὶ ζώου ψόφος, καὶ οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ 420b τύπτοντός τινος καὶ τι καὶ ἐν τινι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη ταῦτα 15 μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἄέρα. ἥδη γὰρ τῷ ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπὶ τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείουσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ' ἐρμηνεία ἔνεκεν τοῦ εὐ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τε τὴν θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ' αἷτιον ἐν ἑτέροις 20 εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, ὅπως ὑπάρχει τὸ εὐ.

How produced "Ὅργανον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ὁ φάρυγξ· οὗ δ' ἔνεκα καὶ τὸ μόριόν ἐστι τοῦτο, πλεῦμων· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μορίῳ πλεῖστον ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον 25 εἶσω ἀναπνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν ἄέρα, ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνὴ ἐστίν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζώου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἵπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ 30 ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες), ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σημαντικός γὰρ δὴ τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς 421a αὐτήν. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα πρὸς αὐτήν. σημεῖον

¹ He means his fifth element, the aether, which constitutes the celestial sphere, in which the heavenly bodies move.

δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μὴδ' ἐκπνέοντα, ἀλλὰ κατέχοντα· κινεῖ γὰρ τοῦτ' ὁ κατέχων. φανερόν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα.

Why fish
are mute

644—Intelligence is, according to Ar., dependent on the sense of touch.

De an. II 9, 421 a²⁰⁻²⁶:

Intelligence
and the sense
of touch

20 Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις (sc. αἰσθήσεσι) λείπεται (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) πολλῶν τῶν ζώων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀφὴν πολλῶν τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῦς. διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζώων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ' ἄλλο δὲ μὴδὲν· οἱ 25 μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.

645—Why man smells only when he inhales.

De an. II 9, 421 b^{8-422 a⁶}:

Smell in
man and in
other
animals

421b Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὁσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος· καὶ γὰρ τὰ 10 ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὁσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ ἔναιμα καὶ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἕνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφήν ὑποσμμα γινόμενα, διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως ὁσμᾶται, ὃ δ' ἄνθρωπος 15 ἀναπνέων, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ ἄλλ' ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὁσμᾶται, οὔτε πόρρωθεν οὔτ' ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις. 20 ὥστε τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνεύουσιν, ἑτέραν ἂν τιν' αἴσθησιν ἔχει παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ τῆς ὁσμῆς αἰσθάνεται· ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ὁσφραν- τοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους ὁσφρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὁσμῶν ὑφ' ὧνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλτου καὶ 25 θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὁσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα. εἴκοι δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ὥσπερ τὰ ὅμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθαλμῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει φράγμα 30 καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας μὴδ' ἀνασπάσας οὐχ ὁρᾷ· τὰ δὲ σκληροφθαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιούτον, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ὁρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ δια- φανεῖ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὁσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν ἀκάλυφτος εἶναι, 422a ὥσπερ τὸ ὅμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχομένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὁσμᾶται ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὁσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύ- 5 σαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον.

646—Taste and touch do not take place through an interposed foreign body.

Taste and
touch

De an. II 10, 422 a⁸⁻¹⁰:

Τὸ δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἀπτόν τι· καὶ τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀφή.

647—General description of a "sense".

"Sense"
in general

De an. II 12, 424 a¹⁷⁻²⁴:

Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἐστὶ τὸ 424a δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ 20 τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἡ ἑκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ἡ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ¹.

3—THINKING

648—In his third Book *De anima* Ar. treats *noûs* or the thinking power. The first stage superior to the senses, namely that faculty by which we distinguish the object of one sense from that of the other, is discussed in the following passage.

The "sensus
interior"

De an. III 2, 426 b⁸⁻²¹:

Ἐκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν 426b τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἢ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ δια- 10 φοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψεις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἑκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἑκαστον κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει; ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γὰρ ἐστίν. ἢ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ 15 ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν ἀπτόμενον αὐτοῦ κρίνειν τὸ κρίνον. οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐνὶ τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ καὶ εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἰσθοιο, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἐν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ 20 γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ. λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό.

The problem was first formulated by Plato, *Theaet.* 185a². S. Augustine, in *De libero arbitrio* II 3, 8, qualifies that faculty by which we judge "quid ad quemque sensum pertineat, et quid inter se vel omnes vel quidam eorum communiter habeant", as a *sensus interior*, and distinguishes it from reason, because animals too possess it. "Namque aliud est quo videt bestia, aliud quo ea quae videndo sentit, vel vitat vel appetit: ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem intus in ipsa anima".

¹ According to its "form" or formulable essence.

² Our nr. 319a.

649—Difference between thinking and perceiving.

a. Thinking and perceiving identified by the ancients.

De an. III 3, 427 a¹⁹-b⁵:

427a Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφο-
20 τέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων), καὶ οἱ γε ἀρχαῖοι
τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναι φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς
εἴρηκε ¹.

Thinking
and
perceiving

»πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.«

25 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις· ὅθεν

«σφίσιν αἰεὶ

καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοῖα παρίσταται . . . »

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὀμήρου »τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν« ². πάντες
γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν καὶ αἰσθά-
νεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὁμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγοις
427b διωρίσαμεν· καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἡπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον
γὰρ τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ· διὸ ἀνάγκη ἦτοι,
ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου
5 θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὁμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν.

b. Thinking is different from perceiving. It is partly imagination, partly judgment.

Ib., 427 b²⁷⁻²⁹:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία
δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου
λεκτέον.

650—Imagination.

Imagination

a. It is neither sense, nor opinion.

Ib., 428 a⁵⁻²², b⁹⁻¹⁰:

428a Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἦτοι
δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὄρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρ-
χοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἴτα αἴσθησις μὲν αἰ πάρεστι, φαντασία
10 δ' οὐ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν
ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ' οὐ. οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώλῃ. εἴτα αἰ μὲν ἀληθεὺς
αἰεὶ, αἰ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἰ πλείους ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτ' οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν

Neither
sense

¹ Emped. fr. 106 and 108 (*Gr. Ph.* I p. 61 n. 2, to nr. 113a).

² From *Od.* XVIII 136 ff.

ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα· τότε ἡ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής. καὶ ὅπερ δὲ 15 ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν αἰ ἀληθευόντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής. **nor opinion** ἀλλὰ δόξη μὴν ἔπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ 20 πιστεῦειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δ' ἐν πολλοῖς. — Οὐτ' ἄρα ἐν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὐτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία.

b. What is imagination.

What it is Ib., 428 b¹⁰⁻¹⁷, 428 b³⁰-429 a⁴:

Ἄλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐστὶ κινήθέντος τοῦδὲ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαν- 428b τασία κίνησις τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανο- μένοις καὶ ὧν αἰσθησίς ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ 15 κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθὴ καὶ ψευδῇ. —

Definition Εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχει ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα ἢ φαντασία, τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ 30 λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνο- 429a μένης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὅψις μάλιστα αἰσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴ- ληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτός οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

651—The thinking part of the soul.

Thinking *De an.* III 4, 429 a¹⁰⁻¹³:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν' ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.

A passive faculty a. Ib., 429 a¹³⁻²⁹:

Εἰ δὴ ἐστὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἡ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ 429a ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἶδους καὶ δυνάμει 15 τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο ¹, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει· ὥστε μὴδ' 20 εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς

¹ The mind "becomes its objects" in actual knowledge. Therefore, the thinking power must be *potentially* identical with its possible objects. *Animus est quodammodo omnia*, as it is formulated later by S. Thomas Aquinas.

νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ὃ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐθὲν ἐστὶν ἐνεργεία
 25 τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὐλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις
 γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμὸς, ἢ καὶ ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ·
 νῦν δ' οὐθὲν ἐστὶν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν¹, πλὴν
 ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητικὴ, οὔτε ἐντελεχεῖα ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη.

b. Since in the above passage thinking is qualified as a passive process, while on the other hand *noûs* is described as being *ἀπαθής* and *ἀμιγής*, an objection might arise.

Ib., 429 b²²⁻²⁸:

Objection

Ἀπορήσεις δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθὲν μηθὲν
 ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί
 ἐστὶν. ἢ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν.

c. Ar. replies, 429 b²⁹-430 a²:

Reply

... τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς
 ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεῖα οὐδὲν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ
 430a ἐν γραμματείῳ ὃ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχεῖα γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ
 τοῦ νοῦ.

652—Mind is not *only* a passive faculty.

De an. III 5, 430 a¹⁰⁻²⁵:

Active
mind

10 Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστω γένει (τοῦτο
 δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα,
 οἶον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας
 τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα
 15 ποιεῖν, ὡς ἔξις τις, οἶον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει
 ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεία χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθής καὶ
 ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνεργεία. αἰ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ
 20 ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι·
 ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύνάμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε
 μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον
 ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίδιον. οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς
 25 νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

Cp. the next nr.

653—With this description of the νοῦς ποιητικός, as it is called later, we might compare the following passage from the *De gen. anim.*, where

¹ The formula τόπος εἰδῶν does not occur in Plato's Dialogues, but it expresses fairly well his view of the soul.

it is argued that no material activity can exist apart from a body, and consequently, that no bodily activity could enter from outside. Exception is to be made for *noûs* exclusively, for only *noûs* has no connexion with any bodily activity.

**Noûs enters
from outside**

De gen. an. II 3, 736 b²²⁻²⁹:

Ὅσων γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματική, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ ποδῶν· ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτάς καθ' αὐτάς εἰσιέναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους οὔσας, οὔτ' 25 ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι· τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα περίττωμα μεταβαλλούσης τῆς τροφῆς ἐστίν. λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.

SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER RHETORIC AND POETICS

I—THE RHETORIC

654—Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is closely related with his logical writings, at least with the *Topics* and *Analytics*. This does not imply, however, that it should belong to the same period of Aristotle's life. Not only the political event mentioned in II 23, points to a date after 339¹; indeed, chapters like 12-14 of the same book can hardly be the work of a young man.

a. Against Plato's *Gorgias* Aristotle defends that rhetoric is a τέχνη, which ought to have a special method.

Rhet. I 1, 1354 a¹⁻¹¹:

1354a Ἡ ῥητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ². ἀμφοτέραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων εἰσὶν ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· 5 πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἔξεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν· δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυχάνουσιν οἳ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ 10 ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.

**Rhetoric the
counterpart
of dialectic**

b. Against existing treatises on "the Art of Speech", composed by professional rhetors, he complains that their authors always neglected the argumentative element of rhetoric, which is, in fact, its essential part.

Ib., 1354 a¹¹⁻¹⁸:

Νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μῦριον· αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἐντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἱ 15 δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων³ οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ

**Defect of
existing
treatises**

¹ See M. Dufour's Introduction to Ar.'s *Rhetoric*, Paris 1932, p. 14 f.

² On the meaning of the term *dialectic* in Aristotle see our nr. 435 sub a and b, * and the text of *Top.* I 1 cited there.

³ The *enthymema* has been defined by Ar. in the *Anal. Pr.* II 27, 70 a¹⁰⁻¹¹, as a syllogism from probabilities or signs.

δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργή καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν.

655—The use of rhetoric.

a. As means of producing conviction.

Use of
rhetoric

Rhet. I 1, 1355 a^{20,29}:

Χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διὰ τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τάληθῃ καὶ 20 τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἂν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αἱ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμῆσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχοιμεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥᾶδιον ἂν' ἐκείνης πεῖσαι 25 λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως ¹.

b. Rhetoric has to draw opposite conclusions.

Rhetoric as
ἀντιλογικὴ
τέχνη

Ib., 1355 a^{29,38}:

Ἦτι δὲ τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, 30 οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφοτέρω πρᾶττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τάναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ εἰσιν ἀμφοτέραι 35 τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' αἰετάλῃθῃ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὥς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

c. Its possible abuse is no argument against it.

Why
admissible

Ib., 1355 a^{38-b7}:

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχροὺς μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχροὺς· ὁ μᾶλλον ἰδίον ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος 1355b χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· 5 τούτοις γὰρ ἂν τις ὠφελήσειε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

¹ The reference is to *Top.* I 2, 101 a^{26,27} ff., where it is said that the subject treated in this book (namely, dialectic) is useful for three purposes: for intellectual training, for causal encounters (πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις) and for the philosophical sciences.

d. Its function is not only to persuade, but to see the possible ways of persuading people about any given subject.

Ib., 1355 b⁹⁻¹⁴:

10 ... καὶ ὅτι χρησίμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πείσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἱατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς.

Its true
function

656—Rhetoric, then, is defined by Ar. in the following formula.

Rhet. I 2, 1355 b²⁵⁻²⁶:

Ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

Definition
of rhetoric

657—a. There are three modes of persuasion.

Ib., 1356 a^{1-10, 14-17, 19-20}:

1356a Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἶδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἥθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναι πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἡθους, ὅταν λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ ὅσσον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μὴ ἐστίν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς δὲ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φαμεν πραγματεῦσθαι τοὺς νῦν 10, 14 17, 19 τεχνολογοῦντας. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δελξώμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν.

Three modes
of
persuasion

b. These then being the means of effecting persuasion, rhetoric is necessarily related with dialectic and ethics.

Ib., a²⁰⁻²⁷:

20 Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πῖστες διὰ τούτων εἰσὶ, φανερόν ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ τρία ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετάς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποιόν τι, καὶ 25 ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πῶς. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυῆς τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσ-αγορεύειν πολιτικὴν.

Relation of
rhetoric with
dialectic and
ethics

658—That rhetoric “proves opposites” (655b), might be illustrated excellently by the final chapter of this book, from which we cite the following passages.

On combat-
ing and
defending
written laws

a. *Rhet.* I 15, 1375 a²¹-b²⁶:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων 1375a
ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν δικανικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, νόμοι
μάρτυρες συνθῆκαι βάσανοι ὅρκος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἰπώμεν, πῶς 25
χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογού-
μενον. φανερόν γάρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ἢ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ
κοινῷ νόμῳ χρηστέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπεικέσιν ὡς δικαιοτέροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνώμη
τῇ ἀρίστη τοῦτ' ἐστὶ, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ 30
μὲν ἐπεικὲς αἰεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γὰρ
ἐστίν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις· ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντι-
γόνη (ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ
τὸν ἄγραφον).

35

οὐ γὰρ τί νῦν γε καχθές, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ποτε.

1375b

ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἐμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν· ὥστ' οὐ
νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ 5
ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνη τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
ἀληθές. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι
καὶ ἐμμένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· οἷον
ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἅττ' ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συν- 10
τίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐφ' ὅποτέραν
τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἴτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ
εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον
τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ 15
πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τότε γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον
ἐνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιорκῇ.
καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδεὶς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δια-
φέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ 20
παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἱατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἢ ἀμαρτία τοῦ ἱατροῦ
ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν
εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν 25
τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω.

Arguments
about
witnesses

b. *Ib.*, 1376 a¹⁷-b³¹:

Πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων 1376a
δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστη, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶν ἐξαπατῆσαι

20 τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν. ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ
 25 περὶ τοῦ ἥθους, ὥστε φανερόν ὅτι οὐδέποτ' ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὐτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἥθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς
 30 φαυλότητα. τὰ δ' ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξὺ, ἢ εὐδοκίμοῦντος ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξὺ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν λεκτέον ἐξ οἷων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρῆσις ἔστιν ὅσον αὖξιν ἢ καθαιρεῖν **On contracts**
 1376b ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχῃσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τοῦναντίον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὅποιοι γὰρ ἂν τινες ᾧσιν οἱ
 5 ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες τούτοις αἱ συνθήκαι πισταὶ εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης αὖξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἔστιν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθήκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι
 10 τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἔστιν, ὥστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἢ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεῖα τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τᾶλλα δὲ ὅσα ἀρμόττει,
 15 ἐπιτολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. ἂν δ' ἐναντία ἢ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μὲν, ἅπερ ἂν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦθ' ἀρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ᾧσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωνσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἰθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βρα-
 20 βευτῆς ὁ δικαστής· οὐκ οὖν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ὥς δικαιότερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτῃ οὔτ' ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γὰρ ἔστιν), συνθήκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστὶ τινι ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν
 25 γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ' ὕστεραι ἡπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ἢ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ
 30 συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ πῃ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

659—Since persuasion is also concerned with the state of mind of the hearers, practical psychology has its part in rhetoric. In book II, ch. 2-11, Ar. treats the various emotions, in ch. 12-14 the various types of human character in different ages.

**The young
man**

a. The young man's character. *Rhet.* II 12, 1389 a²-b¹².

Οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἥθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. 1389a
καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ
ἀφροδίσια, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀφίσκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυ- 5
μίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις
καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πείναι. καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ
ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὁρμῇ. καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ 10
φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἀγανακτοῦσιν, ἂν οἴωνται
ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι μὲν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνοικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ
ἢ νεότης, ἢ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχὴ τις. καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι·
φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω ἐνδείας πεπειραῖσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιττακοῦ 15
ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραν¹. καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις ἀλλ' εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω
τεθεωρηκέναί πολλαὺς πονηρίας. καὶ εὐπιστοὶ διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἐξηπατῆσθαι.
καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω διάθερμοὶ εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς
φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναί. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα 20
ἐλπίδι· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἢ δὲ μνημὴ τοῦ παροικομένου,
τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γὰρ πρώτη
ἡμέρᾳ μεμνησθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἴονται, ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοὶ εἰσι 25
διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ ῥαδίως. καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι· θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ
εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος
οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθὸν τι θαρραλέον ἐστίν. καὶ αἰσχυνητοί·
οὐ γὰρ πω καλὰ ἔτερα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου 30
μόνον. καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπεινώνονται, ἀλλὰ
τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροὶ εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὐτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο
δ' εὐέλπιδος. καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων·
τῷ γὰρ ἥθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέ- 35
ροντος ἢ δὲ ἀρετῇ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων
ἡλικιωῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, 1389b
ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἅπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἀμαρτά-
νουσι παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον². πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσί τε γὰρ ἄγαν
καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὁμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ 5
διισχυρίζονται· τοῦτο γὰρ αἰτιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν. καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα
ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ
βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν· τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀνακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστ' ἀνάξια 10
πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς. καὶ φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ εὐτράπελοι· ἢ γὰρ
εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἥθος.

¹ The word of Pittacus is unknown to us.

² Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

b. The character of elderly men. *Rhet.* II 13, 1389 b¹³-1390 a²⁸:

Οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηγμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ
 15 πλείστα ἔχουσιν ἥθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι
 καὶ ἡμαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιού-
 νται οὐδέν, ἥττον τε ἄγαν ἅπαντα ἢ δεῖ. καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασιν δ' οὐδέν. καὶ ἀμφισβη-
 20 τοῦντες προστιθέασιν αἰεὶ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω, παγίως
 οὐδέν. καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσὶν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβά-
 νειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοι εἰσὶ διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἄπιστοι δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν.
 καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑπο-
 25 θήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὥς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὥς φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι
 διὰ τὸ τεταπεινωθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ
 τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἐν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἢ
 οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὥς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ
 ῥᾶδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ
 30 διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γὰρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὥστε προ-
 ωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατὰψυξίς τις ἐστίν. καὶ
 φιλόζωοι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι
 τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὐ δὲ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ φίλαυτοι
 35 μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία γὰρ τις καὶ αὕτη. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν,
 ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον
 1390a αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. καὶ ἀνάισχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυνητοί·
 διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι
 τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων
 5 φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν.
 καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ
 δὲ παρεληλυθὸς πολὺ, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπίς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἢ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροι-
 10 χομένων. ὅπερ αἷτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς. διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα
 λέγοντες· ἀναμνησκόμενοι γὰρ ἡδονταί. καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μὲν εἰσιν ἀσθενεῖς
 δέ, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσιν, ὥστε οὗτ' ἐπιθυ-
 μητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κέρδος. διὸ καὶ
 15 σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικούτοι· αἱ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι, καὶ δουλεύ-
 ουσι τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ
 λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ δ' ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν. καὶ τὰδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν
 εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ
 20 ταῦτό τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιланθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν· πάντα
 γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐλεητικόν. ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοὶ
 εἰσιν, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ
 • φιλογέλῳ. τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἥθη τοιαῦτα· ὥστ'
 25 ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἦθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς

ὁμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

**Men in
their prime**

c. The character of men in their prime. II 14, 1390 a²⁹-b¹³:

Οἱ δὲ ἀκμάζοντες φανερόν ὅτι μεταξύ τούτων τὸ ἦθος ἔσονται, ἑκατέρων ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ 30 τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες μᾶλλον. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδῶ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀρμόττον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ 1390b πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ σῶφρονες μετ' ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι διήρηται ταῦτα· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι σῶφρονες καὶ δειλοί· ὥς δὲ 5 καθόλου εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διήρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἀρμόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε 10 καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἐνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα. περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἡθῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

2—POETICS

660—The different kinds of poetry defined as various modes of imitation.

**General
definition
of poetry**

Poet. I, 1447 a¹³⁻¹⁸:

Ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγωδίας ποίησις, ἔτι δὲ κωμωδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβο- 1447a ποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἢ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς, πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν 15 οὔσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον. διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν· ἡ γὰρ τῷ γένει ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι, ἡ τῷ ἑτέρα, ἡ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

661—a. The means of imitation. *Ib.*, 1447 a¹⁸-b²⁰, b²³⁻²⁹:

**Means of
imitation**

Ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνται τινες ἀπεικάζοντες, οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας, ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω κἂν 20 ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις· ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἡ χωρὶς ἡ μεμιγμένοις, οἷον ἁρμονίᾳ μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἢ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστικὴ, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι 25 τυγχάνωσιν οὔσαι τοιαῦται τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον ἡ τῶν συρίγγων. αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ 25 ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς ἁρμονίας οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἦθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἡ, δὲ ἐποποιία μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις, καὶ τούτοις εἴτε μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων, εἴθ' ἐνὶ τινι γένει χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων τυγχάνουσα μέχρι τοῦ 1447b

10 νῦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου
 μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους, οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείων
 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν· πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποι γε
 συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιούς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιούς ὀνομάζουσιν,
 15 οὐχ ὡς τοὺς κατὰ μίμησιν ποιητάς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες.
 καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἱατρικὸν ἢ φυσικόν¹ τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν
 εἰώθασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὀμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον·
 διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητὴν. —
 23 Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δὲ τινες αἱ πᾶσι χρῶνται
 τοῖς εἰρημένους, λέγω δὲ οἷον ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἢ τε τῶν
 διθυραμβικῶν ποιήσεις καὶ ἢ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἢ τε τραγωδία καὶ ἢ κωμωδία·
 διαφέρουσι δέ, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω
 29 τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν, ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

b. The objects represented. Ib., 2, 1448 a¹⁻¹⁴, 16-19:

Objects

1448a Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους
 ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἦθῃ σχεδὸν αἰεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνους· κακία
 γὰρ καὶ ἀρετὴ τὰ ἦθῃ διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἦτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας
 5 ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων
 δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἵκαζεν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθειῶν
 ἐκάστη μιμήσεων ἔξει ταύτας τὰς διαφορὰς, καὶ ἔσται ἑτέρα τῷ ἑτέρα μιμεῖσθαι
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι
 10 ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον
 "Ὀμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος <ὁ> τὰς
 14, 16 παρωδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος . . . χείρους. — Ἐν δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ
 τραγωδία πρὸς τὴν κωμωδίαν διέστηκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἢ δὲ βελτίους
 μιμεῖσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

c. The manner in which each kind of object is represented.

Poet. 3, 1448 a¹⁹⁻²⁵:

**Manner of
representation**

"Ἐτι δὲ τούτων τρίτῃ διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιο ἂν τις.
 20 καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς² καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα
 ἢ ἑτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὥσπερ "Ὀμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ με-
 ταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους.
 ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν, ὡς εἵπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς
 25 τε καὶ ᾧ καὶ ὡς.

* ¹ An almost certain correction of Heinsius, adopted by newer editors (Bywater, Hardy). The Ms A (Bekker's A) has μουσικόν.

² ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς - by the same means.

Origin of
poetry in
general

662—a. The origin of poetry in general and why men take a delight in it.

Poet. 4, 1448 b⁴⁻¹⁵:

Ῥοίκασι δὲ γεννηῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται 1448b
φυσικαί. τό τε γάρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ 5
τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις
ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας.
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὀρῶμεν, 10
τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων
τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μανθάνειν
οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἡδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ
κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. 15

Origin of
tragedy

b. The origin of tragedy. *Ib.*, 1449 a⁹⁻²⁹:

Γενομένης δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς ¹ (καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία, 1449a
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά,
ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα), κατὰ μικρὸν ἠϋξήθη
προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερόν αὐτῆς, καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα 15
ἡ τραγωδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν 15
πλήθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Λισχύλος ἤγαγε, καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε,
καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν
Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λέξεως γελοίας, διὰ τὸ ἐκ
σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν, ὅψε ἀπεσεμνύνθη, τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἱαμβεῖον 20
ἐγένετο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστι-
κωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης ² αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον
εὔρεν· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἱαμβεῖόν ἐστιν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· 25
πλεῖστα γὰρ ἱαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐξάμετρα δὲ
ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθῃ
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὥς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται.

Comedy

663—a. Comedy. *Poet.* 5, 1449 a³²⁻³⁷:

Ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἵπομεν, μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι
κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γελοῖον μῦριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον
ἐστὶν ἀμάρτημά τι καὶ αἰσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθύς τὸ γελοῖον 35
πρόσωπον αἰσχρὸν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.

¹ "It certainly began in improvisations" (Bywater).

² "As soon as a spoken part came in" (Bywater).

b. Epic poetry. Ib., 1449 b⁹⁻²⁰:

Epic poetry

1449b Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγωδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ <διὰ> μέτρου μεγάλου ¹ μίμησις
 10 εἶναι σπουδαίων ἡκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἀπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν
 εἶναι, ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πειραῖται
 ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ
 15 χρόνῳ, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει. καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις
 τοῦτο ἐποιοῦν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταῦτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς
 τραγωδίας. διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγωδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ
 περὶ ἐπῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγωδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτῇ, οὐ πάντα
 20 ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ.

664—a. The famous definition of tragedy. *Poet.* 6, 1449 b²⁴⁻³¹:Definition
of tragedy

Ἔστιν οὖν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος
 25 ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ, χωρὶς ἐκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρῶντων
 καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων
 παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

Λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος,
 30 τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἶδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἓνια μόνον περαίνεισθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα
 διὰ μέλους.

There has been much discussion on the meaning of the κάθαρσις τῶν παθημάτων spoken of in this definition. The best interpretation has been given by F. W. Trench, *The place of κάθαρσις in Aristotle's aesthetics*, in *Hermathena*, Dublin 1938, p. 110-134. He argues that, in Aristotle's view, the παθήματα are not as such bad and abnormal, but should be ordered and brought to serenity, which is accomplished through melody, rhythm, art-form. Like Pythagoras and Plato before him, Ar. believed in the influence of music and rhythm on the emotions.

This paper seems not to have been known to Fr. Dirlmeier, who, in *Hermes* 1940, p. 81-92, *Κάθαρσις παθημάτων*, tries again to prove that the genetive παθημάτων is a *separativus*.

Further recent literature on the subject:

M. Kommerell, *Lessing und Aristoteles* (Frankfurter wissenschaftl. Beiträge. Kulturwiss. R. 2) Frankfurt a.M. 1940.

A. Tumarkin, *Die Kunsttheorie von Aristoteles im Rahmen seiner Philosophie*, in *Museum Helveticum* 1945, p. 108-122.

For editions and further literature, see Bibliography p. 302 and 303.

b. Of the formative elements of tragedy, action is the first essential.

Formative
elements:
1. actionIb., 1450 a¹⁶⁻²⁵, a³⁸-b²⁰:

1450a Ἡ γὰρ τραγωδία μίμησις ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ
 εὐδαιμονίας <καὶ κακοδαιμονίας> ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν
 πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πράξις τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης. εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ

¹ Text of Bywater. The codex A has μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου, B μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μετὰ λόγου. Other editors read: μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μετὰ μέτρου.

ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοῦναντίον. οὐκ οὖν ὅπως 20 τὰ ἤθη μιμήσονται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς πράξεις. ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγωδίας· τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἀπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγωδία, ἄνευ δὲ 24, 25 ἡθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. —

2. Other elements

Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἶον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγωδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη. 38 παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψει τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα. 1450b ἔστι τε μίμησις πράξεως, καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα, 5 ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων¹ τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποιοῦν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστι δὲ ἥθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὅποια τις, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἢ προαίρεται ἢ φεύγει (διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἥθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μὴδ' ὅλως 10 ἔστιν ὃ τι προαίρεται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων). διάνοια δέ, ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσιν τι ὥς ἔστιν ἢ ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ² ἡ λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας ἐρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν 15 αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [πέντε] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων. ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μὲν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς· ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγωδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὅψεων ἢ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς 20 τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστίν.

665—a. A story or plot must be of some length.

Length of the story

Poet. 7, 1451 a⁹⁻¹⁵:

‘Ὁ δὲ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, αἰ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ 1451a συνδηλὸς εἶναι καλλίον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὥς δὲ ἀπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν, ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἶδος ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγέθους.

15

b. Unity of the plot.

Its unity

Poet. 8, 1451 a¹⁶⁻³⁵:

Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς, οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἶονται, ἐὰν περὶ ἓνα ἢ· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἅπειρα τῷ ἐνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων οὐδὲν ἐστίν ἓν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ πράξεις ἐνὸς πολλάί εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις. διὸ πάντες εἰκόασιν

¹ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων - in the speeches in tragedy.

² ἐν λόγῳ corr. Bywater. Mss. τῶν μὲν λόγων.

20 ἀμαρτάνειν, ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακλεῖδα καὶ Θησηΐδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιή-
 ματα πεποιήκασιν· οἷονται γὰρ ἐπεὶ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἓνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι
 25 ἰδεῖν, ἥτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα
 ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιή-
 σασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ, ὣν οὐδὲν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον
 30 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἢ
 μία μίμησις ἐνός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησις ἐστὶ, μιᾶς
 τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως
 ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεισθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι
 τὸ ὅλον· ὁ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπιδήλον, οὐδὲ μόνον τοῦ
 35 ὅλου ἐστίν.

666—Why poetry is more philosophical and of more serious importance than history.

Poet. 9, 1451 a³⁶-b⁷:

Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ
 ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.
 1451b ὁ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμμετρα διαφέρουσιν·
 εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία
 5 τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενό-
 μενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον
 ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἢ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἢ δ' ἱστορία τὰ
 καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.

**Poetry
 superior to
 history**

BOOK IV
THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL
AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER
THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

I—THEOPHRASTUS

**Life and
work**

667—a. The man and his work. *Diog. L. V* 35, the end - 36, the beginning.

Τοῦ δὴ Σταγειρίτου γεγόνασι μὲν πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, διαφέρων δὲ μάλιστα Θεόφραστος, περὶ οὗ λεκτέον. — Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἐρέσιος. — Οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἤκουσεν Ἀλκιππου τοῦ πολίτου ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, εἴτ' ἀκούσας Πλάτωνος μετέστη πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην· κἀκείνου εἰς Χαλκίδα ὑποχωρήσαντος αὐτὸς διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν Ὀλυμπιάδι τετάρτῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ.

b. Cp. *Simpl., Phys.* 964, ³⁰ Diels:

Τὸν κορυφαῖον τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων Θεόφραστον.

c. Prosperity of the School under Theophr. *Diog. L. V* 37:

Ἀπῆντων τ' εἰς τὴν διατριβὴν αὐτοῦ μαθηταὶ πρὸς δισχιλίους.

d. He is greatly honoured, both at Athens and abroad.

Diog. L. ib., 37 and 41:

Κάσανδρος γοῦν αὐτὸν ἀπεδέχετο καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἔπεμψεν ἐπ' αὐτόν· τοσοῦτον δ' ἀποδοχῆς ἤξιοῦτο παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, ὥστ' Ἀγωνίδης τολμήσας ἀσεβείας αὐτὸν γράψασθαι, μικροῦ καὶ προσῶφλεν. — Καὶ αὐτόν, ὡς ὁ λόγος, Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ παρέπεμψαν ποσὶ, τὸν ἄνδρα τιμήσαντες.

Writings

668—*Diog. L. V* 42:

Καταλέλοιπε δὲ βιβλία καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι μάλιστα πάμπλειστα.

His numerous works covered the whole field of Aristotle's studies: logic, science metaphysics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, poetics. Preserved are his two standard works on botany, the *Περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορίας* and *Περὶ φυτῶν αἰτιῶν*, several small treatises

on various subjects of science, fragments of his great *History of philosophy* (Φυσικῶν δόξαι), and of other works. The treatise *Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν* was a part of the *Φυσικῶν δόξαι*, and the *Characters* belonged probably to a greater work on ethics.

669—Empirical basis of scientific theories.

**Empirical
basis**

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

Εὐθὺ γὰρ χρὴ συμφωνεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους τοῖς εὐρημένοις.

b. Applying this principle throughout his work, he states in the same book, 17, 6:

Ἐκ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα θεωροῦσι σύμφωνος ὁ λόγος τῶν γιγνομένων.

c. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 3, 5:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα μᾶλλον εὐποροῦμεν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις δίδωσιν ἀρχάς.

670—Sense-perception provides thought with material, either to use directly or indirectly, by solving the difficulties which perception presents to it.

a. *Metaph.* VIII 19 ed. Ross-Fobes:

Τὸ δὲ ὄν ὅτι πολλαχῶς, φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις καὶ τὰς διαφοράς θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητεῖ· τάχα δ' ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν ὡς ὑποβάλλει τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰ μὲν ἀπλῶς ζητοῦσα, τὰ δ' ἀπορίαν ἐνεργαζομένα, δι' ἧς, κἂν μὴ δύνηται προβαίνειν, ὅμως ἐμφαίνεται τι φῶς ἐν τῷ μὴ φωτὶ ζητούντων ἐπὶ πλέον. —

Ib. 25: Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινὸς δυνάμεθα δι' αἰτίου θεωρεῖν, ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λαμβάνοντες.

b. Cf. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 362 D:

Θεόφραστος δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πίστεώς φησιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης αἱ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκτείνονται.

671—The phenomenology of plants teaches him that empirical facts should not be artificially forged into a theory.

**Perception
more reliable
than theory**

a. *Hist. plant.* I 3, 5:

Speaking of the difficulty of the classification of plants, he says:

Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ὥσπερ λέγομεν οὐκ ἀκριβολογητέον τῷ ὄρω ἀλλὰ τῷ τύπῳ ληπτέον τοὺς ἀφορισμούς.

b. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 4, 8:

Ἄλλ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ ἀκριβὲς μᾶλλον ἴσως αἰσθητικῆς δεῖται συνέσεως, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ εὐμαρὲς ἀφορίσαι.

672—Logic.

**Conversion
of proposi-
tions**

a. Theophr. changes Aristotle's indirect proof of the conversion of universal negative propositions into a direct proof.

Alex. Aphrod. in *Ar. Anal. pr.* 31, 4-10 Wallies:

Θεόφραστος μὲν καὶ Εὐδημος ἀπλούστερον ἔδειξαν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφουσιν ἑαυτῇ· τὴν γὰρ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ὠνόμασε καθόλου στερητικήν. Τὴν δὲ δεῖξιν οὕτω ποιοῦνται· κείσθω τὸ Α κατὰ μηδενὸς τοῦ Β· εἰ κατὰ μηδενός, ἀπέzeugkται τοῦ Β τὸ Α καὶ ἐχώρισται· τὸ δὲ ἀπεζευγμένον ἀπεζευγμένου ἀπέzeugkται· καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα παντὸς ἀπέzeugkται τοῦ Α· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κατὰ μηδενὸς αὐτοῦ. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνοι.

The same is told by Philoponus in *An. pr.* 48¹¹.¹⁸ W.

b. Theophr. maintains (against Ar.) the convertibility of universal negative propositions of possibility.

Alex. in *An. pr.* 220, 9-16 W.:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι καὶ Εὐδημος, ὥς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐμνημονεύσαμεν, ἀντιστρέφειν φασὶ καὶ τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν αὐτῇ, ὥσπερ ἀντέστρεφε καὶ ἡ ὑπάρχουσα¹ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀναγκαία. "Ὅτι δὲ ἀντιστρέφει, δεικνῶσιν οὕτως· εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, καὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Β μηδενί, ὅτε ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, τότε ἐνδέχεται ἀπεζευχθαι τὸ Α πάντων τῶν τοῦ Β· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ', ἔσται τότε καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Α ἀπεζευγμένον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί.

On the logic of modality in Theophr. see Bochensky, *La logique de Théophraste*, Fribourg (Suisse) 1947, ch. V.

**Moods of the
syllogism**

673—a. To Aristotle's four moods of the first figure of the syllogism Theophr. added five others.

Alex., *An. pr.* 69, 36-70, 1 W.:

Θεόφραστος δὲ προστίθησιν ἄλλους πέντε τοῖς τέτταρσι τούτοις οὐκέτι τελείους οὐδ' ἀναποδείκτους ὄντας, ὧν μνημονεύσει καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τῶν μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ προελθόντων, τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο τῷ δευτέρῳ κατ' ἀρχάς.

Bochensky, o.c., p. 56-65, in treating these new moods, states that Theophr. developed Ar.'s indications in a formalistic sense.

b. Later we find the five moods of Theophr. in Boëthius, *De syllogismo categorico*, Patrol. Lat. LXIV, 814 c:

¹ ὑπάρχων is a species of ἀναγκαῖον, what the schoolmen call the *necessarium ex suppositione*. Cp. Bochensky o.c., p. 73.

Quattuor in prima figura modos in Analyticis suis Aristoteles posuit. Ceteros vero quinque modos Theophrastus et Eudemus addiderunt, quibus Porphyrius, gravissimae vir auctoritatis, visus est consensisse, qui sunt huiusmodi.

Follows a description of the new moods.

674—According to Theophr., in syllogisms in which the premisses are of different modality, the conclusion follows the weaker premiss. **Modality**

a. Alex., *An. pr.* 124, ⁸⁻²¹ W.:

Οἱ δὲ γε ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ (sc. Ἀριστοτέλους) οἱ περὶ Εὐδημόν τε καὶ Θεόφραστον οὐχ οὕτως λέγουσι, ἀλλὰ φασιν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τε καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συζυγίαις, ἂν ὧσι συγκείμεναι συλλογιστικῶς, ὑπάρχον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοῦτο λαμβάνοντες ἐκ τε τοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς τὸ συμπέρασμα αἰεὶ τῷ ἑλάττονι καὶ χείρονι τῶν κειμένων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι· ἂν τε γὰρ ἐκ καταφατικῆς καὶ ἀποφατικῆς προτάσεως, συνάγεται ἀποφατικὸν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἂν τ' ἐκ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν ταῖς μίξεσιν ἔχειν· ὑπάρχον γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίας καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συμπλοκαῖς τῷ ἑλάττον εἶναι τὸ ὑπάρχον τοῦ ἀναγκαίου. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο δεικνύουσιν. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει μὲν παντί, οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐνδέχεται ποτε αὐτὸ καὶ ἀποξευχθῆναι αὐτοῦ· ὅτε δὴ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ ἀπέξευκται, τότε καὶ τὸ Α αὐτοῦ ἀποξευχθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῷ ὑπάρξει.

b. Again, if one of the premisses is possible, the conclusion will be possible. Alex., *An. pr.* 173, ³²⁻¹⁷⁴, ³ W.:

Θεόφραστος μὲν οὖν καὶ Εὐδήμος οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένης καὶ ὑπαρχούσης μίξει φασὶν ἔσεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνδεχόμενον, ὅποτέρᾳ ἂν τῶν προτάσεων ἐνδεχομένη ληφθῇ· χεῖρον γὰρ πάλιν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος.

Cf. Philoponus, *An. pr.* 205, ¹³⁻¹⁵ W. See: Bochensky o.c., p. 79 ff. on "the rule of the *peiores*".

675—a. According to Philoponus, Theophr. and Eudemus introduced the doctrine of hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.

Philop., *An. pr.* 242, ¹⁴⁻²¹ W.:

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τοσοῦτον εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν ἐπαύσατο καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἐποιήσατο, ἅτε δὴ τούτων μὲν τελείων ὄντων καὶ μηδενὸς ἐξῶθεν δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ὑποθετικῶν δεομένων τῶν κατηγορικῶν, εἰπώμεν

**Hypothetical
syllogisms**

ἡμεῖς βραχεία περὶ αὐτῶν. Ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι πολυστήχους πραγματείας περὶ τούτων κατεβάλλοντο οἳ τε μαθηταὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ Εὐδήμον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ ἔτι οἱ Στωϊκοί.

Is this statement true? Is it true that Theophr., Eudemus and other disciples of Ar. dealt explicitly with hypothetical syllogisms?—The following text of Alexander seems to contradict this communication of Philoponus.

b. Alex., *An. pr.* 389, ³² - 390, ³:

Λέγει (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως περαίνεσθαι, περὶ ὧν ὑπερτίθεται μὲν ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπιμελέστερον, οὐ μὲν φέρεται αὐτοῦ σύγγραμμα περὶ αὐτῶν. Θεόφραστος δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις Ἀναλυτικοῖς μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐδήμος καὶ τινες ἄλλοι τῶν ἐταίρων αὐτοῦ.

Bochensky o.c., p. 110, concludes that, if Theophr. "mentions" these syllogisms, he did not treat them at length.

As to the frequent combination of the names of Theophr. and Eudemus, Bochensky (o.c., p. 125) suggests that Ar. discussed these questions in his School more abundantly than it is done in his written treatises, and that both Theophr. and Eud. represented the views of Ar. in the latest phase of his teaching.

676—Metaphysics.

the First
Principle

a. Theophr. admits, with Ar., one first principle of all.

Metaph. I 6 Ross-Fobes:

Μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων οἶον ἄρτιος ὁ λόγος ἀρχὴν τε ποιῶν μίαν πάντων καὶ 5a 5
τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποδιδούς, ἔτι δὲ μὴ διαιρετὸν μηδὲ ποσὸν τι λέγων
ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς ἐξαίρων εἰς κρείττω τινὰ μερίδα καὶ θειοτέραν. οὕτω γὰρ μᾶλλον 10
ἀποδοτέον ἢ τὸ διαιρετὸν καὶ μεριστὸν ἀφαιρετέον. Ἀμα γὰρ ἐν ὑψηλοτέρῳ
τε καὶ ἀληθινωτέρῳ λόγῳ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἢ ἀπόφασις.

b. His objections to the Aristotelian theory of the Prime Mover.

Ib., II 7-9:

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη λόγου δεῖται πλείονος περὶ τῆς ἐφέσεως, ποία καὶ 15
τίνων. Ἐπειδὴ πλείω τὰ κυκλικά καὶ αἱ φοραὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὑπεναντία, καὶ τὸ
ἀνήνυτον καὶ οὗ χάριν ἀφανές. Εἴτε γὰρ ἐν τὸ κινεῖν, ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ πάντα τὴν
αὐτὴν· εἴτε καθ' ἕκαστον ἕτερον αἰ τ' ἀρχαὶ πλείους, ὥστε τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν 20
εἰς ὄρεξιν ἰόντων τὴν ἀρίστην οὐδαμῶς φανερόν. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
σφαιρῶν τῆς αἰτίας μερίζονα ζητεῖ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ <ἀρκεῖ> ὁ γε τῶν ἀστρολόγων.
Ἀπορον δὲ καὶ πῶς ποτε φυσικὴν ὄρεξιν ἐχόντων οὐ τὴν ἡρεμίαν διώκουσιν
ἀλλὰ τὴν κίνησιν. — Εἰ δ' ἡ ἐφεσις, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου, μετὰ ψυχῆς, 25, 28
εἰ μὴ τις λέγοι καθ' ὁμοιότητα καὶ μεταφοράν, ἐμψυχ' ἂν εἴη τὰ κινούμενα.
Ψυχῇ δ' ἅμα δοκεῖ καὶ κίνησις ὑπάρχειν· ζωὴ γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσιν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ αἰ 5b

5 ὁρέξεις πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ζώοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καίπερ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὔσαι δι' ἐτέρων ὅμως ὡς ἐμψύχοις γίγνονται. Εἰ δ' οὖν τῆς κυκλικῆς αἰτίου τὸ πρῶτον οὐ τῆς ἀρίστης ἂν εἴη· κρείττων γὰρ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ
10 πρῶτῃ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἢ τῆς διανοίας ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις.

677—His difficulties about the teleological explanation of nature.

a. How should we conceive the first principles? What is the reason of everything? How far does the ordering of the world reach, and why does it stop at a certain point?

Difficulty
about
teleology

Ib., IV 14-15:

6b Πῶς δέ ποτε χρὴ καὶ ποίας τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑποθέσθαι τάχ' ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις,
25 πότερον ἀμόρφους καὶ οἷον δυναμικὰς ὥσπερ ὅσοι πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἢ μεμορφωμένας ὡς μάλιστα δέον ταύτας ὠρίσθαι καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ φησὶν· τοῖς γὰρ τιμιω-
7a τάτοις οἰκειότατον ἢ τάξις καὶ τὸ ὠρίσθαι. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς σχεδὸν ἔχειν οὕτω καθάπερ ἐν γραμματικῇ καὶ μουσικῇ καὶ ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς. Συνακολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας ὁμοίως
5 αἰπερ τὴν φύσιν μιμοῦνται· καὶ τὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμόρφους πάσας, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰς ὑλικὰς· οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρας ἐμμόρφους, καὶ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ τέλεον <ὄν>· οἷον γὰρ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τὴν ἅπασαν
10 οὐσίαν. Ἄλογον δὲ κάκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν εἰ ὁ μὲν ὅλος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν ἅπαντ' ἐν τάξει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ δυνάμεσι καὶ περιόδοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μὴθὲν τοιοῦτον ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σάρμα¹ εἰκῇ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος,
15. 10 φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, [ὁ] κόσμος. — Χαλεπὸν δὲ πάλιν αὖ τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἐκάστοις περιθεῖναι πρὸς τὸ ἕνεκά του συνάγοντας ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἐν ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πομφόλυγι· πλὴν εἰ συμβαίνει τῇ ἀστέρων τάξει καὶ μεταβολῇ
7b μορφὰς παντοίας καὶ ποικιλίας γίγνεσθαι τῶν τε περὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν. Ὡς δὴ μέγιστόν τινες παράδειγμα ποιοῦνται τὰ περὶ τὰς ὥρας τὰς ἐτείους ἐν
5 αἷς καὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν γενέσεις οἷον γεννῶντος τοῦ ἡλίου. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθά που ζητεῖ τὴν σκέψιν, ἀφορισμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντα μέχρι πόσου τὸ τεταγμένον, καὶ διὰ τί πλεον ἀδύνατον ἢ εἰς τὸ χεῖρον μετάβασις.

b. It is sometimes difficult to decide whether a thing exists for a certain purpose or by chance. Many things do not exist for a purpose, and there is much more evil than good.

Ib., IX 28-32:

10a Ὑπερ δὲ τοῦ πάνθ' ἕνεκά του καὶ μὴθὲν μάτην, ἄλλως <θ'> ὁ ἀφορισμὸς οὐ ῥάδιος καθάπερ πλεονάκις λέγεται (πόθεν δ' ἄρξασθαι χρὴ καὶ εἰς ποῖα
3 τελευτᾶν;), καὶ δὴ ἐνία τῷ μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν συμπτωματικῶς

¹ Corr. Diels. Mss. σάρξ.

τὰ δ' ἀνάγκη τινὶ καθάπερ ἐν τε τοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν γῆν πλείοσιν. Τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα αἱ ἔφοδοι καὶ ἀνάρροιαὶ θαλάττης [ἢ τίνος αἱ προχωρήσεις] ¹ ἢ 10b ἀναζηράνσεις καὶ ὑγρότητες καὶ ὅλως πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεταβολαὶ καὶ φθοραὶ καὶ γενέσεις, [ἢ αἱ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ ἀλλοιωσεις καὶ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεθισταμένων] ² καὶ ἕτερα δ' οὐκ ὀλίγα παρόμοια τούτοις; 5 "Ἐτι δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ζώοις τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ μάταια καθάπερ τοῖς ἄρρεσιν οἱ μαστοὶ καὶ τοῖς θήλεσιν ἢ πρόσεις εἴπερ μὴ συμβάλλεται, καὶ πώγωνος δ' ἐνίοις ἢ ὅλως τριχῶν ἔκφυσις ἐν τισι τόποις· . . . καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα λάβοι 10, 16 τις ἂν τοιαῦτα. Καὶ τὸ μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦν περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ζώων· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ταῦθ' ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα καὶ δι' ἑτέρας ἀνάγκας. "Ἐδει γὰρ εἴπερ τούτων χάριν αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτά καὶ ὡσάυτως. — 20

Ἀπλῶς μὲν ὅτι τὴν φύσιν <εἰκὸς> ἐν ἅπασιν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ ἐφ' ὧν 11a 5 ἐνδέχεται μεταδιδόναι τοῦ αἰεὶ καὶ τοῦ τεταγμένου· ὥς δ' αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων ὁμοίως· ὅπου γὰρ οἶόν τε τὸ βέλτιον, ἐνταῦθα οὐδαμοῦ παραλείπει, οἶον τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τὴν φάρυγγα τοῦ οἰσοφάγου, τιμιώτερον γάρ. καὶ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ 10 κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας τὴν κραῖσιν ἀρίστην, ὅτι τὸ μέσον τιμιώτατον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα κόσμου χάριν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὕρεξις οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γ' ἐμφαίνει διότι πολὺ τὸ οὐχ ὑπακοῦν οὐδὲ δεχόμενον τὸ εὖ, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλῶν πλεῖον· 15 ὀλίγον γάρ τι τὸ ἔμψυχον, ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἄψυχον· καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀκαριαίου ³ καὶ βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιον τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πληθὺς εἶναι τὸ κακόν. 20

678—Yet he accepts the Aristotelian teleology and professes its principle explicitly.

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

ἢ γὰρ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἥμιστα δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ κυριωτάτοις.

b. Cf. *ib.* I 16, 11:

ἢ δὲ (sc. φύσις) αἰεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ὁρμᾷ.

Theophr.'s
theology

679—a. Cicero reproached Theophr. with the same "inconsistency" in theology which he disapproved of in Aristotle.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 35:

Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus.

Cp. on Aristotle *ib.* § 33 (our nr. 430). The same is said by Minucius Felix, *Oct.* XIX 9.

¹ Secl. Ross.

² Secl. Usener.

³ Corr. Ross. Transl.: "of animate things themselves there is only a minute part whose existence is actually better than its non-existence would be" (Ross-Fobes).

b. He considered atheism as an abnormality and a great sin.

Simpl. in Epict. *Enchir.* 38, IV 357 Schweigh.:
 Πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι . . . νομίζουσι εἶναι θεὸν πλὴν Ἀκροθοϊτῶν, οὓς
 ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος ἀθέους γενομένους ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως καταποθῆναι.

680—a. The divine order of the universe was to him at the same **Fate and Nature**
 time Fate and Nature.

Alex. Aphrod., *De an.*, at the end:

Φανερώτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δείκνυσι ταῦτόν ὃν τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην τῷ
 κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τῷ Καλλισθένει.

b. Like Plato, he seems to have spoken of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ.

Julianus, *Or.* VI, 185 a Spanh.:

Ἀλλὰ καὶ Πυθαγόρας οἷ τε ἀπ' ἐκείνου μέχρι Θεοφράστου τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν
 ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ φασι. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ὁ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ποτέ, τοῦτο ὁ
 θεὸς ἀεί.

**the contem-
plative life**

Cf. Cic. in *De fin.* V 4, 11, who says, referring to Ar. and Theophr.: Vitae autem
 degendae ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quiesca, in contemplatione et cognitione
 posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima.

681—He corrects Ar.'s conception of movement: movement occurs **Movement**
 in every category, not only in that of substance, quantity, quality
 and place.

Theophr. fr. 19 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 860, 19-23 D.):

Θ. ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ Φυσικῶν καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατη-
 γοριῶν τὴν κίνησιν θεωρεῖσθαι φησι γράφων οὕτως· περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τὸν μὲν
 καθόλου καὶ κοινὸν λόγον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἐνέργειά τις
 ἐστὶν ἀτελής τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἢ τοιοῦτον καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

682—a. He opposes Ar.'s definition of space.

Space

Fr. 21 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 604, 4-11 D.):

Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικαῖς ἀπορεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ τόπου λόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ
 Ἀριστοτέλους τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ, ὅτι κινούμενος ἔσται
 ὁ τόπος, ὅτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀπλανής, ὅτι ἐὰν συναχθῶσιν
 αἱ σφαῖραι, καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ, ὅτι τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα μὴδὲν
 αὐτὰ μετακινήθοντα, ἐὰν ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ περιέχοντα αὐτά, οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐν τόπῳ.

b. He tries to define it himself by the order and place of the bodies
 in relation to each other.

Fr. 22 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 639, ¹⁵⁻²²):

Καὶ Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς φαίνεται τὴν ἔννοιαν ταύτην ἐσχηκῶς περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν οἷς φησὶν ὡς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ προάγων τὸν λόγον· μήποτε οὐκ ἔστι καὶ αὐτὴν οὐσία τις ὁ τόπος ἀλλὰ τῇ τάξει καὶ θέσει τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις· ὁμοίως δ' ἐπὶ ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, εἴτε ἐμψύχων εἴτε ἀψύχων, ἑμμορφον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐχόντων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων τάξις τις καὶ θέσις τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν. Διὸ καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ λέγεται τῷ ἔχει τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν ἕκαστον ἐπιποθήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἀπαιτήσκει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ θέσιν.

**Eternity
of the kosmos**

683—He defends the eternity of the universe against the Stoic Zeno.

[Philo], *De aetern. mundi* 117, p. 510 Mangey:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι φησὶ τοὺς γένεσιν καὶ φθοράν τοῦ κόσμου κατηγοροῦντας ὑπὸ τεττάρων ἀπατηθῆναι τῶν μεγίστων, γῆς ἀνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἐκάστου τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν διαλύσεως, χερσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γένη ζώων.

The following chapters (23-27) contain Theophr.' arguments against these four points.

**Thinking
a movement
of the soul**

684—Theophr. explains thinking as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 964, ²⁹⁻⁹⁶⁵, ⁶ D.:

Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀρέσκει τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ κινήσεως αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ὅτι »αἱ μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ὄργανα σωματικαὶ κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν, ὅσαι δὲ κρίσεις καὶ θεωρίαι, ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀναγαγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ τέλος, εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς κρεῖττόν τι καὶ θειότερον, ἅτε δὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιῶν καὶ παντέλειος«. — Καὶ τούτοις ἐπάγει· »Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων σκεπτέον, εἴ τινα χωρισμὸν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ὅρον, ἐπεὶ τό γε κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ὁμολογούμενον«.

685—a. In ethics, he shares Ar.' view of eudaemonia as the final end.

Eudaemonia Cic., *De fin.* V 29, 86:

Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita comparanda; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus.

**Definition
of the good**

b. With Ar., he defines the good as that which is praiseworthy in itself.

Cic., *De legibus* I 13, 37 f.:

Ad respublicas firmandas et ad stabiliendas vires, sanandos populos,

omnis nostra pergit oratio. Quocirca vereor committere ut non bene provisae et diligenter explorata principia ponantur: nec tamen ut omnibus probentur — nam id fieri non potest —, sed ut iis qui omnia recta atque honesta per se expetenda duxerunt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod per se ipsum laudibile esset, aut certe nullum habendum magnum bonum nisi quod vere laudari sua sponte posset, his omnibus — (and, among others, Theophr.' name is mentioned here) his omnibus haec quae dixi probantur.

686—a. He attributes some value to outward circumstances of life.

**Value of
outward
circum-
stances**

Cic., *Tusc.* V 9, 24:

(Theophrastus) cum statuisset verba, tormenta, cruciatus, patriae eversions, exilia, orbitates magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus clare et ample loqui, cum humiliter demisseque sentiret. — Vexatur autem ab omnibus ¹ primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quam ob rem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit.

b. He considers marriage as an impediment to the life of a scholar. **Marriage**

Hieronymus, *Adv. Jovin.* I 47:

Fertur aureolus Theophrasti liber de nuptiis, in quo quaerit an vir sapiens ducat uxorem. Et cum definisset, si pulchra esset, si bene morata, si honestis parentibus, si ipse sanus ac dives, sic sapientem aliquando inire matrimonium, statim intulit: „Haec autem in nuptiis raro universa concordant. Non est ergo uxor ducenda sapienti. Primum enim impediri studia philosophiae, nec posse quemquam libris et uxori pariter inservire.

687—Theophr.' Characters.

a. III, 'Αδολεσχίας.

Garrulity

Ἡ δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ μὲν διήγησις λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων, ὁ δὲ ἀδολεσches τοιοῦτός τις οἶος, ὃν μὴ γινώσκει, τούτῳ παρακαθεζόμενος πλησίον πρῶτον μὲν τῆς αὐτοῦ γυναικὸς εἰπεῖν ἐγκώμιον, εἴτα, ὃ τῆς νυκτὸς εἶδεν ἐνύπνιον, τοῦτο διηγῆσασθαι, εἴθ' ὃν εἶχεν ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα διεξελθεῖν· εἴτα δὴ προχωροῦντος τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ὡς πολὺ πονηρότεροί εἰσιν οἱ νῦν ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἀρχαίων, καὶ ὡς ἄξιοι <οὐ> γεγόνασιν οἱ πυροὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, καὶ ὡς πολλοὶ ἐπιδημοῦσι ξένοι, καὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐκ Διονυσίων πλώϊμον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ ποιήσειεν ὁ Ζεὺς ὕδωρ πλεῖον, τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ βελτίως ἔσεσθαι,

¹ Doubtless, most by the Stoics; hardly by the Peripatetics.

καὶ ὃν ἄγρὸν εἰς νέωτα γεωργήσῃ, καὶ ὥς χαλεπὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν, καὶ ὥς Δάμιππος μυστηρίοις μεγίστην δᾶδα ἔστησεν, καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ κίονες τοῦ Ὀιδείου, 10 καὶ »χθρὲς ἤμεσα«, καὶ »τίς ἐστὶν ἡμέρα τήμερον;« καὶ ὥς Βοηδρομιῶνος μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ μυστήρια, Πυανοψιδῶνος δὲ Ἀπατούρια, Ποσιδεῶνος δὲ <τὰ> κατ' ἄγρους Διονύσια· καὶ ὑπομένῃ τις αὐτόν, μὴ ἀφίστασθαι.

The officious
man

b. XIII, Περιεργίας.

Ἀμέλει <ή> περιεργία δόξει εἶναι προσπύησις τις λόγων καὶ πράξεων μετ' εὐνοίας, ὃ δὲ περιεργὸς τοιοῦτός τις <οἶος> ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι ἃ μὴ δυνήσεται· καὶ ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ πράγματος δικαίου εἶναι ἀνταναστὰς ἐλεγχθῆναι· καὶ πλείω δὲ ἐπαναγκάσαι τὸν παῖδα κεράσαι ἢ ὅσον δύνανται οἱ παρόντες ἐκπιεῖν· καὶ διείργειν τοὺς μαχομένους, καὶ οὓς οὐ γινώσκει· καὶ ἀτραποῦ 5 ἡγήσασθαι, εἴτα μὴ δύνασθαι εὐρεῖν οἷ πορεύεται· καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν προσελθὼν ἐρωτῆσαι πότε μέλλει παρατάττεσθαι, καὶ τί μετὰ τὴν αὐρίον παραγγελεῖ· καὶ προσελθὼν τῷ πατρὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ μήτηρ ἤδη καθεύδει ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ· καὶ ἀπαγορεύοντος τοῦ ἱατροῦ ὅπως μὴ δώσει οἶνον τῷ μαλακίζομένῳ, φήσας βούλεσθαι διάπειραν λαμβάνειν, εὖ ποτίσαι τὸν κακῶς ἔχοντα· καὶ γυναικὸς 10 δὲ τελευτησάσης ἐπιγράψαι ἐπὶ τὸ μνήμα τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ αὐτῆς <τῆς> γυναικὸς τοῦνομα καὶ ποδαπή ἐστὶ, καὶ προσεπιγράψαι ὅτι οὗτοι πάντες χρηστοὶ ἦσαν· καὶ ὁμνῦναι μέλλων εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς περιεστηκότας ὅτι »καὶ πρότερον πολλάκις ὁμῶμοκα«.

The
grumbler

c. XVII, Μεμψιμοιρίας.

Ἔστιν ἡ μεμψιμοιρία ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδομένων, ὃ δὲ μεμψίμοιρος τοιούσδε τις οἶος, ἀποστείλαντος μερίδα τοῦ φίλου, εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν φέροντα· »ἐφθόνησέ μοι τοῦ ζωμοῦ καὶ τοῦ οἴναριου, οὐκ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καλέσας«· καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐταίρας καταφιλούμενος εἰπεῖν· »θαυμάζω εἰ σὺ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτω με φιλεῖς«· καὶ τῷ Διὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, οὐ διότι <οὐχ> ὕει, ἀλλὰ διότι 5 ὕστερον· καὶ εὐρὼν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ βαλλάντιον εἰπεῖν· »ἄλλ' οὐ θησαυρὸν εὗρηκα οὐδέποτε«· καὶ πριάμενος ἀνδράποδον ἄξιον, καὶ πολλὰ δεηθεὶς τοῦ πωλοῦντος· »θαυμάζω« εἰπεῖν »ὅ τι ὑγιὲς οὕτω ἄξιον ἐώνημαι«· καὶ πρὸς τὸν εὐαγγελιζόμενον ὅτι· »νιός σοι γέγονεν« εἰπεῖν ὅτι· »ἂν προσθῆς· καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ἡμισυ ἄπεστιν, ἀληθῆς ἔρεῖς«· καὶ δίκην νικήσας καὶ λαβὼν πάσας τὰς ψήφους 10 ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ γράψαντι τὸν λόγον, ὥς πολλὰ παραλελοιπότι τῶν δικαίων· καὶ ἐράνου εἰσνεχθέντος παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ φήσαντός τινος· »ἰλαρὸς ἴσθι«, »καὶ πῶς;« εἰπεῖν »ὅτε δεῖ τὰργύριον ἀποδοῦναι ἐκάστῳ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων χάριν ὀφείλειν ὥς εὐεργετημένον;»

2—DICAEOARCHUS

688—Suidas s.v. Δικαίαρχος (fr. 1 Wehrli):

Life and
work

Δικαίαρχος: Φειδίου, Σικελιώτης, ἐκ πόλεως Μεσσήνης, Ἀριστοτέλους ἀκουστής, φιλόσοφος καὶ ῥήτωρ καὶ γεωμέτρης. Καταμετρήσεις τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ὄρων, Ἑλλάδος βίον ἐν βιβλίοις γ'. οὗτος ἔγραψε τὴν πολιτείαν Σπαρτιατῶν, καὶ νόμος ἐτέθη ἐν Λακεδαιμόνι καθ' ἑκάστον ἔτος ἀναγινώσκεισθαι τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ τῶν Ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν ἀκροᾶσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐκράτει μέχρι πολλοῦ.

689—Cic., *De fin.* IV 28, 79 (fr. 3 W.):

A later
judgment

...Panaetius ... semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter tractandos magno opere censeo.

690—Naturalistic doctrine on soul.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* I 10, 21 (fr. 7 W.):

Doctrine
on soul

Dicaearchus autem in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit, doctorum hominum disputantium primo libro multos loquentes facit; duobus Pherecraten quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum et hoc esse nomen totum inane frustra animalia et animantes appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quae nulla sit, nec sit quicquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat.

b. Cf. *Tusc.* I 22, 51 (fr. 8 e W.):

Dicaearchus quidem et Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi quid aut qualis esset intellegentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt.

c. Sextus, *Pyrrh.* II 31 (fr. 8 b W.):

Οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασκαν, ὥς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήνιον Δικαίαρχον.

691—Soul a harmony of the four elements.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* II, Patrol. Gr. XL, p. 537 (fr. 11 W.):

Δικαίαρχος δὲ ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι) ἀντὶ τοῦ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίας τῶν στοιχείων. Οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ

ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κραῖσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ 5 Δικαίαρχος ἀνούσιον.

The same doctrine is attested in a few words by Plut., *Plac.* IV 2, 5; Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 1, and Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* V 18 (fr. 12 a-c W.).

Divination 692—In spite of this naturalistic doctrine of soul D. is said to have acknowledged divination in dreams.

a. Galenus, *Hist. phil.* 105 (fr. 13 a W.):

Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Δικαίαρχος τοὺς ὀνείρους εἰσάγουσιν, ἀθάνατον μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ νομίζοντες, θείου δὲ τινος μετέχιν.

b. Cic., *De div.* I 3, 5 (fr. 14 W.):

Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit.

Human possibilities

693—The following reflexion on the polarity of human possibilities¹ is cited by Cic. from D.' work Π. ἀνθρώπων φθορᾶς.

Cic. *De off.* II 5, 16 (fr. 24 W.):

Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus quam omni 5 reliqua calamitate. cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere.

Superiority of the βίος πρακτικός

694—Against Theophr., D. defended the superiority of the βίος πρακτικός to the βίος θεωρητικός.

a. Cic., *Ep. ad Att.* II 16, 3 (fr. 25 W.):

Nunc prorsus hoc statui, ut quoniam tanta controversia est Dicaearcho familiari tuo cum Theophrasto amico meo, ut ille tuus τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον longe omnibus anteponat, hic autem τὸν θεωρητικόν, utrique a me mos gestus esse videatur.

b. Codex Vaticanus 435 (fr. 31 W.):

(The ancient Romans did not strive after cleverness in words, not ever

¹ The fragment is explained by Wehrli in this sense.

in such apophthegmata as those attributed to the seven sages.)

Δικαιάρχῳ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα σοφῶν εἶναι ἀνδρῶν δοκεῖ, μὴ γὰρ δὴ γε τοὺς πάλαι λόγῳ φιλοσοφεῖν. ἀλλ' εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν τότε γοῦν ἐπιτηδευσιν ἔργων καλῶν, χρόνῳ δὲ λόγων ὀχλικῶν γενέσθαι τέχνην. καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸν πιθανῶς διαλεχθέντα μέγαν εἶναι δοκεῖν φιλόσοφον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάλαι χρόνοις ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος ἦν 5 φιλόσοφος, εἰ καὶ μὴ περιβλέπτους καὶ ὀχλικούς ἀσκοῖτο λόγους. οὐ γὰρ ἐζήτουν ἐκεῖνοί γε εἰ πολιτευτέον οὐδὲ πῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπολιτεύοντο αὐτοὶ καλῶς, οὐδὲ εἰ χρή γαμεῖν, ἀλλὰ γήμαντες ὃν δεῖ τρόπον γαμεῖν ταῖς γυναιξὶ συνεβίουν. ταῦτα ἦν, φησὶν, ἔργα ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα σοφῶν, αἱ δὲ ἀποφθέξεις αὗται πρᾶγμα φορτικόν.

c. Cf. Plut., *An seni gerenda res publica*, c. 26, 796 c (fr. 29 W.).

(Philosophy does not only consist in speaking ex cathedra, like πολιτεύεσθαι does not only consist in crying in the assembly. There is a συνεχῆς ἐν ἔργοις καὶ πράξεσιν ὁρωμένη καθ' ἡμέραν ὁμαλῶς πολιτεία καὶ φιλοσοφία, which escapes the notice of the people). Καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στοαῖς ἀνακάμπτοντας περιπατεῖν φασιν, ὡς ἔλεγε Δικαιάρχος, οὐκέτι δὲ τοὺς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἢ πρὸς φίλον βαδίζοντας. ὅμοιον δ' ἐστὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι. Σωκράτης γοῦν οὔτε βάρη θεῖς οὔτε εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὔθ' ὥραν διατριβῆς 5 ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην φυλάττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παίζων ὅτε τύχοι καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συστρατευόμενος ἐνίοις καὶ συναγοράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ δεδμεμένος καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον ἐφιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ἀπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον.

695—An important work of D. was his *Bios 'Ελλάδος*, which is cited rather frequently by later writers (Wehrli, fr. 47-66).

The
development
of mankind

a. Varro, *Rerum rustic.* II 1, 3 (fr. 48 W., first part).

Igitur, inquam, et homines et pecudes cum semper fuisse sit necesse natura — sive enim aliquod fuit principium generandi animalium, ut putavit Thales Milesius et Zeno Citicus, sive contra principium horum exstitit nullum, ut credidit Pythagoras Samius et Aristoteles Stagiritēs — 5 necesse est humanae vitae a summa memoria gradatim descendisse ad hanc aetatem, ut scribit Dicaearchus, et summum gradum fuisse naturalem, cum viverent homines ex his rebus, quae inviolata ultro ferret terra; ex hac vita in secundam descendisse pastoriciam e feris atque agrestibus, ut arboribus ac virgultis [ac] decarpendo glandem, arbu[s]tum, mora, 10 poma colligerent ad usum, sic ex animalibus cum propter eandem utilitatem quae possent silvestria deprenderent ac concluderent et mansues-

cerent. In quis primum non sine causa putant oves assumptas et propter utilitatem et propter <p>laciditatem. maxime enim hae natura quietae et aptissimae ad vitam hominum. ad cibum enim lacte et caseum adhibitum, ad corpus vestitum et pelles attulerunt. tertio denique gradu a 15 vita pastoralis ad agri culturam descenderunt, in qua ex duobus gradibus superioribus retinuerunt multa, et quo descenderant, ibi processerunt longe, dum ad nos perveniret.

b. Porphy., *De abstinence* IV 2 (fr. 49 W., the beginning).

Τῶν τοίνυν συντόμως τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀκριβῶς τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ συναγαγόντων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ περιπατητικὸς Δικαίαρχος, ὃς τὸν ἀρχαῖον βίον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀφηγούμενος τοὺς παλαιούς καὶ ἐγγὺς θεῶν φησὶ γεγονότας, βελτίστους τε ὄντας φύσει καὶ τὸν ἄριστον ἐξηκότας βίον, ὥς χρυσοῦν γένος νομίζεσθαι παραβαλλομένους πρὸς τοὺς νῦν, κιβδύλου καὶ φαυλοτάτης ὑπάρχοντας ὕλγης, μηδὲν φονεύειν 5 ἔμψυχον. ὃ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς παριστάντας χρυσοῦν μὲν ἐπονομάζειν γένος

«ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα», λέγειν,

«τοῖσιν ἔην· καρπὸν δ' ἔφερεν ζεῖδαρος ἄρουρα

αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἀφθονον. οἱ δ' ἐθελήμοι

ἥσυχαι ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο σὺν ἐσθλοῖσιν πολέεσσιν»¹.

10

ἃ δὲ καὶ ἐξηγούμενος ὁ Δικαίαρχος τὸν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίον τοιοῦτον εἶναι φησίν.

Political
writings

696—Cicero mentions D. with the greatest respect among writers on political subjects.

a. Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 67 W.):

Nam veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum popularem atque civilem de re publica disserebant. ab hac familia magis ista manarunt Platone principe, post Aristoteles illustravit omnem hunc civilem in disputando locum; Heraclidesque Ponticus profectus ab eodem Platone; Theophrastus vero, institutus ab Aristotele, habitavit ut scitis 5 in eo genere rerum, ab eodemque Aristotele doctus Dicaearchus huic rationi studioque non defuit.

b. Cf. *Ep. ad Att.* II 2 (fr. 69 W.):

Πελληναίων² in manibus tenebam et hercule magnum acervum Dicaearchi mihi ante pedes exstruxeram. o magnum hominem, et unde multo plura didiceris quam de Proclio³. Κορινθίων et Ἀθηναίων puto me Romae habere. mihi credas, lege te hac docco, mirabilis vir est.

¹ Hesiodus, *Erga* 116 ff.

² Whether this Πελληναίων πολιτεία was a work of D. or not, is uncertain. I. may have belonged to Aristotle's collection of 158 πολιτεῖαι.

³ Proclius is unknown to us.

Ἡρώδης¹, si homo esset, eum potius legeret quam unam litteram scriberet.

697—D. seems to have considered a mixed constitution to be the best. **The best constitution**

Photius, *Bibl.* 37 (fr. 71 W.):

“Ὡς δ’ αὐτοὶ πολιτείας εἰσάγουσιν (sc. post-Platonic writers among whom D. is mentioned) ἐκ τῶν τριῶν εἰδῶν τῆς πολιτείας δέον αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαι φασι, βασιλικῶ καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῶ καὶ δημοκρατικῶ, τὸ εἰλικρινές αὐτῇ ἐκάστης πολιτείας συνεισαγωγῆς, κάκεινῃ τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀποτελοῦσης.

As it appears from a quotation in Athen. IV 141 a ff. (fr. 72 W.), the work in which D. expounded this theory was entitled *Τριπολιτικός*.

698—a. Like Aristotle and Eudoxus of Cnidus, D. taught the spherical **Form of the earth**

Martian. Capella VI 590 f. (fr. 108 W.):

Formam totius terrae non planam, ut aestimant positioni qui eam disci diffusioris assimilant, neque concavam, ut alii qui descendere imbrem dixere telluris in gremium, sed rotundam, globosam etiam [sicut Secundus] Dicaearchus asseverat. namque ortus obitusque siderum non 5 diversus pro terrae elevatione vel inclinationibus haberetur, si per plana diffusis mundanae constitutionis operibus uno eodemque tempore supra terras et aequora nituissent, aut item si emersi solis exortus concavis subductionis terrae latebris abderetur.

Cp. Ar., *De caelo* II 297 a⁸ ff., and Eudoxi *Ars astronomica* ed. Blass 1887, p. XI, XVIII-XX.

b. On D.’s calculation of the circumference of the earth, see Wehrli, *Dikaiarchos*, p. 77 ff.

3—ARISTOXENUS

699—Suidas s.v. Ἀριστόξενος (f. 1 W.):

Life

Υἱὸς Μνησίου, τοῦ καὶ Σπινθάρου, μουσικοῦ, ἀπὸ Τάραντος τῆς Ἰταλίας. διατρίψας δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ φιλόσοφος γέγονε καὶ μουσικῇ ἐπιθέμενος οὐκ ἡστόχησεν, ἀκουστὴς τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ Λάμπρου τοῦ Ἐρυθραίου, εἴτα Ξενοφίλου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου καὶ τέλος Ἀριστοτέλους. εἰς ὃν ἀποθανόντα 6 ὕβρισε, διότι κατέλιπε τῆς σχολῆς διάδοχον Θεόφραστον, αὐτοῦ δόξαν μεγάλην

¹ Atticus had an administrator of this name. Probably this person is meant here.

ἐν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ἔχοντος. γέγονε δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ τῶν μετέπειτα χρόνων, ὡς εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ριᾶ Ὀλυμπιάδος¹, σύγχρονος Δικαιάρχῳ τῷ Μεσσηνίῳ. συνετάξατο δὲ μουσικά τε καὶ φιλόσοφα, καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ παντὸς εἵδους παιδείας. καὶ ἀριθμοῦνται αὐτοῦ τὰ βιβλία εἰς υνγ'.

His life of
Pythag.

700—a. He wrote a *life of Pythagoras*, traces of which can be found in several later works (Wehrli, fr. 11-25).

In his work on the *Pythagorean bios* he explains the ancient taboos in a rationalistic sense. Cp. our nr. **24b, d**.

Life of Archytas and of Socrates

b. He also wrote a *life of Archytas* (Wehrli, fr. 47-50) and another *of Socrates* (W., fr. 51-60), in which he opposes the hot temper and profligacy of the latter to Archytas' self-command.

c. Cyrillus, *Contra Julianum* VI 185 (fr. 54 a, W.) quotes Aristoxenus' *Life of Socr.* as follows:

Λέγει δὲ ὁ Ἀριστόξενος, ἀφηγούμενος τὸν βίον τοῦ Σωκράτους, ἀκηχοένα Σπινθάρου τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἦν εἰς τῶν τούτῳ ἐντυχόντων. τοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκώς εἴη, τοιαύτην εἶναι τὴν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἥθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἵδους ιδιότητα. γίνεσθαι δὲ που τοῦτο, ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζοιτο, ὅτε δὲ φλεχθεῖη ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τούτου, δεινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην. οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀποσχέσθαι οὔτε πράγματος.

d. Ib., 186 (W., same fr.):

Γέγραφε γὰρ ὡδὶ πάλιν περὶ αὐτοῦ Πορφύριος: »ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εὐκολον, καὶ μικρὰς δεόμενον παρασκευῆς εἰς τὰ καλ' ἡμέραν γεγενῆσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν σφοδρότερον μὲν εἶναι, ἀδικίαν δὲ μὴ προσεῖναι. ἥ γὰρ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἢ ταῖς κοιναῖς χρῆσθαι μόναις. δύο δὲ σχεῖν γυναῖκας ἅμα, Ξανθίππην μὲν πολῖτιν καὶ κοινοτέραν πως, Μυρτῶ δὲ ὅτι Ἀριστείδου θυγατρίδην τοῦ Λυσιμάχου. καὶ τὴν μὲν Ξανθίππην περιπλακεῖσαν λαβεῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἑαυτῷ Λαμπροκλῆς ἐγένετο. τὴν δὲ Μυρτῶ γάμῳ, ἐξ ἧς Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Μενέξενος«.

The same is told by Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* XII 174, who used the same source.

Cp. Plut., *Aristides* c. 27: Δημήτριος δ' ὁ Φαληρεὺς καὶ Ἰερώνυμος ὁ Ῥόδιος καὶ Ἀριστόξενος ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης . . . ἱστοροῦσι Μυρτῶ θυγατρίδην Ἀριστείδου Σωκράτει τῷ σοφῷ συνοικῆσαι, γυναῖκα μὲν ἑτέραν ἔχοντι, ταύτην δ' ἀναλαβόντι χηρεύουσαν διὰ πέναν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεομένην.

701—Plut., *De Herodoti malign.* 9, 856 c, qualifies this kind of gossip as a species of the genus κακοήθεια. Fr. 55 W.:

¹ 336-333 B.C.

Ἐγγύς δὲ τούτων εἰσὶν οἱ τοῖς ψόγοις ἐπαίνους τινὰς παρατιθέντες, ὡς ἐπὶ Σωκράτους Ἀριστόξενος, ἀπαίδευτον καὶ ἀμαθῆ καὶ ἀκόλαστον εἰπών, ἐπήνεγκεν ἡδὲ καὶ δ' οὐ προσῆν¹. "Ὡσπερ γὰρ οἱ σύν τινι τέχνῃ καὶ δεινότητι κολακεύοντες ἔστιν ὅτε πολλοῖς καὶ μακροῖς ἐπαίνους ψόγους παραμιγνύουσιν 5 ἑλαφροῦς, οἷον ἡδυσμα τῇ κολακείᾳ τὴν παρρησίαν ἐμβάλλοντες, οὕτω τὸ κακὸν εἰς πίστιν ὧν ψέγει προαποτίθεται τὸν ἔπαινον.

702—The measure of reliability of Aristoxenus as a biographer may **Life of Plato** appear from what he tells about Plato (fragments of his *Life of Plato*, W. 61-68).

a. Diog. L. III 8 (fr. 61 W.):

Καὶ αὐτόν (sc. Πλάτωνα) φησιν Ἀριστόξενος τρεῖς ἐστρατεῦσθαι, ἅπαξ μὲν εἰς Τάναγραν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς Κόρινθον, τρίτον ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ. ἔνθα καὶ ἀριστεῦσαι.

b. Lucianus, *De parasito* 34 (861). Fr. 62 W.:

Παράσιτος: . . . ὁ δὲ Πλάτων . . . ὀλίγας παρασιτήσας ἡμέρας τῷ τυράνῳ (sc. Διονυσίῳ) τοῦ παρασιτεῖν ὑπὸ ἀφύιας ἐξέπεσε, καὶ πάλιν Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος καὶ φιλοπονήσας καὶ παρασκευάσας ἑαυτὸν αὐθις δευτέρῳ στόλῳ ἐπέπλευσε τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ δειπνήσας πάλιν ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξέπεσε. καὶ αὕτη ἡ συμφορὰ Πλάτωνι περὶ Σικελίαν ὁμοία δοκεῖ γενέσθαι τῇ Νικίῳ.

c. Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praef. evang.* XV 2 (fr. 64 W.):

Τίς δ' ἂν πεισθεῖη τοῖς ὑπ' Ἀριστοξένου τοῦ μουσικοῦ λεγομένοις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; ἐν γὰρ τῇ πλάνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ φησὶν ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ ἀντοικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τινὰς Περίπατον ξένους ὄντας. οἷονταί οὖν ἔνιοι ταῦτα περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγειν αὐτόν, Ἀριστοξένου διὰ παντὸς εὐφημοῦντος Ἀριστοτέλην.

d. Diog. L. III 37 (fr. 67 W.):

Ἦν Πολιτεῖαν (sc. Πλάτωνος) Ἀριστόξενός φησιν πᾶσαν σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου γεγράφθαι Ἀντιλογικοῖς.

703—His doctrine of the soul is cited on a level with that of Dicaearchus **Soul** (our nr. 690b).

a. Cicero describes Aristoxenus' doctrine of the soul in *Tusc.* I 10, 19 (fr. 120 a W.):

Aristoxenus musicus idemque philosophus ipsius corporis intentionem quandam animam esse dixit, velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos.

¹ Wehrli cites the text up till here.

b. Cp. Lactantius, *Inst.* VII 13 (fr. 120 c, W.):

Quid Aristoxenus, qui negavit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum vivit in corpore? sed sicut in fidibus ex intentione nervorum effici concordem sonum atque cantum, quem musici harmoniam vocant, ita in corporibus ex compage viscerum ac vigore membrorum vim sentiendi existere. Quo nihil dici delirius potest.

Musicology 704—In musicology, Aristox. was among the greatest authorities in Antiquity.

a. Cic., *De oratore* III 33, 132 (fr. 69a, W.):

An tu existimas, cum esset Hippocrates ille Cous, fuisse tum alios medicos qui morbis, alios qui vulneribus, alios qui oculis mederentur? num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, num musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus universum complecteretur atque 5 ut alius aliam sibi partem, in qua elaboraret, seponeret?

b. Cic., *De fin.* V 18, 49 (fr. 69 b, W.):

Duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede etc. . . ., quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis?

c. Alex. Aphr., in Ar. *Top.* 105 a³⁴ (fr. 69 c, W.):

Θείη γάρ ἂν τις ὡς ἔνδοξον τὸ ὑπὸ Ἰπποκράτους λεγόμενον ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀρχιμήδους ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀριστοξένου ἐν μουσικῇ.

4—DEMETRIUS OF PHALERON

Life 705—a. Suidas Δ 429 (fr. 3 W.):

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεὺς (Φάληρον δὲ λιμὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς), ὃς τὸ πρῶτον Φανὸς ἐκαλεῖτο. φιλόσοφος Περιπατητικὸς· γέγραφε φιλόσοφά τε καὶ ἱστορικά καὶ ῥητορικά καὶ πολιτικά καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν (fr. 75), ἤκροάσατο δὲ Θεοφράστου καὶ δημαγωγὸς Ἀθήνῃσι γέγονε. συνέγραψε δὲ συχνὰ βιβλία.

b. Diog. L. V 75:

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεὺς. οὗτος ἤκουσε μὲν Θεοφράστου· δημηγορῶν δὲ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις τῆς πόλεως ἐξηγήσατο ἔτη δέκα, καὶ εἰκόνων ἡξιώθη χαλκῶν ἐξήκοντα πρὸς ταῖς τριακοσίαις, ὧν αἱ πλείους ἐφ' ἑπταν

ἦσαν καὶ ἄρμάτων καὶ συνωρίδων, συντελεσθεῖσαι ἐν οὐδὲ τριακοσίαις ἡμέραις· 5 τοσοῦτον ἐσπουδάσθη. ἄρξασθαι δ' αὐτὸν τῆς πολιτείας φησὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Μάγνης ἐν τοῖς Ὀμωνύμοις, ὅποτε φυγὼν Ἀλέξανδρον εἰς Ἀθήνας ἦκεν "Αρπαλος. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα τῇ πατρίδι ἐπολιτεύσατο. καὶ γὰρ προσόδοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς ἠϋξήσε τὴν πόλιν, καίπερ οὐκ εὐγενὲς ὢν.

c. Diodorus XVIII 74, 2 (fr. 13 W., at the end):

Οὗτος δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς πόλεως ἤρχεν εἰρηνικῶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας φιλανθρώπως.

706—D. was made absolute governor at Athens by Cassander in 318/7, and expelled ten years later by Demetrius Poliorcetes.

**Governor
of Athens**

a. Pausanias I 25, 6 (fr. 14 W.):

Κάσσανδρος δὲ βασιλεύσας . . . Πάνακτον τεῖχος ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ καὶ Σαλαμῖνα εἶλε τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίους ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον τὸν Φανοστράτου [τὰ πρὸς] δόξαν εἰληφότα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. τοῦτον μὲν δὴ τυραννίδος ἔπαυσε Δημήτριος ὁ Ἀντιγόνου.

b. Syncellus 274 d, p. 521, ¹³ Dind. (fr. 17 W.):

Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐγνωρίζετο τρίτος νομοθέτης Ἀθήνησι, οὗτος Ἀθηναίοις ἀποδοὺς τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἦλθεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον.

Law-giver

c. Cic., *De leg.* II 25, 63 (fr. 135 W.) tells us something about D.' measures of legislation.

**Limitation
of funeral
pomp**

Posteaquam, ut scribit Phalereus, sumptuosa fieri funera et lamentabilia coepissent, Solonis lege sublata sunt. quam legem eisdem prope verbis nostri decemviri in decimam tabulam coniecerunt. —

Sed ait rursus idem Demetrius increbuisse eam funerum sepulcrorum- 5 que magnificentiam, quae nunc fere Romae est; quam consuetudinem lege minuit ipse, fuit enim hic vir ut scitis non solum eruditissimus, sed etiam civis e re publica maxime tuendaeque civitatis peritissimus. is igitur sumptum minuit non solum poena sed etiam tempore, ante lucem enim iussit efferri. sepulcris autem novis finivit modum, nam super 10 terrae tumulum noluit quod statui nisi columellam tribus cubitis ne altiore aut mensam aut labellum, et huic procurationi certum magistratum praefecerat.

Wilamowitz, *Ar. und Athen*, I p. 363, speaks of "die segensreiche Verwaltung des Demetrios" and states: "So über Athen zu herrschen hat D. bei Aristoteles gelernt: er ist der νομοθετικὸς ἀνὴρ, den die Politik erzogen hat. Gerade an Athen hat sie ihre praktische Probe bestanden".

Honoured by the people **707**—The people of Athens showed their gratitude by honouring D. exceedingly.

a. Nepos, *Milt.* 6 (fr. 21 W.):

Idem ille populus, posteaquam maius imperium est nactus et largitione magistratum corruptus est, trecentas statuas Demetrio Phalereo decrevit.

b. Cf. Plin., *N.H.* XXXIV 12, 27 (fr. 22 W.):

Nullique arbitror pluris statuas dicatas quam Phalereo Demetrio Athenis, siquidem CCCLX statuere, nondum anno hunc numerum dierum excedente, quas mox laceravere.

Cp. also Diog. Laert. V 75, sub **705b**, supra.

Later in disgrace **708**—His life was a good example of those sudden changes of Fate which happened not unfrequently in those days.

a. Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* c. 27, p. 820 c (fr. 54 W.):

Τῶν δὲ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως τριακοσίων ἀνδριάντων οὐδεὶς ἔσχεν ἰὸν οὐδὲ πίνον, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἔτι ζῶντος προανηρέθησαν.

His own reaction

b. Diog. Laert. V 82 (fr. 122 W.):

Οὗτος ἀκούσας ὅτι τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ κατέστρεψαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἔφη, δι' ἣν ἐκείνας ἀνέστησαν.

He meets Krates in Thebes

709—Plut., *De adulate et amico* c. 28, p. 69 c (fr. 59 W.):

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ὅτε τῆς πατρίδος ἐξέπεσε καὶ περὶ Θήβας ἀδοξῶν καὶ ταπεινὰ πράττων διῆγεν, οὐχ ἡδέως ἰδεῖν προσιόντα Κράτητα, παρρησίαν κυνικὴν καὶ λόγους τραχεῖς προσδεχόμενος. ἐντυχόντος δὲ πρῶως αὐτῷ τοῦ Κράτητος καὶ διαλεχθέντος περὶ φυγῆς ὡς οὐδὲν ἔχοι κακὸν οὐδ' ἄξιον φέρειν βαρέως πραγμάτων σφαλερῶν καὶ ἀβεβαίων ἀπηλλαγμένον, ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει παρακαλοῦντος, ἡδίων γενόμενος καὶ ἀναθαρρήσας πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶπε: φεῦ τῶν πράξεων ἐκείνων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν δι' ἃς ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔγνωμεν.

D. in Alexandria

710—a. Cic., *De fin.* V 19, 53 (fr. 62 W.):

Itaque multi, cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esse iniuria, ad Ptolemaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia ad quam te hortamur excelleret Theophrastique esset 5

auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus.

b. Aristee ad Philocr. epist. 9 (fr. 66 W.):

**Librarian of
Ptol. I**

Κατασταθείς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως βιβλιοθήκης Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐχρηματίσθη πολλὰ διάφορα πρὸς τὸ συναγαγεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην βιβλία, καὶ ποιούμενος ἀγορασμοὺς καὶ μεταγραφὰς ἐπὶ τέλος ἤγαγεν, ὅσον ἐφ' ἐαυτῷ, τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως πρόθεσιν. παρόντων οὖν ἡμῶν
5 ἔρωτηθείς, πόσαι τινὲς μυριάδες τυγχάνουσι βιβλίων, εἶπεν: ὑπὲρ τὰς εἴκοσι, βασιλεῦ· σπουδάσω δ' ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς τὸ πληρωθῆναι πεντήκοντα μυριάδας τὰ λοιπά. προσήγγελται δέ μοι καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων νόμιμα μετα-
γραφῆς ἄξια καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ βιβλιοθήκης εἶναι. τί τὸ κωλύον οὖν, εἶπεν,
10 ἐστὶ σε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι; πάντα γὰρ ὑποτέτακται σοι τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν. ὁ δὲ Δημήτριος εἶπεν: ἐρμηνείας προσδεῖται, χαρακτῆρσι γὰρ ἰδίοις κατὰ τὴν Ἰουδαίων χρῶνται . . . μεταλαβὼν δὲ ἕκαστα ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶπε γραφῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Ἰουδαίων, ὅπως τὰ προειρημένα τελείωσιν λάβῃ.

Josephus, *Adv. Apionem* II 45 tells that Ptol. Philadelphus sent Demetrius with two other persons to translate the Jewish Law. This story is probably invented by Jewish authors.

Further testimonies in Wendland's ed. of Aristee's Epist., 1900, p. 90 ff.

711—a. Cicero mentions him as one of the very rare persons who excelled both in philosophy and in politics.

**Cicero's
judgment
on D.**

Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 72 W.):

Post a Theophrasto (sc. doctus) Phalereus ille Demetrius, de quo feci supra mentionem, mirabiliter doctrinam ex umbraculis eruditorum[que] otioque non modo in solem atque in pulverem, sed in ipsum discrimen aciemque produxit: nam et mediocriter doctos magnos in re publica
5 viros et doctissimos homines non nimis in re publica versatos multos commemorare possumus; qui vero utraque re excelleret, ut et doctrinae studiis et regenda civitate princeps esset, quis facile praeter hunc inveniri potest?

b. Again, he praises his double ability, both in forensic eloquence and in philosophical disputation.

Cic., *De off.* I 1, 3 (fr. 73 W.):

Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero

haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere.

In his *Brutus* 9, 37, Cicero speaks of the rhetoric style of Demetrius. "Hic primus inflexit orationem et eam mollem teneramque reddidit, et suavis sicut fuit videri maluit quam gravis" (fr. 175 W.).

His works 712—Diog. Laert. V 80 (fr. 74 W., first part):

Πλήθει δὲ βιβλίων καὶ ἀριθμῷ στίχων σχεδὸν ἅπαντας παρελήλακε τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν Περιπατητικούς, εὐπαίδευτος ὢν καὶ πολύπειρος παρ' ὄντινόν. ὢν ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ἱστορικά τὰ δὲ πολιτικά τὰ δὲ περὶ ποιητῶν τὰ δὲ ῥητορικά, δημηγοριῶν τε καὶ πρεσβειῶν ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ λόγων Αἰσωπειῶν συναγωγαὶ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω.

A fragm. of the 713—The following passage from his *Περὶ τύχης* is cited by Plutarch in his *Consolatio ad Apoll.* c. 6, p. 104 a (fr. 79 W.):

"Ὅθεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος εἰπόντος Εὐριπίδου
ὁ δ' ἄλβος οὐ βέβαιος ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος
καὶ ὅτι

μικρὰ τὰ σφάλλοντα, καὶ μί' ἡμέρα
τὰ μὲν καθεῖλεν ὑψόθεν τὰ δ' ἦρ' ἄνω 5
τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καλῶς ἔφη λέγειν αὐτόν, βέλτιον δ' ἂν ἔχειν εἰ μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν
ἀλλὰ στιγμὴν εἶπε χρόνου.

5—STRATO OF LAMPSACUS

Successor of 714—Successor of Theophr. as the head of the Peripatetic School.

Diog. Laert. V 58 (fr. 1 W.):

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτοῦ (sc. Θεοφράστου) τὴν σχολὴν Στράτων Ἀρχεσιλάου Λαμψακηνός, οὗ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις ἐμνημόνευσεν· ἀνὴρ ἐλλογιμώτατος καὶ φυσικὸς ἐπικληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην παρ' ὄντινόν ἐπιμελέστατα διατετριφέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ καθηγήσατο Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου καὶ ἔλαβε, φασί, παρ' αὐτοῦ τάλαντα ὀγδοήκοντα. σχολαρχεῖν δέ, καθά φησιν 5
'Απολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, ἤρξατο τῇ τρίτῃ καὶ εἰκοστῇ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ
'Ολυμπιάδι¹, τῆς σχολῆς ἀφηγησάμενος ἔτη ὀκτωκαίδεκα.

715—His succession changed the character of the School.

a. Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 13 (fr. 12 W.):

Simus igitur contenti his (sc. Aristotele, Theophrasto), namque horum posterī meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi

¹ 288-285 B.C.

disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur.
 primum Theophrasti Strato physicum se voluit, in quo etsi est magnus,
 5 tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus; huius Lyco oratione
 locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior.

In this book and in the *Ac. Post.* from which the next quotation is taken, Cicero follows Antiochus of Ascalon, who finds an essential agreement between the Stoa, the Academy and the early Peripatetic School, namely Aristotle and Theophr., excluding Strato and his successors.

b. Cic., *Acad. post.* I 9, 33 (fr. 13 W.):

Theophrastus autem . . . vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae, spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore inbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea
 5 disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis.

716—Diog. Laert. V 59-60 mentions several works of Str. on logic. Simplicius, in his Commentary on the *Categories*, mentions a monography Π. τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου (sub a), from which he cites an important fragment later in the same work (sub b).

Works
on logic

a. Simpl. in Ar. *Categ.*, p. 148, ²⁴ Kalbfleisch (fr. 29 W.):

Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιεῖται (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης), οὐ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους παραδιδούς — καὶ ἄλλους γοῦν οὐκ ὀλίγους προστίθῃσιν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ὁ Στράτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ, — ἀρκοῦντας δὲ πρὸς εἰσαγωγὴν καὶ τοὺς ἐκτεθέντας οἰόμενος.

The same is told in the Scholia in Ar., p. 87 a³⁷ Brandis (fr. 28 W.).

b. Simpl. in Ar. *Categ.*, p. 423, ¹ ff. Kalbfleisch (fr. 27 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ πολλοὺς ἀπηριθμησάτο τρόπους, οὓς νομίζω δυνατόν εἶναι ὑπὸ τοὺς πέντε τοὺς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένους ἀναγαγεῖν οἷον μερισμὸν ἐκείνων ὄντας. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ πρότερον ταχθήσεται τὸ ἀτελὲς τοῦ τελείου λεγόμενον,
 5 διότι ἔσχατον ἐν πᾶσι τὸ τέλος · τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν τάξιν. ἔτι δὲ ὑπ' ἄμφω ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ <τὸ> τῇ ἀξίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερόν ἐστιν, οὗ ἐπιστήμη πρότερον, οἷον μονάδος ἢ δυάδος καὶ πλήθους ἢ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῶν. πρῶτον δὲ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τῇ ἀξίᾳ, ὧν τὸ ἔργον πρότερον,

οἶον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς αἷτιον, πρῶτον 10
 δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀξίᾳ. πρῶτον δὲ τῇ φύσει ὡς μὴ
 ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, ὅπερ δυνατόν εἶναι θατέρου μὴ
 ὄντος, ὡς τόπος σώματος καὶ σῶμα χρώματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐν
 θατέρῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, οἶον ἡ οὐσία ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ κατὰ
 φύσιν πρότερον τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ὁ νόμος τῆς παρανομίας καὶ ἡ ἔξις τῆς 15
 στερήσεως. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ τῇ ἀξίᾳ πρότερον καὶ τὸ δυνάμει τάττοιο ἂν τὰ τῷ
 τιμιωτέρῳ συγγενέστερα, ὡς τὸ ποσὸν τοῦ ποιοῦ προτάττοιο ἂν, διότι τὸ μὲν
 ποσὸν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν οὐ. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν μετέχει γενέσεως καὶ
 φθορᾶς, ὡς ὁ χρόνος, τὸ δὲ οὐ, ὡς ὁ τόπος, καὶ τὸ μὲν χωριστόν, τὸ δὲ οὐ·
 ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδύνατον, ἄνευ δὲ ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι 20
 δυνατόν. καὶ τὸ ἀμερὲς τοῦ μεριστοῦ· ἀρχῇ γὰρ ὁμοιότερον, ὥστε καὶ κύκλου
 τὸ κέντρον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ προτέρου μετέχον, ὡς τὸ αἰδίων μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ,
 τὸ φθαρτὸν δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον δυάδος, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν τριάδος. καὶ εἰ
 τὸ μὲν μένει χρόνον τινά, τὸ δὲ οὐ μένει, οἶον σῶμα κινήσεως καὶ χρόνου. ὑπὸ
 δὲ τὸ τῇ τάξει πρότερον εἶη ἂν τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ 25
 ὕστερον. ὑπὸ δὲ <τὸ ἐν> τοῖς ἀντιστρέφουσιν ὡς αἰτιῶδες πρότερον ἂν εἶη τὸ
 στοιχεῖον· καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ὡς τὸ πεπερασμένον τοῦ ἀπείρου,
 καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐκ θατέρου, οἶον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος· ὕλικὸν γὰρ καὶ
 οὗτος αἷτιον. ὅτι δὲ καὶ <τὸ> αὐτὸ κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον
 εἶναι δυνατόν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Στράτων ἐνεδείξατο, τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον 30
 πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα ἀλλήλων δεικνύς.

**Explanation
 of the
 universe**

717—He explains the universe by purely natural causes.

a. Cic., *Ac. pr. (Lucullus)* 38, 121 (fr. 32 W.):

Negas sine deo posse quicquam: ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem muneris. sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est acquius habere ipsos deos: negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis et levibus 5 et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interiecto inani: somnia censet haec esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis, ipse autem singulas mundi partes persequens quicquid aut sit aut fiat naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.

10

b. Lactantius, *De ira Dei* X 1 (fr. 34 W.):

Qui nolunt divina providentia factum esse mundum, aut principiiis inter se temere coeuntibus dicunt esse concretum aut repente natura

exstitisse; naturam vero, ut ait Strato, habere in se vim gignendi et minuendi, sed eam nec sensum habere ullum nec figuram, ut intelligamus 5 omnia quasi sua sponte esse generata, nullo artifice nec auctore.

c. Cf. Plut. *Adv. Coloten* c. 14, p. 1115 b (fr. 35 W.):

Καὶ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν ὁ κορυφαϊότατος Στράτων οὐτ' Ἀριστοτέλει κατὰ πολλὰ συμφέρεται καὶ Πλάτωνι τὰς ἐναντίας ἔσχηκε δόξας περὶ κινήσεως περὶ νοῦ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ γενέσεως· καὶ τελευτῶν τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῶον εἶναι φησι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην· ἀρχὴν 5 γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἴθ' οὕτω περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον.

Strato abandons not only the Platonic and Stoic explanation of the universe, but also the Aristotelian principle of teleology.

718—**a.** By his theory of weight Str. comes near to Epicurus. Simpl. in Ar. *De caelo*, p. 267, ²⁹ Heiberg (fr. 52 W.):

Atomic theory

“Οτι δὲ οὐδὲ τῇ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐκθλίψει βιαζόμενα κινεῖται (sc. τὰ στοιχεῖα), δείκνυσιν ἐφεξῆς (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης). ταύτης δὲ γεγόνاسι τῆς δόξης μετ' αὐτὸν Στράτων τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶν σῶμα βαρύτητα ἔχειν νομίζοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰ βαρύτερα ὑφίζανειν τὰ ἥττον βαρέα ὑπ' 5 ἐκείνων ἐκθλίβεσθαι βίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ὥστε, εἴ τις ὑφεῖλε τὴν γῆν, ἐλθεῖν ἂν τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κέντρον, καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ εἴ τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ πῦρ.

b. He differs from Epicurus in his theory of first principles.

Sextus, *Pyrrh.* III 33 (fr. 43 W.):

Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας (sc. ἀρχὰς εἶναι εἶπεν).

Cf. Aëtius I 3, 24 (Dox., p. 288): Στράτων στοιχεῖα <θερμὸν> καὶ ψυχρόν.

719—His theory of the void.

The void

a. Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 14 (fr. 54 W.):

‘Ο δὲ Στράτων ἔμπαλιν ἔξωθεν μὲν (sc. τοῦ παντός) μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἔνδοθεν δὲ δυνατόν εἶναι.

The meaning of the above statement may appear from the following passages of Simplicius.

b. Simpl., *Corollarium de loco*, in Ar. *Phys.* p. 618, ²⁰ Diels (fr. 60 W.):

Οἱ δὲ ἰσόμετρον αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ κενόν) τῷ κοσμικῷ σώματι ποιοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῇ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ φύσει κενὸν εἶναι λέγουσι, πεπληρωῶσθαι δὲ αὐτὸ σωμαμάτων ἀεί, καὶ μόνῃ γε τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖσθαι ὡς καθ' αὐτὸ ὑφεστώς, οἷοί τινες οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν φιλοσόφων γεγόνاسι, καὶ Στράτωνα δὲ οἶμαι τὸν Λαμψακηνὸν ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς δόξης.

c. Simpl., *Phys.* 693, ¹⁰ Diels (fr. 65 a, W.):

— 'Ο μέντοι Λαμψακηνός Στράτων δεικνύναι πειρᾶται, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ κενὸν διαλαμβάνον τὸ πᾶν σῶμα, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι συνεχές, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἂν δι' ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλου σώματος ἐδύνατο διεκπίπτειν τὸ φῶς οὐδὲ ἡ θερμότης οὐδὲ ἄλλη δύναμις οὐδεμία σωματική. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αἱ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀκτῖνες διεξέπιπτον εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου ἕδαφος; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν μὴ εἶχε πόρους, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ διέστελλον 5 αὐτὸ αἱ αὐγαί, συνέβαινε ὑπερεκχεῖσθαι τὰ πλήρη τῶν ἀγγείων, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀκτίνων ἀνεκλῶντο πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον, αἱ δὲ κάτω διεξέπιπτον.

The same argument for the existence of a void is used by Hero in his *Pneumatica* (fr. 65 b, W.).

d. Cp. the following passage in Hero:

Pneum. I p. 26, ¹³ Schmidt (fr. 66 W.):

'Ἐτι δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ φανερόν ὡς ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὑπάρχει κενά, τῷ τὸν ἐμβαλλόμενον οἶνον εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ ὁρᾶσθαι κατὰ χύσιν εἰς πάντα τρόπον τοῦ ὕδατος χωροῦντα. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐγένετο μὴ ὄντων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι κενῶν. φέρεται δὲ καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἕτερον διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου· ὅταν γὰρ τις πλείους ἄψῃ λύχνους ἅπαντα φωτίζεται μᾶλλον, τῶν αὐγῶν πάντῃ φερομένων δι' ἀλλήλων. [ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διὰ χαλκοῦ 5 καὶ σιδήρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων διεκπίπτει σωμαμάτων, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς νάρκης τῆς θαλασσίας γινόμενον.]

Motion 720—Straton's definition of motion.

Simpl., *Phys.* 711, ⁹ Diels (fr. 70 W.):

'Ο δὲ Λαμψακηνός Στράτων οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους μόνον συνεχῇ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναί φησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτήν, ὡς εἰ διακοπεῖη, στάσει διαλαμβανόμενῃ, καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ δύο στάσεων κίνησιν οὔσαν ἀδιάκοπον. καὶ ποσὸν δέ τι, φησίν, ἡ κίνησις καὶ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά.

Time 721—a. Time differs from number.

Simpl., *Phys.* 788, ³⁶ Diels (fr. 75 W.):

'Ο μέντοι Λαμψακηνός Στράτων αἰτιασάμενος τὸν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἐταίρων ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ χρόνου ὀρισμὸν αὐτὸς καίτοι Θεοφράστου μαθητῆς ὢν τοῦ πάντα σχεδὸν ἀκολουθήσαντος τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει καινότεραν ἐβάδισεν ὁδόν. ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ κινήσεως εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οὐκ ἀποδέχεται, διότι ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς διωρισμένον ποσόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος 5 συνεχής, τὸ δὲ συνεχές οὐκ ἀριθμητόν. εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μέρος τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, κατὰ τοῦτο ἔστι τις τῆς κινήσεως ἀριθμός, οὕτω γε ἂν καὶ τὸ μῆκος ἀριθμητὸν εἴη (καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ποσὸν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἐστί) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ συνέχειαν γινομένων

10 καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ χρόνου εἴη ἂν χρόνου χρόνος·
 ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ φθείρηται, ὁ
 δὲ χρόνος καὶ γίνεται καὶ φθίρεται συνεχῶς. καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον
 εἶναι πάντα τὰ μέρη (μὴ γὰρ οὐσῶν τῶν τριῶν μονάδων οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τριάς εἴη),
 τοῦ δὲ χρόνου ἀδύνατον. ἔσται γὰρ ὁ πρότερος χρόνος καὶ ὁ ὕστερος ἅμα.
 15 ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται μονὰς καὶ νῦν, εἴπερ ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς. ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ἐκ
 τῶν νῦν σύνθετος, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἐκ μονάδων.

Cp. Ar.'s definition of time in *Phys.* IV, 219 b¹⁻² (our nr. 510a).

b. Again, he criticizes Ar.'s definition by remarking that time is no more the measure of motion than of rest.

Simpl., ib. 789, ¹⁵ D. (fr. 77 W.):

Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀπορεῖ (sc. Στράτων): τί μᾶλλον ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς τοῦ
 ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἢ τοῦ ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ; καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ ὁμοίως ἔστι
 τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

A fact which, for the rest, did not remain unobserved by Ar. Cp. *Phys.* IV 221 b⁷, where he says: 'Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἡρεμίας μέτρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἡρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ.

c. Time is the quantitative element in actions.

Simpl., ib. 789, ³³ D. (fr. 76 W.):

Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ ἀντειπὼν πρὸς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπόδοσιν ὁ Στράτων
 αὐτὸς τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ποσὸν εἶναι τίθεται: πολλὸν γὰρ, φησί,
 χρόνον φαμέν ἀποδημεῖν καὶ πλεῖν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὀλίγον
 χρόνον, ὁμοίως δὲ καθῆσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν καὶ μηδὲν πράττειν καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον
 5 φαμέν καὶ ὀλίγον. ὦν μὲν ἔστι τὸ ποσὸν πολὺ, πολλὸν χρόνον, ὦν δὲ ὀλίγον,
 ὀλίγον. χρόνος γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἐκάστοις τούτων ποσόν. διὸ καὶ φασιν οἱ μὲν βραδέως
 ἤκειν οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὸν αὐτόν, ὥς ἂν ἐκάστοις φαίνεται τὸ ἐν τούτοις ποσόν.
 ταχὺ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι φαμεν, ἐν ᾧ τὸ μὲν ποσὸν ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃ ἐπαύσατο
 ὀλίγον, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ· τὸ βραδύ δὲ τούναντίον, ὅταν ᾗ τὸ μὲν
 10 ποσὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ πεπραγμένον ὀλίγον. διὸ, φησὶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ
 τὸ ταχὺ καὶ τὸ βραδύ· πᾶσα γὰρ ἴση ἔστι τῷ ἑαυτῆς ποσῷ καὶ οὔτε ἐν ὀλίγῳ
 τῷ ποσῷ πολλή οὔτε ἐν πολλῷ βραχεῖα. διὰ τοῦτο δέ, φησί, καὶ πλείω μὲν
 εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνον λέγομεν, θάττω δὲ καὶ βραδύτερον χρόνον οὐ λέγομεν.
 15 πρᾶξις μὲν γὰρ καὶ κινήσις ἔστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τὸ ἐν ᾧ
 ἢ πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔστι θάττων καὶ βραδύτερον, ἀλλὰ πλεον καὶ ἔλαττον ὥσπερ
 καὶ χρόνος. ἡμέρα δὲ καὶ νύξ, φησί, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος οὐδὲ
 χρόνου μέρη, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁ φωτισμὸς καὶ ἡ σκίασις, τὰ δὲ ἡ τῆς σελήνης καὶ
 τοῦ ἡλίου περίοδος, ἀλλὰ χρόνος ἔστι τὸ ποσὸν ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα.

Definition

d. Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. phys.* II) 177 (fr. 79a W.):

Διόπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς ἀποστὰς τῆσδε τῆς ἐννοίας ἔλεγε χρόνον ὑπάρχειν μέτρον πάσης κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς.

Unity of the soul

722—a. He rejects Ar.'s doctrine of the *noûs*.

Tertullianus, *De anima* 14 (fr. 108 W.):

Specta portentosissimam Archimedis munificentiam, organum hydraulicum dico, tot membra, tot partes, tot compagines, tot itinera vocum, tot compendia sonorum, tot commercia modorum, tot acies tibiarum, et una moles erunt omnia. sic et spiritus, qui illic de tormento aquae anhelat, non ideo separabitur in partes, quia per partes administratur, 5 substantia quidem solidus, opera vero divisus. non longe hoc exemplum est a Stratone et Aenesidemo et Heraclito, nam et ipsi unitatem animae tuentur, quae in totum corpus diffusa et ubique ipsa, velut flatus in calamo per cavernas ita per sensuality variis modis emicet, non tam concisa quam dispensata.

10

Mind identified with the senses

b. Cp. Sextus, *Math.* VII (= *Adv. log.* I) 350 (fr. 109 W.):

Καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν διάνοιαν) τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινων ὁπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσιν, ἧς στάσεως ἤρξε Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνισίδημος.

Rejection of an a priori

723—He explains knowledge as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 965, ⁷ Diels (fr. 74 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ὁ Θεοφράστου γεγωνὸς ἀκουστῆς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις Περιπατητικοῖς ἀριθμούμενος τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖ κινεῖσθαι οὐ μόνον τὴν ἄλογον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν λογικὴν, κινήσεις λέγων εἶναι τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. λέγει οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ κινήσεως πρὸς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ τάδε· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῶν κινεῖται ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὄρων καὶ ἀκούων καὶ ὁσφραϊνόμενος· 5 ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἡ νόησις τῆς διανοίας καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ὄρασις τῆς ὀψεως. καὶ πρὸ τούτου δὲ τοῦ ῥήτου γέγραπεν· ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰσιν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν κινήσεων αἱ αὐταί, ἃς ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὐτὴν τε κινεῖται διανοουμένη καὶ ἃς ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐκινήθη πρότερον. δῆλον δὲ ἐστίν· ὅσα γὰρ μὴ πρότερον ἐώρακε, ταῦτα οὐ δύναται νοεῖν, οἷον τόπους ἢ λιμένας ἢ γραφὰς ἢ ἀνδριάντας ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἢ 10 τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων.

One central organ

724—His doctrine of one central organ.

a. Plut., *De libidine et aegritudine* c. 4, p. 697b (fr. 111 W.):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντα συλλήβδην ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ φέροντες ἀνέθεσαν, ὥσπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς οὐ μόνον τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς λύπας, οὐδὲ τοὺς

φόβους καὶ τοὺς φθόνους καὶ τὰς ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόνους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνους καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνίστασθαι φάμενος καὶ 5 τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα εἶναι, μὴ τὸν πόδα πονούντων ἡμῶν ὅταν προσκρούσωμεν, μηδὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὅταν κατὰξωμεν, μὴ τὸν δάκτυλον ὅταν ἐκτέμωμεν. ἀναίσθητα γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, πρὸς δὲ τῆς πληγῆς ὀξέως ἀναφερομένης τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀλγηδὸνα καλοῦμεν. ὥς δὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοῖς ὤσιν αὐτοῖς ἐνηχοῦσαν ἔξω δοκοῦμεν εἶναι, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν 10 διάστημα τῇ αἰσθήσει προσλογιζόμενοι, παραπλησίως τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος πόνον οὐχ' ὅπου τὴν αἴσθησιν εἴληφεν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ἐλκομένης ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφ' οὗ πέπονθε. διὸ καὶ προσκόψαντες αὐτίκα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγομεν, τῷ πληγέντι μορίῳ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀξέως ἀποδιδόντος, καὶ παρεγκόπτομεν ἔσθ' ὅτε τὸ πνεῦμα· καὶ τὰ μέρη δεσμοῖς 15 διαλαμβάνηται, <ταῖς> χερσὶ σφόδρα πιέζομεν, ἰστάμενοι πρὸς τὴν διάδοσιν τοῦ πάθους, καὶ τὴν πληγὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀναισθητοῖς θλίβοντες, ἵνα μὴ συνάψῃ πρὸς τὸ φρονοῦν ἀλγηδὼν γένηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Στράτων ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὥς εἰκὸς τοιοῦτοις.

b. Plut., *De sollertia anim.* 3, p. 961a (fr. 112 W.):

Καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων ὥς οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἴτ' αὖθις ἐπανῆλθεν 5 καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ διώκει τῶν προιεμένων ἕκαστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ἥ καὶ λέλεκται·
νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τᾶλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά¹).

ὥς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὄτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.

6—LYCO AND ARISTO OF CEOS

725—Strato was succeeded in the School by Lyco.

Strato
succeeded
by Lyco

a. Diog. Laërt. V 65:

Τοῦτον (sc. Στράτωνα) διεδέξατο Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς.

b. Ib. 68:

Ἀφηγήσατο δὲ τῆς σχολῆς ἔτη τέτταρα πρὸς τοῖς τετταράκοντα, Στράτωνος αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις καταλιπόντος κατὰ τὴν ἐβδόμην καὶ εἰκοστὴν καὶ ἑκατοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (270/268).

726—He is described by his contemporary Antigonus of Carystus as a man of the world, even of rather extravagant inclinations.

¹ Epicharmus, B 12 Diels VS.

His
character

a. Athenaeus, *Deipn.* XII 69, 547d-548b (fr. 7 W.):

Καὶ Λύκων δὲ ὁ περιπατητικός, ὥς φηοῖν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος ¹, κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπιδημήσας παιδείας ἕνεκα ταῖς Ἀθήναις περὶ συμβολικοῦ κώθωνος ² καὶ πόσον ἐκάστη τῶν ἐταιρουσῶν ἐπράττετο μίσθωμα ἀκριβῶς ἡπίστατο. Ὑστερον δὲ καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου προστάς ἐδείπνιζε τοὺς φίλους ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτελεία πολλῇ χρώμενος. Χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν παραλαμβανομένων εἰς αὐτὰ ⁵ ἀκροαμάτων καὶ ἀργυρωμάτων καὶ στρωμνῆς ἢ λοιπῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ ἢ τῶν δείπνων περιεργία καὶ ὁ τῶν τραπεζοποιῶν καὶ μαγείρων ὄχλος τοσοῦτος ἦν ὥστε πολλοὺς ὀρρωδεῖν καὶ βουλομένους προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν διατριβὴν ἀνακόπτεσθαι. — Οὐ γὰρ ἵνα συρρύνετες ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ἑως ὀρθρου γενομένης τραπέζης ἀπολαύσωσιν ἢ χάριν ἐξοινίας ἐποιήσαντο τὰς συνόδους ταύτας οἱ ¹⁰ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Σπεῦσιππον, ἀλλ' ἵνα φαίνωνται καὶ τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες καὶ μουσικῶς ἀλλήλοις συμπεριφερόμενοι, καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν ἀνέσεως καὶ φιλολογίας. Ἄ δὴ πάντα γέγονεν δεύτερα παρὰ τοῖς ὕστερον τῶν τε χλανιδῶν καὶ τῆς πολυτελείας τῆς εἰρημένης· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε τοὺς λοιποὺς ὑπεξαίρουμαι. Ὁ δὲ Λύκων ὑπ' ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τῆς πόλεως τόπῳ ἐν ¹⁵ τῇ Κόνωνος οἰκίᾳ εἶχεν εἰκοσίσκλινον οἶκον, ὅς ἦν ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς ὑποδοχάς. Ἦν δὲ ὁ Λύκων καὶ σφαιριστῆς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐπιδέξιος.

b. Cp. Diog. Laërt. V 67 (fr. 8 W.):

Ἦν δὲ καὶ καθαρώτατος τὴν στολήν, ὥς ἀνυπερβλήτῳ χρῆσθαι μαλακότητι ἱματίων, καθὰ φησιν Ἑρμιππος. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυμναστικώτατος ἐγένετο καὶ εὐέκτης τὸ σῶμα τὴν τε πᾶσαν σχέσιν ἀθλητικὴν ἐπιφαίνων, ὠτοθλαδίας ³ καὶ ἐμπινῆς ὢν, καθὰ φησιν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ παλαῖσαι λέγεται τὰ τ' ἐν τῇ πατρίδι Ἰλίου καὶ σφαιρίσαι.

Political
influence

727—a. He often gave political advice to the Athenians.

Diog. Laërt. V 66:

Πολλάκις τε πολλὰ συμβουλευσας Ἀθηναίοις τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφέλησεν.

Liberality

b. And showed liberality towards the Athenian state as well as to the sanctuary of Delphi. The last point appears from a decree of the Delphic amphiktyones who honoured him with a laurel wreath etc. for the sake of his great εὐνοία and φιλοτιμία towards the God and the sanctuary at Delphi (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*³, nr. 461); the first from a list of

¹ Cp. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 78 sqq.

² Symposia on common account.

³ A boxer with cauliflower ears.

those who ἐπέδωκαν εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου (*ib.* nr. 491).

Wehrli sees in this liberality a feature of the μεγαλόψυχος of Aristotle, an ideal which was certainly before Lyco's eyes. I think it would require a great deal of benevolence to see in L. a true representative of the μεγαλόψυχος. Certainly L. displayed a kind of μεγαλοπρέπεια; yet, as it seems, not without avoiding the extreme of χουνότης, as he was judged by his contemporaries. Whether his personality and behaviour offered a desirable antidote to the type of one-sided erudition represented by Strato, may seem to us rather problematical.

728—Lyco seems to have been more a rhetor than a philosopher. More a
rhetor than
a philosopher

a. Diog. Laert. praises him exclusively as a φραστικὸς ἀνὴρ and a philosopher for a certain paedagogical talent.

Diog. Laërt. V 65-66:

— Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς, φραστικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ παίδων ἀγωγὴν ἀκρῶς συντεταγμένος. ἔφασκε γὰρ δεῖν παρεξῆχθαι τοῖς παισὶ τὴν αἰδῶ καὶ φιλοτιμίαν ὥς τοῖς ἵπποις μύωπα καὶ χαλινόν. τὸ δ' ἐκφραστικὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ περιγεγωνὸς ἐν τῇ ἐρμηνείᾳ φαίνεται κἀνθένδε· φησὶ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον 5 ἐπὶ παρθένου πενιχρᾶς· »Βαρὺ γὰρ φορτίον πατρὶ κόρη διὰ σπάνιν προικὸς ἐκτρέχουσα τὸν ἀκμαῖον τῆς ἡλικίας καιρόν.« διὸ δὴ καὶ φασιν Ἀντίγονον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὥς οὐκ ἦν ὥσπερ μήλου τὴν εὐωδίαν καὶ χάριν ἄλλοθί που μετενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δένδρου τῶν λεγομένων ἑκάστον ἔδει θεωρεῖσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ λέγειν γλυκύτατος 10 ἦν· παρὸ καὶ τινες τὸ γάμμα αὐτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι προσετίθεσαν.

We have a fragment of L. in the work of the rhetor Rutilius Lupus (II 7; Wehrli, fr. 26), which is indeed remarkable from a stylistic point of view.

b. Cf. Cic., *De fin.* V 13:

Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior.

729—His view of the highest good appears from a passage in Clemens, *Strom.* II, c. 21, 129, 9 (Stählin II, p. 183), fr. 20 W.: What he
called
"the end"

Λύκων ὁ Περιπατητικὸς τὴν ἀληθινὴν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς τέλος ἔλεγεν εἶναι, ὥς Λεύκιμος τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς.

Wehrli rightly remarks that, for Lyco, the "true joy of the soul" is surely not the Aristotelian contemplation.

730—Probably Lyco was succeeded by Aristo of Ceos, the author of a great characterological fragment preserved in Philodemus' *Περὶ κακιῶν* X.

a. He is mentioned by Cicero in the above-cited passage, *De fin.* V 13 (after Lyco): Aristo
of Ceos

Concinnus deinde et elegans huius (sc. successor), Aristo, sed ea quae desideratur a magno philosopho gravitas in eo non fuit. Scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.

b. Strabo X 6, 486, mentions him among those who came from Iulis in Ceos and calls him an emulator of Bion of Borysthene:

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰουλίδος ὃ τε Σιμωνίδης ἦν ὁ μελοποιὸς καὶ Βακχυλίδης — καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσόφων Ἀρίστων, ὁ τοῦ Βορυσθενίτου Βίωνος ζηλωτής.

731—After Lyco, whose chief interest seems to have been in rhetoric, A. develops another side of Aristotle's inheritance, namely, the description of types of character. The first part of the fragment in Philodemus' Π. κακιῶν X (col. X-XXIV; first part till XVI 27) deals amply with ὑπερηφανία.

This quality is not dealt with by Ar., either in the *Eth. Nic.* or in the *Eth. Eud.* Theophr., *Char.* 24, defined it as καταφρόνησις τις πλὴν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων.

As to A., he considers ὑπερηφανία as a great fault, because it underestimates our dependence on τύχη and on our fellow-men. Thus, he protests against the Stoic idea of autarkeia of the individual.

The first part of our fragment seems to have been written in a protreptical style, as may appear from the following passages.

A fragment
from the
work "On
relieving
from
arrogance"

a. Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. X 30-XIII 8 (fr. 13 I-IV W.):

Ἐάν ποτε συναισθάνηται μετεωριζόμενος, μεταρίπτειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τὰς ἔμπροσθε ταπεινώσεις ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης, εἴποτε γεγόνασιν — — καὶ λαμβάνειν Col
XI
πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ τῆς τύχης ἑτεροκλινές¹ καὶ ὀξύστροφον· καὶ ἐπὶ πάγου πορευομένους τὸ Εὐριπίδου² λέγειν¹, ὃ καὶ Διονύσιος οὐ κακῶς ἐπιφωνεῖν ἐκέλευεν τινα δις τῆς ἡμέρας· 10

ὁρᾷς τυράννους διὰ μακρῶν ἠϋξημένους;
καὶ μνημονεύειν ἐναργῶς, ὃν τρόπον αὐτὸς διετέθην¹ πρὸς ὑπερηφανήσαντα, — — καθάπερ καὶ Δίων πρὸς Πτοιδώρον τὸν Μεγαρέα, ὃς¹ πολὺν χρόνον 20 ἐπὶ τῆς θύρας περιμένων πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον· »ἦ που καὶ ἡμεῖς«, εἶπεν, »ἐκεῖ πολλὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐποιοῦμεν.« Καὶ ὅταν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐκληρίας ἐπιστάνη, μὴ προσεπιρητορεύειν αὐταῖς πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον, ἀλλ' ἀποσπᾶν ὅτι δύναται, κουφίζειν³ τῆς ἰσχύνητος πεφυκυίας¹. . . ὥς καὶ Περικλῆς ταπεινου- 30 μένους μὲν ἐξῆρεν Ἀθηναίους, μεγαλαυχουμένους δὲ συνέστειλε. — — καὶ Co
XI
παραμετρεῖν ἑαυτὸν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς πενεστέρους ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον

¹ Restitution of Wehrli.

² Fr. 420 Nauck².

³ To relieve from.

εἶδος ὑπερέχοντα, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐξαίρει, τὸ δὲ συστέλλει, τοῦτο μὲν ἐπ' ἀγρῶν
 10 κτήσεως, τοῦτο δ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν · παρυπομιμνήσ-
 κεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ συναντᾶν εἰωθότος φθόνου τοῖς ὑπερηφανοῦσιν, ὃς ὀφθαλμία
 τίς ἐστιν ψυχῆς, ὥστ'ε καὶ ὅσπερ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἢ τῶν συναντῶντων γεγανω-
 20 μένη χλανὶς ἐνοχλεῖ, κωφότερον δ' ἢ περ ἐὰν παριῶν καὶ ἀναβαλλόμενος δια-
 τινάξῃ, παραπλησίως καὶ τὸν φθονερὸν λυπεῖ μὲν ἀλλότρια τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὐχ
 οὕτω δ' ὥσπερ ὅταν οἶον ἀναπτερυγίζοντά τινα καταμάθῃ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς
 ὕψος ἐξαίρόμενον · τότε δὲ προσφύς ἔδακεν. "Ὅσαι δ' ἀπώλειαι διὰ φθόνον
 30 γίνονται, βλέπεται τοῖς ἅπασιν. — Ἐννοεῖν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, ὅταν
 εἰς ἀτυχίαν μεταπέσῃ · λυπηρὰ γάρ, ἅτε συνεπιτιθεμένων εὐλόγως τῷ τῆς
 τύχης πταίσματι τῶν πολλῶν κατ' ἐχθρῶν ὁμολογουμένων — — ὅτι τῆς
 Col. XIII πρότερον ὑπερηφανίας ἀνεμίμησεν. διὸ καὶ φασιν ἀχθόμενον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ
 σχεδὸν πάντας ἐπιχαίρειν πρὸς Ἀρχέλαον ἀπελθεῖν¹. —

b. "Greatness of soul"² is to be separated from arrogance.

Philodemus, *ib.*, col. XV, l. 22-33 (fr. 13 VI W.):

Καὶ διαιρεῖν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὑπερηφανίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ συμφύρειν ὥς ἐν καὶ
 ταῦτόν · διαφέρει γὰρ ὅσον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος οἰδήσεως εὐεξία, καὶ ἔστιν
 τοῦ μὲν μεγαλοψύχου τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν τυχηρῶν ὑπερέχοντα τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς
 30 ὄγκῳ, τοῦ δ' ὑπερηφάνου τὸ διὰ κουφότητα ταύτης ἐκπνευματούμενον ὑπὸ
 κτήσεως ὑπερορᾶν ἑτέρους.

c. Arrogance may turn to madness.

Philodemus, *ib.*, Col. XVI, l. 15-27 (fr. 13 VII W.):

Ἐννοεῖν δ' ὅτι καὶ εἰς μωρίαν ἐνίστε τὸ νόσημα περίστησιν ἢ μανίαν, εἰ μὴ
 20 τὰ Ξέρξου τῶν δυεῖν οὐκ ἔχεται ἢ θατέρου, τὸ ζευγνύειν τὸν Ἑλλησποντον καὶ
 καοιέναι πέδας εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τᾶλλα ποιεῖν ἃ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν ·
 ἢ τὸ θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς γεγονέναι δοκεῖν καὶ τᾶλλ' ὅσα γίνεται περὶ
 τοὺς ἀνέδην ὑπερηφανοῦντας.

The fragment of Aristo's *Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας*³, preserved by Philodemus, is, as Wehrli remarked, our oldest example of Hellenistic protreptic literature.

732—The rest of Philodemus' fragment shows a very different style and character. Wehrli considers it on good grounds as being taken from another work of A.

¹ It was Euripides who, by the φθόνος of his enemies which had passed over into ἐπιχαιρεκακία, was driven to Archelaus.

² Which is often translated by "pride".

³ The title is mentioned by Philodemus in col. X, l. 10-11.

The
αὐθάδης

a. Description of the αὐθάδης.

Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. XVII. 29-col. XVII, l. 17 (fr. 14 I-II W.):

‘Ο δ’ αὐθάδης λεγόμενος ἔοικε μὲν εἶναι μεικτός ἐξ οἰήσεως¹ καὶ ὑπερ-
ηφανίας καὶ ὑπεροψίας, μετέχων δὲ καὶ πολλῆς εἰκαιότητος². Τοιοῦτος γὰρ
ἐστίν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, οἷος ἐν τῇ μάκ<τ>ρα³ θερμόν ἢ ψυχρὸν αἰτεῖν μὴ
προανακρίνας τὸν συμβεβηκότ’, εἰ κἀκείνῳ συναρέσκει, καὶ — — παῖδα πριά-
μενος μὴδὲ τοῦνομα προσερωτῆσαι μὴτ’ αὐτὸς θέσθαι, καλεῖν δὲ παῖδα καὶ
μὴθὲν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν συναλείψαντα μὴ ἀντισυναλείφειν· καὶ ξενισθεὶς μὴ
ἀντιξενίσαι· καὶ θύραν ἀλλοτρίαν κόπτων, ἐπερωτήσαντος τίς ἐστίν, μὴδὲν
ἀποκρίνεσθαι, μέχρι ἂν ἐξέλθῃ· καὶ ἀρρωστοῦντ’ αὐτὸν ἐπισκεπτομένου φίλου¹⁰
μὴ λέγειν πῶς ἔχει, μὴδ’ αὐτὸς ἐπισκεπτόμενός τινα τοιοῦτό τι προσερωτῆσαι·
καὶ γράφων ἐπιστολὴν τὸ χαίρειν μὴ προσγράψαι μὴδ’ ἐρρῶσθαι τελευταῖον.

Col.
XVII

The
αὐθέκαστος

b. Description of the αὐθέκαστος. Ib., col. XVII 17-XVIII 11
(fr. 14 II-III W.):

‘Ο δ’ αὐθέκαστος οὐ πάνυ μὲν εἰκαῖός ἐστιν οὐδ’ ἄλογος ὥσπερ ὁ αὐθάδης,
δι’ οἷσιν δὲ τοῦ μόνος φρονεῖν ἰδιογνωμονῶν καὶ πειθόμενος ἐν ἅπασιν κατορθώ-
σειν, ἀμαρτήσεσθαι δ’, ἂν ἐτέρου κρίσει προσσχρήσῃται, μετέχων δὲ καὶ ὑπερ-
ηφανίας· οἷος μὴδενὶ προσαναθέμενος ἀποδημεῖν, ἀγοράζειν, πωλεῖν, ἀρχὴν
μετιέναι, τᾶλλα συντελεῖν· κἂν προσερωτήσῃ τις, τί μέλλει ποιεῖν· νοῖδ’³⁰
ἐγώ« λέγειν· κἂν μέμφηταί τις, ὑπομειδιῶν. » Ἐμὲ σύ;« καὶ παρακληθεὶς ἐπὶ
συνεδρεῖαν βουλευομένῳ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο μέλλει
πράττειν· καὶ πάντ’, ἐν ὅσοις ἀποτέτευχε, — — τελεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτεθυμηκέναι
γενέσθαι φάσκειν· καὶ μὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι τοῦνομα καλούμενος ὡς αὐθέκαστος, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἔτι παιδάρια λέγειν εἶναι τοὺς ὡς παιδαγωγοὺς ἄλλοις προσανατιθεμένους·
καὶ μόνος ἔχειν πώγωνα καὶ πολιάς· καὶ ζῆν δυνήσεσθαι γενόμενος ἐν ἐρημίᾳ.¹⁰

Col.
XVIII

The
παντειδήμων

c. Ib., col. XVIII 11-38 (fr. 14 III W.):

Τούτου δ’ ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶν ὁ παντειδήμων, ἀναπεπεικώς ἑαυτὸν ὅτι πάντα
γινώσκει, τὰ μὲν μαθὼν παρὰ τῶν μάλιστ’ ἐπισταμένων, τὰ δ’ ἰδὼν ποιούντας
μόνον, τὰ δ’ αὐτὸς ἐπινοήσας ἀφ’ αὐτοῦ. ἅστι τοιοῦτος οὐ μόνον οἷον Ἰππίαν
τὸν Ἥλεϊον ἱστορεῖ Πλάτων, ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμ’ εἶχεν, αὐτῷ πεποικμέναι²⁰
λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάζειν οἰκίαν καὶ πλοῖον δι’ αὐτοῦ καὶ χωρὶς ἀρχιτέκ-
τονος· καὶ γράφειν συνθήκας ἑαυτῷ δεομένας ἐμπειρίας νομικῆς· καὶ δούλους
ιδίους ἱατρεῦειν, μὴ μόνον ἑαυτόν, ἐπιχειρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους· καὶ φυτεύειν καὶ³⁰
φορτίζεσθαι τὰ μάλισθ’ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνικωτάτων κατορθούμενα· καὶ ναυαγῶν
ἐν ἅπασι μὴδ’ οὕτω παύεσθαι τῆς ἀποπληξίας· οἷος δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων
ἀντιποιοῦμενος πάντων ἀσχημονεῖν· καὶ τοὺς καταγελῶντας ἀπείρους λέγειν. —

¹ Presumption.

² Thoughtlessness.

³ Bathing-tub.

Wehrli remarks that the list of characters dealt with by A. was probably longer than our fragment in Philodemus, and that, in this case, the work of A. gave a complete description of human characters, which formed "ein bedeutendes Zeugnis peripatetischer Erfahrungswissenschaft auch auf ethischem Gebiete".

733—Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 14e, mentions, on a level with the *Abaris* of Heracl. Pont., the *Lyco* of A., as a writing in which τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα were treated μεμειγμένα μυθολογία. Cp. our nr. **782**.

7—ARISTO OF COS

734—While we found in Lyco rhetoric accepted and cultivated as a part of philosophy, Aristo of Cos, a pupil of Aristo of Ceos and his successor, probably the author of the great fragments on rhetoric preserved by Philodemus, went back to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*.

a. Strabo, XIV, 19, 658:

Οὗτος (sc. Hippocrates) τε δὴ ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνδόξων Κῶος ἀνὴρ, — καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς Νικίας ὁ καὶ τυραννήσας Κῶων, καὶ Ἀρίστων ὁ ἀκροασάμενος τοῦ περιπατητικοῦ (i.e. Aristo of Ceos) καὶ κληρονομήσας ἐκεῖνον.

Aristo
of Cos

He is probably the same who is mentioned by Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* II 61, as a γνῶριμος Κριτολόου, and by Quintilianus II 15, 19 as *discipulus Critolai*.

b. Philodemus, *Volumina rhetorica* ed. Sudhaus I, p. 360, col. LXXI, l. 7-8:

τὸ βιβλίον τᾶρίστωνος.

735—a. The rhetor is not worthy to pretend to be a governor.

His rejection
of rhetoric

Philodemus, o.c. p. 361, col. LXXII l. 12-18:

Φησὶ δὴ πρῶτον ἀποτρέπων ὅτι κελευστοῦ καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτου δόξαν ἔχων ὁ ῥήτωρ οὐκ ἄξιός ἐστι προσποιεῖσθαι κυβερνήτης εἶναι.

b. Since rhetoric as a whole has to do with falsehood, the man who seeks truth has to avoid it.

Ib., col. LXXIII 1-4:

Φησὶν ὅλην τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ ψεύδους, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τῷ φιλαληθεῖ πευκτέαν.

c. In what sense rhetoric, in Aristo's opinion, does not achieve truth, may appear from the following lines, in which we are reminded of Plato's definition of rhetoric as a kind of κολακεία — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στο-

χάζεται ἀνευ τοῦ βελτίστου (Gorg. 464 e-465 a). Cp. 464c: οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη¹.

Philodemus, *ib.*, p. 362, col. LXXIV, l. 5-15:

Εἰ δὲ τὸ κατεστοχασμένον εἰκότως ἢ τάληθεῖ συνεγγίζον πιθανὸν ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ ἀδυνατοῦν ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ ἀποβαίνειν, ὃ [πι]θανῶς² λέγουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες, αἰσχύνονται περὶ τοῦ μηδ' ὅποιανοῦν ἀπόδειξιν εἰσενεγκεῖν.

d. A. denies the rhetor the right of uttering praise or blame, since he is not able to judge.

Philod., *ib.*, p. 367 f., col. LXXXIV, l. 5-10, 12-13:

Ἡ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἐροῦσιν (sc. τὸ ἐγκωμιάσαι καὶ ψέξαι δυνατόν εἶναι³), ἢ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦντες πῶς οὐ δεδείχασιν ἕτερον ὄντα τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων ἐμπειρίας; — "Ὡστ' οὐδ' ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ ψέγειν — —

As Plato did in the above-cited passage of the *Gorgias*, he speaks of ἐμπειρία of the rhetores, as opposed to the knowledge of the πολιτικοί.

e. The Socratic-Platonic distinction between those who know their subject and the mass of ignorant people is seen in the following lines: the author speaks of ἀτεχνοὶ and ἐντεχνοὶ πίστεις, the first of which are the common property of everybody, while the latter are proper only to those who have some special knowledge.

Philod., *o.c.* p. 369 f., col. LXXXVII, l. 3-19:

Ἀξίον δ' ἐπιστάσεως⁴ τὰς μὲν ἀτέχνους (sc. πίστεις) κοινὰς ἀπάντων ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δ' ἐντέχνων⁵ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς προσήκειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ παρηκολουθηκότος⁶ ἴδιον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἐν νόσοις ἰατρῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸ πλεῖν χειμῶσιν κυβερνήτου, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· τὸ δ' εἶδος τοῦ παραθεωρήσαντος⁶ πῶς — —

f. The rhetor, by his lack of knowledge, might even be harmful to the state.

Philod., *o.c.* p. 375 f., col. XCVIII, l. 4-16:

— τῷ δὲ μήτε ποῦ μήτε πῶς μήτε πότε πλευστέον εἰδέναι προσβλαβῆς ἂν γένοιτο μᾶλλον οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ. Περὶ γὰρ ὠφελίμων τε καὶ βλαβερῶν

¹ Our nr. 198c.

² Text of Wehrli.

³ Col. LXXXIII, l. 8-10.

⁴ Attention.

⁵ Ar., *Rhet.* 1355 b³⁵ makes the distinction between ἐντεχνοὶ and ἀτεχνοὶ πίστεις (our nr. 657a), and deals with εἶδος, σημεῖον and τεκμήριον as means of proof

⁶ The man who knows his subject is here indicated by the terms ὁ παρηκολουθηκώς and ὁ παραθεωρήσας.

ὥς τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο παρακολουθεῖν, εἰ καί τις αὐτὸν ἐνάρκησε ¹ νοεῖν παντάπασι διδακτὴν τὴν πάντων δύναμιν. —

g. The art of persuasion is perfectly useless if knowledge is lacking.

Philod., o.c., p. 379 f., col. CIV, l. 6-16:

Καὶ πρὸς τὸ τρίτον δὲ λεγέσθω τὸ κἂν πάνυ πειστικὸς ὁ λόγος ἤ, ὁ μὴ τὸ πῶς καὶ τίνας δεῖ πείθειν καὶ πότε κατέχων πάντων ἂν ἀχρηστότατος εἴη καθάπερ καὶ πηδάλιον· ὃ συμβέβηκε καὶ τῷ τοῦ ῥήτορος, ὅτι λόγος μέν, οὐ ῥήτορος δ' εἶναι λέγοιτ' ἄν.

7A—NOTE ON THE MAGNA MORALIA

736—To the remains of the early Peripatetic School doubtless belong **The Magna Moralia** the *Magna moralia*, attributed to Ar. by tradition. See our nrs. **561**, **565b**, *supra*.

⁴ "hypnotized".

NINETEENTH CHAPTER THE EARLY ACADEMY

I—SPEUSIPPUS

**List of
members of
the Academy**

737—Diog. Laert. III 46 gives the following list of disciples of Plato.

Μαθηταὶ δ' αὐτοῦ Σπεύσιππος Ἀθηναῖος, Ξενοκράτης Χαλκηδόνιος, Ἀριστοτέλης Σταγειρίτης, Φίλιππος Ὀπούντιος, Ἐστιαῖος Περίθιος, Δίων Συρακόσιος, Ἀμυκλος Ἡρακλεώτης, Ἐραστος καὶ Κορίσκος Σκῆψιοι, Τιμόλαος Κυζικηνός, Εὐαίων Λαμψακηνός, Πύθων καὶ Ἡρακλείδης Λῆνιοι, Ἴπποθάλῃς καὶ Κάλλιππος Ἀθηναῖοι, Δημήτριος Ἀμφιπολίτης, Ἡρακλείδης Ποντικὸς καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους, σὺν οἷς καὶ γυναῖκες δύο, Λασθένεια Μαντινικὴ καὶ Ἀξιοθέα Φλειασία, ἥ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα ἡμίσχετο, ὥς φησι Δικαίαρχος.

Cf. Index Herculanensis col. VI, Mekler p. 33-37.

**Organisation
of the School**

738—The Academy seems to have been organized as a θίασος for the cult of the Muses.

Diog. L. III 25:

Ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων Φαβωρίνου φέρεται ὅτι Μιθραδάτης ὁ Πέρσης ἀνδριάντα Πλάτωνος ἀνέθετο εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημειαν καὶ ἐπέγραψε· »Μιθραδάτης Ὀρουτοβάτου Πέρσης Μούσαις εἰκόνα ἀνέθετο Πλάτωνος, ἣν Σιλανίων ἐποίησε.«

Cp. Wilamowitz, *Philol. Unters.* IV 263 ff., and our next nr.

Speusippus

739—a. Speusippus, successor of Plato. Diog. L. IV 1:

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτὸν Σπεύσιππος Εὐρυμέδοντος Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν μὲν δῆμων Μυρρινουσίος, υἱὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδελφῆς αὐτοῦ Πωτώνης. Καὶ ἐσχολάρχησεν ἔτη ὀκτώ, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγδότης καὶ ἐκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος¹. Χαρίτων τ' ἀγάλαματ' ἀνέθηκεν ἐν τῷ μουσεῖῳ τῷ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ ἰδρυθέντι. καὶ ἔμεινε μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Πλάτωνι δογμάτων.

Zeller remarks rightly that the last sentence might prove something too much.

b. When struck by an incurable disease, he gave up the direction of the School voluntarily. Diog. L. IV 2:

¹ 348-345 B.C.

Ἦδη δὲ ὑπὸ παραλύσεως καὶ τὸ σῶμα διέφθαρτο, καὶ πρὸς Ξενοκράτην διεπέμπετο παρακαλῶν αὐτὸν ἔλθεῖν καὶ τὴν σχολὴν διαδέξασθαι.

c. His reply to Diogenes, who told him that life was not worth living in such a bad state of health.

Stob., *Ecl.* IV, c. 52*, 17:

Σπευσίππῳ παραλυθέντι τὰ σκέλη Διογένης ἐξαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου παρήγει, ὁ δὲ οὐ τοῖς σκέλεσιν, ἔφη, ὠζῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ νῷ.

740—a. Speus. believed in the unity of science. Diog. L. IV 2: **The unity of science**

Οὗτος πρῶτος, καθά φησι Διόδωρος ἐν ἀπομνημονευμάτων πρώτῳ, ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐθέασατο τὸ κοινὸν καὶ συνωκείωσε καθόσον ἦν δυνατόν ἀλλήλοις.

The method here referred to was applied by Speus. in his *Hómoia* and had the purpose of dividing things into genera and species.

b. Speus.' *Ὅμοια* were, as it appears from fragments in Athenaeus, **The "Ὅμοια"** a survey of the different kinds of plants and animals, in which similar phenomena were combined and dissimilar separated. Lang, fr. 5-26.

741—a. In the following passage of the *Anal. post.* Ar. is polemizing against Speus. **Definition and division impossible**

Ar., *Anal. post.* II 13, 97 a⁶⁻¹¹ (fr. 31a Lang):

Οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ τὸν ὀρίζομενον καὶ διαιρούμενον ἅπαντα εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα. καίτοι ἀδύνατόν φασί τινες εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς εἰδέναι τὰς πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ εἰδόμενα ἕκαστον. ἄνευ δὲ τῶν διαφορῶν οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον εἰδέναι· οὐ γὰρ μὴ διαφέρει, ταῦτόν εἶναι τούτῳ, οὐ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τούτου.

b. Cf. Philoponus in *Anal. post.*, p. 405, ²⁷, Wallies (fr. 31c Lang):

Τοῦτο λέγει ἀναιρῶν τοὺς λόγους δι' ὧν ἐπεχείρει ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἀναιρῆσαι καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τοὺς ὀρισμούς· ἐπεχείρει γὰρ οὗτος δεικνύειν, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδοῦναι ὀρισμὸν τινος, λέγων ὡς ὁ θέλων δι' ὀρισμοῦ παραστήσῃ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ὀφείλει γινώσκειν πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν καθ' ἃς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· οὕτως γὰρ παρίσταται ἢ φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐν τῷ χωρίζεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· τὸ δὲ χωριζόμενον διὰ τινων διαφορῶν δεῖ χωρίζεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον πάντα τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν ἢ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν, λοιπὸν δι' ὀρισμοῦ παραστήσῃ τι ἀδύνατον.

742—He attributed more to sense-perception than Plato did.

Sextus, *Math.* VII (*Adv. Log.* I) 145 (Fr. 29 Lang):

Ὡς δὲ καὶ Πλάτων· Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά,

Theory of knowledge

τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπέιληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἢ τοῦ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, 5 οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειουμένην ἀλλ' <ἐκ> τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμοσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφυῆ, ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ 10 τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

**Doctrine
of the first
principles**

743—a. He separated the One from the Good and took the evolutionary point of view: the Good can, according to his teaching, not be at the beginning but only at the end of being, as its perfection, reached by a process of development.

Ar., *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b³⁰-1073 a³ (Fr. 34a, Lang):

“Ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὁρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶν προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἢ φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα.

b. The One itself is not even being.

Ar. opposes again this view of Speus. in *Metaph.* N 5, 1092 a¹¹⁻¹⁵ (Fr. 34 e Lang):

Οὐκ ὁρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴ τις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν δὲ αἰεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησὶν, ὥστε μὴδὲ ὅν τι εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτό.

c. A reason why he denied that the One is the Good, was that, in this case, multiplicity would be the bad.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 4, 1091 b³⁰⁻³⁵ (fr. 35 a Lang):

Ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει ἄτοπα, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον στοιχεῖον, εἴτε πλῆθος ὃν εἴτε τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν αὐτό. διόπερ ὁ μὲν ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτειν τῷ ἐνὶ ὧς ἀναγκαῖον ὄν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἢ γένεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους φύσιν εἶναι.

d. Meanwhile, he seems to have placed the One on the side of the good things in his scale of values.

Ar., *Eth. Nic.* I 4, 1096 b⁵⁻⁷ (fr. 37 a, Lang):

Πιθανώτερον δ' εοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἓν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθεῖν δοκεῖ.

744—He seems to have identified Plato's principle of the infinite Dyad or the Great and Small with multiplicity.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 1, 1087 b⁴⁻⁹ (fr. 48 b Lang):

Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τῷ ἐνὶ τῷ ἴσῳ τὸ ἄνισον, ὥς τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ πλήθους οὖσαν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ πλήθους· γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου δυάδος τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς δὲ οὐσίας ἀμφοῖν.

745—a. From the One and Multiplicity he derives mathematical numbers, which in his system take the place of the Ideas in Plato. **Mathematical numbers instead of Plato's Ideas**

Ar., *Metaph.* M 9, 1086 a²⁻⁵ (Fr. 42 c Lang):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἶδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν.

b. Ar. criticized this explanation of the universe at the end of his book Λ of the *Metaph.*, 1075 b³⁷-1076 a⁴ (Fr. 33 c Lang):

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιῶδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλὰς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. »οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίᾳ· εἴς κοίρανος ἔστω«.

c. In *Metaph.* M 6, 1080 b¹¹⁻¹⁸ Ar. states the difference between Speus. and Plato on the one hand, and between Speus. and Pythagoreanism on the other. From the latter Speus. differs in this way, that Pythagoreans did not separate their numbers from sensible things, while Speus. did (Fr. 42 c Lang).

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἓνα, τὸν μαθηματικόν, πλὴν οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας συνεστάναι φασίν.

Next geom.
magnitudes,
next soul

746—a. In his hierarchy of being, then, there followed after the One the numbers, then geometrical magnitudes, and next soul.

Ar., *Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b¹⁸⁻²⁴ (Fr. 33 a Lang):

Ἐτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα αἰδία, ὥσπερ Πλάτων τὰ τ' εἶδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν. Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἐκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει 5 τὰς οὐσίας.

b. Asclepius in *Metaph.* 377, ³⁵ and 379, ¹² Hayduck (Fr. 33 d Lang) adds to this:

Noûs καὶ πάλιν ἄλλην οὐσίαν νοῦ καὶ ἄλλην ψυχῆς.

Noûs
called God

747—a. Aëtius, *Plac. ap. Stob.* I 1, 29^b, p. 35, ³ W. (fr. 38 Lang):
Σπεύσιππος (θεὸν ἀπεφύνατο) τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἐνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῇ δέ.

b. He seems to have localized this Mind or ruling power of the universe in the centre of the earth, as it appears from a rather obscure text of Theophr. ¹.

Theophr., *Metaph.* IX 32 ed. Ross-Fobes (fr. 41 Lang):

Τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιον τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πλεῖον εἶναι τὸ κακόν, οὐκ ἐν ἀοριστίᾳ δὲ μόνον καὶ οἷον ὕλης εἶδει, καθάπερ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἀμαθεστάτου. Εἰκῇ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες ὥσπερ Σπεύσιππος σπάνιον τι τὸ τίμιον ποιεῖ τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἐκατέρωθεν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄντα καλῶς ἔτυχεν ὄντα. 5

c. In Cicero, and later by Minucius Felix, he is charged with atheism, in that he qualified this ruling Force of the universe as an animal power.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 32 (Fr. 39 a Lang):

Nec multo secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum.

Cf. Minuc. Felix 19, 7.

Immortality
of the soul

748—He considers the soul as immortal, even its irrational part. Olympiodorus in Plat. *Phaed.* p. 124, ¹³ Norvin (Fr. 55 Lang):

¹ I give the text as it is read by Ross-Fobes. Several corrections have been made in it.

“Ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ¹ ἕξεως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, ὡς Πλωτῖνος † ἐνι ὅπου ²· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλικος καὶ Πλούταρχος.

749—Speus. wrote several works on ethics. A few traces of them have remained in later writers. Ethics

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 22, 133; p. 186, ¹⁹ Stählin (Fr. 57 Lang): eudaimonia

Σπεύσιππός τε ὁ Πλάτωνος ἀδελφιδεὺς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἕξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν ἢ ἕξιν ἀγαθῶν, ἧς δὴ καταστάσεως ἀπαντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὁρεξὶν ἔχειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας. εἶεν δ' ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικάι.

b. Like Aristotle and other Academics, Speus. did not consider outward goods as indifferent things, though he held that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness. its relation to virtue

Cic., *Tusc.* V 10, 30 (fr. 58 a Lang):

Non igitur facile concedo neque Bruto meo neque communibus magistris nec veteribus illis, Aristoteli, Speusippo, Xenocrati, Polemoni, ut, cum ea quae supra enumeravi (paupertas, ignobilitas, humilitas, solitudo, amissio suorum, graves dolores corporis, perdita valetudo alia similia) in malis numerent, iidem dicant semper beatum esse sapientem.

c. Cp. Cic., *Tusc.* V 13, 39 (fr. 58 b Lang):

Hic (humanus animus) igitur si est excultus, etsi eius acies ita curata est, ut ne caecaretur erroribus, sit perfecta mens, id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem virtus. Et, si omne beatum est cui nihil deest et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatam est, idque virtutis est proprium, certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, id est cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone. Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi.

d. Seneca summarizes Speus.' doctrine shortly in the following sentence. *Epist.* 85, 18 (fr. 58 c, Lang):

Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

Cp. also Plut., *De comm. not.* c. 13, p. 1065a (fr. 59 Lang).

¹ Lang reads ἐψύχου (a conjecture of Bernays).

² The meaning of these words is uncertain.

pleasure
not a good

750—Speus. denied that, because pain is an evil, pleasure must be a good.

a. Ar., *Elh. Nic.* VII 14, 1153 b¹⁻⁷ (fr. 60 a Lang):

Ἄλλα μὴν ὅτι ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική· τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὥς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυσεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττω καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν¹.

b. How Speus. meant his thesis, appears in the following passage of Gellius, *N.A.* IX 5, 4 (fr. 60 i Lang):

Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese, bonum tamen esse, quod utriusque medium foret.

2 - XENOCRATES

The man
and his
character

751—a. Diog. L. IV 6; 7-8:

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθόηγορος Χαλκηδόνιος· οὗτος ἐκ νέου Πλάτωνος ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς Σικελίαν αὐτῷ συναπεδήμησεν. Ἦν δὲ τὴν φύσιν νωθρός, ὥστε λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα συγκρίνοντα αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλει, »τῷ μὲν μύωπος δεῖ, τῷ δὲ χαλινοῦ.« — »Σεμνὸς δὲ τὰ τ' ἄλλα Ξενοκράτης καὶ σκυθρωπὸς αἰεί, ὥστε αὐτῷ λέγειν συνεχῆς τὸν Πλάτωνα, »Ξενοκράτες, θῷε ταῖς Χάρισι.« — 5

Ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀξιόπιστος σφόδρα, ὥστε μὴ ἐξὸν ἀνώμοτον μαρτυρεῖν, τοῦτ' ἄνθρωπος συνεχῶρουν Ἀθηναῖοι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐταρχέστατος ἦν. Ἀλεξάνδρου γοῦν ποτὲ συχνὸν ἀργύριον ἀποστείλαντος αὐτῷ, τρισιχίλιας Ἀττικὰς ἀφελὼν τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπέπεμψεν, εἰπὼν ἐκεῖν' πλειόνων δεῖν πλείονας τρέφοντι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου πεμφθὲν μὴ προσέσθαι, ὥς φησι Μυρωνιανὸς ἐν Ὀμοίοις.

b. Cp. *Index Acad.* col. VI, Mekler p. 39:

Οἱ δ' ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ λέγονται προκρῖναι τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀγασθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν σωφροσύνην.

His works

c. Diog. Laërt. IV 11:

Καὶ πλεῖστα ὅσα καταλέλοιπε συγγράμματα καὶ ἔπη καὶ παραινέσεις.

Follows a long list, in which are mentioned: a work *περὶ φύσεως*, several works on logic, theory of knowledge (such titles as *π. ἐπιστήμης*, *π. τοῦ ψεύδους*, *π. τὴν διάνοιαν*), metaphysics (*π. τοῦ ὄντος*, *π. εἰμαρμένης*, *π. ἰδεῶν*), on geometry, on numbers, on astronomy, and rather numerous works on ethical subjects.

Head of the
School during
25 years.

d. Ib., 14:

Διεδέξατο δὲ Σπεύσιππον καὶ ἀφηγήσατο τῆς σχολῆς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη.

¹ "that pleasure is essentially evil".

752—a. With Speusippus he shared a predilection for Pythagoreanism. Iambl., *Theol. arithm.* p. 61 g.E.:

Παρά Ξενοκράτους ἐξαίρετως σπουδασθεισῶν αἰ Πυθαγορικῶν ἀκροάσεων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν Φιλολάου συγγραμμάτων.

b. Diog. L. IV 10 (fr. 2 Heinze):

Mathematical studies a necessary propaedeusis

Ἡρὸς δὲ τὸν μήτε μουσικὴν μήτε γεωμετρίαν μήτε ἀστρονομίαν μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν φοιτᾶν· πορεύου, ἔφη (ὁ Ξενοκράτης)· λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας. οἱ δὲ τοῦτό φασιν εἰπεῖν· παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ πόκος οὐ κνάπτεται.

753—a. Tripartition of philosophy.

Sextus, *Math.* VII (= Adv. Log. I) 16; (fr. 1 H.):

Division of phil.

Πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν (οἱ διμερῇ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποστησάμενοι) ἐλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἡθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἡθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν 5 διαλεχθεῖς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτη καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως.

b. Practical purpose of philosophy.

[Galenus], *Hist. phil.* 8, p. 605, ⁷ Diels; (fr. 4 H.):

Practical purpose

Αἰτία δὲ φιλοσοφίας εὐρέσεώς ἐστι κατὰ Ξενοκράτη τὸ ταραχῶδες ἐν τῷ βίῳ καταπαῦσαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

754—Tripartition of knowledge.

three kinds of Knowledge

Sextus, *Math.* VII 147 (fr. 5 H.):

Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησιν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν τὴν δὲ νοητὴν τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστὴν, ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, νοητὴν δὲ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ, δοξαστὴν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ὁρατὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι' ἀστρολογίας. τούτων μέντοι 5 τοῦτον ἐχόντων τὸν τρόπον, τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας κριτήριον ἀπεφαίνετο τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς δὲ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αἰσθητῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῆς δὲ μικτῆς τὴν δόξαν· καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βέβαιόν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθές μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον 10 κοινὸν ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ ψευδοῦς ὑπάρχειν. τῆς γὰρ δόξης τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς Μοίρας παραδεδόσθαι, "Ἄτροπον μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθὴ δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Λάχεσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν δοξαστῶν.

Cp. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, our nr. 432b.

the cat-
egories

755—He reduced the categories to two, namely the καθ' αὐτό and the πρὸς τι.

Simpl., in *Ar. Categ.* γ 6 b; Schol. in *Ar.* 47 b²⁵ Brandis (fr. 12 H.):

Οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τῷ πρὸς τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τοσοῦτον τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος.

the First
Principles

756—His doctrine of First Principles.

a. Aetius, *Plac.* I 7, 30; *Dox.* p. 304 b¹ (fr. 15 H., first part):

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθήνορος Καλχηδόνιος τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυάδα θεούς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατὴρ ἔχουσιν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσιν, ἥντινα προσ-αγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ ὡς θήλειαν, μητὴρ θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός.

b. Aetius, *Plac.* I 3, 23; *Dox.* p. 288 b¹⁵ (fr. 28 H.):

Ξενοκράτης συνεστάναι τὸ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀενάου, ἀέναιον τὴν ὕλην αἰνιττόμενος διὰ τοῦ πλῆθους.

The same doctrine of Xenocr. is mentioned by Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 12, p. 158 Gaisford.

His
hierarchy
of being

757—From these two principles proceed first Numbers, not ideal but mathematical Numbers, identified by Xenocr. with the Ideas; next geometrical, finally physical bodies.

a. *Ar., Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b²⁴ (fr. 34 H.):

Ἐνιοὶ δὲ τὰ μὲν εἶδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά.

b. Asclepius, p. 379, ¹⁷ Hayduck, explains this passage in the following lines:

Ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀποτείνεται, καὶ φησιν ὅτι τὰ εἶδη τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς προσηγόρευεν, ἐπειδὴ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ περιοριστικοὶ εἰσιν ὧν εἰσιν ἀριθμοί, οὕτω καὶ τὰ εἶδη περιοριστικὰ τῆς ὕλης ὑπάρχουσιν· εἶτα μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας δευτέρας οὐσίας ὑποτίθεται τὰς διανοητάς, τουτέστι τὰ μαθήματα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα· τελευταῖα δὲ τὰ φυσικά.

Between geometrical and physical bodies, doubtless the celestial bodies were interposed (τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν, *Ar.* l.c.; cp. our n^o. 743, supra).

Xenocr.' identification of mathematical numbers and Ideas is referred to in several other places of *Ar.*'s *Metaphysics*, namely: *A* 1, 1069 a³³; *M* 1, 1076 a¹⁹;

M 6, 1080 b²¹; M 8, 1083 b²; M 9, 1086 a⁵; his doctrine of geometrical magnitudes in M 6, 1080 b²⁸ and N 3, 1090 b²¹.

On the place of Soul in this hierarchy, see nr. 748.

758—a. His doctrine of indivisible lines.

**Theory of
indivisible
lines**

Ar., *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 a³⁷-b² (fr. 41 H.):

Ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μέχρι πύσου (γεννώσι), οἷον ἡ πρώτη γραμμὴ ἄτομος, εἴτα δύο, εἴτα καὶ ταῦτα μέχρι δεκάδος.

The meaning of this doctrine is, that all geometrical bodies should be finally reduced to very small and indivisible lines. Thus, Simplicius says, commenting on Ar.'s *Phys.* I 3, p. 142 Diels:

Ὡς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἐπίπεδα εἶπεν εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐλάχιστα σώματα, οὕτως ὁ Ξενοκράτης τὰς γραμμάς, ἀδιαιρέτους μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα, διαιρετάς δὲ καὶ αὐτάς οὕσας τῇ φύσει.

b. Ar. opposes this theory in several places, e.g. *De caelo* III 1, 299 a⁶ (fr. 41 H.):

Ἐπειτα δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ στερεὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συγκεῖσθαι, ἐπίπεδα δ' ἐκ γραμμῶν, ταύτας δ' ἐκ στιγμῶν. οὕτω δ' ἐχόντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος γραμμὴν εἶναι. περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπέσκεπται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετα μήκη.

Cp. [Ar.], *De lin. insec.* 968 a¹-b²¹ (fr. 42 H.).

c. Philoponus in Ar. *Phys.* I 3, p. 84, ¹⁵ Vit., says that Xenocr. admitted his hypothesis of indivisible lines in order to avoid Zeno's consequences of indefinite division (Fr. 44 H.):

Ὅτι καὶ τῇ Ζήνωνος ἀπορίᾳ δι' ἧς κατεσκεύαζε καὶ ἐν εἶναι τὸ ὄν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' ἀπειρον τομῆς τῶν μεγεθῶν, κακῶς ἐνέδοσαν ψευδῶς ὑποθέμενοι, μὴ εἶναι ἐπ' ἀπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετά. ἐνδεδώκασιν γὰρ ὅτι εἰ ἐπ' ἀπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετά εἴη, μήτε κίνησιν εἶναι μήτε εἶναι τι κυρίως ἔν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ πολλά, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ πολλῶν μονάδων. ἔνθεν ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἀνῆρει τὴν ἐπ' ἀπειρον τῶν μεγεθῶν τομὴν.

759—Soul is defined by Xenocr. as a self-moving number.

**Definition
of Soul**

a. Ar., *De an.* I 2, 404 b²⁷ (fr. 60 H.):

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικόν, οὕτως ἐνιοὶ συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινουῦνθ' ἑαυτόν.

b. The commentators are unanimous in attributing this definition to Xenocr. E.g. Alex. Aphr. in Ar. *Top.* II 4, p. 162, ⁴ Wallies:

εἰ δὴ κατὰ Ξενοκράτην ψυχὴ ἐστὶν ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν, —

c. Cp. Philoponus in Ar. *De an.* I 1 (402 a²²) A 15:

Οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ τὸ ποσόν (sc. ἀνάγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν)· ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Ξενοκράτης· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ φησι κινῶν ἑαυτὸν ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ.

This
definition
explained

760—**a.** This definition is first explained as indicating that soul takes an intermediate place between the Ideas (Numbers) and sensible things.

Simpl., in Ar. *De an.* I 2 (404 b²⁷) p. 30, ⁴ Hayduck (fr. 64 H., the beginning):

Ξενοκράτους ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς οὗτος λόγος βουλομένου τὴν μεσότητα αὐτῆς τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδοποιουμένων ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἐνδείξασθαι· ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ κινητὸν τοῖς εἰδοποιουμένοις προσήκει. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄκρων μόνον δηλοῖ ὅτι οὔτε ἀριθμὸς ἀπλῶς ἔσται οὔτε κινητὸν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑφείτται, ἥ τοῦ ἀμερίστου ἐκβέβληται, τοῦ δὲ ἐστὶ κρείττων, ἥ τοῦ 5 μεριστοῦ ὑπερέχει· τὸ συναμφοτέρον οὖν ἂν πως εἴη ὡς ἀμφοτέροις κοινωνοῦσα, ἀριθμὸς κινήτός.

b. A similar explanation is given by Philoponus, in Ar. *De an.* I 4, (408 b³²) E 11 (fr. 65 H., l. 24-29):

Ἐλεγεν οὖν ἀριθμὸν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα εἰδῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λόγου· ἐκ τῶν λόγων πάντων γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοὺς λόγους ἔχει ὡς εἵπομεν· ἀριθμοὺς δὲ τὰ εἶδη ἐκάλουν ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ αὐτὸς γοῦν ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς φησιν »καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν τόπον εἰδῶν«. ἀριθμὸν μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο· κινουῦντα δὲ αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ αὐτοζῶν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ὕφ' ἑτέρου αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν, 5 αὐτοζωὴ γὰρ ἐστίν.

c. Plutarch (*De animi procr.* I, p. 1012 d) derives the two elements of soul in the definition of Xenocr. from the composing elements in Plato's *Tim.*, 35 a (Fr. 68 H., l. 11-16, 18-23).

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. those who follow Xenocr.) οὐδὲν ἢ γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας· ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἓν, μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλήθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γενέσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἐνὸς ὀρίζοντος τὸ πλήθος, καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. — Τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κινήτικόν 5 καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ· τοῦ δὲ ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συμμιγέντων, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγενῆσθαι, μηδὲν ἤττον τοῦ ἰστάναι καὶ ἰστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὔσαν.

761—**a.** The soul's immateriality was proved by Xenocr. by the following argument.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 30, p. 72 Matth. (fr. 66 H.):

Ἔτι, ἡ ψυχὴ, εἰ μὲν τρέφεται, ὑπὸ ἁσωμάτου τρέφεται· τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα τρέφει αὐτήν· οὐδὲν δὲ σῶμα ὑπὸ ἁσωμάτου τρέφεται· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχὴ· Ξενοκράτης οὕτω συνῆγεν.

We find the argument back in Tertull., *De anima* c. 6: "De insignioribus argumentationibus erit etiam illa, quod omne corpus corporalibus ali iudicant, animam vero ut incorporalem incorporalibus, sapientiae scilicet studiis."

b. Xenocr. held the immortality of the soul, not only of its logical part, but of the whole. Ar. opposes X. in the following lines of his *De anima* (Fr. 73 H.):

Ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἶόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμαί;

Philoponus comments on these lines (E 14; Heinze ib.):

Ξενοκράτης ἄτε δὴ Πλάτωνος ὡν μαθητὴς χωριστὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος.

Cp. our nr. 737 on Speus.

762—Xenocr. seems to have held that Soul penetrates the universe, descending from the higher regions of being to the inferior ones, so that not only the heavenly bodies are ensouled, and therefore divine beings, but also the elements of the sensible world. Moreover, he admitted the existence of half-divine beings (daemons) in the lower world, which take an intermediate place between the gods and men.

**Gods and
daemons**

Aetius, *Plac.* I 7; *Dox.* 304 b (fr. 15 H., second half ¹):

Θεὸν δ' εἶναι καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυρώδεις Ὀλυμπίους θεοὺς, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑποσελήνους δαίμονας ἀοράτους. ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ <θείας τινὰς δυνάμεις> ² καὶ ἐνδιήκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν <διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος Ἀιθρὴν ὡς> ἀειδῆ προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὑγροῦ Ποσειδῶνα, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς φυτοσπύρον Δήμητρα. ταῦτα δὲ χορηγῆσας τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν.

763—Molecular theory.

**The elements
composed of
molecules**

Aetius, *Plac.* I 17, 3; *Dox.* 315 b²³ (Fr. 50 H.):

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἶονεῖ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων.

764—**a.** Xenocr. held the eternity of the kosmos, and, accordingly, defends a non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

**Eternity of
the kosmos**

¹ The first part of this fragment has been cited supra, under nr. 756a.

² Better: <θείας τινὰς εἶναι δυνάμεις>.

Ar. *De caelo* I 9, 279 b³² (fr. 54 H.):

“Ἦν δέ τινες βοήθειαν ἐπιχειροῦσι φέρειν ἑαυτοῖς τῶν λεγόντων ἄφθαρτον μὲν εἶναι γενόμενον δὲ (τὸν κόσμον), οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές· ὁμοίως γάρ φασι τοῖς τὰ διαγράμματα γράφουσι καὶ σφᾶς εἰρηκέναι περὶ τῆς γενέσεως, οὐχ ὥς γενομένου ποτέ, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλίας χάριν ὥς μᾶλλον γνωριζόντων, ὥσπερ τὸ διάγραμμα γιγνόμενον θεασαμένους· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, οὐ τὸ 5 αὐτὸ ἐξ ἀτάκτων γάρ ποτε τεταγμένα γενέσθαι φασίν, ἅμα δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι καὶ τεταγμένον ἀδύνατον.

The commentators explain the passage as referring to Xenocr. .

b. One of the scholia mentions Xenocr. and Speus.:

Schol. cod. Reg. 1853, p. 489 a ⁹ Brandis (Heinze, p. 180, l. 12-15):

‘Ὁ Ξενοκράτης καὶ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἐπιχειροῦντες βοηθῆσαι τῷ Πλάτῳ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐ γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον ὁ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζεν ἀλλὰ ἀγένητον, χάριν δὲ διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ γνωρίσαι καὶ παραστῆσαι αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον ἔλεγε τοῦτον γενητὸν.

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 a mentions Xenocr. and Crantor.

Ethics **765**—Xenocr. wrote a considerable number of works on ethics. Cp. our nr. **742b**. He was known in Antiquity as a severe moralist, though he taught, with the whole Academy, that virtue is not the only good.

**Virtue and
the other
goods**

a. Cic., *De fin.* IV 18, 49 (fr. 90 H.):

Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit (bonum omne esse laudabile), quippe qui valetudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponent.

b. Cp. Seneca, *Epist.* 85, 18 (fr. 91 H.):

Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

c. Cic., *Tusc.* V 18, 51 (fr. 86 H.):

Quid ergo aut hunc (Critolaum) prohibet aut etiam Xenocratem illum gravissimum philosophorum, exaggerantem tantopere virtutem, extenuantem cetera et abicientem, in virtute non beatam modo vitam, sed etiam beatissimam ponere?

Plutarchus, *Comp. Cim. c. Luc.* 1, opposes Xenocr. together with the Stoa to Epicureanism.

766—In what Xenocr., and the Academy in general, differed from Stoicism, may appear from the following passages of Cicero.

a. Cic., *De leg.* I 21, 55 (fr. 89 H.):

Si ut Chius Aristo dixit solum bonum esse quod honestum esset, malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnis plane parís ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse, valde a Xenocrate et Aristotele et ab illa Platonis familia discreparet (Antiochus), essetque
5 inter eos de re maxima et de omni vivendi ratione dissensio; nunc vero, cum decus, quod antiqui summum bonum esse dixerant, hic solum bonum dicat, itemque illi summum malum, hic solum, divitias, valetudinem, pulchritudinem commodas res appellet, non bonas, paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem incommodas, non malas, sentit idem quod Xenocrates,
10 quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo.

b. Cic., *Ac. pr. (Lucullus)* 44, 136 (fr. 93 H.):

Atrocitas quidem ista tua (Antioche) quo modo in veterem Academiam inruperit nescio; illa vero (παράδοξα de sapiente) ferre non possum, non quo mihi displiceant — sunt enim Socratica pleraque — mirabilia Stoicorum, quae παράδοξα nominantur: sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles
5 ista tetigit? hos enim quasi eosdem esse vultis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientes solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo solum civem, solum liberum? insipientes omnes peregrinos, exules,
10 servos, furiosos? denique scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbes quidem aut civitates, nisi quae essent sapientium?

767—He declared that the virtuous life is always happy, keeping to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic* and the *Laws* (cp. our nrs. **275a, b** and **374a**).

a. Ar., *Top.* VII 1, 152 a⁷⁻¹⁰ (fr. 82 H., l. 19-22):

The virtuous
life is happy

Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἰρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων· ἔν γὰρ τὸ αἰρετώτατον καὶ μέγιστον.

b. Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. *Top.* II 6, 112 a³² (fr. 81 H., l. 11-13):

Εἰ δὴ δαίμων ἐκάστου ἡ ψυχὴ, καθ' ἃ Ξενοκράτει δοκεῖ, εἴη ἂν εὐδαίμων ὁ εὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων· εὖ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος· ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄρα εὐδαίμων.

768—Virtue not only in actions, but in the intention of the heart.

Interior
character of
virtue

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIV 42 (fr. 95 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖρος ἔλεγε μηδὲν διαφέρειν, ἢ τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἄλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι. ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν τόν τε ἐς ἃ μὴ δεῖ χωρία βλέποντα, καὶ ἐς οὓς μὴ δεῖ τόπους παριόντα.

769—Xenocr. a friend of animals.

Stories
about X.

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIII 31 (fr. 101 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Καλχηδόνιος ὁ ἑταῖρος Πλάτωνος τά τε ἄλλα ἦν φιλοικτίρμων καὶ οὐ μόνον φιλόανθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἡλέει· καὶ οὖν ποτε καθημένου ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ διωκόμενος βιαίως στρουθὸς ὑπὸ ἱέρακος ἐς τοὺς κόλπους αὐτοῦ κατέπετ· ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως ἐδέξατο τὸν ὄρνιν καὶ διεφύλαξεν ἀποκρύψας, ἔστε ὁ διώκων ἀπῆλθεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡλευθέρωσεν αὐτὸν τοῦ φόβου, ἀπλώσας τὸν κόλπον ἀφῆκε τὸν ὄρνιν ἐπειπὼν ὅτι μὴ ἐξέδωκε τὸν ἰκέτην.

770—Xenocr. as an ambassador.

Diog. L. IV 9 (fr. 109 H.):

Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρεσβεύων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον περὶ αἰχμαλώτων Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸν Λαμιακὸν πόλεμον καὶ κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον πρὸς αὐτὸν προηγέκατο ταυτί¹.

ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ ὃς ἐναΐσιμος εἶη
πρὶν τλαίῃ πάσσασθαι ἐδητύος ἡδὲ ποτῆτος,
πρὶν λύσασθ' ἐτάρους καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι;

5

καὶ τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν εὐστοχίαν εὐθὺς ἀφεῖναι.

3—HERACLIDES PONTICUS

A disciple
of Plato

771—a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in Diog. Laert. III 46 (our nr. **726**), in the *Index Acad.* col. VI, p. 33 Mekler, and by Strabo XII 541.

b. He edited, as others did, Plato's lecture π. τάγαθοῦ.

Simpl., in *Ar. Phys.*, p. 453 D., l. 25-30 (fr. 42 W.):

Ἀρχάς γάρ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστόν φασι δυάδα λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα, τὴν δὲ ἀόριστον δυάδα καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τιθεὶς ἄπειρον εἶναι ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τάγαθοῦ λόγοις, οἷς Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑστιάριος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰνιγματωδῶς, ὡς ἐρρήθη.

5

Head of the
Academy
in 361

c. Suidas says that Plato left him as head of the School during his third stay in Sicily (fr. 2 W.):

¹ *Od.* X 383-385.

Ἡρακλείδης, Εὐφρονος, φιλόσοφος, Ἡρακλείας τῆς Πόντου, — Πλάτωνος γνῶριμος· ἐκδημήσαντος δὲ Πλάτωνος εἰς Σικελίαν, προεστάναι τῆς σχολῆς κατελείφθη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

Speus. and Xenocr. accompanied the Master to Sicily (Plut., *Dio* 22; Diog. L. IV 11).

d. In this light we have to read the account of Diog. L., V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Ἡρακλείδης Εὐθύφρονος Ἡρακλεώτης τοῦ Πόντου, ἀνὴρ πλούσιος. Ἀθηνῆσι δὲ παρέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν Σπευσίππῳ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων διήκουσε καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐζηλώκει· καὶ ὕστερον ἤκουσεν Ἀριστοτέλους, ὥς φησι Σωτίων ἐν διαδοχαῖς.

Supposed that the statement is true, the meeting with Speusippus here mentioned must have taken place during Plato's second stay in Sicily (367-364), while the τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐζηλώκει certainly implies that he knew Plato and heard him lecturing. That he heard Aristotle too, refers doubtless to Aristotle's lectures in the Academy. Cp. Strabo XIII 610, who says of Hermeias: γενόμενος δ' Ἀθήνησιν ἠκροάσατο καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους.

772—**a.** When, after the death of Speusippus, Xenocrates was chosen as the head of the Academy (338), Heracl. returned to Pontus.

Index Acad., col. VI, p. 38-39 Mekler (fr. 9 W.):

Οἱ δὲ νεανίσκοι ψηφοφορήσαντες ὅστις αὐτῶν ἡγήσεται (sc. after the death of Speusippus) Ξενοκράτην εἵλοντο τὸν Καλχηδόνιον, Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν ἀποδεδημηκότος εἰς Μακεδονίαν, Μενεδήμου δὲ τοῦ Πυρραίου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους ἡττηθέντων. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἡρακλείδης ἀπῆρεν εἰς τὸν Πόντον, ὁ δὲ Μενεδήμος ἕτερον περίπατον καὶ διατριβὴν κατεσκευάσατο.

Probably, after his return to Pontus, Heracl. held a school there, as may appear from Diog. Laert. VII 166, where it is said of a certain Dionysius, called ὁ Μεταθέμενος:

ἤκουσε δὲ, καθὰ φησι Διοκλῆς, πρῶτον μὲν Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ πολίτου, ἔπειτ' Ἀλεξίου καὶ Μενεδήμου, τελευταῖον δὲ Ζήνωνος (fr. 12 W.).

b. Later doxographi treat him sometimes as a Peripatetic, as by Diog. L. his bios is placed at the end of the 5th book, after that of Demetrius of Phaleron. Thus, among modern scholars, Wehrli treats him in Heft 7 of his *Schule des Aristoteles*, and Heath in ch. XVIII of his *Aristarchus of Samos*.

Proclus in *Tim.* 281 E (fr. 106 W.) does not deny that H. was in fact a disciple of Plato. What he denies is, that he was *legitimately* called a Platonist, since he held the rotation of the earth round its axis, while Plato made it unmoved (see our nr. 352 and note 2 to εἰλλομένην):

‘Ηρακλείδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Ποντικός, οὐ Πλάτωνος ὢν ἀκουστής, ταύτην ἐχέτω τὴν δόξαν, κινῶν κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν· Πλάτων δὲ ἀκίνητον αὐτὴν ἵστησιν.

Instead of the οὐ in the first line of this text Fabricius conjectured ὁ, Taylor τοῦ. Schneider, in his edition of Proclus' Commentary of 1847, notes: "Fortasse Proclus non auditum esse Platonem, sed intellectum ab Heraclide negat".

Character 773—**a.** H.' character and writings. Diog. L. V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Οὗτος ἐσθῆτί τε μαλακῇ ἐχρῆτο καὶ ὑπέρογκος ἦν τὸ σῶμα, ὥστ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν μὴ Ποντικὸν ἀλλὰ Πομπικὸν καλεῖσθαι. πρῶτος τ' ἦν ἐν βλέμμα καὶ σεμνός. Φέρεται δ' αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα.

Follows a long list of his works, among which many dialogues on ethical subjects are mentioned.

Ethical dialogues

b. Diog. describes these dialogues in the following lines.

Ib., 88-89 (fr. 22 W.):

Τούτων τὰ μὲν κωμικῶς πέπλακεν, ὡς τὸ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης· τὰ δὲ τραγικῶς, ὡς τὸ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἥδην καὶ τὸ περὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ τὸ περὶ ἐξουσίας. ἔστι δ' αὐτῷ καὶ μεσότης τις ὁμιλητικῇ φιλοσόφων τε καὶ στρατη-

Other works

γικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ καὶ γεωμετρικά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ διαλεκτικά. ἄλλως τ' ἐν ἅπασι ποικίλος τε καὶ διηρμένος 5 τὴν λέξιν ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχῶν γεῖν ἱκανῶς δυνάμενος.

Soul

774—Soul is defined by Heracl. as an aetheric body, shining, something like light.

a. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 6 (Dox. 388) = fr. 99a W.:

‘Ηρακλείδης φωτοειδῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ὥριστο.

We find this doctrine mentioned in Tertull., *De anima* 9, and in Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I 14.

b. Philoponus, *De an.* A 4 (Dox. 214) = fr. 100 W.:

Οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασιν αἰθέριον εἶναι σῶμα (ταῦτόν δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν οὐράνιον) ὥσπερ ‘Ηρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός.

775—**a.** Before entering bodies, souls abide in the milky way.

Iambl. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 39 (I, 378 Wachsmuth) = fr. 98 W.:

Καὶ τούτους (sc. the places whence the soul comes when it is incarnated in a στερεὸν σῶμα) ‘Ηρακλείδην μὲν τὸν Ποντικὸν ἀφορίζειν περὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν, ἄλλους δὲ καθ' ὅλας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, ἀφ' ὧν δὴ δεῦρο κατιέναι τὰς ψυχὰς· τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρι λέγειν αὐτὰς κατοικεῖν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κάτω χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περίγειον γένεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωματῶν αἰεὶ στερεῶν πίπτειν εἰς ἕτερα σώματα διυσχυρίζεσθαι.

5

Cp. Pl., *Tim.* 41 d c (our nr. 354a).

b. He shares Plato's view that the universe, the planets, the earth and the heaven are gods.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34 (fr. 112 W.):

Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refert libros, et tamen modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius formam mutabilem esse vult, eodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos.

776—a. The universe is infinite.

Cosmology

Stob., *Ecl.* I 21, 5 (*Dox.* 328, b 4) = fr. 113 W.:

Σέλευκος ὁ Ἐρυθραῖος ¹ καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἄπειρον τὸν κόσμον.

b. Each star is also a universe or world, suspended in the infinite aether and comprising an earth, an atmosphere and an aether.

Aët., *Plac.* II 13, 15 (*Dox.* 343, a⁷) = fr. 114a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον ὑπάρχειν γῆν περιέχοντα ἀέρα τε καὶ αἰθέρα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ αἰθέρι. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δόγματα ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς φέρεται· κοσμοποιοῦσι γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων.

c. The moon is earth surrounded with mist.

Stob., *Ecl.* I 26 (*Dox.* 356, b²⁵) = fr. 115a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης [καὶ Ὀκελλος] γῆν ὁμίχλῃ περιεχομένην.

777—Heracl. held the rotation of the earth round its own axis.

Rotation
of the earth

a. Aët. III 13, 3 (*Dox.* 378 a¹⁰) = fr. 105 W.:

Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἐκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινοῦσι μὲν τὴν γῆν, οὐ μὴν γε μεταβατικῶς, ἀλλὰ τρεπτικῶς, τροχοῦ δίκην ἐνηξονισμένην, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ' ἀνατολὰς περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον.

The text has been reproduced under **44b**, and is cited here again for the sake of its utmost interest.

Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* p. 252, suggests that the views attributed by the Doxographi to Ecphantus the Pythagorean (who is, for the rest, unknown to us) were expressed in a dialogue of Heracl. and put into the mouth of Ecph., represented as a Pythagorean.

b. Cp. Simplicius in Ar. *De caelo*, p. 444 l. 31 - 445, 2 Heiberg (fr. 109 W.):

Ar. admitted the possibility that both the heaven of the fixed stars and the fixed stars themselves are at rest διὰ τὸ γεγονέναι τινάς, ὧν Ἡρακλείδης τε ὁ Ποντικὸς ἦν καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, νομίζοντας σώζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα τοῦ μὲν

¹ The astronomer Seleucus of Babylon.

οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄστρον ἡρεμούντων, τῆς δὲ γῆς περὶ τοὺς τοῦ ἰσημερινοῦ πόλους ἀπὸ δυσμῶν κινουμένης ἐκάστης ἡμέρας μίαν ἔγγιστα περιστροφὴν.

Also ib. p. 519, ⁹⁻¹¹; 541, ²⁸⁻²⁹; schol. in Ar. p. 505 b⁴⁶⁻⁴⁷ Brandis. Cp. Simpl. in *Phys.*, p. 292, ²⁰, infra, sub 768.

Copernicus refers to Heracl. in his dedicatory epistle to Paul III and in I 5 of his work *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium*.

**Rotation of
Mercury and
Mars**

778—Heracl. seems to have held also the theory that Mercury and Mars rotate round the sun, a theory which occurs later combined with that of the epicycles, as it may be seen in Theon of Smyrna, p. 186, 17-187, 13 Hiller.

The passage is explained by Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 257 f. The same theory is mentioned by Chalcidius, *Tim.* c. 110, pp. 176-7 Wrobel. It occurs again in Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I 19; Vitruvius, *Architect.* IX 1 (4), 6; Martianus Capella VIII 854, 880, 882.

779—That he held the Copernican system, was defended by Schiaparelli ¹, and again by Staigmüller, on the ground of Simpl., *De caelo* 444 and 452 Heiberg, and chiefly of *Phys.* 292 Diels. It is not accepted by Heath, who follows Tannery in rejecting the name 'Ηρακλ. ὁ Ποντικός in l. 21 of the last mentioned passage of Simplicius, as a gloss ².

The text of Simpl., *Phys.* 292, ¹⁵⁻²³ (fr. III W.), runs:

Διὰ τί ἀνωμάλως ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ πλάνητες φαίνονται κινούμενοι; 15
"Οτι, εἰ ὑποθώμεθα ἐκκέντρους αὐτῶν τοὺς κύκλους ἢ κατ' ἐπίκυκλον πολού-
μενα τὰ ἄστρα, σωθήσεται ἡ φαινόμενη ἀνωμαλία αὐτῶν, δεήσει τε ἐπεξελθεῖν,
καθ' ὅσους δυνατὸν τρόπους ταῦτα ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα, ὥστε εἰκέναι
τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον τρόπον αἰτιολογίᾳ τὴν περὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρον 20
πραγματεῖαν. Διὸ καὶ παρελθὼν τίς φησιν 'Ηρακλείδης Ποντικός, ὅτι καὶ
κινουμένης πῶς τῆς γῆς, τοῦ δὲ ἡλίου μένοντός πῶς δύναται ἡ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον
φαινόμενη ἀνωμαλία σφῶζεσθαι.

By the τις in l. 21, according to Tannery and Heath, Aristarchus of Samos is meant.

**Atomic
theory**

780—His atomic theory differed from that of Democritus in that Heracl. makes his ὄγκοι παθητοί, i.e. capable of being worked on by each other.

a. Dionys. ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 23, 3 (Dox. 252) = fr. 119 W.:

Ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης (sc. atomism) 'Επίκουρος γεγόνασι καὶ Δημόκριτος. Τοσοῦτον δὲ διεφώνησαν ὅσον ὁ μὲν ἐλαχίστας πάσας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνεπαισθη-

¹ *I precursori di Copernico nell' Antiquità*, Milano 1873.

² Heath, *Aristarchus*, pp. 276-283.

τους, ὁ δὲ καὶ μεγίστας εἶναι τινὰς ἀτόμους ὁ Δημόκριτος ὑπέλαβεν. Ἀτόμους δὲ εἶναι φασιν ἀμφοτέρω καὶ λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερρότητα. Οἱ δὲ τὰς 5 ἀτόμους μετονομάσαντες ἀμερῇ φασιν εἶναι σώματα τοῦ παντὸς μέρη, ἐξ ὧν ἀδιαίρετων ὄντων συντίθεται τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύεται. καὶ τούτων φασὶ τῶν ἀμερῶν ὀνοματοποιῶν Διόδωρον γεγονέναι. Ὄνομα δέ, φασίν, αὐτοῖς ἄλλο Ἡρακλείδης θέμενος ἐκάλεσεν ὄγκους.

On Diodorus, cf. our nr. **232** (Diodorus Cronus).

~ b. Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. Phys.* II) 318 = fr. 121 W.:

Ἐξ ἀπείρων δ' ἐδόξασαν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γένεσιν οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἐξ ἀνομοίων τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν, τουτέστι τῶν ἀτόμων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν 5 Ποντικὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην ἐξ ἀνομοίων μὲν, παθητῶν δέ, καθάπερ τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων.

Asclepiades of Prusa was a medical man, who lived at Rome in the first century B.C. He was influenced by Epicurus and Heracl. Pont., and is mentioned by later authors as an adherent of the atomic theory.

c. Heracl. held that the atoms are joined together to a universe by divine Reason. See our nr. **775b** (Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34).

781—One of the chief works of Heracl. was his books Π. μουσικῆς. **Musicology** An important fragment of these is preserved in Plut., *De mus.* § 25-103. Another passage is cited in Athenaeus XIV 624 C-626 A. For the rest, Philodemus, *De mus.* col. XXIII 30-XXIV 4 may give us some idea of the contents of Heracl.' work (fr. 163 W.). The text runs:

Ἄ μέντοι Διογένης φησίν, κατανοήσαντας ἡμᾶς <τ>ἀναγεγραμμένα παρ' Ἡρακλείδῃ περὶ πρέποντος μέλους καὶ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ ἄρρένων καὶ μαλακῶν ἡθῶν καὶ πράξεων ἁρμοττουσῶν καὶ ἀναρμόστων τοῖς ὑποκείμενοις προσώποις, οὐ μακρὰν ἀπηρτημένην τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἡγήσεσθαι τῷ πρὸς πλεῖστα ἐπὶ 5 τοῦ βίου χρησιμεύειν τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν οἰκείως διατιθέναι πρὸς πλείους ἀρετάς, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πάσας, ἐκθέντες ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἄλλοις δὲ συγγενῶς εἰρημένα παρεδείξαμεν ὅσης ἐστὶν γέμοντα ληρείας.

H., like Plato and Aristotle before him, held apparently that music should have a moral value and influence on men, a thesis which was violently opposed by the Epicurean Philodemus.

782—Heracl.' *Abaris* was a kind of life of a saint, which became the **The Abaris** prototype of later lives of Pythagoras. It was adorned with spiritistic stories, which made it very popular in Antiquity.

Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 1, p. 14 E (fr. 74 W.):

“Οτι δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοῖς μὴ δοκοῦσι φιλοσόφως, μηδὲ ἀπὸ σπουδῆς λέγεσθαι χάριουσι μᾶλλον καὶ παρέχουσιν ὑπηκόους ἑαυτοὺς καὶ χειροῆθεις, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις, καὶ τὸν Ἀβαριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου, καὶ τὸν Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος διερχόμενοι, [ἀλλὰ καὶ] τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα μεμιγμένα 5 μυθολογία μεθ’ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι.

H.’ name
in Antiquity

783—On the whole, Heracl. was a celebrated and much read author in later Antiquity, up to the Christian era. Varro was greatly influenced by his dialogues; Cicero and Atticus admired him.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* V 3, 8 praises his erudition (fr. 89 W.):
auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, vir doctus in primis.
Cp. also *Div.* I 23, 46.

b. Timaeus rebuked him for his mysticism. Diog. L. VIII 72 (fr. 85 W.):

Timaeus opposes the stories of the miraculous disappearance of Empedocles. Τοιαῦτά τινα εἰπὼν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐπιφέρει. »Ἀλλὰ διὰ παντός ἐστιν Ἡρακλείδης τοιοῦτος παραδοξολόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς σελήνης πεπτωκέναι ἄνθρωπον λέγων. Cp. Plut., *Cam.* 22; *De aud. poet.* 1.

c. Epicurus and his disciples covered him with invectives.

Plut., *Contra Epicuri beatitudinem* 2, p. 1086 E (fr. 20 W.):

Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes was very moderate in his language. Τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἵσχιστα ῥήματα βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμούς, ἀλαζονείας, ἐταιρήσεις, ἀνδροφονίας, βαρυστόνους, πολυφθόρους, βαρυσγεφάλους συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἰππάρχου καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν κατεσκέδασαν.

4—EUDOXUS, PHILIPPUS OF OPOUS AND THE EPINOMIS

784—Another famous disciple of Plato and teacher in the Academy was Eudoxus of Cnidus, philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, medical man and lawgiver.

Eudoxus
of Cnidus

a. Diog. L. VIII 86-88:

Εὐδοξος Αἰσχίνου Κνίδιος, ἀστρολόγος, γεωμέτρης, ἱατρός, νομοθέτης. οὗτος τὰ μὲν γεωμετρικὰ Ἀρχύτα διήκουσε, τὰ δ’ ἱατρικὰ Φιλιστίωνος τοῦ Σικελιώτου, καθὰ Καλλίμαχος ἐν τοῖς πῖναξί φησι. Σωτίων δ’ ἐν ταῖς διαδοχαῖς

λέγει καὶ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι. γενόμενον γὰρ ἐτῶν τριῶν πού καὶ εἴκοσι
 5 καὶ στενωῶς διακείμενον κατὰ κλέος τῶν Σωκρατικῶν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀπᾶραι
 σὺν Θεομέδοντι τῷ ἱατρῷ, τρεφόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· οἱ δέ, καὶ παιδικὰ ὄντα·
 καταχθέντα δ' εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ὁσημέραι ἀνιέναι Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἀκούσαντα τῶν
 σοφιστῶν αὐτόθι ὑποστρέφειν. δύο δὲ μῆνας διατρίψαντα οἴκαδ' ἐπανελθεῖν
 10 καὶ πρὸς τῶν φίλων ἐρανισθέντα εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀπᾶραι μετὰ Χρυσίππου τοῦ
 ἱατροῦ, συστατικὰς φέροντα παρ' Ἀγησιλάου πρὸς Νεκτάναβιν· τὸν δὲ τοῖς
 ἱερῶσιν αὐτὸν συστήσαι. — Ἐντεῦθεν τε γενέσθαι ἐν Κυζίκῳ καὶ τῇ Προπον-
 τίδι σοφιστεύοντα· ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ Μαυσωλὸν ἀφικέσθαι. ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἐπανελ-
 θεῖν Ἀθήναζε, πάνυ πολλοὺς περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔχοντα μαθητάς. — Ἀπεδέχθη δὲ
 15 ἐν τῇ πατρίδι μεγαλοτίμως, ὥς τό γε περὶ αὐτοῦ ψήφισμα γενόμενον δηλοῖ.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐπιφανέστατος ἐγένετο, γράψας τοῖς ἰδίοις
 πολίταις νόμους, ὥς φησιν Ἑρμῖππος ἐν τετάρτῃ περὶ τῶν ἐπτὰ σοφῶν, καὶ
 ἀστρολογούμενα καὶ γεωμετρούμενα καὶ ἕτερ' ἄττα ἀξιόλογα.

b. He died at the age of 53, before Plato. Diog. L., ib., 90:
 Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τρίτον ἄγων καὶ πεντηκοστὸν ἔτος.

c. His celebrity. Diog., ib. 91:
 Τοῦτον ἀντὶ Εὐδόξου Ἐνδοξὸν ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς φήμης.

785—He rejected the theory of the Ideas in its Platonic form.

Interpreta-
 tion of the
 theory of
 the Ideas

a. Ar., *Metaph.* A 9, 991 a⁸⁻¹⁸ (our nr. 529a).

b. Alex. explains the passage as follows:

Εὐδόξος τῶν Πλάτωνος γνωρίμων μίξει τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς αὐτάς τὸ
 εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἡγεῖτο ἕκαστον εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τινες, ὥς ἔλεγε . . . μίξει τῶν
 ἰδεῶν τὰ ἄλλα.

786—In ethics, too, he held a view very different from Plato's, namely
 that pleasure is the supreme good. We found it in Aristotle's *Ethics*
 (our nrs. 594-596) and shall find it again in Epicurus.

Pleasure
 the supreme
 good

a. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 2, 1172 b⁹⁻¹⁸ 1:

Εὐδόξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τάχαθὸν ᾧετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα
 10 αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἰρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ
 μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταῦτό φέρεσθαι μνηύειν ὥς πᾶσι τοῦτο
 ἄριστον (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὐρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν), τὸ
 δὲ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τάχαθὸν εἶναι· ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι

¹ The passage referred to sub 596c.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς. Διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὥς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν.

b. Plato himself was brought by this theory to write his *Philebus* and to revise his own view of the best life (our nr. 348).

**Theory of
the celestial
spheres**

787—As to astronomy, Eudoxus' theory of concentric celestial spheres preceded that of Callippus and Aristotle's theory of a plurality of un-
moved Movers, expounded in *Metaph.* A 8.

Our nr. 517.

See on Eudoxus' hypothesis: Heath, *Aristarchus*, p. 193-211.

**Geometry
1. His theory
of proportion**

788—a. An important part of Euclides' *Elementa* has been taken from Eudoxus. It was Eud. who invented and elaborated the theory of proportion expounded in *Elem.* V. The essence of this theory is its applicability to incommensurable as well as commensurable quantities.

Eud.' conception of equal ratios is embodied in Eucl. V, def. 5:

Ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ μεγέθη λέγεται εἶναι πρῶτον πρὸς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον πρὸς τέταρτον, ὅταν τὰ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τρίτου ἰσάκεις πολλαπλάσια τῶν τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τετάρτου ἰσάκεις πολλαπλασίων καὶ ὅποιοι οὖν πολλαπλασιασμὸν ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου ἢ ἅμα ὑπερέχη ἢ ἅμα ἴσα ᾗ ἢ ἅμα ἐλλείπη ληφθέντα κατὰ λ-
ληλα.

On the importance of this definition see Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 191.

**2. His
method of
exhaustion**

b. Secondly, he discovered the method of exhaustion, which is at the root of all Archimedes' further developments in the mensuration of plain and solid figures. The fundamental thesis has come down to us by Eucl., *Elem.* X 1.

The method is explained in Cantor's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Mathematik* I² 229, 254, 257 f.; Heath, *Works of Archimedes* p. XLVIII ff.; Zeuthen, *Hist. des math.*, 136 ff.

**3. His curve
for doubling
a cube**

c. He solved, by means of a complicated curve, the problem of doubling the cube.

Eutocius in Archim. *Sphaer. et cyl.* 66, 12 Heiberg:

(Εὐδοξος) φησὶν ἐν προοιμίῳ διὰ καμπύλων γραμμῶν αὐτὴν (τὴν εὕρεσιν) ὑψορκεῖναι.

Cf. Proclus' account of the problem, in *Eucl. Elem.* I 213, 3-7. A reconstruction of Eud.' method has been ventured by Tannery, *Mém. de la Société des Sciences de Bordeaux*, 2e série, II (1878), 282 f., and by Künssberg, *Eud. von Knidos* II, 55 f.

Heath treats the question shortly in his *Aristarchus*, p. 190 f., and again, in his *Apollonius of Perga*, p. XXII f.

789—A less dissentient Platonist and member of the Academy was **Philippus of Opos**

a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in the list of Diog. L. III 46 (our nr. **726**).

b. He is said to have transcribed the *Laws* and to be the author of the *Epinomis*. **Author of the *Epinomis*?**

Diog. L. III 37:

Ἐνιοὶ τέ φασι ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ Ὀπούντιος τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῦ μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. Τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι.

Cp. *Index Acad.* 13, where he is called ὁ ἀστρολόγος and ἀναγραφεὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἀκουστής.

Suidas says: ὅς τοὺς Πλάτωνος Νόμους διεῖλεν εἰς βιβλία ιβ'· τὸ γὰρ ιγ' αὐτὸς προσθεῖναι λέγεται.

The authenticity of the *Epinomis* has been lately defended by J. Harward (*The Epinomis of Plato*, Oxford 1928), by

A. E. Taylor (Proceedings of the Brit. Acad. XV, 235), by

H. Raeder (Kgl. Danske Vidensk. Selskab, Hist. filol. Medd. XXVI 1, Kopenhagen 1938), and by

E. des Places (Revue des Et. grecques XLIV, 153 ff.), while many others reject it.

I personally think the authorship of Philippus probable, though there is no decisive evidence for it.

c. The list of his works presented by Suidas contains chiefly mathematical and astronomical treatises, but also ethical writings. **Works**

790—Doubtless, certain features in the *Epinomis* may be mentioned as being characteristic of the first generation of the Academy, during Plato's old age and after his death. **Wisdom in the *Epinomis***

First, Wisdom is in the *Epinomis* essentially conditioned by the knowledge of number.

Epin. 976 c-977 d:

176 Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῦ φανῆναι γέ τινα ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἔχων σοφὸς γίγνεται· ἂν ὁ σοφὸς ὄντως ὦν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος. ἴδωμεν δὴ. χαλεπῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ παντά-
d πασιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἑτέραν πάρεξ τῶν εἰρημένων εὐρεῖν, ἣ σοφία μὲν λέγεται· ἂν ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν οὔτε βάναισος οὔτ' ἡλίθιος ἔσται, σοφὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸς δι' αὐτὴν πολίτης τε καὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως ἔσται
5 πόλεως ἅμα καὶ ἐμμελής. κατὶδωμεν δὴ ταύτην πρώτην, τίς ποτ' ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐπιστήμη μία διεξεληθοῦσα ἢ μὴ παραγενομένη τῶν νῦν παρουσῶν ἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ ἀφρονέστατον παράσχοιτο ζῶον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. οὐ δὴ τοῦτο γε πάνυ χαλεπὸν τὸ κατιδεῖν. μία γὰρ ὥς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν ἢ τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα παντὶ τῷ θνητῷ γένει τοῦτ' ἂν δράσειεν· θεὸν δ' αὐτὸν μᾶλλον ἢ τινα τύχην ἡγοῦμαι δόντα ἡμῖν σῶζειν ἡμᾶς. ὃν δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦμαι,

φράζειν χρή, καίπερ ἄτοπον ὄντα, καὶ πως οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ· πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθῶν αἷτιον ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἷτιον 97; ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ γεγονέναι; τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω θεόν, ὃ Μέγιστόν τε καὶ Κλεινόν; σχεδὸν Οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ δικαιοτάτον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὐχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων 5 αἷτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν· δοῦναι δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως αὐτόν φαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δώσειν, ἐάν τις θέλῃ συνακολουθεῖν. ἐάν γὰρ ἦ τις ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ὀρθὴν τὴν τοῦδε, εἴτε κόσμου ἢ b εἴτε ὀλυμπον εἴτε οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῷ λέγειν, λεγέτω μὲν, ἀκολουθεῖτω δὲ ὅπῃ ποικίλλων αὐτόν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὥρας τε καὶ τροφὴν πᾶσιν παρέχεται. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὖν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαῖμεν ἂν, 5 σὺν ἀριθμῷ παντί, καὶ τᾷλλ' ἀγαθῷ· τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, ἐάν τις τὴν ἀριθμῶν αὐτοῦ δόσιν δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθῃ πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον.

Ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πως τοῖς λόγοις ἀναμνησιώμεν ὅτι καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς ἐνόησαμεν ὡς, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλοιμεν, c οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ τι φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ποτὲ ψυχὴ τούτου τοῦ ζῴου πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν λάβοι σχεδόν, ὅτου λόγος ἀπείη· ζῶον δὲ ὅτι μὴ γινώσκει δύο καὶ τρία μηδὲ περιττὸν μηδὲ ἄρτιον, ἀγνοοῖ δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀριθμὸν, οὐκ ἂν 5 ποτε διδόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας [ἔχοι] μόνον εἴη κεκτημένον, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετὴν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκαλύει. d στερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἂν ποτε γένοιτο, ὅτῳ δὲ σοφία μὴ προσείη, πάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τελέως ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος εὐδαίμων ποτὲ γένοιτο.

Moral
purpose of
astronomical
studies

791—Second, the greatest virtue is, according to our author, piety,—and it is learned by learning astronomy. To this purpose mathematical studies are necessary.

a. *Epin.* 989 b¹-990 b²; 990 c⁵-991 a¹:

Μεῖζον μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείσῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι τῷ 98; θνητῷ γένει· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ταῖς ἀρίστοις φύσεσιν οὐ γέγονεν, λεκτέον. ἀρισται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ χαλεπώτατα μὲν ἂν γενόμεναι, μέγιστον δὲ ὄφελος, ἂν γίγνωνται· τὰ τε γὰρ τῆς βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως 5 μετρίως ἀποδεχομένη ψυχὴ καὶ πρᾶως, εὐκόλος ἂν εἴη, τὴν τε ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμένη, καὶ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν εὐπειθής, καὶ τό γε μέγιστον, ἐν ταύταις ταῖς φύσεσιν δυναμένη μανθάνειν καὶ μνήμων οὖσα, εὖ μάλα χαίρειν τούτοις αὐτοῖς δύναται' c ἂν φιλομαθῆς ὥστ' εἶναι. ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε ῥάδια φύεσθαι, γενόμενά τε, καὶ τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας τυχόντα ἥς δεῖ, τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χείρους κατέχειν ὀρθότατα δύναται' ἂν τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ ἕκαστα ὡς 5 δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ, περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ καθαρμοῦς τῶν περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώ-

πους, οὐ σχήμασι τεχνάζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντας ἀρετήν, ὃ δὴ καὶ μέ-
 d γιστόν ἐστι συμπάντων πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. τοῦτο δὴ οὖν τὸ μέρος εἶναι φαμεν
 φύσει κυριώτατον καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα μαθεῖν, εἰ
 διδάσκοι τις. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν διδάξειεν, εἰ μὴ θεὸς ὑφηγοῖτο· εἰ τ' οὖν διδάσκοι,
 5 κατὰ τρόπον δὲ μὴ δρῶν τὸ τοιοῦτον, κρεῖττον μὴ μανθάνειν. ὅμως δ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν
 λεγομένων ἀνάγκη μαθεῖν ταῦτα καὶ ἐμὲ λέγειν τὴν τοιαύτην τε καὶ ἀρίστην
 e φύσιν. πειρώμεθα δὴ τῷ τε λόγῳ διεξιελθεῖν ἅ τ' ἐστὶν καὶ οἷα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μανθά-
 ραι, κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν τ' ἐμὴν τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὴν τῶν δυναμένων εἰσακούσσαι,
 990 θεοσεβείας ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τις τίνα μαθήσεται. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον
 ἀκούσαντι, τὸ δ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε, ὃ τις οὐκ ἂν ποτε δόξειεν δι'
 ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος — ἀστρονομίαν — ἄγνοεῖ τε ὅτι σφώτατον ἀνάγκη
 5 τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι, μὴ τὸν καθ' Ἡσίοδον ἀστρονομούντα καὶ πάντας
 τοὺς τοιούτους, οἷον δυσμάς τε καὶ ἀνατολὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν
 ὀκτῶ περιόδων τὰς ἐπτὰ περιόδους, διεξιούσης τὸν αὐτῶν κύκλον ἐκάστης
 b οὕτως ὡς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾶδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι, μὴ θαυ-
 c 5 μαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως. — Διὸ μαθημάτων δέον ἂν εἴη· τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν
 τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ ὅλης τῆς τοῦ
 περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου γενέσεώς τε καὶ δυνάμεως, ὅσῃν παρέχεται πρὸς τὴν
 d τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. ταῦτα δὲ μαθόντι τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἐστὶν ὃ καλοῦσι μὲν σφόδρα
 γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν, τῶν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοις φύσει ἀριθμῶν
 ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπιπέδων μοῖραν γεγонуῖα ἐστὶν διαφανής· ὃ δὴ θαῦμα
 5 οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ γεγονὸς θεῖον φανερόν ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ δυναμένῳ συννοεῖν.
 μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τοὺς τρεῖς ὑψιζήμενους καὶ τῇ στερεᾷ φύσει ὁμοίους· τοὺς δὲ
 ἀνομοίους αὖ γεγονότας ἐτέρᾳ τέχνῃ ὁμοιοῖ, ταύτῃ ἣν δὴ στερομετρίαν ἐκά-
 e λεσαν οἱ προστυχεῖς αὐτῇ γεγονότες· ὃ δὲ θεῖόν τ' ἐστὶν καὶ θαυμαστόν τοῖς
 ἐγκαθορῶσί τε καὶ διανοούμενοις ὡς περὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἀεὶ στρεφομένης τῆς
 δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ καθ' ἐκάστην ἀναλογίαν εἶδος καὶ γένος
 991 ἀποτυπῶται πᾶσα ἡ φύσις.

b. Knowledge of the heavenly bodies is at the top, for its object is divine. Ib., 99I b⁵-c¹:

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γιγνέσθω τε καὶ ἐχέτω σύμπαντα· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τέλος, εἰς θείαν γένεσιν ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὀρατῶν καλλίστην τε καὶ θειοτάτην φύσιν ἱτέον, ὅσῃν ἀνθρώποις θεὸς ἔδωκεν κατιδεῖν, ἣν οὐποτε ἄνευ τῶν νῦν διειρημένων μὴ κατιδὼν ἐπεύξεται τις ῥαστώνῃ παραλαβεῖν.

792—These things are certainly not against the spirit of Plato's philosophy, at least in his later years. Cp. the following passages:

a. *Epin.* 98I e³⁻⁶:

Νομίσαι δὲ δὴ δεῖ πάλιν τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν ζῶων γέννη, ὃ δὴ πᾶν χρὴ φάναι

The souls of
the celestial
bodies

θεῖον γένος ἄστρον γεγονέναι, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δ' εὐδαιμονεστάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 898 d-899 c (our nr. 391).

**Evil
overcome by
good**

b. *Epin.* 988 d⁴-e⁴:

Διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων, ψυχῆς οὕσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ πάντων μὲν δ 5 τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τοιούτων, τῶν δὲ αὖ φλαύρων τοιούτων ἄλλων, τῆς μὲν φορᾶς πάσης καὶ κινήσεως ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τὰγαθὸν c φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούναντίον ἐναντιᾶν, νενικηέναι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 904 a b (our nr. 392a).

**Gods and
daemons**

c. *Epin.* 984 d³-e³:

Θεοὺς μὲν δὴ, Δία τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, ὅπη τις ἐθέλει, d ταύτη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τιθέσθαι νόμον καὶ πάγιον ἐχέτω τοῦτον τὸν λόγον· θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὁρατούς, μεγίστους καὶ τιμιωτάτους καὶ ὀξύτατον ὀρώντας 5 πάντη, τοὺς πρώτους τὴν τῶν ἄστρον φύσιν λεκτέον καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τούτων αἰσθανόμεθα γεγονότα, μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἐξῆς δαίμονας, ἀέριον c δὲ γένος, ἔχον ἔδραν τρίτην καὶ μέσην, τῆς ἐρμηνείας αἵτιον, εὐχαῖς τιμᾶν μάλα χρεῶν χάριν τῆς εὐφήμου διαπορείας.

This, too, can be placed quite well in the Platonic view of the universe. And yet, there is a nescioquid in these things which does give us the impression that they are rather the work of the next generation than that of the Master himself. Indeed, they fit in excellently with what we know of the character of Philippus of Opous. Cp. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* II 1⁵, 1044 f.

5—POLEMO, CRATES AND CRANTOR

Polemo

793—The next generation of the School turned from mathematics to ethics.

**Conversion
to philosophy**

a. Polemo and his conversion to philosophy by Xenocrates.

Diog. L. IV 16:

Πολέμων Φιλοστράτου μὲν ἦν υἱός, Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δῆμων Οἷηθεν. νέος δ' ὦν ἀκόλαστος τε καὶ διακεχυμένος ἦν οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ περιφέρειν ἀργύριον πρὸς τὰς ἐτοιμούςς λύσεις τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στενωποῖς διέκρυπτεν. καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ πρὸς κίονί τινι τριώβολον εὐρέθη προσπεπλασμένον αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν τῇ προειρημένη πρόφασιν. καὶ ποτε συνθέμενος τοῖς νέοις 5 μεθύων καὶ ἐστεφανωμένος εἰς τὴν Ξενοκράτους ἦξε σχολήν· ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν διατραπείς εἶρε τὸν λόγον ὁμοίως· ἦν δὲ περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἀκοῦον δὴ τὸ μειράκιον κατ' ὀλίγον ἐθιγρᾶθη καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο φιλόπονος, ὥς ὑπερβάλλεσθαι τοὺς

ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὸς διαδέξασθαι τὴν σχολήν, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκτῆς καὶ δεκάτης
10 καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος ¹.

b. His further life and behaviour. Diog., ib. 17-18:

His ἀπάθεια

Τοσοῦτον δὲ ἐπιτεῖναι τὸ ἥθος ἀρξάμενον φιλοσοφεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ ταύτῳ
σχήματος τῆς μορφῆς πάντοτε μένειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἀναλλοίωτος ἦν·
διὸ καὶ θηραθῆναι Κράντορα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. κυνὸς γοῦν λυττῶντος καὶ τὴν ἰγνύαν ²
διασπάσαντος μόνον μὴ ὠχριαῖσαι· καὶ ταραχῆς γενομένης ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως
5 πυθόμενων τὸ γεγονὸς ἄτρεπτον μεῖναι. ἔν τε τοῖς θεάτροις ἀσυμπαθέστατος
ἦν. Νικοστράτου γοῦν ποτε τοῦ ἐπικαλουμένου Κλυταιμνήστρα ἀναγινώσκοντός
τι τοῦ ποιητοῦ αὐτῷ τε καὶ Κράτῃ, τὸν μὲν συνδιατίθεσθαι ³, τὸν δ' ἴσα καὶ
μὴ ἀκοῦσαι. καὶ ὅλως ἦν τοιοῦτος οἷόν φησι Μελάνθιος ὁ ζωγράφος ἐν τοῖς
περὶ ζωγραφικῆς· φησὶ γάρ δεῖν αὐθάδειάν τινα καὶ σκληρότητα τοῖς ἔργοις
10 ἐπιτρέχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἡθεσιν.

c. His main interest was more turned to practical life than to theory.

Diog. L. IV 18:

"Ἐφασκε δὲ ὁ Πολέμων δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς
διαλεκτικοῖς θεωρήμασι.

794—His ruling principle in ethics was: living according to nature.

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VII 6, 32, 9 (Stählin III p. 25, l. 2):

Living
according to
nature

Πολέμων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου συντάγμασι.

b. Cic., *Acad.* II 42, 131:

Honestum autem vivere fruentem rebus iis quas primas homini natura
conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (sc. finem bonorum), ut indicant
scripta Polemonis.

c. Plut., *Comm. not.* c. 23, p. 1069:

Τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; Οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων
τούτοις ἡκολούθησεν, ὑποτιθέμενος στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ
τὸ κατὰ φύσιν;

795—The doctrine of the *πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν* is expounded more fully
by Cicero in *De finibus* II 11, 33 f., with reference to Polemo:

The theory
of the
*πρῶτα κατὰ
φύσιν*

Omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, et se ipsum et omnes partes
suas diligit duasque, quae maximae sunt, in primis amplectitur, animum et

¹ 316-313 B.C.

² The hollow of the knee.

³ Came under the impression.

corpus, deinde utriusque partes. Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tunc discernere incipit, ut ea, quae prima data sint natura, appetat asperneturque contraria. In his primis 5 naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. Nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valetudinem, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt quae 10 paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis.

Cp. also *De fin.* IV 6, 14 f.

Virtue the first condition to happiness

796—Virtue was, according to Polemo, the first and absolute condition to happiness, while exterior goods were considered by him as being not absolute conditions.

Clem., *Strom.* II 22, 133, 7 (St. II, p. 186, ²⁸187, 2:

‘Ο γάρ Ξενοκράτους γνώριμος Πολέμων φαίνεται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι βουλόμενος ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων. Δογματίζει γοῦν, χωρὶς μὲν ἀρετῆς μηδέποτε ἂν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπάρχειν, δίχα δὲ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.

Crates

797—Of Crates, Polemo's successor in the School, we know very little for certain. Diog. speaks about his intimate friendship with Polemo and his relations with Crantor.

Diog. L. IV 21-22:

Κράτης πατὴρ δὲ μὲν ἦν Ἀντιγένους <Ἀθηναῖος>, Θριάσιος δὲ τῶν δῆμων, ἀκροατὴς ἅμα καὶ ἐρώμενος Πολέμωνος· ἀλλὰ καὶ διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν αὐτοῦ. Καὶ οὕτως ἀλλήλων ἐφιλείτην ὥστε καὶ ζῶντε οὐ μόνον τῶν αὐτῶν ἡσθη-
δευμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι σχεδὸν ἀναπνοῆς ἐξωμοιώσθη ἀλλήλοις καὶ θανόντε
τῆς αὐτῆς ταφῆς ἐκοινωνεῖτην. Ἔθεν Ἀνταγόρας εἰς ἄμφω τοῦτον ἐποίησε 5
τὸν τρόπον·

Μνήματι τῷδε Κράτητα θεοῦδᾶ καὶ Πολέμωνα
ἐννεπε κρύπτεσθαι, ξεῖνε, παρερχόμενος,
ἄνδρας ὁμοφροσύνη μεγαλήτορας, ὧν ἅπο μῦθος
ἱερὸς ἦϊσεν δαιμονίου στόματος,
καὶ βίोटος καθαρὸς σοφίας ἐπὶ θεῶν ἐκόσμει
αἰῶν' ἀστρέπτοις δόγμασι πειθόμενος.

ἔθθεν καὶ Ἀρκεσίλαον μετελθόντα παρὰ Θεοφράστου πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγειν ὡς εἶεν θεοὶ τινες ἢ λείψανα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους. — Συσσίτιον δέ φησιν
 15 αὐτῷ ὁ Ἀντίγονος εἶναι παρὰ Κράντορι, ὁμονόως συμβιούντων τούτων τε καὶ Ἀρκεσιλάου. τὴν δὲ οἶκῃσιν Ἀρκεσίλαον μὲν ἔχειν μετὰ Κράντορος, Πολέμωνα δὲ σὺν Κράτῃ μετὰ Λυσικλέους τινὸς τῶν πολιτῶν.

798—Something more is known to us about Crantor.

Crantor

• a. Diog. L. IV 24:

Κράντωρ Σολεὺς θαυμαζόμενος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι ἀπῆρεν εἰς Ἀθήνας καὶ Ξενοκράτους διήκουσε Πολέμωνι συσχολάζων. Καὶ κατέλιπεν ὑπομνήματα εἰς μυριάδας στίχων τρεῖς, ὧν τινὰ τινες Ἀρκεσιλάῳ προσάπτουσι.

b. As we saw before, he lived together with Arcesilas. He died before Polemo and Crates.

Diog. IV 27:

Καὶ κατέστρεψε πρὸ Πολέμωνος καὶ Κράτῃτος.

799—a. Proclus in *Tim.* 24 A mentions him as the first to write commentaries on Plato, at least on the *Timaeus*:

His commentary on the *Timaeus*

(Κρ.) ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής.

b. Plutarch cites this commentary in his *De an. procr.* 2, p. 1012 f.:

The creation of the soul

Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τὰ τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, τὰς τε τούτων ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γινομένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας, ἐκ πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα γινώσκῃ, συγκεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν αἰεὶ κατὰ
 5 τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν· ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταύτου καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, διὰ τὸ κακείνων ἑκατέραν μετέχειν ἐτερότητος καὶ ταυτότητος.

800—He cites it again in the same work, a few lines further, on the eternity of the world and the non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

The eternity of the world

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 A:

Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διανοούμενον, ἐπίστασθαι μὲν αἰδῖον ὄντα καὶ ἀγένητον· τὸ δὲ ᾧ τρόπῳ συντέτακται καὶ διοικεῖται καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥάδιον ὁρῶντα τοῖς μῆτε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μῆτε τῶν γενητικῶν σύνοδον ἐξ ἀρχῆς προϋποθεμένοις, ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν τραπέσθαι.

801—A fragment of his ethics is preserved in Sextus, *Math.* XI (= *Adv. Eth.*) 51-58:

Ethics

Some authors have been cited who call health the highest good. S. continues:

The highest
good

Ἄγαθόν δ' εἶπαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρῶτον, οἷ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκα- 51
δημείας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου. δεῖν γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἐκάστῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν
οἰκειὰν τάξιν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Κράντωρ εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ
λεγομένου βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἄγειν πάνυ χαρίεντι συνεκρήσατο παραδείγματι.
εἰ γὰρ νοήσαιμεν, φησί, κοινόν τι τῶν Πανελλήνων θέατρον, εἰς τοῦτό τε ἔκα- 52
στον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παρίον καὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιποιούμενον ἔκειν, εὐθὺς καὶ
εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀναχθισόμεθα τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διαφορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ 53
πλοῦτος παραπηδήσας ἔρεϊ· »ἐγώ, ἄνδρες Πανέλληνες, κόσμον παρέχων
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας καὶ τὰς ὑποδέσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπόλαυσιν
χρειώδης εἰμὶ νοσοῦσι καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ παρέχω τὰ τερπνὰ,
ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεῦρα τῶν πράξεων γίνομαι«. τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν λόγων ἀκού- 54
σαντες οἱ Πανέλληνες ὁμοθυμαδὸν κελεύουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ πρωτεῖα τῷ
πλούτῳ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τούτου ἤδη ἀνακηρυττομένου ἐπιστᾶσα ἡ ἡδονή,

τῇ ἐνὶ μὲν φιλοτίᾳ, ἐνὶ δ' ἡμέρῳ, ἐν δ' ὀαριστύς,
πάρφασις, ἢ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονούντων ¹,

λέγῃ δὲ εἰς μέσον καταστᾶσα, ὅτι αὐτὴν δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀναγορεύειν

55

(ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος, ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος
ἐξέπτατ' οἴκων, μικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον ²,

διώκεται τε πρὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ δι' ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιγίνο-
μένην ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ ἡδονήν), πάντως οἱ Πανέλληνες, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ
πρᾶγμα ἢ οὕτως ὑπολαβόντες, κεκράζονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονὴν στεφανοῦν. ἀλλὰ
καὶ ταύτης τὸ βραβεῖον φέρεσθαι μελλούσης, ἐπὶ εἰσβάλλῃ ἡ ὑγεία μετὰ τῶν 56
συνέδρων αὐτῇ θεῶν, καὶ διδάσκῃ, ὥς οὔτε ἡδονῆς οὔτε πλούτου ὄφελός τι
ἐστὶν ἀπούσης αὐτῆς

(τί γὰρ με πλοῦτος, < . . . > ὠφελεῖ νόσον;
μικρ' ἂν θέλοιμι καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν ἔχων
ἄλυπον οἰκεῖν βίοτον ἢ πλουτῶν νοσεῖν) ³,

ἀκούσαντες πάλιν οἱ Πανέλληνες καὶ μεταμαθόντες, ὥς οὐκ ἔνεστι κλινοπετῇ 57
καὶ νοσοῦσαν ὑποστῆναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, φήσουσι νικᾶν τὴν ὑγείαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ
τῆς ὑγείας ἤδη νικώσης, ἐπὶ εἰσέλθῃ ἡ ἀνδρεία πολὺ στίφος ἀριστέων καὶ
ἡρώων ἔχουσα περὶ ἑαυτήν, καταστᾶσα τε λέγῃ· »ἐμοῦ μὴ παρούσης, ἄνδρες 58

¹ *Ilias* XIV 216.

² Eur., *Phoen.* 558 and *Electra* 944.

³ Eur., fr. 714 Nauck.

Ἑλληνες, ἀλλοτρία γίνεται ἢ κτῆσις τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν, εὐξαίνετό τ' ἂν οἱ πολέμιοι περιουσιάζειν ὑμᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὥς μελλήσοντες ὑμῶν κρατεῖν, καὶ τούτων οὖν ἀκούσαντες οἱ Ἑλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεῖα τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τῇ ὑγείᾳ, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῇ ἡδονῇ, τελευταῖον δὲ τάξουσι τὸν πλοῦτον.

802—a. Cr. was the author of a *Περὶ πένθους*, which became the pattern of many later *Consolationes*. Plutarchus quotes it in the following passage of his *Consol. ad Apollonium*, 3, p. 102:

The
πς πένθους

Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς τὴν ἄγριον ὕμνοῦσι καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν· ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν αὕτη τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὐνοίαν, ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασώζειν ἀναγκαῖον. Τὸ δὲ πέρα τοῦ μέτρου παρεκφέρεσθαι καὶ συναύξειν τὰ πένθη παρὰ φύσιν εἶναί φημι, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίνεσθαι δόξης. Διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἑατέον ὥς βλαβερόν καὶ φαῦλον, καὶ σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον· τὴν δὲ μετριοπάθειαν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμαστέον. Μὴ γὰρ νοσοῖμεν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀκαδημαῖκός Κράντωρ, νοσήσασι δὲ παρείη τις αἰσθησις, εἴτ' οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων, εἴτ' ἀποσπῶτο· τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον τοῦτο οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίνεται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τεθηριῶσθαι γὰρ εἰκὸς, ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοιοῦτον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχὴν.

How far the quotation goes, may be seen in Cicero, *Tusc.* III 6, 12:

Nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, 'minime', inquit, 'adsentior iis, qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; si' inquit 'fuero, sensus adsit, sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. nam istuc nihil dolere non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore'.

b. Again, Cicero quotes the same work of Crantor in the following passage.

Acad. pr. (= Lucullus) 44, 135-136:

Sed quaero quando ista fuerint Academia vetere decreta, ut animam sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent: mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotiōne naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu; est enim non magnus verum aureolus et ut Tuberōni Panaetius praecipit ad verbum ediscendus libellus, atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiōnes istas animis nostris *datas*, metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinēque clementiae; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant — recte secusne alias viderimus; atrocitas quidem ista tua quomodo in veterem Academiam inruperit nescio.

Cr.'s name as a moralist **803**—Horatius, *Epist.* I 2, 4 mentions him as a moralist on a level with Chrysippus:

qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.

His view of life **804**—Crantor's view of life, as it appears in Plutarch's *Consol. ad Apoll.* 27:

Πολλοῖς γὰρ καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὥς φησι Κράντωρ, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι κέκλαυσται τάνθρώπινα, τιμωρίαν ἡγουμένοις εἶναι τὸν βίον, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον συμφορὰν τὴν μεγίστην.

Plut. quotes it together with the young Aristotle's tale of Midas and Silenus in the dialogue *Eudemus* (see our nr. **417a**).

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419 b, l. 8: τί οὖν ὑμῖν ὄφελος — read: ἡμῖν

424 b, fourth al.: See also *Metaph.* Λ 8 — read: Λ 8.

Sub **429 b**: the final passage of *Metaph.* Λ 8 — read: Λ 10.

